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EVOLUTION OF THE WAR

ORIGINS OF THE INSURGENCY

1954 - 1960

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
ORIGINS OF THE INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1954-1960

SUMMARY

From the perspective of the United States, the origins of the insurgency in South Vietnam raise four principal questions:

1. Was the breakdown of the peace of 1954 the fault of the U.S., or of the ambiguities and loopholes of the Geneva Accords?

2. Was the insurgency in essence an indigenous rebellion against Ngo Dinh Diem's oppressive government, transformed by the intervention of first the U.S., and then the DRV?

3. Or was it, rather, instigated, controlled, and supported from its inception by Hanoi?

4. When did the U.S. become aware of the Viet Cong threat to South Vietnam's internal security, and did it attempt to counter it with its aid?

The analysis which follows rests on study of three corpora of evidence:

(a) Intelligence reports and analyses, including the most carefully guarded finished intelligence, and pertinent National Intelligence Estimates.

(b) Unfinished governmental intelligence, field reports, and memoranda such as interrogations of prisoners and translated captured documents, as well as contract studies based on similar evidence.

(c) Open sources, including the works of former U.S. officials, Vietnam correspondents, and the like.

The U.S. has attempted to amplify (c) by publishing White Papers in 1961 and 1965, in which substantial citations were made from (b) and interpretations offered consistent with (a). This study has benefited from further effort during 1967 and early 1968 to identify in (b) evidence which could be publicly released. But, based on the survey of (a), (b), and (c) reported on below, the U.S. can now present no conclusive answers to the questions advanced above.
Tentative answers are possible, and form a continuum: By 1956, peace in Vietnam was plainly less dependent upon the Geneva Settlement than upon power relationships in Southeast Asia -- principally upon the role the U.S. elected to play in unfolding events. In 1957 and 1958, a structured rebellion against the government of Ngo Dinh Diem began. While the North Vietnamese played an ill-defined part, most of those who took up arms were South Vietnamese, and the causes for which they fought were by no means contrived in North Vietnam. In 1959 and 1960, Hanoi's involvement in the developing strife became evident. Not until 1960, however, did the U.S. perceive that Diem was in serious danger of being overthrown and devise a Counterinsurgency Plan.

It can be established that there was endemic insurgency in South Vietnam throughout the period 1954-1960. It can also be established -- but less surely -- that the Diem regime alienated itself from one after another of those elements within Vietnam which might have offered it political support, and was grievously at fault in its rural programs. That these conditions engendered animosity toward the GVN seems almost certain, and they could have underwritten a major resistance movement even without North Vietnamese help.

It is equally clear that North Vietnamese communists operated some form of subordinate apparatus in the South in the years 1954-1960. Nonetheless, the Viet Minh "stay-behinds" were not directed originally to structure an insurgency, and there is no coherent picture of the extent or effectiveness of communist activities in the period 1956-1959. From all indications, this was a period of reorganization and recruiting by the communist party. No direct links have been established between Hanoi and perpetrators of rural violence. Statements have been found in captured party histories that the communists plotted and controlled the entire insurgency, but these are difficult to take at face value. Bernard Fall ingeniously correlated DRV complaints to the ICC of incidents in South Vietnam in 1957 with GVN reports of the same incidents, and found Hanoi suspiciously well informed. He also perceived a pattern in the terrorism of 1957-1959, deducing that a broad, centrally directed strategy was being implemented. However, there is little other corroborative evidence that Hanoi instigated the incidents, much less orchestrated them.

Three interpretations of the available evidence are possible:

Option A -- That the DRV intervened in the South in reaction to U.S. escalation, particularly that of President Kennedy in early 1961. Those who advance this argument rest their case principally on open sources to establish the reprehensible character of the Diem regime, on examples of forceful resistance to Diem independent of Hanoi, and upon the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) alleged to have come into being in South Vietnam in early 1960. These also rely heavily upon DRV official statements of 1960-1961 indicating that the DRV only then proposed to support the NLF.
Option B -- The DRV manipulated the entire war. This is the official U.S. position, and can be supported. Nonetheless, the case is not wholly compelling, especially for the years 1955-1959.

Option C -- The DRV seized an opportunity to enter an ongoing internal war in 1959 prior to, and independent of, U.S. escalation. This interpretation is more tenable than the previous; still, much of the evidence is circumstantial.

The judgment offered here is that the truth lies somewhere between Option B and C. That is, there was some form of DRV apparatus functioning in the South throughout the years, but it can only be inferred that this apparatus originated and controlled the insurgency which by 1959 posed a serious challenge to the Diem government. Moreover, up until 1958, neither the DRV domestic situation nor its international support was conducive to foreign adventure; by 1959, its prospects were bright in both respects, and it is possible to demonstrate its moving forcefully abroad thereafter. Given the paucity of evidence now, well after the events, U.S. intelligence served policy makers of the day surprisingly well in warning of the developments described below:

Failure of the Geneva Settlement (Tab 1)

The Geneva Settlement of 1954 was inherently flawed as a durable peace for Indochina, since it depended upon France, and since both the U.S. and the Republic of South Vietnam excepted themselves. The common ground from which the nations negotiated at the Geneva Conference was a mutual desire to halt the hostilities between France and the Viet Minh, and to prevent any widening of the war. To achieve concord, they had to override objections of the Saigon government, countenance the disassociation of the U.S. from the Settlement, and accept France as one executor. Even so, Geneva might have wrought an enduring peace for Vietnam if France had remained as a major power in Indochina, if Ngo Dinh Diem had cooperated with the terms of the Settlement, if the U.S. had abstained from further influencing the outcome. No one of these conditions was likely, given France's travail in Algeria, Diem's implacable anti-communism, and the U.S.' determination to block further expansion of the DRV in Southeast Asia.

Therefore, the tragedy staged: partition of Vietnam, the sole negotiable basis found at Geneva for military disengagement, became the prime casus belli. To assuage those parties to Geneva who were reluctant to condone the handing over of territory and people to a communist government, and to reassure the Viet Minh that their southern followers could be preserved en bloc, the Accords provided for regrouping forces to North and South Vietnam and for Vietnamese freely electing residence in either the North or the South; the transmigrations severely disrupted the polity of Vietnam, heated the controversy over reunification, and made it possible for North Vietnam to contemplate subversive aggression. The arms control provisions of the Settlement of 1954 mollified parties.
of both sides who were fearful that the armistice would be used to conceal construction of military bases or other preparations for aggression; but these provisions depended on a credible international supervision which never materialized. Partition and regroupment pitted North against South Vietnam, and arms control failed patently and soon. Geneva traded on long-run risks to achieve short-run disengagement. France withdrew from Vietnam, leaving the Accords in the hands of Saigon. Lasting peace came between France and the Viet Minh, but the deeper struggle for an independent, united Vietnam remained, its international implications more grave, its dangers heightened.

The Southeast Asia policy of the U.S. in the aftermath of the Geneva Conference was conservative, focused on organizing collective defense against further inroads of communism, not on altering status quo. Status quo was the two Vietnams set up at Geneva, facing each other across a demilitarized zone. Hanoi, more than other powers, had gambled: hedged by the remaining Viet Minh, it waited for either Geneva's general elections or the voracious political forces in the South to topple the Saigon government. In South Vietnam, Diem had begun his attempt to gain control over his people, constantly decried DRV subversion and handling of would-be migrants as violations of the Geneva Accords, and pursued an international and domestic policy of anti-communism. Both Vietnams took the view that partition was, as the Conference Final Declaration stated, only temporary. But statements could not gainsay the practical impact of the Accords. The separation of Vietnam at the 17th parallel facilitated military disengagement, but by establishing the principle that two regimes were separately responsible for "civil administration" each in distinct zones; by providing for the regroupment of military forces to the two zones, and for the movement of civilians to the zone of their choice; and by postponing national elections for at least two years, permitting the regimes in Hanoi and Saigon to consolidate power, the Geneva conferers in fact fostered two governments under inimical political philosophies, foreign policies, and socio-economic systems.

The Geneva powers were imprecise -- probably deliberately indefinite -- concerning who was to carry out the election provisions. France, which was charged with civil administration in the "regrouping zone" of South Vietnam, had granted the State of Vietnam its independence in June 1954, six weeks before the Accords were drawn up. Throughout 1954 and the first half of 1955, France further divested itself of authority in South Vietnam: police, local government, and then the Army of Vietnam were freed of French control, and turned over to the Saigon government. Concurrently, the U.S. began to channel aid directly to South Vietnam, rather than through France. The convolution of French policy then thrust upon the U.S. a choice between supporting Diem or the French presence in Indochina. The U.S. opted for Diem. By the time the deadlines for election consultations fell due in July 1955, South Vietnam was sovereign de facto as well as de jure, waxing strong with U.S. aid, and France was no longer in a position to exert strong influence on Diem's policy or actions.
As early as January 1955, President Diem was stating publicly that he was unlikely to proceed with the Geneva elections:

"Southern Viet-Nam, since it protested the Geneva Agreement when it was made, does not consider itself a party to that Agreement, nor bound by it.

"In any event, the clauses providing for the 1956 elections are extremely vague. But at one point they are clear -- in stipulating that the elections are to be free. Everything will now depend on how free elections are defined. The President said he would wait to see whether the conditions of freedom would exist in North Viet-Nam at the time scheduled for the elections. He asked what would be the good of an impartial counting of votes if the voting has been preceded in North Viet-Nam by a campaign of ruthless propaganda and terrorism on the part of a police state." *

As the deadline for consultations approached (20 July 1955), Diem was increasingly explicit that he did not consider free elections possible in North Vietnam, and had no intention of consulting with the DRV concerning them. The U.S. did not -- as is often alleged -- connive with Diem to ignore the elections. U.S. State Department records indicate that Diem's refusal to be bound by the Geneva Accords and his opposition to pre-election consultations were at his own initiative. However, the U.S., which had expected elections to be held, and up until May 1955 had fully supported them, shifted its position in the face of Diem's opposition, and of the evidence then accumulated about the oppressive nature of the regime in North Vietnam. "In essence," a State Department historical study found, "our position would be that the whole subject of consultations and elections in Viet-Nam should be left up to the Vietnamese themselves and not dictated by external arrangements which one of the parties never accepted and still rejects." ** Secretary of State Dulles explained publicly that:

"Neither the United States Government nor the Government of Viet-Nam is, of course, a party to the Geneva armistice agreements. We did not sign them, and the Government of Viet-Nam did not sign them and, indeed, protested against them. On the other hand, the United States believes, broadly speaking, in the unification of countries which have a historic unity, where the people are akin. We also believe that, if there are conditions of really free elections, there is no serious risk that the Communists would win. . . ." ***

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* Interview with Max Lerner, transcript in OSD files, dated 24 Jan 55.
*** Press Conference, 28 June 55.
Thus, backed by the U.S., Diem obdurately refused to open talks with the Hanoi government. He continued to maintain that the Government of South Vietnam had not signed the Geneva Agreements and thus was not bound by them.

"Our policy is a policy for peace. But nothing will lead us astray of our goal, the unity of our country, a unity in freedom and not in slavery. Serving the cause of our nation, more than ever we will struggle for the reunification of our homeland.

"We do not reject the principle of free elections as peaceful and democratic means to achieve that unity. However, if elections constitute one of the bases of true democracy, they will be meaningful only on the condition that they be absolutely free.

"Now, faced with a regime of oppression as practiced by the Viet Minh, we remain skeptical concerning the possibility of fulfilling the conditions of free elections in the North." *

On 1 June 1956, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter Robertson, stated:

"President Diem and the Government of Free Viet-Nam reaffirmed on April 6 of this year and on other occasions their desire to seek the reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means. In this goal, we support them fully. We hope and pray that the partition of Viet-Nam, imposed against the will of the Vietnamese people, will speedily come to an end. For our part we believe in free elections, and we support President Diem fully in his position that if elections are to be held, there first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions exist there can be no free choice." **

President Eisenhower is widely quoted to the effect that in 1954 as many as 80% of the Vietnamese people would have voted for Ho Chi Minh, as the popular hero of their liberation, in an election against Bao Dai. In October 1955, Diem ran against Bao Dai in a referendum and won -- by a dubiously overwhelming vote, but he plainly won nevertheless. It is almost certain that by 1956 the proportion which might have voted for Ho -- in a free election against Diem -- would have been much smaller than 80%. Diem's success in the South had been far greater than anyone could have foreseen, while the North Vietnamese regime had been suffering from food scarcity, and low public morale

stemming from inept imitation of Chinese Communism -- including a harsh agrarian program that reportedly led to the killing of over 50,000 small-scale "landlords." The North Vietnamese themselves furnished damning descriptions of conditions within the DRV in 1955 and 1956.

Vo Nguyen Giap, in a public statement to his communist party colleagues, admitted in autumn, 1956, that:

"We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror, which became far too widespread. . . . Whilst carrying out our land reform program we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas. . . . In regions inhabited by minority tribes we have attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring, instead of respecting, local customs and manners. . . . When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications alone. Instead of recognizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures such as disciplinary punishments, expulsion from the party, executions, dissolution of party branches and cells. Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization." *

That circumstances in North Vietnam were serious enough to warrant Giap's confiteor was proved by insurrection among Catholic peasants in November 1956, within two weeks of his speech, in which thousands more lives were lost. But the uprisings, though then and since used to validate the U.S.-backed GVN stand, were not foreseen in 1955 or 1956; the basis for the policy of both nations in rejecting the Geneva elections was, rather, convictions that Hanoi would not permit "free general elections by secret ballot," and that the ICC would be impotent in supervising the elections in any case.

The deadlines for the consultations in July 1955, and the date set for elections in July 1956, passed without international action. The DRV repeatedly tried to engage the Geneva machinery, forwarding messages to the Government of South Vietnam in July 1955, May and June 1956, March 1958, July 1959, and July 1960, proposing consultations to negotiate "free general elections by secret ballot," and to liberalize North-South relations in general. Each time the GVN replied with disdain, or with silence. The 17th parallel, with its demilitarized zone on either side, became de facto an international boundary, and -- since Ngo Dinh Diem's rigid refusal to traffic with the North excluded all economic exchanges and even an interstate postal agreement -- one of the most restricted boundaries in the world. The DRV appealed to the UK and the USSR as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to no avail. In January 1956, on DRV urging, Communist China requested another

* General Vo Nguyen Giap, speaking to the 10th Congress of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee, October 1956.
Geneva Conference to deal with the situation. But the Geneva Co-Chairmen, the USSR and the UK, responded only by extending the functions of the International Control Commission beyond its 1956 expiration date. By early 1957, partitioned Vietnam was a generally accepted modus vivendi throughout the international community. For instance, in January 1957, the Soviet Union proposed the admission of both the GVN and the DRV to the United Nations, the USSR delegate to the Security Council declaring that "in Vietnam two separate States existed, which differed from one another in political and economic structure..." Thus, reunification through elections became as remote a prospect in Vietnam as in Korea or Germany. If the political mechanism for reunifying Vietnam in 1956 proved impractical, the blame lies at least in part with the Geneva conferees themselves, who postulated an ideal political settlement incompatible with the physical and psychological dismemberment of Vietnam they themselves undertook in July 1954.

But partition was not, as the examples of Korea and Germany demonstrate, necessarily tantamount to renewed hostilities. The difference was that in Korea and Germany international forces guarded the boundaries. In Vietnam, the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps prior to the date set for elections in 1956 left South Vietnam defenseless except for such forces as it could train and equip with U.S. assistance. The vague extending of the SEATO aegis over Vietnam did not exert the same stabilizing influence as did NATO's Central Army Group in Germany, or the United Nations Command in Korea. Moreover, neither East Germany nor North Korea enjoyed the advantage of a politico-military substructure within the object of its irredentism, as the Viet Minh residue provided North Vietnam. The absence of deterrent force in South Vietnam invited forceful reunification; the southern Viet Minh regroupees in the North and their comrades in the South made it possible.

Pursuant to the "regroupment" provisions of the Geneva Accords, some 190,000 troops of the French Expeditionary Corps, and 900,000 civilians moved from North Vietnam to South Vietnam; more than 100,000 Viet Minh soldiers and civilians moved from South to North. Both nations thereby acquired minorities with vital interests in the outcome of the Geneva Settlement. In both nations, the regroupees exerted an influence over subsequent events well out of proportion to their numbers.

In North Vietnam, the DRV treated the southern regroupees from the outset as strategic assets -- the young afforded special schooling, the able assigned to separate military units.

The southerners in the North, and their relatives in the South, formed, with the remnants of the Viet Minh's covert network in South Vietnam, a means through which the DRV might "struggle" toward reunification regardless of Diem's obduracy or U.S. aid for South Vietnam. These people kept open the DRV's option to launch aggression without transcending a
"civil war" of southerners against southerners -- no doubt an important consideration with the United States as a potential antagonist. The evidence indicates that, at least through 1956, Hanoi did not expect to have to resort to force; thereafter, the regroupees occupied increasing prominence in DRV plans.

For Diem's government, refugees from the North were important for three reasons: firstly, they provided the world the earliest convincing evidence of the undemocratic and oppressive nature of North Vietnam's regime. Though no doubt many migrants fled North Vietnam for vague or spurious reasons, it was plain that Ho's Viet Minh were widely and genuinely feared, and many refugees took flight in understandable terror. There were indications that the DRV forcefully obstructed the migration of other thousands who might also have left the North. In 1955 and 1956, the refugees were the most convincing support for Diem's argument that free elections were impossible in the DRV.

Secondly, the refugees engaged the sympathies of the American people as few developments in Vietnam have before or since, and solidly underwrote the U.S. decision for unstinting support of Diem. The poignancy of hundreds of thousands of people fleeing their homes and fortunes to escape communist tyranny, well journalized, evoked an outpouring of U.S. aid, governmental and private. The U.S. Navy was committed to succor the migrants, lifting over 300,000 persons in "Operation EXODUS" (in which Dr. Tom Dooley -- then a naval officer -- won fame). U.S. government-to-government aid, amounting to $100 per refugee, more than South Vietnam's annual income per capita, enabled Diem's government to provide homes and food for hundreds of thousands of the destitute, and American charities provided millions of dollars more for their relief. U.S. officials defending American aid programs could point with pride to the refugee episode to demonstrate the special eligibility of the Vietnamese for U.S. help, including an early, convincing demonstration that Diem's government could mount an effective program with U.S. aid.

Thirdly, the predominantly Catholic Tonkinese refugees provided Diem with a claque: a politically malleable, culturally distinct group, wholly distrustful of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV, dependent for subsistence on Diem's government, and attracted to Diem as a co-religionist. Under Diem's mandarinal regime, they were less important as dependable votes than as a source of reliable political and military cadres. Most were kept unassimilated in their own communities, and became prime subjects for Diem's experiments with strategic population relocation. One heritage of Geneva is the present dominance of South Vietnam's government and army by northerners. The refugees catalyzed Diem's domestic political rigidity, his high-handedness with the U.S., and his unyielding rejection of the DRV and the Geneva Accords.

The Geneva Settlement was further penalized by the early failure of the "International Supervisory Commission" established by the Armistice
Agreement (Article 3\textsuperscript{4}) and cited in the Conference Declaration (Article 7). While a Joint Commission of French and Viet Minh military officers was set up to deal with the cease-fire and force regroupment, the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC) furnished by Poland, India, and Canada, was to oversee the Accords in general. Its inability to cope with violations of the Armistice in the handling of would-be migrants, vociferously proclaimed in both Saigon and Hanoi, impugned its competence to overwatch the general free elections, for which it was also to be responsible.

Equally serious for the Settlement, the ICC was expected to control arms and guarantee against aggression. The armistice agreement signed by the French and the Viet Minh, and affirmed in the several declarations of the Geneva Conference, included four main provisions for arms control: (1) arms, bases, and armed forces were to be fixed at the level existing in Vietnam in July 1954, with allowance for replacement of worn or damaged equipment, and rotation of personnel; (2) further foreign influences were to be excluded, either in the form of alliances, or foreign military bases established in either North or South Vietnam; (3) neither party was to allow its zone to be used for the renewal of aggression; and, (4) all the foregoing were to be overseen by the ICC.

As was the case of the regroupment provisions, these arrangements operated in practice to the detriment of the political solution embodied in the Accords, for the ICC, the election guardian, was soon demonstrated to be impotent.

The level of arms in Vietnam in 1954 was unascertainable. The Viet Minh had been surreptitiously armed, principally by the Chinese, from 1950 onward. That Viet Minh forces were acquiring large amount of relatively advanced weaponry was fully evident at Dien Bien Phu, but neither the DRV nor its allies owned to this military assistance. After the 1954 armistice, French, U.S., and British intelligence indicated that the flow of arms into North Vietnam from China continued on a scale far in excess of "replacement" needs. Similarly, while U.S. military material had been provided to the French more openly, no one -- neither the French, the Vietnamese, the U.S., nor certainly the ICC -- knew how much of this equipment was on hand and serviceable after 1954. The issue of arms levels was further complicated by regroupment, French withdrawals, and the revamping of the national army in South Vietnam. The ICC could determine to no one's satisfaction whether the DRV was within its rights to upgrade the armament of the irregulars it brought out of South Vietnam. Similarly, though the DRV charged repeatedly that the U.S. had no right to be in South Vietnam at all, the ICC had to face the fact that U.S. military advisors and trainers had been present in Vietnam since 1950 under a pentilateral agreement with Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and France. If France withdrew its cadres in Vietnamese units, could they not be "replaced" by Americans? And if the French were withdrawing both men and equipment in large quantities, did not Vietnam have a right under the Accords to replace them in kind with its own, American-equipped formations? To DRV charges and GVN countercharges, the ICC
could reply with legalistic interpretations, but it found it virtually impossible to collect facts, or exercise more than vague influence over U.S., GVN, or DRV policy. The only major example of U.S. ignoring the ICC was the instance of the U.S. Training and Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), 350 men ostensibly deployed to Vietnam in 1956 to aid the Vietnamese in recovering equipment left by the French, but also directed to act as an extension of the existing MAAG by training Vietnamese in logistics. TERM was introduced without ICC sanction, although subsequently the ICC accepted its presence.

The question of military bases was similarly occluded. The DRV protested repeatedly that the U.S. was transforming South Vietnam into a military base for the prosecution of aggression in Southeast Asia. In fact, as ICC investigation subsequently established, there was no wholly U.S. base anywhere in South Vietnam. It was evident, however, that the South Vietnamese government had made available to the U.S. some portions of existing air and naval facilities -- e.g., at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Nha Be -- for the use of MAAG and TERM. ICC access to these facilities was restricted, and the ICC was never able to determine what the U.S. was shipping through them, either personnel or materiel. By the same token, ICC access to DRV airports, rail terminals, and seaports was severely limited, and its ability to confirm or deny allegations concerning the rearming of the People's Army of Vietnam correspondingly circumscribed. International apprehensions over arms levels and potential bases for aggression were heightened by statements anticipating South Vietnam's active participation in SEATO, or pronouncements of DRV solidarity with China and Russia.

Not until 1959 and 1961 did the ICC publish reports attempting to answer directly DRV charges that the U.S. and South Vietnam were flagrantly violating the arms control provisions of the Geneva Accords. Similarly, though in its Tenth and Eleventh Interim Reports (1960 and 1961) the ICC noted "the concern which the Republic of Vietnam has been expressing over the problem of subversion in South Vietnam," it did not mention that those expressions of concern had been continuous since 1954, or attempt to publish a factual study of that problem until June 1962. In both cases, the ICC was overtaken by events: by late 1960, international tensions were beyond any ability of the ICC to provide reassurances, and the U.S. was faced with the decision whether to commit major resources to the conflict in South Vietnam.

The Geneva Settlement thus failed to provide lasting peace because it was, as U.S. National Security Council papers of 1956 and 1958 aptly termed it, "only a truce." It failed to settle the role of the U.S. or of the Saigon government, or, indeed, of France in Vietnam. It failed because it created two antagonist Vietnamese nations. It failed because the Geneva powers were unwilling or unable to concert follow-up action in Vietnam to supervise effectively observance of the Accords.
or to dampen the mounting tension. Mutual distrust led to incremental violations by both sides, but on balance, though neither the United States nor South Vietnam was fully cooperative, and though both acted as they felt necessary to protect their interests, both considered themselves constrained by the Accords. There is no evidence that either deliberately undertook to breach the peace. In contrast, the DRV proceeded to mobilize its total societal resources scarcely without pause from the day the peace was signed, as though to substantiate the declaration of its Deputy Premier, Pham Van Dong, at the closing session of the Geneva Conference:

"We shall achieve unity. We shall achieve it just as we have won the war. No force in the world, internal or external, can make us deviate from our path . . ."

Diem's rejection of elections meant that reunification could be achieved in the foreseeable future only by resort to force. Diem's policy, and U.S. support of it, led inevitably to a test of strength with the DRV to determine whether the GVN's cohesiveness, with U.S. support, could offset North Vietnam's drive to satisfy its unrequited nationalism and expansionism.

Revolt Against My-Diem (Tab 2)

By the time President Kennedy came to office in 1961, it was plain that support for the Saigon government among South Vietnam's peasants -- 90% of the population -- was weak and waning. The Manifesto of the National Liberation Front, published in December 1960, trumpeted the existence of a revolutionary organization which could channel popular discontent into a political program. Increasingly Diem's government proved inept in dealing either through its public administration with the sources of popular discontent, or through its security apparatus with the Viet Cong. Diem's government and his party were by that time manifestly out of touch with the people, and into the gap between the government and the populace the Viet Cong had successfully driven. When and why this gap developed is crucial to an understanding of who the Viet Cong were, and to what extent they represented South as opposed to North Vietnamese interests.

The U.S. Government, in its White Papers on Vietnam of 1961 and 1965*, has blamed the insurgency on aggression by Hanoi, holding that the Viet Cong were always tools of the DRV. Critics of U.S. policy in Vietnam usually hold, to the contrary, that the war was started by South Vietnamese; their counterarguments rest on two propositions: (1) that the insurgency began as a rebellion against the oppressive and clumsy

government of Ngo Dinh Diem; and (2) that only after it became clear, in late 1960, that the U.S. would commit massive resources to succor Diem in his internal war, was the DRV impelled to unleash the South Vietnamese Viet Minh veterans evacuated to North Vietnam after Geneva. French analysts have long been advancing such interpretations; American protagonists for them often quote, for example, Philippe Devillers, who wrote in 1962 that:

"... In 1959, responsible elements of the Communist Resistance in Indo-China came to the conclusion that they had to act, whether Hanoi wanted them to or no. They could no longer continue to stand by while their supporters were arrested, thrown into prison and tortured, without attempting to do anything about it as an organization, without giving some lead to the people in the struggle in which it was to be involved. Hanoi preferred diplomatic notes, but it was to find that its hand had been forced." *

Devillers related how in March 1960 the "Nambo Veterans of the Resistance Association" issued a declaration appealing for "struggle" to "liberate themselves from submission to America, eliminate all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, expel American military advisors..." and to end "the colonial regime and the fascist dictatorship of the Ngo family." ** Shortly thereafter, according to Devillers, a People's Liberation Army appeared in Cochinina and:

"From this time forward it carried on incessant guerrilla operations against Diem's forces.

"It was thus by its home policy that the government of the South finally destroyed the confidence of the population, which it had won during the early years, and practically drove them into revolt and desperation. The non-Communist (and even the anti-Communist) opposition had long been aware of the turn events were taking. But at the beginning of 1960 very many elements, both civilian and military, in the Nationalist camp came to a clear realization that things were moving from bad to worse, and that if nothing were done to put an end to the absolute power of Diem, then Communism would end up by gaining power with the aid, or at least with the consent, of the population. If they did not want to allow the Communists to make capital out of the revolt, then they would have to oppose Diem actively. ..." ***

Based on a similar analysis, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., held that:

*** Devillers, loc. cit.
"Diem's authoritarianism, which increasingly involved manhunts, political reeducation camps, and the 'regroupment' of population, caused spreading discontent and then armed resistance on the countryside. It is not easy to disentangle the events of these murky years; but few scholars believe that the growing resistance was at the start organized or directed by Hanoi. Indeed, there is some indication that the Communists at first hung back . . . it was not until September, 1960 that the Communist Party of North Vietnam bestowed its formal blessing and called for the liberation of the south from American imperialism." *

Events in Vietnam in the years 1954 to 1960 were indeed murky. The Diem government controlled the press tightly, and discouraged realism in reports from its provincial bureaucracy. Even official U.S. estimates were handicapped by reliance upon GVN sources for inputs from the grass roots of Vietnamese society, the rural villages, since the U.S. advisory effort was then largely confined to top levels of the GVN and its armed forces. But enough evidence has now accumulated to establish that peasant resentment against Diem was extensive and well founded. Moreover, it is clear that dislike of the Diem government was coupled with resentment toward Americans. For many Vietnamese peasants, the War of Resistance against French-Bao Dai rule never ended; France was merely replaced by the U.S., and Bao Dai's mantle was transferred to Ngo Dinh Diem. The Viet Cong's opprobrious catchword "My-Diem" (American-Diem) thus recaptured the nationalist mystique of the First Indochina War, and combined the natural xenophobia of the rural Vietnamese with their mounting dislike of Diem. But Viet Cong slogans aside, in the eyes of many Vietnamese of no particular political persuasion, the United States was reprehensible as a modernizing force in a thoroughly traditional society, as the provider of arms and money for a detested government, and as an alien, disruptive influence upon hopes they held for the Geneva Settlement. As far as attitudes toward Diem were concerned, the prevalence of his picture throughout Vietnam virtually assured his being accepted as the sponsor of the frequently corrupt and cruel local officials of the GVN, and the perpetrator of unpopular GVN programs, especially the population relocation schemes, and the "Communist Denunciation Campaign." Altogether, Diem promised the farmers much, delivered little, and raised not only their expectations, but their fears.

It should be recognized, however, that whatever his people thought of him, Ngo Dinh Diem really did accomplish miracles, just as his American boosters said he did. He took power in 1954 amid political chaos, and within ten months surmounted attempted coups d'état from within his army and rebellions by disparate irregulars. He consolidated his regime while providing creditably for an influx of nearly one million

* The Bitter Heritage, pp. 34-35.
destitute refugees from North Vietnam; and he did all of this despite active French opposition and vacillating American support. Under his leadership South Vietnam became well established as a sovereign state, by 1955 recognized de jure by 36 other nations. Moreover, by mid-1955 Diem secured the strong backing of the U.S. He conducted a plebiscite in late 1955, in which an overwhelming vote was recorded for him in preference to Bao Dai; during 1956, he installed a government -- representative in form, at least --, drafted a new constitution, and extended GVN control to regions that had been under sect or Viet Minh rule for a decade; and he pledged to initiate extensive reforms in land holding, public health, and education. With American help, he established a truly national, modern army, and formed rural security forces to police the countryside. In accomplishing all the foregoing, he confounded those Vietnamese of North and South, and those French, who had looked for his imminent downfall.

While it is true that his reforms entailed oppressive measures -- e.g., his "political reeducation centers" were in fact little more than concentration camps for potential foes of the government -- his regime compared favorably with other Asian governments of the same period in its respect for the person and property of citizens. There is much that can be offered in mitigation of Diem's authoritarianism. He began as the most singularly disadvantaged head of state of his era. His political legacy was endemic violence and virulent anti-colonialism. He took office at a time when the government of Vietnam controlled only a few blocks of downtown Saigon; the rest of the capital was the feudal fief of the Binh Xuyen gangster fraternity. Beyond the environs of Saigon, South Vietnam lay divided among the Viet Minh enclaves and the theocratic dominions of the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao sects. All these powers would have opposed any Saigon government, whatever its composition; in fact, their existence accounts for much of the confidence the DRV then exhibited toward the outcome of the Geneva Settlement. For Diem to have erected any central government in South Vietnam without reckoning resolutely with their several armed forces and clandestine organizations would have been impossible: they were the very stuff of South Vietnam's politics.

Diem's initial political tests reinforced his propensity to inflexibility. The lessons of his first 10 months of rule must have underscored to Diem the value of swift, tough action against dissent, and of demanding absolute personal loyalty of top officials. Also, by May 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem had demonstrated to his satisfaction that the U.S. was sufficiently committed to South Vietnam that he could afford on occasion to resist American pressure, and even to ignore American advice. Diem knew, as surely as did the United States, that he himself represented the only alternative to a communist South Vietnam.

Diem was handicapped in all his attempts to build a nation by his political concepts. He saw himself as a moral reformer; he talked affairs
of state with the extravagant expectations of a Rousseau, and he acted with the zeal of a Spanish Inquisitor. Despite extensive travel and education in the West, and despite his revolutionary mien, he remained what he had been raised: a mandarin of Imperial Hue, steeped in filial piety, devoted to Vietnam's past, modern only to the extent of an intense, conservative Catholicism. The political apparatus he created to extend his power and implement his programs reflected his background, personality, and experience: a rigidly organized, over-centralized familial oligarchy. Though his brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, created extensive personal political organizations of considerable power — Nhu's semi-covert Can Lao party borrowed heavily from communist doctrine and technique -- and though a third brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, was the ranking Catholic bishop, in no sense did they or Diem ever acquire a broad popular base for his government. Diem's personality and his political methods practically assured that he would remain distant, virtually isolated from the peasantry. They also seem to have predetermined that Diem's political history over the long-run would be a chronicle of disaffection: Diem alienated one after another of the key groups within South Vietnam's society until, by late 1960, his regime rested on the narrow and disintegrating base of its own bureaucracy and the northern refugees.

Such need not have been the case. At least through 1957, Diem and his government enjoyed marked success with fairly sophisticated pacification programs in the countryside. In fact, Diem at first was warmly welcomed in some former Viet Minh domains, and it is probable that a more sensitive and adroit leader could have captured and held a significant rural following. Even the failure of the Geneva Accords to eventuate in general elections in 1956 at first had little impact upon GVN pacification. The strident declarations of the DRV notwithstanding, reunification of partitioned Vietnam was not at first a vital political issue for South Vietnam's peasants. By and large, as late as 1961 as Devillers pointed out:

"For the people of the South reunification is not an essential problem. Peace, security, freedom, their standard of living, the agrarian question -- these are far more important questions to them. The stronghold of the sects over certain regions remains one of the factors of the situation, as is also, in a general fashion, the distrustful attitude of the Southerner towards the Northerner, who is suspected of a tendency to want to take charge of affairs." *

The initial GVN pacification effort combined promises of governmental level reforms with "civic action" in the hamlets and villages. The latter was carried out by "cadre" clad in black pajamas, implementing the Maoist "three-withs" doctrine (eat with, sleep with, work with the people) to initiate rudimentary improvements in public health, education,

* Devillers, p. 19.
and local government, and to propagandize the promises of the central government. Unfortunately for Diem, his civic action teams had to be drawn from the northern refugees, and encountered Cochinchinese-Tonkinese tensions. More importantly, however, they incurred the enmity of the several Saigon ministries upon whose field responsibilities they impinged. Moreover, they became preoccupied with Diem's anti-communist campaign to the detriment of their social service. By the end of 1956, the civic action component of the GVN pacification program had been cut back severely.

But the salesmen were less at fault than their product. Diem's reform package compared unfavorably even in theory with what the Viet Minh had done by way of rural reform. Diem undertook to: (1) resettle refugees and other land destitute Vietnamese on uncultivated land beginning in 1955; (2) expropriate all rice land holdings over 247 acres and redistribute these to tenant farmers beginning in 1956; and (3) regulate landlord-tenant relations beginning in 1957 to fix rents within the range 15-25% of crop yield, and to guarantee tenant land tenure for 3-5 years. Despite invidious comparison with Viet Minh rent-free land, had these programs been honestly and efficiently implemented, they might have satisfied the land-hunger of the peasants. But they suffered, as one American expert put it from "lack of serious, interested administrators and top side command." Government officials, beginning with the Minister for Agrarian Reform, had divided loyalties, being themselves land holders. Moreover, the programs often operated to replace paternalistic landlords with competitive bidding, and thus increased, rather than decreased, tenant insecurity. And even if all Diem's goals had been honestly fulfilled -- which they were not -- only 20% of the rice land would have passed from large to small farmers. As it turned out, only 10% of all tenant farmers benefited in any sense. By 1959, the land reform program was virtually inoperative. As of 1960, 45% of the land remained concentrated in the hands of 2% of landowners, and 15% of the landlords owned 75% of all the land. Those relatively few farmers who did benefit from the program were more often than not northerners, refugees, Catholics, or Annamese -- so that land reform added to the GVN's aura of favoritism which deepened peasant alienation in Cochinchina. Farmer-GVN tensions were further aggravated by rumors of corruption, and the widespread allegation that the Diem family itself had become enriched through the manipulation of land transfers.

Diem's whole rural policy furnishes one example after another of political maladroitness. In June 1956, Diem abolished elections for village councils, apparently out of concern that large numbers of Viet Minh might win office. By replacing the village notables with GVN appointed officials, Diem swept away the traditional administrative autonomy of the village officials, and took upon himself and his government the onus for whatever corruption and injustice subsequently developed at that level. Again, the GVN appointees to village office
were outsiders -- northerners, Catholics, or other "dependable" persons -- and their alien presence in the midst of the close-knit rural communities encouraged revival of the conspiratorial, underground politics to which the villages had become accustomed during the resistance against the French.

But conspiracy was almost a natural defense after Diem launched his Denunciation of Communists Campaign, which included a scheme for classifying the populace into lettered political groups according to their connections with the Viet Minh. This campaign, which featured public confessions reminiscent of the "people's courts" of China and North Vietnam, invited neighbors to inform on each other, and raised further the premium on clandestine political activity. In 1956, the GVN disclosed that some 15-20,000 communists had been detained in its "political reeducation centers," while Devillers put the figure at 50,000. By GVN figures in 1960, nearly 50,000 had been detained. A British expert on Vietnam, P. J. Honey, who was invited by Diem to investigate the reeducation centers in 1959, concluded that, after interviewing a number of rural Vietnamese, "the consensus of the opinion expressed by these peoples is that . . . the majority of the detainees are neither communists nor pro-communists." Between 1956 and 1960, the GVN claimed that over 100,000 former communist cadres rallied to the GVN, and thousands of other communist agents had surrendered or had been captured. The campaign also allegedly netted over 100,000 weapons and 3,000 arms caches. Whatever it contributed to GVN internal security, however, the Communist Denunciation Campaign thoroughly terrified the Vietnamese peasants, and detracted significantly from the regime's popularity.

Diem's nearly paranoid preoccupation with security influenced his population relocation schemes. Even the refugee relief programs had been executed with an eye to building a "living wall" between the lowland centers of population and the jungle and mountain redoubts of dissidents. Between April 1957 and late 1961, the GVN reported that over 200,000 persons -- refugees and landless families from coastal Annam -- were resettled in 147 centers carved from 220,000 acres of wilderness. These "strategic" settlements were expensive: although they affected only 2% of South Vietnam's people, they absorbed 20% of U.S. aid for agriculture. They also precipitated unexpected political reactions from the Montagnard peoples of the Highlands. In the long run, by introducing ethnic Vietnamese into traditionally Montagnard areas, and then by concentrating Montagnards into defensible communities, the GVN provided the tribes with a cause and focused their discontent against Diem. The GVN thus facilitated rather than hindered the subsequent subversion of the tribes by the Viet Cong. But of all Diem's relocation experiments, that which occasioned the most widespread and vehement anti-GVN sentiment was the "agrovillle" program begun in mid-1959. At first, the GVN tried to establish rural communities which segregated families with known Viet Cong or Viet Minh connections from other citizens, but the public outcry caused this approach to be dropped. A few months later, the GVN announced
its intent to build 80 "prosperity and density centers" along a "strategic route system." By the end of 1963, each of these 80 agrovilles was to hold some 400 families, and each would have a group of satellite agrovilles of 120 families each. In theory, the agroville master plan was attractive: there were provisions for community defense, schools, dispensary, market center, public garden, and even electricity. Despite these advantages, however, the whole program incurred the wrath of the peasants. They resented the corvee labor the GVN resorted to for agroville construction, and they abhorred abandoning their cherished ancestral homes, tombs, and developed gardens and fields for a strange and desolate community. Passive peasant resistance, and then insurgent attacks on the agrovilles, caused abandonment of the program in early 1961 when it was less than 25% complete.

Yet, for all Diem's preoccupation with rural security, he poorly provided for police and intelligence in the countryside. Most of the American aid the GVN received was used for security, and the bulk of it was lavished on the Army of Vietnam. Security in the villages was relegated to the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Guard (CG) -- poorly trained and equipped, miserably led. They could scarcely defend themselves, much less secure the farmers. Indeed, they proved to be an asset to insurgents in two ways: they served as a source of weapons; and their brutality, petty thievery, and disorderliness induced innumerable villagers to join in open revolt against the GVN. The Army of Vietnam, after 1956, was withdrawn from the rural regions to undergo reorganization and modernization under its American advisors. Its interaction with the rural populace through 1959 was relatively slight. The SDC and CG, placed at the disposal of the provincial administrators, were often no more venal nor offensive to the peasants than the local officials themselves, but the corrupt, arrogant and overbearing men the people knew as the GVN were among the greatest disadvantages Diem faced in his rural efforts.

Nor was Ngo Dinh Diem successful in exercising effective leadership over the Vietnamese urban population or its intellectuals. Just as Diem and his brothers made the mistake of considering all former Viet Minh communists, they erred in condemning all non-Diemist nationalists as tools of Bao Dai or the French. The Diem family acted to circumscribe all political activity and even criticism not sanctioned by the oligarchy. In late 1957, newspapers critical of the regime began to be harassed, and in March 1958, after a caustic editorial, the GVN closed down the largest newspaper in Saigon. Attempts to form opposition political parties for participation in the national assembly met vague threats and bureaucratic impediments. In 1958, opposition politicians risked arrest for essaying to form parties unauthorized by Nhu or Can, and by 1959 all opposition political activity had come to a halt. In the spring of 1960, however, a group of non-communist nationalist leaders came together -- with more courage than prudence -- to issue the Caravelle Manifesto, a recital of grievances against the Diem regime.
Eleven of the 18 signers had been cabinet members under Diem or Bao Dai; 4 had been in other high government positions, and others represented religious groups. Their manifesto lauded Diem for the progress that he had made in the aftermath of Geneva, but pointed out that his repressions in recent years had "provoked the discouragement and resentment of the people." They noted that "the size of the territory has shrunk, but the number of civil servants has increased and still the work doesn't get done"; they applauded the fact that "the French Expeditionary Corps has left the country and a Republican Army has been constituted, thanks to American aid," but deplored the fact that the Diem influence "divides the men of one and the same unit, sows distrust between friends of the same rank, and uses as a criterion for promotion fidelity to the party in blind submission to its leaders"; they described, despairingly, "a rich and fertile country enjoying food surpluses" where "at the present time many people are out of work, have no roof over their heads, and no money." They went on to "beseech the government to urgently modify its policies." While the Caravelle Manifesto thoroughly frightened Diem, coming, as it did, three days after Syngman Rhee was overthrown in Korea, it prompted him only to further measures to quell the loyal opposition.

By the fall of 1960, the intellectual elite of South Vietnam was politically mute; labor unions were impotent; loyal opposition in the form of organized parties did not exist. In brief, Diem's policies virtually assured that political challenges to him would have to be extra-legal. Ultimately, these emerged from the traditional sources of power in South Vietnam -- the armed forces, the religious sects, and the armed peasantry.

Through 1960, the only serious threats to Diem from inside the GVN were attempted military coups d'etat. In his first 10 months in office, Diem had identified loyalty in his top army commanders as a sine qua non for his survival. Thereafter he took a personal interest in the positioning and promoting of officers, and even in matters of military strategy and tactics. Many of Vietnam's soldiers found Diem's attentions a means to political power, wealth, and social prominence. Many others, however, resented those who rose by favoritism, and objected to Diem's interference in military matters. In November 1960, a serious coup attempt was supported by three elite paratroop battalions in Saigon, but otherwise failed to attract support. In the wake of the coup, mass arrests took place in which the Caravelle Group, among others, were jailed. In February 1962, two Vietnamese air force planes bombed the presidential palace in an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Diem and the Nhus. Again, there was little apparent willingness among military officers for concerted action against Diem. But the abortive attempts of 1960 and 1962 had the effect of dramatizing the choices open to those military officers who recognized the insolvency of Diem's political and military policies.

Diem's handling of his military impinged in two ways on his rural policy. Diem involved himself with the equipping of his military forces,
showing a distinct proclivity toward heavy military forces of the conventional type. He wanted the Civil Guard equipped very much like his regular army -- possibly with a view to assuring himself a check on army power. There were a few soldiers, like General Duong Van Minh, who sharply disagreed with the President on this point. Nonetheless, Diem persisted. His increasing concern for the loyalty of key officials, moreover, led him to draw upon the military officer corps for civil administrators. From 1956 on his police apparatus was under military officers, and year by year, more of the provincial governments were also placed under military men. By 1958, about 1/3 of the province chiefs were military officers; by 1960, that fraction had increased to nearly 2/3; by 1962, 7/8 of all provinces were headed by soldiers.

Diem's bête noire was communism, and he appealed to threats from communists to justify his concentration on internal security. In August 1956, GVN Ordinance 47 defined being a communist, or working for them, as a capital crime. In May 1959, by GVN Law 10/59, the enforcement of Ordinance 47 was charged to special military tribunals from whose decisions there was no appeal. But "communist" was a term not used by members of the Marxist-Leninist Party headed by Ho Chi Minh, or its southern arms. Beginning in 1956, the Saigon press began to refer to "Viet Cong," a fairly precise and not necessarily disparaging rendition of "Vietnamese Communist." There is little doubt that Diem and his government applied the term Viet Cong somewhat loosely within South Vietnam to mean all persons or groups who resorted to clandestine political activity or armed opposition against his government; and the GVN meant by the term North as well as South Vietnamese communists, who they presumed acted in concert. At the close of the Franco-Viet Minh War in 1954, some 60,000 men were serving in organized Viet Minh units in South Vietnam. For the regroupments to North Vietnam, these units were augmented with large numbers of young recruits; a reported 90,000 armed men were taken to North Vietnam in the regroupment, while the U.S. and the GVN estimated that from 5-10,000 trained men were left behind as "cadre." If French estimates are correct that in 1954 the Viet Minh controlled over 60-90% of rural South Vietnam outside the sect domains, these 5-10,000 stay-behinds must have represented only a fraction of the Viet Minh residue, to which GVN figures on recanting and detained communists in the years through 1960 attest.

From studies of defectors, prisoners of war, and captured documents, it is now possible to assess armed resistance against Diem much better than the facts available at the time permitted. Three distinct periods are discernible. From 1954 through 1957, there was a substantial amount of random dissidence in the countryside, which Diem succeeded in quelling. In early 1957, Vietnam seemed to be enjoying the first peace it had known in over a decade. Beginning, however, in mid-1957 and intensifying through mid-1959, incidents of violence attributed to Viet Cong began to occur in the countryside. While much of this violence appeared to have a political motive, and while there is some evidence to indicate
that it was part of a concerted strategy of guerrilla base development. In accordance with sound Mao-Giap doctrine, the GVN did not construe it as a campaign, considering the disorders too diffuse to warrant committing major GVN resources. In early 1959, however, Diem perceived that he was under serious attack and reacted strongly. Population relocation was revivified. The Army of Vietnam was committed against the dissidents, and the Communist Denunciation Campaign was reinvigorated. By autumn 1959, however, the VC were in a position to field units of battalion size against regular army formations. By 1960, VC could operate in sufficient strength to seize provincial capitals for periods ranging up to 24 hours, overrun ARVN posts, and cut off entire districts from communication with the GVN-controlled towns. Diem's countermeasures increasingly met with peasant obstructionism and outright hostility. A U.S. Embassy estimate of the situation in January 1960 noted that:

"While the GVN has made an effort to meet the economic and social needs of the rural populations... these projects appear to have enjoyed only a measure of success in creating support for the government and, in fact, in many instances have resulted in resentment... the situation may be summed up in the fact that the government has tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or resentment."

In December 1960, the National Liberation Front of SVN (NLF) was formally organized. From its inception it was designed to encompass all anti-GVN activists, including communists, and it formulated and articulated objectives for all those opposed to "My-Diem." The NLF placed heavy emphasis on the withdrawal of American advisors and influence, on land reform and liberalization of the GVN, on coalition government and the neutralization of Vietnam; but through 1963, the NLF soft-pedalled references to reunification of Vietnam. The NLF leadership was a shadowy crew of relatively obscure South Vietnamese. Despite their apparent lack of experience and competence, however, the NLF rapidly took on organizational reality from its central committee, down through a web of subordinate and associated groups, to villages all over South Vietnam. Within a few months of its founding, its membership doubled, doubled again by fall 1961, and then redoubled by early 1962. At that time an estimated 300,000 were on its rolls. Numerous administrative and functional "liberation associations" sprang into being, and each member of the NLF normally belong simultaneously to several such organizations.

The key operational components of the NLF were, however, the Liberation Army and the People's Revolutionary Party. The former had a lien on the services of every NLF member, man, woman, or child, although functionally its missions were usually carried out by formally organized military units. The People's Revolutionary Party was
explicitly the "Marxist-Leninist Party of South Vietnam" and claimed to be the "vanguard of the NLF, the paramount member." It denied official links with the communist party of North Vietnam beyond "fraternal ties of communism." Although the PRP did not come into existence until 1962, it is evident that communists played a paramount role in forming the NLF, and in its rapid initial growth. The official U.S. view has been that the PRP is merely the southern arm of the DRV's communist party, and a principal instrument through which Hanoi instigated and controlled the revolt against "N-Im." The organizational genius evident in the NLF, as well as the testimony of Vietnamese communists in interrogations and captured documents supports this interpretation.

But significant doubt remains. Viet Minh stay-behinds testified in 1955 and 1956 that their mission was political agitation for the holding of the general elections promised at Geneva. Captured documents and prisoner interrogations indicate that in 1957 and 1958, although there was some "wildcat" activity by local communists, party efforts appeared to be devoted to the careful construction of an underground apparatus which, though it used assassinations and kidnapping, circumstantially avoided military operations. All evidence points to fall of 1959 as the period in which the Viet Cong made their transition from a clandestine political movement to a more overt military operation. Moreover, throughout the years 1954-1960, a "front" seems to have been active in Vietnam. For example, the periodic report submitted by USMAAG, Vietnam, on 15 July 1957 -- a time of ostensible internal peace -- noted that:

"The Viet Cong guerrillas and propagandists, however, are still waging a grim battle for survival. In addition to an accelerated propaganda campaign, the Communists have been forming 'front' organizations to influence portions of anti-government minorities. Some of these organizations are militant, some are political. An example of the former is the 'Vietnamese Peoples' Liberation Movement Forces,' a military unit composed of ex-Cao Dai, ex-Hoa Hao, ex-Binh Xuyen, escaped political prisoners, and Viet Cong cadres. An example of the latter is the 'Vietnam-Cambodian Buddhist Association,' one of several organizations seeking to spread the theory of 'Peace and Co-existence.'"

Whether early references to the "front" were to the organizations which subsequently matured as the NLF cannot be determined. Indeed, to shed further light on the truth or falsehood of the proposition that the DRV did not intervene in South Vietnam until after the NLF came into existence, it is necessary to turn to the events in North Vietnam during the years 1954-1960.
Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam (Tab 3)

The primary question concerning Hanoi's role in the origins of the insurgency is not so much whether it played a role or not -- the evidence of direct North Vietnamese participation in subversion against the Government of South Vietnam is now extensive -- but when Hanoi intervened in a systematic way. Most attacks on U.S. policy have been based on the proposition that the DRV move on the South came with manifest reluctance, and after massive U.S. intervention in 1961. For example, George McTavish Kahin and John W. Lewis, in their book The United States in Vietnam, state that:

"Contrary to United States policy assumptions, all available evidence shows that the revival of the civil war in the South in 1958 was undertaken by Southerners at their own -- not Hanoi's -- initiative. ... Insurgency activity against the Saigon government began in the South under Southern leadership not as a consequence of any dictate from Hanoi, but contrary to Hanoi's injunctions." *

As discussed above, so much of this argument as rests on the existence in South Vietnam of genuine rebellion is probably valid. The South Vietnamese had both the means, the Viet Minh residue, and motive to take up arms against Ngo Dinh Diem. Moreover, there were indications that some DRV leaders did attempt to hold back southern rebels on the grounds that "conditions" were not ripe for an uprising. Further, there was apparently division within the Lao Dong Party hierarchy over the question of strategy and tactics in South Vietnam. However, the evidence indicates that the principal strategic debate over this issue took place between 1956 and 1958; all information now available (spring, 1968) points to a decision taken by the DRV leaders not later than spring, 1959, actively to seek the overthrow of Diem. Thereafter, the DRV pressed toward that goal by military force and by subversive aggression, both in Laos and in South Vietnam.

But few Administration critics have had access to the classified information upon which the foregoing judgments are based. Such intelligence as the U.S. has been able to make available to the public bearing on the period 1954-1960 has been sketchy and not very convincing: a few captured documents, and a few prisoner interrogations. Indeed, up until 1961, the Administration itself publicly held that Ngo Dinh Diem was firmly in control in South Vietnam, and that the United States aid programs were succeeding in meeting such threat to SVN security as existed both within South Vietnam and from the North. Too, the vigorous publicizing of "wars of national liberation" by N. S. Khrushchev and the "discovery" of counterinsurgency by the Kennedy Administration in early 1961 tended to reinforce the overall public impression that North Vietnam's aggression was news in that year. Khrushchev's speech of 6 January 1961, made, according to Kennedy biographer Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "a conspicuous

* The United States in Vietnam, pp. 119-120.
impression on the new President, who took it as an authoritative exposition of Soviet intentions, discussed it with his staff and read excerpts from it aloud to the National Security Council." Thereafter, Administration leaders, by their frequently identifying that Khrushchev declamation as a milestone in the development of communist world strategy, lent credence to the supposition that the Soviet Union had approved aggression by its satellite in North Vietnam only in December 1960 -- the month the NLF was formed.

American Kremlinologists had been preoccupied, since Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, with the possibilities of a genuine détente with the USSR. They were also bemused by the prospect of a deep strategic division with the "Communist Bloc" between the Soviets and the Chinese. Yet, despite evidences of disunity in the Bloc -- in Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany -- virtually all experts regarded North Vietnamese national strategy, to the extent that they considered it at all, as a simple derivative of that of either the USSR or the CPR. P. J. Honey, the British authority on North Vietnam, tends to the view that Hanoi remained subservient to the dictates of Moscow from 1956 through 1961, albeit carefully paying lip service to continue solidarity with Peking. More recently, a differing interpretation has been offered, which holds that the Hanoi leaders were in those years motivated primarily by their concern for internal development, and that they, therefore, turned to the Soviet Union as the only nation willing and able to furnish the wherewithal for rapid economic advancement. Both interpretations assume that through 1960 the DRV followed the Soviet line, accepted "peaceful coexistence," concentrated on internal development, and took action in South Vietnam only after Moscow gave the go-ahead in late 1960.

But it is also possible that the colloquy over strategy among the communist nations in the late 1950's followed a pattern almost exactly the reverse of that usually depicted: that North Vietnam persuaded the Soviets and the Chinese to accept its strategic view, and to support simultaneous drives for economic advancement and forceful reunification. Ho Chi Minh was an old Stalinist, trained in Russia in the early '20's, Comintern colleague of Borodin in Canton, and for three decades leading exponent of the Marxist-Leninist canon on anti-colonial war. Presumably, Ho spoke with authority within the upper echelons of the communist party of the Soviet Union. What he said to them privately was, no doubt, quite similar to what he proclaimed publicly from 1956 onward: the circumstances of North Vietnam were not comparable to those of the Soviet Union, or even those of the CPR, and North Vietnam's policy had to reflect the differences.

Khrushchev's de-Stalinization bombshell burst in February 1956 at a dramatically bad time for the DRV. It overrode the Chinese call for reconvening of the Geneva Conference on Vietnam, and it interfered with the concerning of communist policy on what to do about Ngo Dinh Diem's refusal to proceed toward the general elections scheduled for July 1956.
Although the Soviets issued in March 1956 a demand for GVN observance of the Accords, its diplomacy not only failed to bring about any action on behalf of the DRV, but elicited, in April 1956, a sharp British note condemning Hanoi for grave violations of the Accords. Hanoi received the British note about the time that Khrushchev proclaimed that the Soviet was committed to a policy of "peaceful coexistence." At the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, held in Hanoi that month, Ho Chi Minh lauded "de-Stalinization," but unequivocally rejected "peaceful coexistence" as irrelevant to the DRV. In November 1957, after more than a year of upheavals and evident internal political distress in North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan journeyed to Moscow for the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. That conference issued a declaration admitting the possibility of "non-peaceful transition to socialism" remarkably similar in thrust to Ho's 1956 speech. Further, Khrushchev's famous January 1961 speech was simply a precurs of the Declaration of the November 1960 Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. That 1960 Declaration, which formed the basis for Khrushchev's pronouncements on wars of national liberation in turn explicitly reaffirmed the 1957 Declaration. The parallelism of the texts is remarkable:

BY HO CHI MINH
SPRINT CLOSING BRIEF PAPER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAGO DONG PARTY
APRIL 4th, 1956

"...We have grasped the great significance of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This Congress has analyzed the new situation prevailing in the world, and pointed out the new conditions favorable to the preservation of peace and the advance towards socialism by the revolutionary forces of the working class and the laboring people: Clearly the Soviet Union's victorious role, giving us still greater enthusiasm and making us believe still more strongly in the irresistible forces of the Soviet Union, the bastion of revolution and of world peace; Pointed out the tasks of the Communist Party in the ideological and organizational fields. The Congress particularly emphasized the application of Marxist-Leninist principles to collective leadership and opposed the cult of the individual.

While recognizing that war may be expected, we must be vigilant to detect the vengeance schemes; for as long as imperialism exists, the danger of war still exists.

While recognizing that in certain countries the road to socialism may be a peaceful one, we should be ever on our guard. In countries where the majority of state, the armed forces, and the police of the bourgeois class are still strong, the proletariat class still has to prepare for armed struggle.

While recognizing the possibility of realizing Viet-Name by peaceful means, we should always remember that our people's principal enemies are the American imperialism and their agents who still occupy half of our country and are preparing for war; therefore, we should firmly hold aloft the banner of peace and advance our vigilance..."

DECLARATION OF THE CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST
AND WORKING PARTIES OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
MOSCOW, 1957

"The Communist and workers parties are faced with great historic tasks. In present day conditions in a number of capitalist countries, the working class has the possibility...to unite the majority of the people, should state power without civil war can ensure the transfer of basic means of production to the hands of the people...

In conditions in which the exploiting classes resort to the use of force by these circles at one time or another, the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily. In these conditions the security and forms of class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance of the working majority to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people on the use of force by these circles at one time or another stage of the struggle for socialism..."
Other evidence supports the foregoing hypothesis. The DRV was, in 1960, an orthodoxyically constituted communist state. Both the government and the society were dominated by the Lao Dong (Communist) Party, and power within the party concentrated in a small elite -- Ho Chi Minh and his lieutenants from the old-time Indochinese Communist Party. This group of leaders were unique in the communist world for their homogeneity and for their harmony -- there has been little evidence of the kind of turbulence which has splintered the leadership of most communist parties. While experts have detected disputes within the Lao Dong hierarchy -- 1957 appears to be a critical year in that regard -- the facts are that there has been no blood-purge of the Lao Dong leadership, and except for changes occasioned by apparently natural deaths, the leadership in 1960 was virtually identical to what it had been in 1954 or 1946. This remarkably dedicated and purposeful group of men apparently agreed among themselves as to what the national interests of the DRV required, what goals should be set for the nation, and what strategy they should pursue in attaining them.

These leaders have been explicit in setting forth DRV national goals in their public statements and official documents. For example, Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues placed a premium on "land reform" -- by which they meant a communization of rural society along Maoist lines. Moreover, they clearly considered a disciplined society essential for victory in war and success in peace. It was also evident that they were committed to bring about an independent, reunified Vietnam capable of exerting significant influence throughout Southeast Asia, and particularly over the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia. What is not known with certainty is how they determined the relative priority among these objectives.

In the immediate aftermath of Geneva, the DRV deferred to the Geneva Accords for the achievement of reunification, and turned inward, concentrating its energies on land reform and rehabilitation of the war-torn economy. By the summer of 1956, this strategy was bankrupt; the Geneva Settlement manifestly would not eventuate in reunification, and the land reform campaign foundered from such serious abuses by Lao Dong cadre that popular disaffection imperiled DRV internal security. In August 1956, the Lao Dong leadership was compelled to "rectify" its programs, to postpone land reform, and to purge low echelon cadre to mollify popular resentment. Even these measures, however, proved insufficient to forestall insurrection; in November 1956, the peasant rebellions broke out, followed by urban unrest. Nonetheless, the DRV leadership survived these internal crises intact, and by 1958 appears to have solved most of the problems of economic efficiency and political organization which occasioned the 1956-1957 outbursts.

But domestic difficulty was not the only crisis to confront the Lao Dong leaders in early 1957. In January, when the Soviet Union proposed
to the United Nations the admitting of North and South Vietnam as separate states, it signalled that the USSR might be prepared in the interests of "peaceful coexistence," to make a great power deal which would have lent permanency to the partition of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh, in evident surprise, violently dissented. When in February 1957 Khrushchev went further in affirming his intention to "coexist" with the United States, the DRV quickly moved to realign its own and Soviet policies. In May 1957, the Soviet head of state, Voroshilov, visited Hanoi, and in July and August 1957, Ho Chi Minh traveled extensively in Eastern Europe, spending several days in Moscow. The Voroshilov visit was given top billing by the Hanoi Press and Ho, upon his return from Moscow, indicated that important decisions had been reached. Thereafter, Hanoi and Moscow marched more in step.

In the meantime, the needs and desires of communist rebels in South Vietnam had been communicated directly to Hanoi in the person of Le Duan, who is known to have been in South Vietnam in 1955 and 1956, and to have returned to Hanoi sometime before the fall of 1957. In September of that year, upon Ho's return from Europe, Le Duan surfaced as one of the members of the Lao Dong Politburo; it is possible that he was already at that time de facto the First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, to which position he was formally promoted in September 1960. In 1955 and 1956, Le Duan, from the testimony of prisoners and captured documents, had been expressing conviction that Diem would stamp out the communist movement in South Vietnam unless the DRV were to reinforce the party there. Presumably, he carried these views into the inner councils of the DRV. In November 1957, Le Duan and Ho traveled to Moscow to attend the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. The Declaration of that conference, quoted above, has since been cited repeatedly by both North and South Vietnamese communists, as one of the strategic turning points in their modern history. Le Duan, upon his return to Hanoi from Moscow, issued a statement to the effect that the DRV's way was now clear. Taking Le Duan literally, it could be construed that the DRV deemed the Moscow Declaration of 1957 the "go ahead" signal from Moscow and Peking for forceful pursuit of its objectives.

There is some sparse evidence that the DRV actually did begin moving in 1958 to set up a mechanism for supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam. But even had the decision been taken, as suggested above, in late 1957, it is unlikely that there would have been much manifestation of it in 1958. The Lao Dong leadership had for years stressed the lessons that they had learned from experience on the essentiality of carefully preparing a party infrastructure and building guerrilla bases before proceeding with an insurgency. Viet Minh doctrine would have dictated priority concern to refurbishing the communist party apparatus in South Vietnam, and it is possible that such a process was set in motion during 1958. Orders were captured from Hanoi which directed guerrilla bases be prepared in South Vietnam in early 1959.
There is, however, other evidence that questioning among the DRV hierarchy concerning strategy and tactics for South Vietnam continued throughout 1958 and into 1959. Captured reports from party headquarters in South Vietnam betrayed doubt and indecisions among party leaders there and reflected the absence of clear guidance from Hanoi. Moreover, in 1958, and in 1959, the DRV did concentrate much of its resources on agricultural and industrial improvement; extensive loans were obtained from the Soviet Union and from the Chinese Peoples Republic, and ambitious uplift programs were launched in both sectors. It is possible, therefore, to accept the view that through 1958 the DRV still accorded priority to butter over guns, as part of its base development strategy.

In the larger sense, domestic progress, "consolidation of the North," was fundamental to that strategy. As General Vo Nguyen Giap put it in the Lao Dong Party Journal Hoc Tap of January 1960:

"The North has become a large rear echelon of our army... The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country."

Up until 1959, the economy of North Vietnam was scarcely providing subsistence for its people, let alone support for foreign military undertakings; by that year, substantial progress in both agriculture and industry was evident:

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Due mainly, however, to industrial growth, the Gross National Product reached a growth rate of 6% per annum in 1958, and sustained that rate thereafter. Both 1958 and 1959 were extraordinarily good years in both industry and agriculture. A long-range development plan launched in 1958 achieved an annual industrial expansion of 21% per year through 1960, chiefly in heavy industry. Foreign aid -- both Chinese and Soviet -- was readily obtained, the USSR supplanting the CPR as prime donor. Foreign trade stepped up markedly. Compared with 1955, the DRV's foreign commerce doubled by 1959, and nearly tripled by 1960.

By 1959, it seems likely that the DRV had elected to pursue a "guns and butter" strategy, and obtained requisite Soviet and Chinese aid. While pressing forward with its economic improvement programs -- which were showing definite progress -- the DRV prepared with word and deed for large-scale intervention in South Vietnam. In May 1959, at the Fifteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, a
Resolution was adopted identifying the United States as the main obstacle to the realization of the hopes of the Vietnamese people, and as an enemy of peace. The Resolution of the Fifteenth Plenum called for a strong North Vietnam as a base for helping the South Vietnamese to overthrow Diem and eject the United States. A Communist Party history captured in South Vietnam in 1966, and the testimony of high-ranking captives, indicate that South Vietnamese communists still regard the resolution of the Fifteenth Plenum as the point of departure for DRV intervention.

Within a month of the Fifteenth Plenum, the DRV began to commit its armed forces in Laos, and steadily escalated its aid to the Pathet Lao. By the time the National Liberation Front issued its manifesto in December 1960, the conflict in Laos had matured to the point that Pathet Lao-NVA troops controlled most of NE Laos and the Ia Tien panhandle; moreover, by that time, the Soviet Union had entered the fray, and was participating in airlift operations from North Vietnam direct to Pathet Lao-NVA units in Laos. Also, by the fall of 1959, the insurgency in South Vietnam took a definite upsurge. Viet Cong units for the first time offered a direct challenge to the Army of Vietnam. Large VC formations seized and held district and province capitals for short periods of time, and assassinations and kidnappings proliferated markedly. The Preamble of the Constitution of the DRV, promulgated on 1 January 1960, was distinctly bellicose, condemning the United States, and establishing the reunification of Vietnam as a DRV national objective. During 1959 and 1960, the relatively undeveloped intelligence apparatus of the U.S. and the GVN confirmed that over 4,000 infiltrators were sent from North Vietnam southward -- most of them military or political cadre, trained to raise and lead insurgent forces.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party convened its Third National Congress. There Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Glap, and others presented speeches further committing the DRV to support of the insurgency in the South, demanding the U.S. stop its aid to Diem, and calling for the formation of a unified front to lead the struggle against "My-Diem." The Resolution of the Third Congress, reflecting these statements, is another of those historic benchmarks referred to in captured party documents and prisoner interrogations.

In November 1960, the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries once again declared its support of the sort of "just" war the DRV intended to prosecute. The United States was identified as the principal colonial power, and the right and obligation of communist parties to lead struggles against colonial powers was detailed. By the time Khrushchev cited that Declaration in his "wars of national liberation" speech, the "liberation war" for South Vietnam was nearly a year and a half old.
The evidence supports the conclusion, therefore, that whether or not the rebellion against Diem in South Vietnam proceeded independently of, or even contrary to directions from Hanoi through 1958, Hanoi moved thereafter to capture the revolution. There is little doubt that Hanoi exerted some influence over certain insurgents in the South throughout the years following Geneva, and there is evidence which points to its preparing for active support of large-scale insurgency as early as 1958. Whatever differences in strategy may have existed among Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi, it appears that at each critical juncture Hanoi obtained concurrence in Moscow with an aggressive course of action. Accordingly, it was not "peaceful coexistence," or concern over leadership of the "socialist camp" which governed Hanoi's policy. What appeared to matter to Hanoi was its abiding national interests: domestic consolidation in independence, reunification, and Vietnamese hegemony in Southeast Asia. Both Soviet and Chinese policy seems to have bent to these ends rather than the contrary. If Hanoi applied brakes to eager insurgents in South Vietnam, it did so not from lack of purpose or because of Soviet restraints, but from concern over launching one more premature uprising in the South. Ngo Dinh Diem was entirely correct when he stated that his was a nation at war in early 1959; South Vietnam was at war with both the Viet Cong insurgents and with the DRV, in that the latter then undertook to provide strategic direction and leadership cadres to build systematically a base system in Laos and South Vietnam for subsequent, large-scale guerrilla warfare. Persuasive evidence exists that by 1960 DRV support of the insurgency in South Vietnam included material as well as personnel. In any event, by late 1959, it seems clear that Hanoi considered the time ripe to take the military offensive in South Vietnam, and that by 1960 circumstances were propitious for more overt political action. A recently captured high-ranking member of the National Liberation Front has confirmed that in mid-1960 he and other Lao Dong Party leaders in South Vietnam were instructed by Hanoi to begin organizing the National Liberation Front, which was formally founded upon the issuance of its Manifesto on 20 December 1960. * The rapid growth of the NLF thereafter -- it quadrupled its strength in about one year -- is a further indication that the Hanoi-directed communist party apparatus had been engaged to the fullest in the initial organization and subsequent development of the NLF.

U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency, 1954-1960 (Tab 4)

Much of what the U.S. knows now about the origins of the insurgency in South Vietnam rests on information it has acquired since 1963, approximately the span of time that an extensive and effective American intelligence apparatus had been functioning in Vietnam. Before then, our intelligence was drawn from a significantly more narrow and less reliable range of sources, chiefly Vietnamese, and could not have

supported analysis in depth of insurgent organization and intentions. The U.S. was particularly deprived of dependable information concerning events in South Vietnam’s countryside in the years 1954 through 1959. Nonetheless, U.S. intelligence estimates through 1960 correctly and consistently estimated that the threat to GVN internal security was greater than the danger from overt invasion. The intelligence estimates provided to policy makers in Washington pegged the Viet Cong military offensive as beginning in late 1959, with preparations noted as early as 1957, and a definite campaign perceived as of early 1959. Throughout the years, they were critical of Diem, consistently expressing skepticism that he could deal successfully with his internal political problems. These same estimates miscalculated the numerical and political strength of the Viet Cong, misjudged the extent of rural disaffection, and overrated the military capabilities of the GVN. But as strategic intelligence they were remarkably sound.

Indeed, given the generally bleak appraisals of Diem’s prospects, they who made U.S. policy could only have done so by assuming a significant measure of risk. For example, on 3 August 1954, an NIE took the position that:

"Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese, even with firm support from the U.S. and other powers, may be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we believe that the chances for this development are poor and, moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the next year . . ."

This estimate notwithstanding, the U.S. moved promptly to convene the Manila Conference, bring SEATO into being with its protocol aegis over Vietnam, and eliminate France as the recipient of U.S. aid for Vietnam. Again on 26 April 1955, an NIE charged that:

"Even if the present impasse with the sects were resolved, we believe that it would be extremely difficult, at best, for a Vietnamese government, regardless of its composition, to make progress towards developing a strong, stable, anti-Communist government capable of resolving the basic social, economic, and political problems of Vietnam, the special problems arising from the Geneva Agreement and capable of meeting the long-range challenge of the Communists . . ."

Within a matter of weeks, however, the U.S. firmly and finally committed itself to unstinting support of Ngo Dinh Diem, accepted his refusal to comply with the political settlement of Geneva, and acceded to withdrawal of French military power and political influence from South Vietnam. Even at the zenith of Diem’s success, an NIE of July 1956
noted adverse political trends stemming from Diem's "authoritarian role" and predicted that, while no short-term opposition was in prospect:

"Over a longer period, the accumulation of grievances among various groups and individuals may lead to development of a national opposition movement . . ."

There was no NIE published between 1956 and 1959 on South Vietnam: an NIE of May 1959 took the position that Diem had a serious military problem on his hands:

"The [GVN] internal security forces will not be able to eradicate DRV supported guerrilla or subversive activity in the foreseeable future. Army units will probably have to be diverted to special internal security assignments . . ."

The same NIE noted a waning of popular enthusiasm for Diem, the existence of some disillusionment, "particularly among the educated elite," some "dissatisfaction among military officers," but detected little "identifiable public unrest":

"The growth of dissatisfaction is inhibited by South Vietnam's continuing high standard of living relative to that of its neighbors, the paternalistic attitude of Diem's government towards the people, and the lack of any feasible alternative to the present regime."

The 1959 NIE again expressed serious reservations about Diem's leadership and flatly stated that:

"The prospects for continued political stability in South Vietnam hang heavily upon President Diem and his ability to maintain firm control of the army and police. The regime's efforts to assure internal security and its belief that an authoritarian government is necessary to handle the country's problems will result in a continued repression of potential opposition elements. This policy of repression will inhibit the growth of popularity of the regime and we believe that dissatisfaction will grow, particularly among those who are politically conscious . . ."

Despite these reservations, U.S. policy remained staunchly and fairly uncritically behind Diem through 1959.

The National Intelligence Estimates reservations re Diem do not appear to have restrained the National Security Council in its two major reviews of U.S. policy between 1954 and 1960. In 1956, the NSC (in policy directive NSC 5612) directed that U.S. agencies would:
"Assist Free Vietnam to develop a strong, stable, and constitutional government to enable Free Vietnam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone... and work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South Vietnam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Vietnam under anti-Communist leadership."

In 1958 (in NSC 5809) this policy, with its "roll-back" overtones, was reiterated, although revisions were proposed indicating an awareness of the necessity to adapt the army of Vietnam for anti-guerrilla warfare. Operations Coordinating Board Progress Reports on the implementation of the policies laid out in NSC 5612 and 5809 revealed awareness that Vietnam was under internal attack, and that "in spite of substantial U.S. assistance, economic development, though progressing, is below that which is politically desirable."

While classified policy papers through 1959 thus dealt with risks, public statements of U.S. officials did not refer to the jeopardy. To the contrary, the picture presented the public and Congress by Ambassador Durbrow, General Williams, and other Administration spokesmen was of continuing progress, virtually miraculous improvement, year-in and year-out. Diem was depicted as a strong and capable leader, firmly in command of his own house, leading his people into modern nationhood at a remarkable pace. As late as the summer of 1959, Ambassador Durbrow and General Williams assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Vietnam's internal security was in no serious danger, and that Vietnam was in a better position to cope with invasion from the North than it had ever been. In the fall of 1959, in fact, General Williams expressed the opinion that by 1961 GVN defense budgets could be reduced, and in the spring of 1960, he wrote to Senator Mansfield that American military advisors could begin a phased withdrawal from MAAG, Vietnam the following year.

Whatever adverse judgment may be deserved by such statements or by the quality of U.S. assistance to Vietnam on behalf of its internal security, the American aid program cannot be faulted for failing to provide Diem funds in plenty. The U.S. aid program -- economic and military -- for South Vietnam was among the largest in the world. From FY 1946 through FY 1961, Vietnam was the third ranking non-NATO recipient of aid, and the seventh worldwide. In FY 1961, the last program of President Eisenhower's Administration, South Vietnam was the fifth ranking recipient overall. MAAG, Vietnam, was the only military aid mission anywhere in the world commanded by a lieutenant general, and the economic aid mission there was by 1958 the largest anywhere.

Security was the focus of U.S. aid; although military grants comprised only 25% of the total program in the years 1955 through 1961,
more than 75% of the economic aid the U.S. provided in the same period went into the GVN military budget; thus at least $3 out of every $10 of aid provided Vietnam went directly toward security. In addition, other amounts of nominally economic aid (e.g., that for public administration) went toward security forces, and aid for agriculture and transportation principally funded projects with strategic purposes and with an explicit military rationale. For example, a 20-mile stretch of highway from Saigon to Bien Hoa, built at General Williams' instance for specifically military purposes, received more U.S. economic aid than all funds provided for labor, community development, social welfare, health, and education in the years 1954-1961.

In March 1960, Washington became aware that despite this impressive outpouring of treasure, material, and advice, the Viet Cong were making significant headway against Diem, and that U.S. aid programs ought to be reconfigured. In March, the JCS initiated action to devise a Counter-insurgency Plan (CIP), intended to coordinate the several U.S. agencies providing assistance to the GVN, and rationalize the GVN's own rural programs. The CIP was worked out among the several U.S. agencies in Washington and Saigon during the summer and fall of 1960.

The heightened awareness of problems in Vietnam did not, however, precipitate changes in NSC policy statements on Vietnam. Objectives set forth in NSC 6012 (25 July 1960) were virtually identical to those of NSC 5809.

Planning proceeded against a background of developing divergence of view between the Departments of State and Defense. As Ambassador Durbrow and his colleagues of State saw the problem on the one hand, Diem's security problems stemmed from his political insolvency. They argued that the main line of U.S. action should take the form of pressures on Diem to reform his government and his party, liberalizing his handling of political dissenters and the rural populace. Department of Defense officials, on the other hand, usually deprecated the significance of non-communist political dissent in South Vietnam, and regarded Diem's difficulties as proceeding from military inadequacy. In this view, what was needed was a more efficient internal defense, and, therefore, the Pentagon tended to oppose U.S. leverage on Diem because it might jeopardize his confidence in the U.S., and his cooperation in improving his military posture. Communist machination, as Defense saw it, had created the crisis; the U.S. response should be "unserving support" for Diem.

While the CIP was being developed, Department of Defense moved to adapt the U.S. military assistance program to the exigencies of the situation. On 30 March 1960 the JCS took the position that the Army of Vietnam should develop an anti-guerrilla capability within the regular force structure, thus reversing an antithetical position taken by General
Williams. During 1959 Diem had attempted to form a number of special "commando" units from his regular forces, and the MAAG had opposed him on the grounds that these would deplete his conventional strength. In May, MAAG was authorized to place advisers down to battalion level. In June, 1960, additional U.S. Army special forces arrived in Vietnam, and during the summer a number of Ranger battalions, with the express mission of counter-guerrilla operations, were activated. In September, General Williams was replaced by General McGarr who, consistent with the directives of the JCS, promptly began to press the training of RVNAF to produce the "anti-guerrilla guerrilla." General McGarr's desire for an RVNAF capable of meeting and defeating the Viet Cong at their own game was evident in the CIP when it was forwarded to Washington, in January, 1961, just before John F. Kennedy took office.

The CIP had been well coordinated within the U.S. mission in Vietnam, but only partially with the Vietnamese. The plan, as forwarded, incorporated one major point of difference between the Embassy and MAAG. General McGarr desired to increase the RVNAF force level by some 20,000 troops, while Ambassador Durbrow maintained reservations concerning the necessity or the wisdom of additional forces. The Ambassador's position rested on the premise that Diem wanted the force level increase, and that the United States should not provide funds for that purpose until Diem was patently prepared to take those unpalatable political measures the Ambassador had proposed aimed at liberalizing the GVN. The Ambassador held out little hope that either the political or even military portions of the CIP could be successfully accomplished without some such leverage: "Consideration should, therefore, be given to what actions we are prepared to take to encourage, or if necessary to force, acceptance of all essential elements of the plan." In the staff reviews of the CIP in Washington, the divergence between State and Defense noted above came once more to the fore. Those (chiefly within DOD) who considered the VC threat as most important, and who therefore regarded military measures against this threat as most urgent, advocated approval and any other measures which would induce Diem's acceptance of the CIP, and his cooperation with MAAG. They were impatient with Ambassador Durbrow's proposed "pressure tactics" since they saw in them the possibility of GVN delay on vital military matters, and the prospect of little profit other than minor concessions from Diem in political areas they deemed peripheral or trivial in countering the VC. Tipping the scales toward what might be called the Diem/MAAG/DOD priorities was the coincident and increasing need to "reassure" Diem of U.S. support for the GVN and for him personally. The fall of President Syngman Rhee of Korea in April, the abortive November 1960 coup d'etat in Saigon, Ambassador Durbrow's persistent overtures for reform, and above all, uncertainties over U.S. support for the Royal Laotian Government. This requirement to reassure Diem was plainly at cross purposes with the use of pressure tactics.

Ten days after President Kennedy came to office, he authorized a $41 million increase in aid for Vietnam to underwrite the RVNAF force
level increase and improvements in the Civil Guard -- a complete buy of the CIP. In March, Ambassador Durrow was replaced by Frederick E. Nolting. Ambassador Durrow's closing interview with Diem in mid-March was not reassuring. While Diem stated that he was prepared to carry out the military aspects of the CIP, he dodged Durrow's questions on the political action prescribed. It was on this disquieting note that the Kennedy Administration began its efforts to counter the insurgency in South Vietnam.
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Tab 1.

FAILURE OF THE GENEVA SETTLEMENT

A. Introduction: The Flawed Peace

The Geneva Conference of 1954 brought only transitory peace to Indochina. Nonetheless, except for the United States, the major powers were, at the time of the Conference, satisfied that with their handiwork: the truce averted a further U.S. military involvement on the Asian mainland, and dampened a heightening crisis between East and West which might readily have led to conflict outside Southeast Asia. So long as these conditions obtained, neither France, the U.K., the U.S.S.R. nor Communist China were seriously disposed to disturb the modus vivendi in Vietnam. U.S. leaders publicly put the best face possible on the Geneva Settlement -- about all that might possibly have been obtained from a seriously disadvantaged negotiating position, and no serious impairment to freedom of United States action. But the U.S., within its inner councils immediately after Geneva, viewed the Settlement's provisions for Vietnam as "disaster," and determined to prevent, if it could, the further extension of communist government over the Vietnamese people and territory. 1/ U.S. policy adopted in 1954 to this end did not constitute an irrevocable nor "open-ended" commitment to the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. But it did entail a progressively deepening U.S. involvement in the snarl of violence and intrigue within Vietnam, and therefore a direct role in the ultimate breakdown of the Geneva Settlement.

The Settlement of Geneva, though it provided respite from years of political violence, bitterly disappointed Vietnamese of North and South alike who had looked toward a unified and independent Vietnam. For the Viet Minh, the Settlement was a series of disappointing compromises to which they had agreed at the urging of the Soviet Union and China, compromises beyond what hard won military advantage over the French had led them to expect. 2/ For the State of Vietnam in the South, granted independence by France while the Geneva Conference was in progress, the Settlement was an arrangement to which it had not been party, and to which it could not subscribe. 3/ The truce of 1954, in fact, embodied three serious deficiencies as a basis for stable peace among the Vietnamese:

-- It relied upon France as its executor.
-- It ignored the opposition of the State of Vietnam.
-- It countenanced the disassociation of the United States.

These weaknesses turned partitioned Vietnam into two hostile states, and given the absence of a stabilizing international force and the impotence of the ICC, brought about an environment in which war was likely, if not inevitable. A nominally temporary "line of demarcation"
between North and South at the 17th parallel was transformed into one of the more forbidding frontiers of the world. A mass displacement of nearly 5% of the population disrupted the polity and heightened tensions in both North and South. And both the Democratic Government of Vietnam (DRV) in the North, and the Government of Vietnam (GVN) in the South, armed, with foreign aid, for what each perceived as a coming struggle over reunification. Some of the main roots of the present conflict run to these failures of Geneva.

B. The Partition of Vietnam

1. Provisions for Unifying Vietnam

The sole formal instrument of the Geneva Conference was the document signed by the military commanders of the two hostile forces termed "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam," dealing largely with the disengagement and regroupment of military forces. Article 14 of the Agreement contained one brief -- but fateful allusion -- to a future political solution:

"Article 14a. Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Vietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement...."

A more general expression of the intent of the conferences was the unsigned "Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference," by which the Conference "takes note" of the aforementioned Agreement and several declarations by represented nations and:

"...recognizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary...declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to insure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July, 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations
will be held on this subject between the competent repre­sentative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards...."

The DRV approved the Final Declaration, and, having failed in its attempts to bring about immediate elections on unification, no doubt did so reluctantly. 7/ There has been some authoritative speculation that the Viet Minh accepted this aspect of the Settlement with deep cynicism; Pham Van Dong, the DRV delegate at Geneva is supposed to have expressed conviction that the elections would never be held. 8/ But it seems more likely that the communist powers fully expected the nascent GVN, already badly shaken from internal stresses, to collapse, and unification to follow with elections or not. In any event, the public stence of the DRV stressed their expectations that the election would be held. Ho Chi Minh stated unequivocally on 22 July 1954 that: "North, Central and South Vietnam are territories of ours. Our country will surely be unified, our entire people will surely be liberated." 9/

The Saigon Government was no less assertive in calling for unification of Vietnam. In a note to the French of 17 July 1954, the GVN delegate at Geneva protested having been left until then "in complete ignorance" of French intentions regarding the division of the country, which he felt failed to "take any account of the unanimous will for national unity of the Vietnamese people"; he proposed, futilely, United Nations trusteeship of all Vietnam in preference to a nation "dismembered and condemned to slavery." 10/ At the final session of the Conference, when called upon to join in the Final Declaration, the GVN delegate announced that his government "reserves its full freedom of action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to its territorial unity, national independence and freedom." 11/ Thus the Geneva truce confronted from the outset the anomaly of two sovereign Vietnamese states, each calling for unification, but only one, the DRV, committed to achieving it via the terms of the Settlement.

2. France Withdraws, 1954-1956

France, as the third party in Vietnam, then became pivotal to any political settlement, its executor for the West. But France had agreed to full independence for the GVN on June 4, 1954, nearly six weeks before the end of the Geneva Conference. 12/ By the terms of that June agreement, the GVN assumed responsibility for international contracts previously made on its behalf by France; but, there having been no reference to subsequent contracts, it was technically free of the Geneva Agreements. It has been argued to the contrary that the GVN was bound by Geneva because it possessed at the time few of the attributes of full sovereignty, and especially because it was dependent on France for defense. 13/ But such debates turn on tenuous points of international law regarding the prerogatives of newly independent or partitioned states. 14/ It is fact that in the years 1954 to 1956, first the Communist Chinese and then the Soviets acknowledged the separate and sovereign identity of the GVN, and that the United States and
Great Britain did likewise. 15/ It is also fact that France speedily divested itself of responsibilities for "civil administration" in South Vietnam. In February, 1956, the GVN requested France to withdraw its military forces, and on April 26, 1956, the French military command in Vietnam, the signatory of the Geneva Agreement, was dissolved. France, torn by domestic political turbulence in which past disappointments and continued frustrations in Vietnam figured prominently, and tested anew in Algeria, abandoned its position in Southeast Asia. 16/ No doubt, an increasingly acerbic relation between its representatives and those of the United States in South Vietnam hastened its departure, where American policy clashed with French over the arming and training of a national army for the GVN, over French military assistance for the religious sects, over French economic policy on repatriating investments, and over general French opposition to Diem. 17/ But more fundamentally, France felt itself shouldered aside in South Vietnam by the United States over:

(1) Policy toward the DRV. The French averred initially that Ho was a potential Tito, and that they could through an accommodation with him preserve their economic and cultural interests in Vietnam--in their view, a "co-existence experiment" of world wide significance in the Cold War. 18/ As of December, 1954, they were determined to carry out the Geneva elections. Eventually, however, they were obliged to choose between the U.S. and the DRV, so firmly did the U.S. foreclose any adjustment to the DRV's objectives. 19/

(2) Policy toward Diem. France opposed Diem not solely because he was a vocally Francophile Annamite, but because he threatened directly their position in Vietnam. His nationalism, his strictures against "feudalists," his notions of moral regeneration all conjoined in an enmity against the French nearly as heated as that he harbored against the communists -- but to greater effect, for it was far easier for him to muster his countrymen's opinion against the French than against the Viet Minh. By the spring of 1955, the Diem-France controversy acquired military dimensions when French supported sect forces took up arms against the GVN. At that time, while the U.S. construed its policy as aiding "Free Vietnam," the French saw Diem as playing Kerensky's role in Vietnam, with the People's Revolutionary Committee as the Bolsheviks, and Ho, the Viet Minh Lenin, waiting off stage. 20/

(3) Military Policy. By the end of 1954, the French were persuaded that SEATO could never offer security for their citizens and other interests in Vietnam, and had despaired of receiving U.S. military aid for a French Expeditionary Corps of sufficient size to meet the threat. 21/ U.S. insistence that it should train RNVF increased their insecurity. Within the combined U.S.-French headquarters in Saigon thereafter, officers of both nations worked side by side launching counter-vailing intrigues among the Vietnamese, and among each other. 22/ The relationship became intolerable with French involvement in support of sect forces in open rebellion against U.S. assisted GVN forces.
In March of 1956, as France prepared to accede to the GVN request for withdrawal of its remaining military forces, Foreign Minister Pineau, in a Paris speech, took the U.K. and the U.S. to task for disrupting Western unity. 23/ While Pineau selected U.S. support of French-hating Diem for particular rancor, he did so in the context of decrying France’s isolation in dealing with nationalist rebels in North Africa -- and thus generally indicted two powers who had threatened the French empire since the U.K. intervened in Syria in 1941, and President Roosevelt assured the Sultan of Morocco that his sympathies lay with the colonial peoples struggling for independence. 24/

Ultimately, France had to place preservation of its European position ahead of empire, and, hence, cooperation with the U.S. before opposition in Indochina. France’s vacating Vietnam in 1956 eased U.S. problems there over the short run, and smoothed Diem’s path. But the DRV’s hope for a national plebescite were thereby dashed. On January 1, 1955, as the vanishing of France’s power in Vietnam became apparent, Pham Van Dong, DRV Premier, declared that as far as Hanoi was concerned: "... it was with you, the French, that we signed the Geneva Agreements, and it is up to you to see that they are respected." Some thirteen months later the Foreign Minister of France stated that: 25/

"We are not entirely masters of the situation. The Geneva Accords on the one hand and the pressure of our allies on the other creates a very complex juridical situation.... The position in principle is clear: France is the guarantor of the Geneva Accords...But we do not have the means alone of making them respected."

But the GVN remained adamantly opposed to elections, and neither the U.S. nor any other western power was disposed to support France’s fulfillment of its responsibility to the DRV.

3. **Diem Refuses Consultation, 1955**

Communist expectations that the Diem government would fall victim to the voracious political forces of South Vietnam were unfulfilled. Diem narrowly escaped such a fate, but with American support -- albeit wavering, and accompanied by advice he often ignored -- Diem within a year of the Geneva Conference succeeded in defeating the most powerful of his antagonists, the armed sects, and in removing from power Francophile elements within his government, including his disloyal military chiefs. He spoke from comparatively firm political ground when, on July 16, 1955, before the date set for consulting with the DRV on the plebescite, he announced in a radio broadcast that: 26/

"We did not sign the Geneva Agreements.

"We are not bound in any way by these Agreements, signed against the will of the Vietnamese people...We shall not miss
any opportunity which would permit the unification of our homeland in freedom, but it is out of the question for us to consider any proposal from the Viet Minh if proof is not given that they put the superior interests of the national community above those of communism."

Moreover, Diem spoke with some assurance of American backing, for the U.S. had never pressed for the elections envisaged by the Settlement. At the final session of Geneva, rather than joining with the Conference delegates in the Final Declaration, the U.S. "observer," Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, had linked U.S. policy vis-a-vis Vietnam to that for Korea, Taiwan and Germany in these terms: 27/

"In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly."

Although the U.S. opposed elections in 1954 because Ho Chi Minh would have then won them handily, 28/ the records of the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board of the summer of 1954 establishes that this government then nonetheless expected elections eventually to be held in Vietnam. 29/ But, two major misapprehensions were evident: (1) the U.S. planned through "political action" to ameliorate conditions in Southeast Asia to the point that elections would not jeopardize its objective of survival for a "free" Vietnam; and (2) the U.S. estimated that France would usefully remain in Vietnam. By the spring of 1955, although U.S. diplomacy had brought the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization into being, and although Diem had with U.S. aid weathered a number of severe political storms, the U.S. was less sanguine that its "political action" would suffice, and that further French presence would be helpful. Accordingly, it began to look closely at the conditions under which elections might be held, and urged that Vietnamese do the same. One definition of terms acceptable to the U.S. was set forth in a State Department memorandum of 5 May 1955, approved by Secretary Dulles: 30/

"The U.S. believes that the conditions for free elections should be those which Sir Anthony Eden put forward and the three Western Powers supported at Berlin in connection with German reunification. The United States believes that the Free Vietnamese should insist that elections be held under conditions of genuine freedom; that safeguards be agreed to assure this freedom before, after, and during elections and that there be adequate guarantees for, among other things, freedom of movement, freedom of presentation of candidates, immunity of candidates, freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization, freedom of association or political meetings, freedom of expression for all, freedom of the press, radio, and free circulation of newspapers, secrecy of the vote, and security of polling stations and ballot boxes."
Although the U.S. communicated to Diem its conviction that proposing such conditions to the DRV during pre-plebescite consultations would lead promptly to a flat rejection, to Diem's marked advantage in world opinion, Diem found it preferable to refuse outright to talk to the North, and the U.S. indorsed his policy. 31/

4. Divided Vietnam: Status Quo Accepted

The deadline for the consultations in July 1955, and the date set for elections in July 1956, passed without further international action to implement those provisions of the Geneva Settlement. The DRV communicated directly with the GVN in July, 1955, and again in May and June of 1956, proposing not only consultative conference to negotiate "free general elections by secret ballot," but to liberalize North-South relations in general. 32/ Each time the GVN replied with disdain, or with silence. The 17th parallel, with its demilitarized zone on either side, became de facto an international boundary, and -- since Ngo Dinh Diem's rigid refusal to traffic with the North excluded all economic exchanges and even an Interstate postal agreement -- one of the most restricted boundaries in the world. The DRV appealed to the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to no avail. 33/ In January, 1956, Communist China requested another Geneva Conference to deal with the situation, but the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. responded only by extending the functions of the International Control Commission beyond its 1956 expiration date. 34/ By early 1957, the partition of Vietnam was generally accepted throughout the international community. In January, 1957, the Soviet Union proposed the admission of both the GVN and the DRV to the United Nations, the U.S.S.R. delegate declaring that "in Vietnam two separate States existed, which differed from one another in political and economic structure...." 35/

Professor Hans Morgenthau, writing at the time, and following a visit to South Vietnam, described the political progress of the GVN as a "miracle," but stated that conditions for free elections obtained in neither the North nor the South. 36/ He concluded that:

"Actually, the provision for free elections which would solve ultimately the problem of Vietnam was a device to hide the incompatibility of the Communist and Western positions, neither of which can admit the domination of all of Vietnam by the other side. It was a device to disguise the fact that the line of military demarcation was bound to be a line of political division as well...."

5. The Discontented

However, there were three governments, at least, for which the status quo of a Vietnam divided between communist and non-communist governments was unacceptable. The GVN, while remaining cool to the DRV, pursued an active propaganda campaign prophesying the overturning of communism in the North, and proclaiming its resolve ultimately to reunify the nation in freedom. The United States supported the GVN, having
established as national policy in 1956, reaffirmed again in 1958, these guidelines: 37/

"Assist Free Viet Nam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone...Work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist leadership..... Support the position of the Government of Free Viet Nam that all Viet Nam elections may take place only after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both zones of Viet Nam.... Treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government, and discourage other non-Communist states from developing or maintaining relations with the Viet Minh regime...."

And the Democratic Republic of Vietnam became increasingly vocal in its calls for "struggle" to end partition. In April, 1956, as the plebicite deadline neared, Ho Chi Minh declared ominously that: 38/

"While recognizing that in certain countries the road to socialism may be a peaceful one, we should be aware of this fact: In countries where the machinery of state, the armed forces, and the police of the bourgeois class are still strong, the proletarian class still has to prepare for armed struggle.

"While recognizing the possibility of reunifying Vietnam by peaceful means, we should always remember that our people's principal enemies are the American imperialists and their agents who still occupy half our country and are preparing for war...."

In 1956, however, Ho Chi Minh and the DRV faced mounting internal difficulties, and were not yet in a position to translate the partition of Vietnam into casus belli.

C. Refugees: Disruption of Vietnam's Society

1. Provisions for Regroupment

Article 14 of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam," which provided for separate political administrations north and south of the 17th parallel, also stated that: 39/

"14(a) From the date of entry into force of the present agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one
party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district."

It is probable that none of the conferees foresaw the ramifications of that one sentence, for it put in motion one million Vietnamese refugees, most of them destitute, who became at first heavy burdens on the DRV and the GVN, and ultimately political and military assets for both regimes. For the United States, the plight of these peoples lent humanitarian dimensions to its policy toward Vietnam, and new perspectives to its economic and military assistance.

2. Exodus to South Vietnam

In accordance with Article 1 of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, 190,000 troops of the French Expeditionary Corps were moved from North Vietnam to the South. In addition, some 900,000 civilians exercised their option under Article 14 (d) of the Armistice. While no wholly reliable statistics exist, there is agreement among several authorities that the figures presented by the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (ICC), citing chiefly the Saigon Government as its source, are generally correct: 40/

Figures of Movement of Population in Vietnam Under Article 14 (d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Zone to South Zone</th>
<th>Period Ending</th>
<th>Total arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.5.55</td>
<td>By air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>By sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Across provisional demarcation line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>By other means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                         | By air        | By sea        | Across provisional demarcation line | By other means | Total |
|                         | 213,635       | 550,824       | 12,344                               | 41,324         | 818,127 |

Estimate of arrivals not registered (Figs. given by the State of Vietnam in April)

|                         | By air        | By sea        | Across provisional demarcation line | By other means | Total |
|                         |               |               |                                     |               | 70,000 |

Figs. given by PAVN

|                         | 19.5.55       | 20.7.55       | Up to 20.7.55                       | TOTAL         |
|                         | 4,749         |              |                                      | 892,876       |

The uncertainty of statistics concerning total numbers of refugees stems not only from DRV reluctance to report departures, but also the turbulent conditions which then obtained throughout Vietnam, where the French were in the process of turning over public administration
to Vietnamese, and where Saigon's communications with refugee relief operations in the field were at best tenuous. U.S. Department of State analysis in 1957 estimated the following composition and disposition of the refugees:

**Civilian Regroupees from the North, 1954-1955**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number (Approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Registered with GVN for refugee benefits</td>
<td>640,000 Vietnamese, 15,000 Nungs, 5,000 Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. French citizens resettled or repatriated by France</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chinese absorbed into Chinese community in South</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>745,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Remainder, 200,000 Vietnamese absorbed without aid, e.g., dependents of military, civil servants.)

The GVN director of refugee programs reported that the refugees were composed, by trade, as follows:

- Farmers---------------------76%
- Fishermen-----------------10%
- Artisans, small businessmen, students, government employees, professionals-----------------14%

But it was religious orientation which ultimately assumed the greatest importance in South Vietnam's political life: an estimated 65% of North Vietnam's Catholics moved to the South, more than 600,000 in all; these, with 2,000 northern Protestants, were settled in their own communities.

3. **Causes of the Exodus**

The flight from North Vietnam reflected apprehension over the coming to power of the Viet Minh. Institutionally, the Viet Minh were further advanced in North Vietnam than the South, and had in areas of the North under their control already conducted several experiments in social revolution.
In 1951, with the legalization of the Communist Party, an "economic leveling" program was launched, consisting of punitive taxes levied on the wealthy. In 1953, there was a short but sharp terror campaign, followed by a "Land Rent Reduction," which forced poor peasants into "land reform battalions" to administer "people's justice" to landlords and their families. These were only preliminaries, however, to the DRV's "Land Reform Campaign" of 1954 to 1956, which more systematically and terroristically struck at traditional wealth distribution. All of these undertakings were associated with the Viet Minh, and though mitigated by the victory over the French and the benign image of "Uncle Ho," they aroused rural resentment and fears.

But the flood of refugees also sprung from other sources. There were a few French, and 200,000 Vietnamese who had been French civil servants, or dependents of French soldiers, or retainers -- these had every reason to anticipate hostility. There were the ethnic people, who had been allied with the French during the war, and would probably have clashed with the North Vietnamese government whatever its policies. The Chinese shadow over the Viet Minh deepened Hmong fears, and strengthened tendencies within the Chinese community of Hanoi to split along Nationalist/Communist lines after the fashion of overseas Chinese throughout the Far East; many Chinese fled. Rich or landed Vietnamese could, with reason, be apprehensive over DRV policies toward the wealthy, and be drawn to the presumably more open South. A former ICC member has noted that there was a labor market in the South, and rumors of an impending corvee labor program in the labor surplus North -- both incentives to migrate. Viet Minh propaganda painted grim pictures of life in South Vietnam, and savagely attacked the French and Americans who were aiding refugees. In turn, French and American propaganda promoted recourse to migration to escape the terrors and injustice of communism. Voice of America was active in rebutting the Viet Minh radio, and battery radios were reportedly distributed to extend the audience for Western programs. Colonel Lansdale described a U.S. instigated black propaganda campaign of pamphlets and announcements, ostensibly Viet Minh in origin, aimed at discrediting the DRV, depreciating its currency, and adding to popular fears of its new powers. One outcome was rampant rumor. For example, the ICC source cited above reported that some refugees believed that the U.S. would use atomic bombs on the Viet Minh. Dr. Tom Dooley found refugees with a Viet Minh pamphlet showing a Hanoi map with three concentric circles of nuclear destruction -- conceivably, an example of Colonel Lansdale's handiwork.

Again, however, the salient political aspect of the migration was that most of the refugees were Catholics. Many northern Catholics, with a long history of persecution at the hands of non-Catholic Tonkinese, would probably have left with their French protectors whatever the character of the successor. But Catholic opposition to the Viet Minh during the war invited retribution, and Ngo Dinh Diem's ascendancy in Saigon was no doubt attractive to his northern co-religionists.
Moreover, almost as soon as the truce became effective, the Catholic bishops entered into a test of power with the Viet Minh, using their "self-defense forces" to balk DRV occupation. The response was predictably ruthless: Catholic villages were attacked by PAVN troops, and in two instances, inhabitants reportedly were massacred; churches were burned, Church property confiscated, priests tortured or jailed, and heavy taxes levied on Church lands and buildings. Among the consequences of that violence was a Catholic propaganda campaign against the Viet Minh -- e.g., the Virgin-had-gone-South theme -- and mass migrations of whole parishes. 46/

4. Exodus: Test of Geneva

The movement of refugees from North Vietnam quickly became a central point of international controversy. Both parties to the Geneva Agreement accused the other of violations in impeding the free egress of would-be migrants, and both sides were undoubtedly at least partially justified in their charges. Aside from the propaganda campaign, France -- with substantial American aid -- helped refugees with food, medicine, and transportation. American and French ships moved whole villages southward, and American and French charities provided for their well-being during the journey and after their arrival in their new homeland. The U.S. Government, besides assigning a Task Force of the Seventh Fleet to refugee assistance, furnished the Saigon Government with $56,000,000 in 1955, and $37,000,000 in 1956 for refugee relief and resettlement considering the outflow from North Vietnam "a convincing tribute to the Free World and an indictment of the Communists." At the same time, both the GVN and the U.S. actively discouraged migration from the South -- the GVN mainly by administrative obfuscation, the U.S. primarily through another propaganda campaign, targeted against Viet Minh in South Vietnam. 47/

DRV behavior toward refugees during the year in which "regroupment" was authorized has served then and since as an indictment of its character, and proof that it could not be expected to permit free elections. Leo Cherne of Look, and Dr. Tom Dooley dramatized the misery and fearfulness of the refugees for American audiences. 48/ Ngo Dinh Diem utilized refugees systematically to mobilize opinion in South Vietnam against Geneva, the ICC, and the DRV as well. 49/ Since the issue has become central to the American policy debate on Vietnam, Frank N. Trager, for example, has stated that, after the DRV perceived that the numbers moving south by far exceeded those coming north, the DRV was impelled to:

"...impose restrictions and brutal punishments on those who sought to go South. Summary arrests, denial of permits, intimidation by 'show trials' of those who served as leaders of the exodus, and executions served to inhibit the exercise of the option. Residual petitions affecting 95,000 persons in the North were presented to the International Control Commission. Nothing ever came of these. An unknown number were thus never allowed to
leave the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The refugee problem was one of the most far reaching issues at the time...."

This condemnation of the DRV was fairly well substantiated by U.S. intelligence. A U.S. Intelligence Advisory Committee report of 1955 quotes "usually reliable French intelligence reports" that after October 1954 three DRV regular infantry divisions, with local forces, were positioned to block refugee movement. These, with "voluminous reports from Catholic and other sources" indicated that the DRV, with armed forces, by barring refugees from local transport, and through economic penalties, was pursuing a deliberate policy to prevent departures. Article 14(d) of the Geneva Agreement obliged the DRV to assist the movement of would-be refugees, but GVN officials reported receiving only 15,000 refugees bearing official Viet Minh exit permits, including 6,300 who obtained their papers under direct ICC supervision. U.S. and French naval officers have attested that thousands of northerners literally escaped to their waiting ships. 51/

Again, no entirely dependable record exists. The ICC was impeded in its observations and reporting by "narrow and complicated administrative procedures in the areas in the control of the PAVN...." 52/ Of 119 investigations conducted by ICC mobile teams during the period, 34 dealt with violations of Article 14(d) alleged by first parties. Beyond these, however, DRV authorities submitted to the ICC 320,000 petitions from friends and relations of regroupees alleging that the French had forced evacuation, and "thousands" of petitions were received from French sources claiming that the DRV was obstructing those who wished to move South. 53/ After a survey of 25,000 refugees in the South, the ICC teams reported that "there was no foundation for the allegation that thousands were victims of a systematic propaganda and many of them wished to go back to the PAVN zone and none of the persons contacted by the teams complained of forced evacuation or expressed a desire to return...." 54/ Investigations in the North, however, did disclose that observance of Article 14(d) by the DRV was not uniformly satisfactory. The ICC majority report notes that: 55/

"(11) religious, social and local influences were used by both sides either to persuade persons to change their zone of residence or to dissuade them from exercising the freedom of choice regarding the zone in which they wanted to live.

"(111) the demand for permits and facilities under Article 14(d) was the largest in the areas under the control of the PAVN and it was generally met except in the areas of Nghe An and Ha Tinh...."

The named areas were predominantly Catholic, and in the village of Dau My, in the province of Nghe An, the ICC team did report on a clash between the civil populace and troops of the DRV in which at least
12 villagers were killed; in another locality, Ba Iang, other incidents of violence were reported which led to 200 arrests. 56/ It was the view of the Indian and Polish members of the ICC, however, that despite these incidents "by the 18th of May (1955) the bulk of the persons who wanted to change the zone of their residence had succeeded in doing so." The Canadian member dissented and submitted a minority report detailing other examples of forceful obstruction of refugees by DRV authorities or crowds, and concluded these were "deliberately planned." Moreover, the Canadians were convinced that the DRV had so effectively restricted ICC inspections that: "it's still not possible to say whether all persons wishing to move from one zone to the other have been able to do so." 57/ Estimates of the numbers of persons prevented from migrating from North Vietnam range from Asian scholar Ellen Hammer's "several fold" those who left, and Diem's estimate of twice the number who reached the South, to Robert Shaplen's "no more than 400,000," and B.S.N. Marti of the ICC, who thinks a number approaching 2,000 likely. 58/

5. Impact of the Exodus: North

Whatever the DRV's intentions concerning the exodus, the numbers of refugees who were permitted to depart speaks for itself: if the estimate of 200,000 is correct, the DRV witnessed the flight of 1 out of every 13 of its citizens at a time when, ostensibly, votes and labor were important to its future. It should be noted that the DRV capitalized upon the abandoned land and other property of the refugees in its initial wealth redistribution schemes, and thus had motive to encourage, rather than impede, departures. 59/ The timing of the uproar with the ICC over violations of Article 14(d) suggests an answer: the incidents observed by the ICC in the North, as well as manifestations in the South of discontent with Saigon's observance of the agreement, multiplied after October, 1954, and peaked toward May, 1955, indicating that the DRV pursued a progressively more ruthless policy on departures. 60/ In seeking to attenuate the outflow, the DRV undoubtedly resorted to stringent measures, at least in certain localities. Whether these measures approached the depravities depicted by Trager and others cannot be adjudicated with present evidence, but it is clear that refugees provided an early and severe test of the DRV's capability for humane and democratic action consistent with the Geneva Settlement -- and in the eyes of many observers in South Vietnam and the West, the DRV failed abjectly, seriously damaging its position vis-a-vis the plebescite. 61/ Within North Vietnam, the refugee experience developed deep divisions between the DRV and rural Catholics which were to persist more than a year after the Geneva movement arrangement expired.

6. Impact of the Exodus: South

For the GVN, the influx of 900,000 people presented problems of paralyzing proportions. Within a few months of Ngo Dinh Diem's taking office, Saigon was ringed with shabby encampments whose inhabitants were wholly dependent on the already overburdened government. Had
it not been for U.S. aid, many of the refugees might never have reached the South, and without U.S. aid there, many might have perished. The U.S. Navy moved 310,968 persons in its "Operation Exodus." The $93 million the GVN received from the U.S. comprised 97% of the funds it dispensed for these purposes, nearly $100 per refugee in a country with a lower national income per capita. 62/ This official aid, plus substantial assistance from American charities, combined with a remarkably energetic and imaginative Vietnamese administration, succeeded by 1957 in providing decent habitation and livelihood for all but a few of the refugees -- a genuinely laudable accomplishment, which must stand with the defeat of the sects among Diem's crowning achievements. 63/

Because of the GVN's undertakings for the refugees, the Geneva "regroupment" turned out, at least initially, very much to its advantage: it gained nearly 1 million loyal citizens adamently opposed to reunification were it to mean their return to DRV rule, whose recounted experiences with the Viet Minh buttressed the moral fiber of the South. Here were whole communities largely dependent on the GVN, untouched by the armed religious sects, and hostile to the Viet Minh, from which Diem could recruit reliable political and military cadres. Here were masses disposed to follow Diem uncritically, easily manipulated for political purposes by Diem or his family. Here, for aid-dispensing Americans, were Vietnamese whose needs were basic, and who proved capable of absorbing simple, quick-return, highly visible forms of assistance.

The GVN began to politicize the refugee communities almost immediately. For example, in July, 1955, when the DRV appealed to Diem to commence consultation towards the plebescite, an apparently well-directed mob of refugees attacked the hotel quarters of the ICC. 64/ Some 20,000 of the refugees were moved together to a sparsely settled tract in the Mekong Delta of 100,000 acres, which was cleared, plowed and irrigated with substantial American technical assistance and 100 tractors; this, the Cai San project, became a showcase of American aid for visitors. 65/ In a much smaller, yet perhaps more significant instance, the GVN formed small, black-pajamaed "civic action" cadres for the purpose of building communications between Saigon and the villages; although the original idea had been to use Saigon bureaucrats, these failed to volunteer, and the bulk of the teams were eventually manned by northern refugees. 66/ Later, refugee communities were transplanted to the frontiers to enhance both the local economy and security there. 67/ The GVN was not ungrateful, and eventually the preferred positions in the Army and the bureaucracy began to be filled with refugee Catholics and other northerners.

In the long run, however, Diem squandered the advantage the Geneva regroupment brought him. His policies kept the refugees an unassimilated, special interest group, which produced further distortions in an already stressed polity. They in turn projected in rural areas an unfavorable image of the GVN, which probably figured in its eventual rejection by most Cochinchinese and non-Catholic Annamites: a government
whose protection and largess were extended preferentially to Catholics and northerners. 68/

7. Southerners Regrouped North

Whether or not at the time of Geneva the DRV leaders genuinely expected the plebiscite of 1956, the Viet Minh of Annam and Cochinchina were apparently instructed through their Communist Party cadre that elections would be held. Thousands of Vietnamese left the South under the regroupment provisions of the Settlement. Upon cadre assurances of return, they staked family ties, ancestral lands, and fortunes.

Unfortunately, we know little still about the Southern regroupees in the North, and less about the Viet Minh who stayed behind when their comrades departed. The reports of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam record the movement of only 4,269 civilians from the South to north of the 17th parallel. 69/ After April 1955, as reported by the ICC, refugees applied to the Saigon authorities, in such numbers that the GVN proved unable to meet demands for permits or transportation. Demonstrations occurred, and special arrangements by the ICC and the French were necessitated. Nonetheless, the total number thus formally involved in ICC reported moves was less than 5,000. 70/ The very sizable migration in 1954 of Viet Minh from the French controlled zone aboard Polish and Soviet ships to the North has not been reported authoritatively. An estimated 90,000 armed Viet Minh departed. An Indian member of the ICC published in 1964 the following figures, which correspond with the totals furnished by the French and the Poles, and which appear on present evidence to be as reliable as any: 71/

Viet Minh Departures for DRV
1954-1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Area</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Que Quang - Binh Dinh</td>
<td>Warriors, 64,000</td>
<td>Luggage, 87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ham Tan-Xuyen Moc</td>
<td></td>
<td>244 vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaine des Joncs</td>
<td>Admin Cadre, 20,000</td>
<td>1 tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cau Mau</td>
<td>Liberated, 30,000</td>
<td>28 artillery pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Families, 43,000</td>
<td>3384 tons supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>130,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>130,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the total, there were a significant number of Montagnards -- Bernard Fall states 10,000 -- and children. A Viet Cong lieutenant colonel, captured in 1961, then one of the senior officers of the Viet Cong intelligence services, has confirmed that Highlanders and 10,000 children were among the regroupees, and that DRV was taking pains to educate both groups well.
Concerning numbers of Viet Minh left behind, figures are even more vague. U.S. intelligence as of 1956 accepted 8,000 as its best estimate, of which 5,000 were armed and organized in skeletal military units; there were reports of strengths up to 10,000. 72/ A more recent U.S. Intelligence appraisal states that: 73/ "While the number of hard-core Communists remaining in South Vietnam after 1954 cannot be confirmed, French and South Vietnamese estimates, based on observations of friendly military commanders in the field, placed the figure at 5,000 'armed Viet Minh.' However, this is clearly a conservative estimate since it does not include political agents or 'soft core' members or supporters...."

In summary, best current estimates indicate:

Disposition of Viet Minh in South 1954-55

Moved North

By Polish and Soviet Ships

90,000 Armed Viet Minh

40,000 Dependents

130,000 Including: 10,000 Highlanders

10,000 Children

By other transport

4,269

134,269 TOTAL

Left Behind

5,000 Armed Viet Minh

3,000 Political Cadre

Unknown dependents of Viet Minh

8. Viet Minh Motivations

Interviews with captured or defected regroupees, and captured Viet Cong documents, establish that the DRV leadership told the Viet Minh in 1954 that the general elections and unification mentioned in Article 14 of the Geneva Agreement would occur in July 1956, as asserted in the Final Declaration of the Conference. 74/ Accordingly, unlike the refugees fleeing south, who evidently accepted permanent separation from their birthplace, most of the Viet Minh who were regrouped to the North expected to be separated from their homes and families only two years. There were a variety of motives or emotions involved, but whatever response the cadre evoked in their
followers, it was clearly understood by all rank and file that the regroupment instructions were an order, and most responded as did one POW: "I did my duty as a soldier." Some were told to go; some to marry, then go; some to stay. After the initial regroupment in 1954, no further large-scale movement northward was encouraged by the DRV. The outburst of enthusiasm for regroupment which resulted in demonstrations in Saigon in April 1955, and DRV support for same, can be attributed to growing conviction that Diem might succeed in his drive for political control, and that he or the U.S. would not permit general elections, or to a tactical cover for the DRV's own difficulties with clamoring would-be refugees. 75/

As of March 1967, a report was available on 23 Viet Minh who stayed behind in 1954. These men had been systematically interviewed, and while they comprise a slender sample, their replies give no evidence that violence or sabotage were included in the initial orders of any; rather, they received organizational and propaganda missions: 76/

"POW: We were given training about the Geneva treaty. We were instructed to work normally with the peasants, to earn a living and to explain to them the clauses of the treaty. We pointed out that general elections would be held in 1956."

Another distributed leaflets, hung posters and organized meetings to promote the plebescite. One had orders "to work as a core cadre exhorting the population to demand negotiations with North Vietnam for a general election." Still another distributed petitions demanding elections, trade relations with DRV, and peace.

However, this "political action" never promised much, since the GVN never seemed disposed toward holding the elections. When in July 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem dismissed with finality any prospect for consultations, the lines began to be drawn between the "stay-behind" cadre and the Saigon government. 77/ After 1956, the last illusions were dispelled, and the Viet Minh apparatus went wholly underground. 78/

D. Arming of the North and the South

1. Provisions For Arms Control

The Geneva Conference intended to fix a ceiling on foreign military personnel, bases and arms in Vietnam corresponding to the levels of July 1954. Within months of the Conference, the DRV and the GVN were each led to believe that the other was contravening those arms control provisions of the Settlement. The DRV could claim, with justification, that the United States was introducing new arms and personnel, assuming an amplified military role in Vietnam, and acquiring bases. The GVN could accuse the DRV, again with justification, of building
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

a massive army, and modernizing it with Communist bloc aid. 79/ The ICC, discredited in its attempts to cope with observance of Article 14(d) of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities..." regarding refugees, was further devalued as a stabilizing influence when forced to admit that it was impotent in inspecting compliance with Articles 16, 17, 18, and 19: 80/

"Article 16...the introduction into Viet-Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited...."

"Article 17...the introduction into Viet-Nam of any reinforcement in the form of all types of arms, munitions, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and armoured vehicles, is prohibited...."

"Article 18...the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Viet-Nam territory.

"Article 19...no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zone of either party; the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

In June, 1958, the ICC issued the following statement concerning its inability to enforce the provisions of Articles 16 and 17: 81/

"The persistence of the Parties in not accepting the Commission's interpretation of the provisions of the Agreements and their failure to implement the recommendations made to them by the Commission have rendered it difficult for the Commission to supervise the implementation of the Articles concerned. The Commission will, as hitherto, continue to discharge its duties under the Geneva Agreements, but would like to emphasize that the lack of cooperation from the Parties seriously affects the effectiveness of its supervision and control. The Commission can, therefore, discharge its responsibilities only to the extent permitted by the Parties, and not as decided by the Commission in accordance with the Geneva Agreements. The Commission hopes that in the future a larger measure of cooperation will be forthcoming from the Parties and the difficulties which have persisted so far will cease to hinder its activities."

The test of the Geneva Agreement also allowed for the rotation of personnel, and the replacement of "destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up" material, arms, and munitions, provided that advance notice
of movements be furnished the ICC, and specified points of entry and departure be employed. Neither the DRV nor the GVN cooperated with the ICC in all respects. The U.S., though it took steps to maintain the appearances of compliance through 1960, especially on personnel ceilings, and although it considered itself hampered by the Settlement, was able to provide in that time over $50,000,000 per annum worth of military assistance to the GVN. 82/ The failure of the Geneva Settlement to control the arming of Vietnam, with its concomitant heightened fears and potential for violence, no less than in the case of the plebescite and the refugees, was directly antecedent to the insurgency in South Vietnam.

2. PAVN Modernizes

At the close of hostilities, the Viet Minh probably had some 300,000 to 400,000 men under arms -- about 130,000 regulars -- of which all but about 70,000 were concentrated in North Vietnam and Laos. (See Map, ff.) 83/ The French had fielded 420,000 troops, including about 200,000 Vietnamese. Both sides received extensive aid from non-combatants, the French chiefly from the U.S., and the DRV chiefly from China. One recent estimate puts relative volumes of aid as follows: 84/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S. Aid</th>
<th>Chinese Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>7,200 tons/month</td>
<td>10 to 20 tons/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>10,000 tons/month</td>
<td>500 to 600 tons/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>4,000 tons/month (as of Dien Bien Phu)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences between the two aid programs were, of course, significant beyond tonnages. The Chinese aid was largely infantry arms and ammunition, while U.S. shipments ranged across the whole costly and complicated inventory of the U.S. armed forces. More importantly, in contrast with the highly visible U.S. participation, Chinese aid was clandestine; neither the donor nor the recipient has made the aid program to this date, and in maintaining the flow without attribution the DRV developed procedures which stood it in good stead after Geneva.

The DRV, from all U.S. intelligence has been able to discern, commenced the reorganization and refitting of its Peoples' Army of Vietnam (PAVN) concurrently with occupation of Tonkin behind the withdrawing French. U.S. evidence indicated that shipments of military materiel from China and the Soviet significantly exceeded in kind and

**VIET MINH TROOP STRENGTH**

(Thousands)

- Popular (guerrilla): 100
- Regional: 70
- Regular: 160

Total: 330

In North Vietnam: 80%
amount that required for replacement, and that, rather, the DRV steadily modernized and expanded its forces during the decade after Geneva. 85/ In the first six months after the truce alone, U.S. intelligence reported that PAVN introduced from China, concealing the movements from the ICC, more than 150 pieces of field and anti-aircraft artillery, 500 mortars, 9,000 automatic weapons, 500 recoiless rifles, 400 military vehicles, and substantial amounts of ammunition. 86/ Thereafter, the U.S. was convinced that regular infusions of modern equipment from the DPR and the Soviet Union supported extensive reorganization and growth of DRV armed forces.

Trends in DRV Armed Strength 87/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAVN</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>Provincial Forces</th>
<th>Armed Public Security Force</th>
<th>Armed Militia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to U.S. estimates, the period 1954-1956 was devoted to regrouping and reorganizing. New divisions were formed, incorporating Viet Minh from South Vietnam regrouped to the North per the Geneva Agreements. Overage and unfit personnel were weeded out, and intensive political indoctrination begun. Divisions were deployed into the countryside, with the new southern formations concentrated in areas of civil unrest. 88/ In 1957 and 1958 improvements in organization and control were inaugurated, PAVN taking on the structure and trappings of a Bloc-style professional army, with regularized pay scales, insignia, rank, and the like. During 1958 and 1959, to meet goals for manning collective farms, some divisions were reduced in personnel and converted to brigades. Conscription was introduced, the Armed Public Security Forces -- frontier and internal security troops -- formed, and the air and naval forces elevated in status. In 1960 and 1961 additional divisions were reduced to brigades, but since diversions to agriculture diminished, this was presumably to provide smaller, more manageable formations for the infiltration then underway into Laos, and in prospect for South Vietnam. In sum, with Bloc aid, the DRV more than doubled its effective infantry divisions from 6 in 1954 to 14 by 1962. U.S. intelligence credited the PAVN in 1954 with the capability, by concentrating all its resources on a single objective, of mounting an attack of limited duration using three divisions supported by direct artillery fire. By 1961, the U.S. rated the North Vietnam Army (NVA) as capable of a five division offensive backed by substantially greater logistic and combat support, including indirect artillery fires. 89/ The U.S. did not know...
with certainty much further concerning the quality or quantity of
Bloc aid during this period. Reports of the presence in North Vietnam
of Soviet-design small arms, artillery, tanks, and trucks were received
regularly by U.S. intelligence, but the proportion of these which were
supplied by the Chinese could not be established. U.S. estimates held
that Soviet aid predominated up until about 1960, and that thereafter
Hanoi looked increasingly to Peking for supply of such items, as well
as for ammunition of all types. 90/ By 1964, except for some remaining
stocks of French weapons, all NVA mortars and recoilless rifles were
reported to be of Chinese manufacture. Similarly, small arms such as
SKS 7.62 mm rifles and K-53 and K-54 7.62 mm machine guns, though of
Russian design, were thought to have been supplied by China. For heavier,
more complex items (e.g., armored vehicles, heavy artillery, antiaircraft
systems, aircraft, and the like), the DRV remained dependent on the
Soviets.

3. The French Arms

In South Vietnam, the most significant military develop­
ment in the immediate aftermath of Geneva was the withdrawal of the
200,000 men of the French Expeditionary Corps by 1956, apparently
removing with them an estimated $200 million worth of undetermined
kinds of military equipment from $1,300 million in MDAP materiel fur­
nished them by the United States during the period 1950-1954. How
precisely this draw-down affected the ceilings envisaged by Articles
16 and 17 of the Agreement was, of course, never established. 91/ The
attention of the DRV and the ICC thereafter was fixed on the Republic of
Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF), and upon the United States military
assistance program for RVNAF.

4. RVNAF Revitalized

The French brought the Vietnamese Army into being in 1948,
its strength in 1949 being reported as 25,000, led by French officers
and noncommissioned officers. 92/ That strength rose eight-fold during
the war, to 50,000 in 1950; 65,000 in 1951; 150,000 in 1952; and 200,000
in 1954, including 1500 navy and 3500 air force personnel. Dien Bien Phu
and its aftermath resulted in widespread desertions, especially from
Vietnamese units being moved from north to south during the regroupment. 93/
Thereafter, under urging from the U.S., French officers and noncommissioned
leaders were withdrawn, and a combined U.S.-French training mission was
established to develop the national army. New force structures for mili­
tary and paramilitary forces evolved, with particular emphasis upon head­
quartes, staffs, and logistic units. Strengths for the Republic of
Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), for the same years given above for DRV
armed forces, were as follows:
### Trends in GVN Armed Strength 94/ (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Mar Corps</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>Provincial Forces</th>
<th>Coastal Forces</th>
<th>Militia Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A sampling of arms is represented below:

### U.S. Army MAB Ordinance in Vietnam 95/ (Selected Items)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Deliveries FY 50-54</th>
<th>Inventory 1 Jan 53</th>
<th>Inventory 30 Nov 63</th>
<th>Deliveries FY 55-64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, 30 cal</td>
<td>73,889</td>
<td>48,051</td>
<td>303,635</td>
<td>321,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, 30 cal</td>
<td>111,667</td>
<td>83,828</td>
<td>122,166</td>
<td>118,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, BAR</td>
<td>13,145</td>
<td>11,839</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td>22,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMG</td>
<td>77,342</td>
<td>63,099</td>
<td>55,743</td>
<td>61,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG, 30 cal</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>5,617</td>
<td>5,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR, 57 mm</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How, 105 mm</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How, 155 mm</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mort, 60 mm</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>2,922</td>
<td>2,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mort, 81 mm</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mort, 4.2 in</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, light</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Car</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. U.S. Aid: SEATO

The role of the United States in the training and equipping of these forces mirrored the misapprehensions of other aspects of U.S. policy. In 1954 Secretary of State Dulles had drawn two principal lessons from the First Indochina War: (1) that it was impossible to support a belligerent in such a war unless he embodied the nationalist aspirations of the people, and (2) collective action on behalf of that belligerent could not be drawn together amid the war. 96 The first took the policy form of U.S. insistence upon a truly national army for South Vietnam, i.e., an army entirely free of French command. The second materialized as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. On 8 September 1954, the U.S., U.K. and France joined with Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand and agreed that: 97

Article IV

"1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes...."

"2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

"3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned...."

By a Protocol to the SEATO Treaty, executed the same day, the Parties:

"...unanimously designate for the purpose of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam...."

Shortly after SEATO was formed, the U.S. and France agreed on direct U.S. aid for the Diem government; a joint communiqué issued 29 September reflected the U.S. belief that the French would remain a military power in South Vietnam: 98
In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the further development of national forces for this purpose, the representatives of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces of its Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government concerned, within the limits permitted under the Geneva Agreements, and to an extent to be determined...The channel for French and United States economic aid, budgetary support, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will be direct to that state...."

On 23 October 1954, President Eisenhower, in a letter to Diem, offered "to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." Direct U.S. military assistance to Diem began in early 1955. As mentioned above, by spring, 1956, the French military command had been dissolved, and the Expeditionary Corps withdrawn, so that the U.S. thereafter alone bore the principal burdens of assisting the GVN to build its defenses.

6. U.S. Aid: MAP

U.S. policy on how RVNAF should develop vacillated accordingly. Initially, we considered that the French forces and the SEATO mantle would suffice for the purposes of shielding the GVN from external aggression, and that as Lt. General John W. ("Iron Mike") O'Daniel, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, put it in February, 1955: 100/

"The (Vietnamese) Army will be above all, according to American ideas on the subject, a police force capable of spotting Communist guerrillas and Communist efforts at infiltration."

The withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps, however, cast RVNAF in a new role, and demanded they be prepared for conventional combat, capable of staving off an attack from the North until U.S. and SEATO aid could be landed. 101/ In June, 1956, in the wake of the French withdrawal, General O'Daniel reported to the American Friends of Vietnam that: 102/

"The Vietnamese Army is now organized into regiments and divisions. In case of an armed attack by the Vietminh from the North, it is capable of effecting enough delay to allow for additional forces to be employed in time to save the country...."

To this threat MAAG turned its attention from 1955 to 1960, with such success that General O'Daniel's successor, Lt. General Samuel T. ("Hanging Sam") Williams could justifiably assert (on the occasion of his retirement
"In 1954 the Communist army of North Vietnam could have crossed the seventeenth parallel and walked into Saigon standing up. Today if they tried it, they would have one nasty fight on their hands."

The Army of Vietnam (ARVN) assumed American forms, with divisions, corps headquarters, and general staffs -- an "upgrading" which appealed to the Vietnamese military, denied such pretensions under the French. Although the MAAG continued to recognize a requirement for assisting ARVN capabilities against guerrillas and infiltrators, the primary efforts of American and Vietnamese soldiers alike were directed toward improving conventional defense capability through 1960, and ARVN became mechanized, ponderous, road bound, and preoccupied with its supply and staffing functions. Indeed, MAAG viewed ARVN "pacification" duties as an obstruction to progress. The internal security of the nation devolved upon two paramilitary forces: the Self-Defense Corps, and the Civil Guard, U.S. aid for both of which comprised an unhappy chapter in the U.S.-GVN relationship. The Self-Defense Corps (SDC) was created in April, 1956, as a village militia, and received U.S. assistance from the MAAG in the form of funds and shoulder arms. Training of the SDC was left to ARVN. The Civil Guard (CG) was established in April 1955, as a paramilitary force which was to operate under the province chiefs. American aid to the CG was provided through a group from Michigan State University under contract to both the U.S. and the GVN. Its organization, equipment, and utilization became a point of controversy almost at once: the Public Administration Division of the Michigan State group conceived of the CG as a rural constabulary, recruited locally, trained and equipped for police operations; Diem preferred a more military organization, heavier in equipment, and organized for sustained combat. In terms of later U.S. concepts of "counterinsurgency," the early judgment of the MSU group was probably correct: a rural constabulary close to the people might have helped Diem meet the early challenges of the insurgency, especially in the field of intelligence. However, with MAAG support, Diem's ideas prevailed, and the CG became a force competitive to ARVN. In actuality both the SDC and the CG were quite ineffective in providing internal security. Their arms, equipment and training were rudimentary. ARVN used its training responsibilities for them as a dumping ground for inept officers. Through them, however, U.S. small arms were channeled into the countryside, there to augment the arsenals of dissidents. And the behavior of these ill-prepared levies probably did little to enhance GVN rapport with the farmers.

From the outset, the American aid program for South Vietnam was overwhelmingly military. There was doubtless, always a limit to how much economic and other non-military aid the GVN needed, wanted, or could efficiently absorb, but primary emphasis in U.S. aid programs from the outset was placed upon security -- with Diem's agreement, as his 1956 letter (supra.) indicates. In the first few years, about 70% of all U.S. aid was for the security establishment.
non-military economic aid was furnished in the form of "commodity imports," an arrangement in which the U.S. purchased imports for Vietnamese who paid for them in Vietnamese currency into a "counterpart fund." The counterpart funds, in turn, were made available for support of the GVN budget -- in 1956, 51% of all GVN expenditures were for defense.

7. Implications: U.S. Role

Much criticism leveled at U.S. assistance for the GVN has cited its military character as evidence that the U.S. deliberately undermined or ignored the Geneva Settlement. SEATO has been similarly suspect, its formation having drawn an immediate DRV protest to the ICC in September 1954, that the treaty violated Article 19 of the "Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities..." forbidding alliances. \[107/\]

However, U.S. official records reveal that the nature and direction of U.S. aid programs, with their emphasis on security, were dictated by no conscious effort to contravene the Settlement, but by the desires of the GVN, and by a mutual adjustment to the circumstances of French withdrawal. In late 1954, J. Lawton Collins, the U.S. Special Representative in Vietnam, recommended an ARVN of 77,000 and reported the French willing to have MAAG expand slowly beyond the Settlement-fixed mid-1954 level of 342. \[108/\] The JCS initially (September, 1954) viewed the Settlement as too restrictive, and enjoined against MAAG's accepting the mission of training RVNAF. However, Defense eventually took the view that while State Department would have to rule on a possible increase in MAAG strength, its 342 personnel were probably "capable of furnishing training assistance to develop Army and Navy internal security forces..." The build-up of DRV forces was perceived, and the JCS view was that this threat entailed retention of at least four divisions of French forces in the South until they could be replaced by combat effective RVNAF divisions. \[109/\]

There followed a period of about six months, December 1954 to May 1955, in which the U.S. government debated within its councils whether or not to throw its entire support behind Ngo Dinh Diem, or to seek alternatives. However, while this debate was in progress, the U.S. followed through in adopting direct aid to GVN, and in extending its advisory effort with ARVN to replace French advisors -- steps explained as authorized by the Geneva Agreement in terms of rotation of personnel, and of implementing a 1950 pentalateral agreement for military aid among the U.S., France, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. \[110/\] Ultimately, Ngo Dinh Diem's success in breaking the power of the sects, as well as the inability of Americans to identify other leaders for the GVN, won him unequivocal American political support and agreement to support an RVNAF of about 150,000. Thus buttressed, Diem refused to open consultations on the plebiscite in July 1955, and in October held an election of his own in which Bao Dai was deposed, and himself installed as head of state of the GVN. Diem then felt confident in requesting the French to remove their forces from Vietnam. The French withdrawal came certainly before ARVN was ready to replace the Expeditionary Corps divisions, and created urgency for MAAG to help develop minimal conventional defense capabilities.
8. Implications: DRV and GVN Protests

By the summer of 1955, the unfolding of U.S.-GVN policy prompted the DRV to appeal directly to the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. In a letter of August 17, 1955, Pham Van Dong, DRV Prime Minister, insisted that "the political question in Vietnam should be settled according to the Geneva Agreements," and requested the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. to "take all necessary measures in order to guarantee observance...." 111/ This request was indorsed by the Chinese on October 31, 1955, and referred in November by the Co-chairmen to other members of the Geneva Conference for comment. The DRV promptly called for reconvening the Geneva Conference; the CPR quickly supported the demand. On February 18, 1956, the U.S.S.R. concurred, and proposed to the U.K. the summoning of a new Conference. The DRV call was based principally upon accusations that the GVN was frustrating execution of the political provisions of the Settlement, but a U.S.S.R. note to the U.K. added the charge that in South Vietnam, "foreign military bases are being set up and attempts are being made to include South Vietnam in a military bloc." The U.K. responses were cool to the idea that a reconvened Geneva Conference "would necessarily provide the quickest or most satisfactory means of reaching agreement," and on April 9, 1956, the U.K. made public a note to the U.S.S.R. rejecting its accusations concerning military bases and blocs, and countercharging "massive military expansion in the North," noting that while French troops had been withdrawn from the South, the army in North Vietnam had been increased from 7 to 20 (sic) divisions since 1954. 112/ The U.K. further took the position that the GVN was not bound by the Geneva Agreements. The outcome was a letter from the Co-chairmen to the DRV and the GVN enjoining cooperation to keep the peace, and asking notification when the recipients felt the time propitious for consultations preliminary to plebescite.

In July, 1959, the government of South Vietnam published a White Paper, summarizing the "violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet Minh communists." 113/ In it the "authorities of the North" were charged with a "policy of aggression and subversion," in that contrary to their 1954 pledges, they obstructed the movements of refugees, conducted widespread destruction and sabotage in South Vietnam, introduced large quantities of arms and ammunition into North Vietnam, and with communist cadres in South Vietnam pursued a scheme to overthrow the Republic of Vietnam. The GVN claimed that between September, 1954, and June, 1959, a total of 3,561 caches of arms and ammunition had been discovered in South Vietnam, of which 303 had been reported to the ICC. Although the 303 "most important" caches so reported contained only 679 rifles, 142 machine guns, 182 mortars, 49 pistols, and assorted mines, grenades and other munitions, the government of South Vietnam construed these to convey the intention of further attacks against the national government..."in violation of the Agreements...." It noted that the United Kingdom had cited in 1956 an increase in the DRV armed forces from 7 to 20 divisions and evoked the 1958 denunciation of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs for the DRV's increasing its military strength from a 1954 total of 200,000 to 550,000. The White Paper castigated Hanoi for "introducing 600 to 700 Chinese instructors" and noted that "the number of Russian and Chinese advisors amounts to several thousand in all echelons of the Army." Noting that the Geneva Accords had proscribed using one zone for conducting of aggression against
the other, the GVN condemned what were termed "national movements, such as 'Patriotic Front,' 'United Front,' or 'Fatherland Front,'" which were in reality of communist inspiration...simply and solely directing communist propagandas and subversive agencies in the zone controlled by the national government." It claimed that responsive to orders from Hanoi, these organizations were conducting a systematic campaign of terror and subversion.

During the two and one half years from 1957 through July, 1959, 174 assassinations involving 10 servicemen, 20 civil guards, 65 village officials and 59 civilians were reported by the GVN to the ICC. The White Paper concluded on the note that:

"Contrary to their official declarations, the Viet-Minh Communists have turned their back upon the interests of the Vietnamese people.

"Is it a question of the reunification of the country? They have conceived of it as a simple subordination to Red Imperialism. In North Vietnam, democratic liberties are scoffed at, sacred human rights trampled under foot. How could the Vietnamese people express their real will under this reign of terror where liberty is nothing but a word?

"Desirous to realize the reunification of the country through freedom and in freedom, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly, but in vain, summoned the Communists to re-establish and respect the fundamental liberties to which human beings are entitled. This appeal was made in order to create a favorable atmosphere for really free general elections.

"Not only are the Viet-Minh Communists enemies of democracy and freedom, but they continue to mobilize their forces to sabotage peace in this part of the world.

"The unceasing reinforcement of the Communist armed forces, the importation, in great numbers, of arms and munitions into North Vietnam, secret arm and ammunition dumps left in the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam, subversive manoeuvres carried out by Communist cadres constitute tangible and irrefutable evidence of their deliberately aggressive intentions."

9. Implications: ICC Impotence

In the meantime, the ICC tried to engage the Geneva Conference machinery to provide a substitute for France in Vietnam, with no better success than the DRV. Acting on an ICC report, the U.K. made representations to the GVN in December, 1955, on behalf of the ICC, but received no reply until April, 1956, in which the GVN promised to cooperate with the ICC, but again declined to accept responsibility for the Geneva Settlement. In May, 1956, the Co-chairmen asked the ICC to remain functioning beyond its contemplated termination in July, 1956, despite the informality of its relations with the GVN. The ICC agreed, on May 27, 1956, to "continue dealing with the parties concerned on the basis of 'status quo.'" 114/ "Status quo" by that time involved the ICC directly with the U.S. aid program. For example, in April, 1956, the GVN notified the ICC through the French that it had accepted a U.S. proposal to augment the U.S. MAAG in May 1956, with a 350-member group to be called the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), tasked to assist in the evacuation of U.S. military equipment and supplies left
behind upon the French withdrawal. Despite an ICC request to delay deployment while the matter was under advisement, TERM personnel arrived on schedule, and without ICC sanction. In 1957 the ICC protested the circumstances of TERM's introduction, but was content with requesting a periodic report of its activities. 115/ The same 1957 report delivered an ICC opinion that SEATO was not a U.S.-GVN alliance prescribed by the Geneva Settlement, and a 1958 report put the ICC on record (the Polish member dissenting) that the GVN might be given "credit" for the war material withdrawn by the French prior to 30 June 1956 in accepting like equipment from the U.S. 116/ A 1959 report ruled that Bien Hoa was not a new military base, and authorized TERM to remain until 31 December 1960. In 1960 the ICC acceded to an increase in the MAAG from 342 to 685 personnel. 117/ Nonetheless, it is clear on the record that U.S. and GVN cooperation with the ICC was little more than pro forma. Convinced that the ICC was impotent in inhibiting the behavior or restricting the arming of the DRV, both the U.S. and the GVN pursued their goals without serious regard for the fixed levels of arms envisaged at Geneva, or for attempts by the ICC to regulate arms. Both governments appreciated that the inability of the other Geneva Conference powers to concert action, well demonstrated in the spring of 1956, constituted international condemnation of status quo in Vietnam, and while both apparently preferred to avoid controversy with the ICC, neither was disposed to consider the ICC or the Settlement it guarded as other than a secondary consideration to GVN security.

E. The Situation in 1956

On June 1, 1956, a prestigious group of citizens assembled in Washington as the "American Friends of Vietnam." They heard Senator John F. Kennedy characterize Vietnam as: 118/

"(1)...the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone in the arch, the finger in the dike...The fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation.

"(2)...Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia...the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians....

"(3)...Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little
Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents...If it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence...our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low.

"(4)...The key position of Vietnam in Southeast Asia...makes inevitable the involvement of this nation's security in any new outbreak of trouble."

Senator Kennedy was followed by Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, who declared that the U.S. sought: 119/

"To support a friendly non-Communist government in Vietnam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.

"To help the government of Vietnam establish the forces necessary for internal security.

"To encourage support for Free Vietnam by the non-Communist world.

"To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by eight ruinous years of civil and international war.

"Our efforts are directed first of all toward helping sustain the internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about 150,000 men, and mobile civil guard of some 45,000 and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level...."

Dr. Tom Dooley described emotionally the plight of the refugees from North Vietnam, and sketched in graphic terms Viet Minh terrorism. Professor Hans Morgenthau extolled the Geneva Settlement and status quo in Vietnam as a logical balancing of the interests of the powers concerned, and General O'Daniel described how the Vietnamese had been given the opportunity to select the type of military organization they like best, and had "followed the U.S. pattern."

But from Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem addressed a sober, reflective letter to the American Friends of Vietnam on the note that "we have arrived at a critical point in our national life." He concluded with the assertion that: "It is indispensable that our army have the where-withal to become increasingly capable of preserving the peace which we seek....Economic aid can be only effective once security is restored...." 120/

From Hanoi to the peoples of Southeast Asia, a commentary on the 1 June conference in Washington was broadcast in Vietnamese headlines:
"The American Colonialists Are the Most Dangerous Enemy of the People." 122/
The commentary castigated the American Friends of Vietnam for supporting Diem in "his sabotage of the Geneva Accords and opposition to the clauses relative to free general elections to unify the country. It is obvious that this association is an organization formed by the American imperialists to more cynically and bluntly intervene in the South...." and called for solidarity against the American intrusion.

However, July 20, 1956, the date the Geneva Conference had indicated for the plebescite on reunification, passed without incident. Years later, when controversy over the failure of the Geneva Settlement raged anew, the U.S. would point to the subsequent behavior of the DRV to demonstrate that its judgment was quite correct in arming the GVN, aiding the refugees, and insisting with Diem that conditions permitting free elections did not exist in North Vietnam. 123/ But in that summer of 1956, most such arguments appeared to be settled to the satisfaction of all parties except Ho Chi Minh.
IV. A. 6. FOOTNOTES


The Administration was severely criticized in public. Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, while the conference was in session on the eve of Dien Bien Phu's fall, asserted that: "American foreign policy has never in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal...We stand in clear danger of being left naked and alone in a hostile world." New York Times, May 7, 1954. Anthony Eden, Toward Peace in Indochina, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), ix-13. The Administration analysis of public record is in Secretary Dulles, Department of State Press Release No. 400, July 23, 1954. For "inner councils" see OCB, "Progress Report on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," NSC 5405, August 6, 1954) TS; and, NSC, "Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East" (NSC 5429, August 4, 1954) TS.

2. U.S. Department of State telegrams,

DULTE 187 from Geneva, 16 June 1954 (TS)
SECTO 553 from Geneva, 2 July 1954 (TS)
Dillon 32 from Paris, 2 July 1954 (TS)
SECTO 632 from Geneva, 17 July 1954 (TS)
SECTO 638 from Geneva, 18 July 1954 (TS)
SECTO 674 from Geneva, 18 July 1954 (TS)


34
5. Ibid., 53.


7. Department of State telegrams SECTO 632 and 645 of 17 and 18 July, 1954, respectively.


12. The French National Assembly ratified on 4 June 1954 two treaties, one providing for independence for Vietnam, the other for Vietnam's association as an equal with France in the French Union. The latter permitted Vietnam to determine subsequently the extent of association. The former recognized Vietnam "as a fully independent and sovereign State invested with all the competence recognized by international law." Vietnam agreed to assume France's part "in all the rights and obligations resulting from international treaties or conventions contracted by France on behalf or on account of the State of Vietnam or of any other treaties or conventions concluded by France on behalf of French Indochina as those acts concern Vietnam." U.S. Department of State, Verbatim Minutes of the Geneva Conference, VerbMin/3 (May 12, 1954), 99-101. Department of State telegram, Dulles to Paris, J398, June 4, 1955, (TS).


17. Dennis Warner, The Last Confucian (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964), 94-95; U.S. Department of State, telegrams as follows:

Paris 481, 5 August 1954
State to Paris for Dulles, TEDUL 14, 22 October 1954
Manila SECTO 50, 1 March 1955
Saigon 4661, 19 April 1955
Paris 4396, 9 April 1955
Paris 4576, 21 April 1955
Paris 4780, 24 April 1955

Also, CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "Possible Developments in South Vietnam" (NIE 631-2-55, 26 April 1955), TS; Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) from his Deputy, "Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Toward South Vietnam," (13 April 1955), TS; JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, "Indochina (Vietnam)" (9 May 1955), TS; Staff Study, OSD/ISA, 13 April 1955, "Programs for the Implementation of U.S. Policy Toward South Vietnam," TS.


20. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 5 May 1955, Part I.

23. Reported in the New York Times (March 5, 1956), and Economist (March 17, 1956).
27. Background Information..., op. cit., 83.
31. Ibid., Dept. of State N-765, "The Shift in U.S. Position...," op. cit.

37. NSC 5612/1 (September, 1956); NSC 5809 (2 April 1958). The First Indochina War culminated in Viet Minh military victory and the Geneva Conference of 1954, but during it a Vietnamese government under Bao Dai, like Ho Chi Minh's DRV claiming dominion over all the Vietnamese, but Nationalist, anti-Communist, and French-supported, came into being. From 1949 on, this nascent state provided the political alternative to the DRV; it was Bao Dai's regime which inherited South Vietnam, and a counterclaim to a unified nation, after the 1954 Geneva settlement. (Fall, The Two Vietnams, op. cit., 210-223).

The United States recognized Bao Dai's regime, the GVN, on February 7, 1950. We had no relations with the DRV, although for six months after the departure of the French from the DRV in 1955, we maintained a vice-consulate in Hanoi, withdrawing it after persistent DRV isolation and harassment. Since, the United States has maintained full relations with GVN, but not even a postal exchange with the DRV. (Ibid., 191, 194). However, although no formal U.S. recognition has been extended, we have acknowledged DRV sovereignty, at first implicitly, and then, after 1962, explicitly. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, the U.S. "observer" related U.S. policy toward the DRV to that we have pursued re North Korea and East Germany. U.S. recognition of, consistent relations with, and increasingly strong support of the GVN after Geneva, were not accompanied by public policy statements more directly aimed at changing the status quo in North Vietnam than that 1954 position. However, national policy papers of the period included the more ambitious objectives quoted.

38. Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 296-299; also Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (10 May 1956). Ho's statement may also have been an answer to Khrushchev's 11 April 1956 speech on "peaceful competition"; Cf. U.S. Dept. of State, Soviet World Outlook (Publication 6336, July 1959), 98.


40. The table is from Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (April 11, 1955 to August 10, 1955). (London: HMG, 1955), 30, App. IV. Cf. B.S.N. Murti, op. cit., 88-91. The U.S. Dept of State's "White Paper" of 1965 entitled Agression from the North mentioned "more than 900,000 refugees" who fled from North Vietnam. a/ Bernard Fall has used the figure 860,000 in his books and essays; b/ Fall also has reported that the French transported 610,000 refugees South. c/ The
U.S. Navy alone moved 310,848 refugees in "Operation Exodus," and although U.S. National Intelligence Estimates in 1955 mention 650,000 refugees from the North, a U.S. Department of State review of the issue in 1957 put the total at "nearly 900,000." The current (1964) National Intelligence Survey refers to "nearly a million." No better estimate is likely to be taken, given the paucity of reliable records.


c/ Fall, The Two Viet Nams, op. cit., 154; Fall, "How the French..." op.cit., 88.


49. E.g., a mob of refugees attacked the billets of the ICC in Saigon in July, 1955, just before the consultations came due, in an apparently manipulated protest. These and other uses of refugees by the GVN are elaborated in below.


52. ICC, Fourth Interim Report..., op. cit., 12.

53. Ibid., 11, 21. The Canadians reported 11,422 first party petitions in the North, and not more than 1,000 in the South upon which no action had been taken as of 18 May 1955.

54. Ibid., 12.

55. Ibid.


57. ICC, Fourth Interim Report, op.cit., 12-13, 23-24. The Canadian report includes the following:

"The reports of the teams disclosed further that incidents of obstruction and hinderance made it difficult for them to complete their tasks effectively. A common experience was to encounter organized groups of persons presenting petitions about forced evacuation and demonstrating in a noisy and disorderly manner, with the effect that not only was the limited time available to the team for its investigation squandered, but also would-be evacuees were intimidated... In at least a dozen instances, intending evacuees were physically molested by such hostile crowds and sometimes forcibly dragged away before they had an opportunity of meeting the team. Team 56 on its visit to Ha Tinh on five occasions saw individuals physically molested and dragged by force from the presence of the team... In our view this phenomenon was not a mere social manifestation but an organized plan. While it has been impossible for the Commission to prove that these measures were organized as a matter of policy by the authority in control of the North, owing to the frequency and the common features of this form of obstruction in all provinces investigated there would seem to be little doubt that these obstructions and hindrances had been deliberately planned...it is still not possible to say whether all persons wishing to move from one zone to the other have been able to do so...."

59. Fall, The Two Viet Names, 154; Ellen Hammer, Vietnam Yesterday and Today, 149-150.


68. In part, this explains the political power of the Buddhists acquired in 1963 -- an amorphous religion, so essentially apolitical and unwieldy that it was among the few Vietnamese institutions ignored by the communists, became the focus of Viet nationalism and a prime contributor to Diem's undoing. Cf., Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 468-472. Bernard Fall's essay on the "Seas of Division" quotes a Vietnamese saying that success in life hinged on "3 D's: -- Diem (family connections); Dao (religion); and Dia-phuong (province of origin). Fall, Viet-Nam Witness (New York: Praeger, 1966), 206-210.

70. CIA, "Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957," (NIE 63-56, 17 July 1956), 10. A thesis advanced by Bernard Fall that the Viet Minh deliberately sent the families of the stay-behinds north, so that the hard-core regulars who remained in the south could engage in "mobile warfare, without having to worry about reprisals against their relatives," has not been substantiated in recent interviews with Viet Cong. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 358.

71. B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided, op. cit., 224; U.S. Dept. of State, "Southern Regroupers and Northerners in the Communist Military Force in South Vietnam," (Research Memorandum RFE-49, November 9, 1966), SECRET, iii. Fall once accepted a figure of 120,000, but later tended to a ceiling of 100,000. Cf., Fall in Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam, op. cit., 57; and Fall, Vietnam Witness, op. cit., 216. The 130,000 total approximates the figures published by the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1956; 150,000 Viet Minh troops and their families. a/ Wilfred G. Burchett, the Australian communist, has referred to "the withdrawal of the 140,000 Viet Minh and the cadres to the north." b/ The statistic usually used in U.S. official publications -- for example in the 1965 White Paper -- is 90,000 Viet Minh troops moved north, and this is commonly regarded as an invaluable reservoir for the DRV's subsequent infiltration of South Vietnam. c/ But the dimension of this resource extended beyond 90,000 "warriors." There were Montagnards who proved particularly useful in building and protecting the infiltration routes down through the Laotian and Vietnamese Highlands. There were also children, an obvious long-range asset. d/ The DRV set up a special school for southern Montagnards, and some 1½ elementary and higher schools were reserved for other southern children. e/ Moreover, there is evidence that the Viet Minh systematically broadened its family ties in the South through hundreds of hasty, directed marriages for departing "warriors" and by recruiting very young men and boys just before departure. f/


c/ U.S. Dept. of State, Aggression from the North (Washington: GPO, 1965) (Dept. of State Publication 7339, February, 1965), 11. Intelligence estimates of the 1954-1956 period used the figure 95,000; e.g., NIE 63-56, op. cit., 6.


A senior captain in the Viet Cong intelligence service wrote a record of his experiences in a document entitled Regroupment Diary; according to this document, his political officer lectured the unit as follows: a/

"(1) Have confidence in the leadership of the General Committee. In two years, the country will be re-unified, because that was the decision of an international body, which gives us reason to trust it. This does not mean that we should be too trustful, but we must continue to struggle.

44
The Party will never abandon the people of the South who will stay to fight; when the time comes, they will be led.

Those who go north should feel happy in their duties. Those who remain behind should carry out the glorious missions entrusted to them by the Party, standing side by side with the people in every situation of struggle.

The political officers also stressed the dangers to which the stay-behinds would be subjected. A Viet Cong cadre whose party history extended back to 1930 stated that:

"Those who did regroup did it voluntarily, after realizing that it was the thing to do. They did it to protect themselves from being arrested by the authorities in the South. They were afraid of being charged with having participated in the Resistance before. All cadres were afraid of future persecution by the South Vietnamese authorities; they all wanted to regroup....They were afraid...."

Still, the Regroupment Diary records that one cadre bet his comrades "three to ten, the country won't be reunified in two years," and that many cadres were worried about leaving family and friends behind. Asked, "Were you a volunteer for regroupment?: the following responses were typical:

(A Defector) At the time it was said that we were volunteers. In reality, they took measures to make sure that everyone left. At the time of regroupment, we had to go. If I had remained, I would have been arrested. I believed that I would remain in the North two years.

(Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections.

(A PA) "Our political officer explained that: we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.

a/ RM-4703, op. cit., 27, 35.
75. Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 12, 21; Murti, op. cit., 87-88.
76. RM-5163, op. cit., 6-7.
77. Ngo Dinh Diem on Elections in Vietnam (July 16, 1955) in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Vietnam (New York: Fawcett, 1965), 193-194. For the U.S. view, see for example, the March 8, 1955, Secretary Dulles, public statement on the consultations scheduled to take place between DRV and GVN preliminary to the general elections; inter alia, he opined that it would "be hard to create in the North conditions which allow genuine freedom of choice." U.S. Dept. of State, "Chronology on Vietnam," (Historical Studies Division, Research Project No. 747, Nov 1965), 12.
82. U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Office of Program Coordination, March 17, 1967), 57. The total through 1964 was over $1 billion; NIS 43D, op. cit., 70.
86. IAC-D-93/2, Viet Minh Violations...Through 31 December 1954, op. cit., 10-11; also CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 October 1954, 6.
87. NIS 43C, op. cit., 59.

88. Ibid., 56-59; Zasloff, Political Motivation...The Vietminh Regroup­ees, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit., 44-52.


90. Ibid., 10.


92. NIS 43D, op. cit., 61.


94. NIS 43D, op. cit., 69.


98. "Direct Aid to the Associated States...," in ibid., 88-89.


100. Quoted in Nighswenger, op. cit., 82, from New York Times for February 13, 1955, p. 1. General Collins, the President’s emissary to the GVN, was reported at the same time to be pressing for a "more reliable armed force chiefly designed to maintain internal security," with protection from external aggression supplied by SEATO. Ibid., quoting Baltimore Sun for 1 February 1955, p. 1.

101. NSC 5612/1, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," (September 5, 1956), 11, provides that the U.S. will: "assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh." "United initial resistance" was defined by JCS memo for SecDef, dated 21 December 1956, subject as above, as follows: "resistance to Communist aggression by defending or by delaying in such manner as to preserve and maintain the integrity of the government and its armed forces for the period of time required to invoke the UN Charter and/or the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the period of time required for the U.S. Government to determine that considerations of national security require unilateral assistance and to commit U.S. or collective security forces to support or reinforce indigenous forces in defense of the country attacked."


104. U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, telegram JCS 974802 of 30 March 1960 to CINCPAC noted increasingly deteriorating internal security in Vietnam and informed that:

"The JCS agree that anti-guerrilla capability should be developed within organization of the regular armed forces by changing emphasis in training selected elements ARVN and other forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare." This cable among many of that period refocused the MAAG Mission on internal security, and this became the central theme of the military portions of the "Counter-insurgency Plan for South Viet-Nam" of January, 1961. U.S. Embassy, Saigon, despatch No. 276, of January 4, 1961. The MAAG "Country Statements" for the period 1956-1960 record a concentration on developing the staff and logistic superstructure of ARVN, and on
U.S. Army-type training programs; throughout, it is clear that the 
MAAG looked increasingly to the Self Defense Corps, the Civil Guard, 
and the National Police to meet the "Viet Minh" internal threat in 
order to free ARVN for conventional combat training. See especially 
on MDAP, non-NATO Countries," paragraphs 1, 5, 6, and Section C, of 
the reports 15 January 1956, 20 July 1956, 21 January 1957, 15 July 
1957; also, same headquarters, "Narrative Study," dated 24 August 
1958, and "Narrative Statement," dated 25 November 1958 with changes 
dated 10 May 1959, 9 August 1959, and 6 November 1959. Cf., Shaplen, 
op. cit., 117-119, 137; Warner, op. cit., 129-136; Scigliano, op. cit., 
160-167; Nighswonger, op. cit., 43-46; David Halberstam, The Making 

105. David Hotham, "South Vietnam - Shaky Bastion," New Republic, 
November 25, 1957, 15; Scigliano, op. cit., 118-119.

106. Ibid., 111-115. The author concluded that the Saigon--Bien Hoa 
Highway had been undertaken for military reasons, and that "this 
20-mile stretch of highway cost more money than the United States 
provided for all labor, community development, social welfare, 
housing, health, and education projects in Vietnam combined during 
the entire period 1954-1961."


108. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, Memorandum for the President, 
17 November 1954, subject: "General Collins' Recommendations 
Regarding Military Force Levels in Vietnam."

109. JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954, subject: 
"Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina," sets an 
objective of a minimum French force of four divisions until four RVNAF 
divisions were available to replace them; it also stresses that the 
Geneva Agreement constituted in Vietnam "a major obstacle to the 
introduction of adequate U.S. MAAG personnel and of additional arms 
and equipment." In a JCS Memo of 19 October 1954, subject: "Development 
and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," the Chiefs, 
noting the Geneva limit on personnel, recommended against MAAG's RVNAF 
unless "political considerations are overriding." In a Memo of 
17 November 1954, subject: "Indochina," the JCS addressed the problem 
of a 77,000 man RVNAF, and found it adequate for internal security 
only; noting the Viet Minh size, they stated that a force of that 
size could not provide for external security if French forces were 
thrown away, but agreed that the MAAG could train RVNAF at that level while 
complying with Geneva ceilings on personnel. Other examples of the 
continuing U.S. concern for observing the Geneva Agreements on the one 
hand, and on the other hand proceeding with the task of providing for 
Vietnam's security within its restrictions are provided in the MAAG, 
Country Statements, op. cit., and in U.S. Dept of State telegram 2661 
from Paris, of 19 December 1954, in which Secretary Dulles accepted.
the principle that U.S. should not contravene the settlement. Dept of State telegram 3441 from Saigon of 17 February 1955 discloses Ambassador Collins' concern for observing the agreements even when observance precluded U.S. assistance for refugees.

110. Anita Lauve Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 315-328. Though questionable on some judgments -- e.g., attributing to the "civilian branch of the U.S. Government" a view that was in opposition to that of "military authorities" and against U.S. assumption of RVNAF training, Mrs. Nutt is essentially correct in her assertion that the U.S. abided by the Geneva ceilings for six years. The principal departure from the 342 strength accommodated TERM, a 350-man Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission which from May 1956 to December 1960 worked to recover, control and outship MDAP supplies -- albeit upgrading the RVNAF logistic capability significantly in the process. The first substantial increase in MAAG followed a February, 1960, GVN request, which raised the ceiling from 342 to 685 -- still below the figure of 888, the combined 1954 strength of French cadres with RVNAF and MAAGs.


112. Ibid.


114. ICC, Sixth Interim Report..., op. cit., 31-32.

115. ICC, Seventh Interim Report..., op. cit., 16-17.


119. Ibid., 15-19.

120. Ibid., passim.

121. Ibid., 101-102.

122. Ibid., 106-107.

REBELLION AGAINST MY-DIEM

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Tab 2.

REBELLION AGAINST MY-DIEM

A. Diem's Political Legacy: Violence and Anti-Colonialism

World War II and the First Indochina War left the society of South Vietnam severely torn. The Japanese, during the years of their presence from 1940-1945, had encouraged armed factionalism to weaken the French administration and strengthen their own position. The war between the Viet Minh and the French -- which began in South Vietnam in September, 1945 -- wrought further disunity. Paradoxically, the South suffered political damage compared to the North from having been the secondary theater of both wars. The Japanese had sought during World War II to control it without sizable occupation forces. Similarly, in the First Indochina War, the French had practiced economy of force in the South so that they could concentrate in Tonkin. For conventional forces, both the Japanese and the French substituted irregular warfare and a system of bribes, subversion, arms, military advice, and officially condoned concessions in corruption. From 1945-1954, the fighting in South Vietnam was more sporadic and diffuse than in the North, but in a societal sense, ultimately more destructive. While in Tonkin the Viet Minh flowed in through and behind the French and continued to build a nation and unify the people with surprising efficiency, in the South they were unable to do so. Not only were the Viet Minh centers of power in the North and the China base area too remote to support effectively the southern insurgency, but also the French had imitated the Japanese in arming and supplying certain South Vietnamese factions, fomenting civil war against the southern arm of the Viet Minh. The results approached anarchy: a virtual breakdown in public administration by Franco-Vietnamese central governments and deep cleavages within the Vietnamese body politic. By the summer of 1954, conspiracy had become the primary form of political communication in South Vietnam, and violence the primary mode of political change.

Politically, as well as geographically, South Vietnam consisted of three distinctive regions: the narrow, coastal plain of Annam, thickly settled by Vietnamese, where was located Hue, the ancient Viet capital and cultural center; the Highlands, sparsely populated by Montagnard tribesmen, in which was situated the summer capital of Dalat; and Cochin­china, the fertile, densely peopled river-delta area in which Saigon stood (see maps, ff.). Cochinchina had experienced a political development markedly different from that of Annam. The last area of modern
THAILAND LAOS

SOUTH VIETNAM

ETHNIC GROUPS

AND REGIONS

Language of ethnic groups is shown within parentheses

- VIETNAMESE (Romanian)
- INDONESIANS/PROTO-MALAYS
- Tribal groups (Non-Khmer)
- Tribal groups (Malayo-Polynesian)
- Cham (Malayo-Polynesian)
- CAMBODIANS (Khmer)

JAMAI Tribal name

NOTE: Chinese and other foreigners are concentrated principally in larger cities

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NOTE: Chinese and other foreigners are concentrated principally in larger cities
Vietnam to be occupied by the Viet people in their expansion southward (8th Century, A.D.), and the first area to fall to French rule (mid-19th Century), Cochinchina had been administered by the French directly as a colony, while Annam remained under the Emperor as a French protectorate.

While the mandarinal rule of the Annamese court was more a matter of form than substance, Annam's public administration preserved a degree of unity among the Vietnamese despite the impress of French culture. In South Vietnam, the French seemed to be a wholly divisive influence. Though Cochinchina was the site of some of the achievements of which French colonialists were most proud -- the chief seat of the rubber industry, and focus of major feats of engineering with canals and railroads -- the Cochinchinese seem to recall less the triumphs of French civilization than its burdens: the French rubber plantations, abrasive with their labor, high-handed with local peoples; the oppressive taxes, and the French controlled monopolies on salt, alcohol and opium; recurrent famine in the midst of one of the earth's richest farming regions; socially restrictive schooling; modernizing challenges to familial piety, village centralism, and other cherished fundamentals of Viet culture.

While Annam -- and Tonkin to the north -- developed indigenous political movements opposing French rule, these were mainly foreign-based, foreign-oriented parties, such as the Nationalist Party (VNQDD), a Vietnamese
copy of the Kuomintang, or the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) of the Comintern, headed by Russian-trained Ho Chi Minh. In Cochinchina, however, there emerged a number of nationalist movements peculiar to that region, or principally based on that region. Saigon, for example, developed a range of leftist movements competitive with the ICP, including two Trotskyite parties, as well as a number of VNQDD splinter movements, and a politically active gangster fraternity, the Binh Xuyen. But the important differences were in the countryside, where millions of Vietnamese joined wholly Cochinchinese religious sects which propagated xenophobic nationalism, established theocracies, and fielded armed forces.

French and Japanese policy had deliberately fostered conflict among these several factions to the extent that Cochinchina was, in 1954, literally factioned among the religious sects, the Binh Xuyen, and the Viet Minh. While by 1954 the Viet Minh dominated Annam and the Highlands, control of Cochinchina eluded them, for all their ruthless efficiency.

1. The Binh Xuyen

Saigon itself in 1954 was under the rule of the Binh Xuyen, a secret society of brigands evolved from the Black Flag pirates which had for generations preyed on the city's commerce. 4/ The Binh Xuyen ethos included a fierce - albeit eclectic - nationalism. They collaborated with the Japanese during World War II, and in September, 1945, led the savage attack against the French in Saigon which marked the start of the Franco-Viet Minh War. The Binh Xuyen leader, Le Van (Bay) Vien, subsequently contracted an alliance with the Viet Minh, allied his 1300 soldiers with their guerrillas, and served for a time as the Viet Minh deputy commander for Cochinchina and one of its chief sources of funds. Bay Vien's refusal to assassinate certain Viet Minh-condemned Vietnamese intellectuals reputedly stirred Viet Minh misgivings, and called the Binh Xuyen favorably to the attention of the National United Front, an anti-communist, Viet nationalist group then operating out of Shanghai. In 1947, Bay Vien was persuaded to cooperate with the National United Front. Informed, the Viet Minh invited him to the Plain of Reeds in an attempt to capture him. Bay Vien escaped, and thereupon threw in his lot with the French and the State of Vietnam, accepting a commission as the first colonel of the Vietnamese National Army. 5/ Bay Vien afterwards paid Bao Dai what Colonel Lansdale termed "a staggering sum" for control of gambling and prostitution in Cholon, and of the Saigon-Cholon police. The French accepted the arrangement because Bay Vien offset the Viet Minh threat to Saigon. By 1954, Bay Vien was operating "Grande Monde," a gambling slum in Cholon; "Cloche d'Or," Saigon's preeminent gambling establishment; the "Noveutes Catinat," Saigon's best department store; a hundred smaller shops; a fleet of river boats; and a brothel, spectacular even by Asian standards, known as the Hall of Mirrors. Besides a feudal fief south of Saigon, he owned an opium factory and distribution system, and held substantial interests in fish, charcoal, hotels, and rubber plantations. Besides the police apparatus and other followers numbering 5000 to 8000, he had some 2500 soldiers.
at his disposal. He ruled Saigon absolutely; not even Viet Minh terrorists were able to operate there. Moreover, he exercised significant influence over the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao leaders.

2. The Cao Dai

The Cao Dai were a religious sect founded by a colonial bureaucrat named Ngo Van Chieu, who with one Pham Cong Tac conducted a series of spiritualist seances from which emerged a new religious faith, and in the early 1920's, a "church" with clerical organization similar to Roman Catholicism. The doctrine of the Cao Dai was syncretic, melding veneration of Christ, Buddha, Confucius, and Lao Tse with a curious occultism which deified such diverse figures as Joan of Arc, Victor Hugo, and Sun Yat Sen. With the dissolution of the authority of the central government during the 1940's and early 1950's, the Cao Dai acquired increasing political and military autonomy. The sect's 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 faithful comprised a loose theocracy centered in Tay Ninh, the border province northwest of Saigon. The Cao Dai, too, cooperated first with the Japanese, and then with the Viet Minh; and the Cao Dai leadership also found the latter uncomfortable allies. In 1947, the Cao Dai realigned with the French, agreeing to secure with their forces...
specified rural areas against the Viet Minh in return for military assistance. Although plagued throughout its history by minor heresy and factional disputes, the Cao Dai became the largest political movement in Cochinchina; the Cao Dai shared with the Hoa Hao the distinction of being the only important political forces to originate in the Vietnamese peasantry. When Diem came to power in 1954, Pham Cong Tac, the Cao Dai Pope, had declared for Bao Dai, controlled some 15,000 to 20,000 armed followers, and ruled the region northwest of Saigon.
3. The Hoa Hao

Southwest of Saigon there existed the Hoa Hao, a new sect, similarly endowed with politico-military autonomy, which repeatedly clashed with the Cao Dai and the Binh Xuyen. In 1939, a mystic faith healer named Huynh Phu So, from a village named Hoa Hao, launched a reformed Hinayana Buddhist movement which swiftly acquired a wide following. (Among the Vietnamese whom Huynh Phu So favorably impressed was Ngo Dinh Diem.) Huynh Phu So enjoyed Japanese protection, and with their aid, in 1944 the Hoa Hao formed armed bands, among the leaders of which there was one Tran Van Soai. A Viet Minh attempt to gain the assistance of the Hoa Hao failed, and the Viet Minh on 8 September 1945 massacred hundreds of Hoa Hao faithful in the town of Can Tho. Tran Van Soai rallied in kind, and in the ensuing weeks Can Tho became the center of extensive slaughter. French intervention stopped the violence, but turned the Hoa Hao against the French. In April, 1947, the Viet Minh executed Huynh Phu So, which caused Tran Van Soai to rally with 2,000 armed men to the French. He was accepted into the French Expeditionary Corps with the rank of general, and assigned the mission of pacifying his own region. The French from that time forward, until 1955, paid the salaries of the Hoa Hao soldiers. At the time Diem came to office in 1954, the sect had some 1,500,000 believers, controlled most of the Mekong Delta region, and had 10,000 to 15,000 men under arms.

The Hoa Hao

---

Diagram showing areas of greatest influence and concentrations held by the Hoa Hao in 1955.
4. The Viet Minh

In 1954, the Viet Minh controlled some 60 to 90 percent of South Vietnam's villages (by French estimates) and 30 to 40 percent of its territory (by U.S. estimates). The bulk of organized Viet Minh forces were located in Annam and the Highlands, proximate to Tonkin, and in regions free of competition from the armed sects. In Cochinchina, they were militarily strongest in areas along the Cambodian border and in the Camau peninsula of the extreme south remote from the principal concentrations of people. Nonetheless, their political organization was pervasive, and in some localities, e.g., Quang Ngai province in Annam, the Viet Minh were the only effective government. A hierarchy of Viet Minh committees paralleled the formal government from the village Administrative and Resistance Committee (ARC) through district, province, and what the Viet Minh termed "interzone" or "region." No reliable estimates exist of the numbers of cadres involved in this apparatus, but Viet Minh military forces of all types south of the 17th parallel probably numbered around 100,000. When orders were issued for the Geneva regroupment, the "provisional assembly areas" designated coincided with the areas in which Viet Minh strength had been greatest. During the time allowed for collecting forces for the move north, the Viet Minh evidently undertook to bank the fires of revolution by culling out of their units trained and reliable cadres for "demobilization," "recruiting" youth -- forcibly in many instances -- to take their place, and caching weapons. Particularly in Annam and the Highlands, then, the Viet Minh posed a significant challenge to Ngo Dinh Diem. His test of strength with the Viet Minh, however, was to be deferred by the Geneva Settlement and DRV policy for some years.

5. Anti-colonialism

The political prospects of Ngo Dinh Diem when he accepted the premiership from Bao Dai were dimmed not only by Viet Minh residue, and by the existence of the armed sects, but by the taint of colonialism. As far as most Cochinchinese peasants were concerned, Diem was linked to Bao Dai, and to the corrupt, French dominated government he headed. Studies of peasant attitudes conducted in recent years have demonstrated that for many, the struggle which began in 1925 against colonialism continued uninterrupted throughout Diem's regime: in 1954, the foes of nationalists were transformed from France and Bao Dai, to Diem and the U.S. -- My-Diem, American-Diem, became the universal term of Viet Cong opprobrium -- but the issues at stake never changed. There was, moreover, some substance to the belief that Diem represented no change, in that, although Ngo Dinh Diem took office before the Geneva Settlement as prime minister with "full powers civil and military," he did not acquire actual administrative autonomy until September, 1954; proclaim independence until January, 1955; or take command of his army until February, 1955.

| 9 | TOP SECRET - Sensitive |
TOP SECRET - Sensitive

civil servants from the pre-Diem days. The national flag and the national anthem remained unchanged. Moreover, the laws remained substantially as they had been: the land-holdings, against which was directed much peasant discontent, were based on pre-Diem law; and old legal proscriptions against nationalist political activities remained on the books during Diem's tenure of office. The onus of colonialism was among the heavy burdens which Ngo Dinh Diem had to shoulder from the outset.

B. Ngo Dinh Diem: Basis of Power

1. Political Origins

Why amid the military disasters of spring 1954, Bao Dai, head of the State of Vietnam, chose Ngo Dinh Diem from among other Vietnamese nationalists to form a government, has long been debated. Diem was an Annamese Catholic who in his youth had some experience in public administration, first as governor of Phan Thiet province, and then Minister of Interior at Bao Dai's Imperial Court in Hue. In 1933 Diem discovered, after a year in the latter office, that reforms he had been promised were being blocked by high French and Annamite officials. He promptly resigned his office and went into political retirement -- an act which earned him modest fame for integrity. Through the years of war and distress in his homeland thereafter, Diem had hewed to attentisme, and by refusing public office, had avoided the political discoloration which besmirched more involved Viet nationalists. Bao Dai had sought him for his premier in 1945, Ho Chi Minh for the DRV government in 1946, the French for their "solutions" in 1947 and 1949 -- all unsuccessfully. Hence, Diem's reputation for incorruptible nationalism, to the extent that he enjoyed one in 1954, was based on an event 20 years old and a long period of political aloofness. He did come from a prominent family; a brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc was a leading Catholic clergyman with countrywide connections, and the family proper retained some considerable influence in Annam. But his personal handicaps were considerable: bachelor, ascetic, shy, inexperienced, he seemed ill-fit for the seething intrigues of Saigon.

One school of conjecture holds that the French pressed him upon Bao Dai in the belief that under him the newly independent State of Vietnam would founder; another that Bao Dai advanced him to power convinced that his inevitable failure would eliminate him as a political competitor. There are those who believe that Diem was foisted upon the Vietnamese and the French by a cabal of prominent American Catholics and a CIA agent. It can be said that Diem was relatively well acquainted among leading Americans, and that Bao Dai might correctly have regarded Diem's contacts in the United States as a possible source of support for Vietnam. Whatever the reasons for his selection, however, at the time he took office there were few who regarded Diem as promising, and fewer still openly willing to back him. Indeed, from the time he took office on 7 July 1954, until the following May, he stood
virtually alone. Unaided by Bao Dai, opposed by the French, and proposed by Americans mainly advice, criticism, and promises -- but scant material assistance -- Ngo Dinh Diem in ten months surmounted the partition of his nation by the Geneva powers, two threatened military coups by his Army Chiefs of Staff, frenetic clashes with the Binh Xuyen armed sects, the withdrawal of the Viet Minh, and the influx of 900,000 refugees from North Vietnam.

2. Early U.S.-Diem Relations

Diem's durability was one of those surprises in Vietnam which prompted Americans thereafter to refer to the "miracle in Vietnam." On 7 December 1954, Senator Mansfield judged that U.S. "prospects for helping Diem strengthen and uphold South Vietnam look very dim." 20/ U.S. Ambassador Heath reported from Saigon on 17 December 1954 a dim view of Diem's chances since "there is every evidence that the French do not want Diem to succeed." 21/ In a January, 1955, report to the National Security Council, General J. Lawton Collins agreed with both analyses. 22/ On 7 April 1955, Collins cabled from Saigon that: "...it is my considered judgment that the man lacks the personal qualities of leadership and the executive ability successfully to head a government that must compete with the unity of purpose and efficiency of the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh." 23/ On 19 April, Collins again cabled: "I see no alternative to the early replacement of Diem." 24/

On 26 April 1955, U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 63.1-2-55, "Possible Developments in South Vietnam," took the view that:

"A political impasse exists in Saigon where the legally constituted government of Premier Diem is being challenged by a venal special interest group, the Binh Xuyen, which controls the National Security Police, and is temporarily allied with some elements of the religious sects....

"Even if the present impasse were resolved, we believe that it would be extremely difficult, at best, for a Vietnamese government, regardless of its composition, to make progress toward developing a strong, stable anti-Communist government capable of resolving the basic social, economic, and political problems of Vietnam, the special problems arising from the Geneva agreement, and capable of meeting the long-range challenge of the Communists...."

But opinion in Washington swung sharply when, in late April, Diem managed to survive a severe test of arms with his army and the sects. Senators Mansfield and Knowland issued strong statements of support for him, and on May 2 Senator Hubert Humphrey told the Senate that:
"Premier Diem is the best hope that we have in South Vietnam. He is the leader of his people. He deserves and must have the wholehearted support of the American Government and our foreign policy. This is no time for uncertainty or half-hearted measures. He is the only man on the political horizon of Vietnam who can rally a substantial degree of support of his people... If we have any comments about the leadership in Vietnam let it be directed against Bao Dai... If the Government of South Vietnam has no room for both these men, it is Bao Dai who must go." 25/

On 9 May 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged that "the government of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem shows the greatest promise of achieving the internal stability essential for the future security of Vietnam." 26/ Five months later, on 11 October, 1955, the National Intelligence Estimate was revised. In NIE 63.1-3-55, "Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956," the U.S. Intelligence Advisory Committee found it possible to be more sanguine concerning Diem's prospects:

"...Diem has made considerable progress toward establishing the first fully independent Vietnamese government... He faced a basically unstable and deteriorating situation... The most significant articulate political sentiments of the bulk of the population was an antipathy for the French combined with a personal regard for Ho Chi Minh as the symbol of Vietnamese nationalism...

"Diem was forced to move slowly. Although possessing considerable national prestige as a patriot, he was inexperienced in administration and was confronted at the outset by the intrigues of Bao Dai and other self-interested individuals and groups, who in many cases benefited from French support....

"Diem concentrated on eliminating or neutralizing the most important groups and individuals challenging the authority of his government... By bribery, persuasion, and finally force, Diem virtually eliminated the Binh Xuyen and the most important elements of the Hoa Hao sects as threats to his authority. At the same time, he maneuvered the Cao Dai--the strongest of the sects--into an uneasy alliance. As a result of these successful actions, Diem gained prestige and increased popularity as a symbol of Diem's efforts to establish a viable anti-communist government are still in doubt....

"Provided the Communists do not exercise their capabilities to attack across the 17th Parallel or to initiate large-scale guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, Diem will probably make further progress in developing a more effective government. His position will probably be strengthened as a result of increased..."
popular support, the continued loyalty of the VNA, and a
deterioration in the strength and cohesiveness of his non-
Communist opposition. The national government will probably
increase the number of rural communities under its control,
particularly in areas now held by the sects...."

It is likely that Diem's stormy first 10 months in office,
June, 1954 to May, 1955, strongly conditioned his behavior in later
years. He must have been impressed almost at once with the political
importance of the army, and the essentiality of personally loyal ranking
officers. He chose openly to oppose the armed sects against the advice
of both his American and French advisers, and his success no doubt
instilled confidence in his own judgments. The same events probably
gave him reason thereafter to value head-on confrontation with a foe
over conciliation or compromise. And in his adamant stand against con-
sultations with the DRV on plebescite, again contrary to initial American
advice, he no doubt learned that on major issues the U.S. stake in his
future was sufficiently high that he could lead, and American policy
would follow. 27/ In any event, he moved with new assurance from mid-
1955 forward. In many respects his first 300 days were his finest hours,
when he was moving alone, rapidly, and with determination against great
odds.

3. Political Concepts: Family Centralism and Personalism

But Diem's early victories were essentially negative, in
eliminating or bypassing obstacles. It remained for him to provide
programs for finding homes and occupations for the refugees, for solving
the politically crucial problems of rural land distribution and taxation,
for installing capable and incorrupt public administrators, for stimu-
lating the economy, for improving the education system -- in short, for
coping with the whole broad range of problems of governing a developing
nation, each rendered especially acute by South Vietnam's war trauma,
internal dissention, and partition from North Vietnam. To cite but a
few: 600,000 refugees were dependent on his government for subsistence;
85,000 people were jobless as a result of the French troop withdrawal;
inter-provincial communications were impaired -- 700 miles of main road
were war-damaged, one third of the railway trackage lay destroyed, 63
concrete bridges on 860 miles of track lay blown. 28/ In devising
programs to meet these challenges, Diem worked from two primal concepts:
family centralism, and "personalism" as a state philosophy.

Diem was raised in a Mandarinal family, born to a tradition
of high position in the social hierarchy and governmental bureaucracy.
It was also a Catholic family, and Diem received a heritage of obdurate
devotion to Christianity under intense persecution -- within a century
of his birth one hundred relatives had been burned to death by Buddhists
in central Annam. His rearing developed his reverence for the past, a
capacity for hard work, and a deep seated piety. Two French authorities
believed that his outlook on life was "born of a profound, of an immense nostalgia for the Vietnamese past, of a desperate filial respect for the society of ancient Annam." \[29\] There was some thought of his becoming a priest, but he elected public administration; his elder brother Thu, the cleric, is said to have speculated that Diem found himself too inflexible, too willful, too severe for the priesthood. \[30\] But above all else, Diem's early years impressed upon him the importance of family in performing the duties of station; the family was the first means of extending personal power, the essential mode of political expression. It is possible that Diem resorted to nepotism simply because he lacked a personal political apparatus which would have permitted him to operate otherwise, but nepotism became the style of his rule, and it was quite consistent with his upbringing.

"Society," said Diem, "functions through personal relations among men at the top." \[31\] One brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, received the title of Advisor to the President, and controlled the semi-covert Personalist Labor Revolutionary Party. His wife, Madame Nhu, became the President's official hostess, a deputy in the National Assembly, and the founder-chairman of the Women's Solidarity Movement. Her father became one of Diem's ambassadors, and his wife the GVN observer at the UN. A second brother of Diem, Ngo Dinh Can, became the virtual overlord of Annam, holding no official position, but ruling the region in all respects. A third brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, the Archbishop of Hue and Primate of Vietnam, also held no office, but functioned as Presidential advisor, and levered Catholic opinion on behalf of Diem. A fourth brother, Ngo Dinh Luyen, became an Ambassador. Three family members—Tran Van Chuong, Tran Van Do, and Tran Van Bac—served in Diem's first cabinet, and two other in-laws, Nguyen Huu Chau and Tran Trung Dung, held the key portfolios of Secretary of State at the Presidency and Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense. One of the reasons General Collins opposed Diem may be a letter he received in April, 1955, from a group of nationalists headed by former Premier Nguyen Phan Long, urging the United States to withdraw its support of Diem on the grounds that his brothers were effectively isolating Diem politically. \[32\] The observation proved to be correct: Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can increasingly gathered power into their own hands, and non-family politicians found themselves quietly shunted aside. Gradually, a concentration of power also occurred within the family circle, again toward Nhu, Mme Nhu and Can, and at the expense of the more remotely related. The President's family thus became an entirely extra-legal elite which in class and geographic origin, as well as religion, was distinct from the South Vietnamese as a whole.

The Diem family circle was promptly targeted by gossips. In Saigon, rumors were the political medium, and stories were soon rampant that members of the family were looting the government. \[33\] By 1957, the whispering campaign against the Nhus mounted to such proportions that they issued a public statement denying that they had ever removed
money from the country, engaged in financial or commercial speculation, 
or accepted bribes. But the impression remained, fed by numerous credible 
reports of official graft at lower levels, that whether or not the Diem 
family took for personal gain, they took.

Another disadvantage proceeded from the Diem's familial concentration 
of power: bureaucratic overcentralization; Diem himself seems to 
have been peculiarly at fault in this instance, reserving for himself 
the power of decision in minute matters, and refusing to delegate authority 
to subordinates who might have relieved him of a crushing administrative 
burden. In part, this may have been simply inexperience in handling 
large enterprise, but there seems to have been deeper, philosophical 
reasons -- a passion for perfection, a distrust of other men, a conviction 
that all subordinates required his paternalistic guidance. The result 
was an impairment of an administrative system already crippled by the 
absence of French civil servants. Subordinate officials, incapable of 
making decisions, fearful of making them, or forbidden to make them, passed 
upward even minute matters on paper to the brothers Ngo, glutting the 
communications of government, and imposing long delays on all, even 
important actions.

Personalism, as Diem called his personal political philosophy, was 
a melange of Asian and European notions which resembled the French Catholic 
personalisme of Emmanuel Mounier, or the Encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII 
and Pius XI. More accurately, it was a blend of Christianity, Marxism, 
and Confucianism which stressed the development of each individual's moral 
character as the basis for community progress toward democracy. Diem saw 
himself as a reformer, even a revolutionary, in the moral realm. His 
central social message was that each citizen achieved moral fulfillment or 
harmony only if he applied himself energetically to his civic duties, 
avoiding on the one hand the selfishness of capitalism, and on the other, the 
selflessness of Marxist collectivism. "The basis for democracy can only be a 
spiritual one," said Diem in his Message to the National Assembly 
on the Constitution of 1956, and in New Delhi in 1957, he took Asians to 
task for losing sight of the spiritual essence of their political traditions:

"...Does not our spirituality of which we are so proud, 
simply conceal a narrow conservatism and a form of escapism 
from concrete responsibility?...Has not Buddhist compassion 
become a pretext for not practicing justice...And is not 
tolerance, which so many can mistake for freedom, the result 
of paternalistic indulgence?"

And the same year, in Korea, he spoke of his hopes for restoring the spiritual 
strength of Vietnam after "the tremendous material and political difficulties 
which assailed Vietnam after Geneva had plunged even the best of her sons 
into a state of apprehension colored with despair..." 

"We pursue two aims.

"First we want to rearm the Vietnamese citizen morally and 
to make him impervious to all tyranny, whatever its origin.

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"Second, we want to reinforce the spiritual cohesion of the Vietnamese people, cohesion which accounts for capacity to enjoy a largely decentralized system without falling into anarchy. Yet this cohesion has been largely shaken by the impact of the west.

"Yet man does not live only by the idea of liberty. He must be given a minimum of material support which will guarantee that liberty..."

A GVN approved biography of Diem explained that he recognized in communism the antithesis of true freedom, precisely because communism denied the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Personalism was the answer therefore to communism, since: 39/

"Personalism is a system based on the divine, therefore spiritual law, which...extols man's transcendent value... The practice of Personalism is symbolic of good citizenship with a highly developed civic spirit..."

Late in Diem's reign, when his combat with the communists had been fully joined, these vague precepts were elaborated by his brother, Nhu, but hardly clarified: 40/

"The personalist conception holds that freedom in an under-developed society is not something that is simply given or bestowed. It can only be achieved through militancy and vigilance, by doing away with all pretensions and pretexts for not realistically applying ourselves to our goals. In a situation of underdevelopment, and during a bleeding war of internal division, it may be argued that there is reason enough not to seek to develop democracy, but our personalist approach is precisely militant in denying this. Human rights and human dignity are not static phenomena. They are only possibilities which men must actively seek and deserve, not just beg for. In this sense, of believing in the process of constantly perfecting of oneself in moral as well as practical ways our personalist approach is similar to Confucianism. Personalism stresses hard work, and it is the working class, the peasants, who are better able to understand the concept than the intellectuals. We must use Personalist methods to realize democracy at the level where people are fighting and working, and in our new scale of values it is those who participate physically and selflessly in the fight against communism who are most privileged, then those who courageously serve the villages without profit, and finally those who engage diligently in productive labor for their own as well as for their villages' benefit..."

Some American observers found these ideas with their emphasis on "democracy" reassuring. Others, including General Edward Lansdale, urged on Diem a broader ideological stratagem of forming a "front" embracing the concepts of the more traditional Viet nationalist parties. But
"Personalism," like Diem's Spanish-style Catholicism, harbored little tolerance; merely different political theories were interpreted as competitive, and even dangerous. Personalism thus limited Diem's political horizons, and almost certainly impaired his government's ability to communicate with the peasantry. "Personalism" became the official philosophy of the state, and though government employees were required to attend weekly sessions on its tenets, it never succeeded in becoming much more than the cant of Diem's administration, and the credo of the two political parties organized and directly controlled by his family.

4. Political Parties

The latter were peculiarly Diemist: paternally authoritarian, organized as an extension of family power. The pivotal organization was the Personalist Labor Revolutionary Party (Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang), an apparatus devised and controlled by Ngo Dinh Nhu, semi-covert, self-effacing, but with members stationed at all the levers of power within Saigon, and a web of informants everywhere in the country. Ngo envisaged the Can Lao as the vanguard of Diem's undertakings, and it became in fact the backbone of the regime. Drawing intelligence from agents at all echelons of government in the village, in factories, schools, military units, the Can Lao sought to detect the corrupt or disloyal citizen, and was empowered to bring him to arrest and trial. The Can Lao, unfortunately for Diem's political flexibility, concentrated on disloyalty. Ngo Dinh Nhu, who admitted that the Can Lao closely resembled the communists in organization and technique, used it to stifle all political sentiment competitive or opposed to Ngo Dinh Diem.

The other Diemist party was an open, "mass party," the National Revolutionary Movement (Phong Trao Cach Mang Quoc Gia). Diem himself was the honorary leader of the Party, and it was the official vehicle for his political movement. The Party claimed to have grown from 10,000 members in 1955 to 1,500,000 in 1959. In that time it acquired a majority in the National Assembly, and amassed strong voting records for Diem and NRM candidates in elections at all levels. The Party claims to have originated in "clandestine struggle for the revolution of national independence and human emancipation" at the time Diem resigned from Bao Dai's government in 1933, but properly it came into being in October, 1954. The NRM was closely associated with the National Revolutionary Civil Servants League (Lien Doan Cong Chuc Mang Quoc Gia), and since membership in the latter was a concomitant of government employment, the civil service became the core of the NRM. The relationship also established a NRM-League hierarchy parallel to, and in most instances identical with, the government hierarchy down to the village level. Obviously, too, the arrangement equated a party membership with distinct advantages in dealing with the government. NRM strength figures were probably exaggerated, and its active members -- those who attended party functions and political indoctrination sessions -- were those in the League; the NRM was, in effect, a party of government employees or dependents.
Diem did not involve himself directly in the managing of either the Can Lao or the NRM. The former, as mentioned, was always the creature of Nhu. Nhu also controlled the southern branches of the NRM, but in Annam and portions of the Central Highlands the NRM was the tightly held instrument of Ngo Dinh Can. Can brooked no opposition whatsoever; Nhu, more confident in the regions where the Can Lao was most efficient, occasionally permitted some political activity by minority groups, such as the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, and the Socialists. But that activity was tolerated only so long as it was pro-Diem and supporting, rather than opposing, GVN policy.

These were the ideas and the political apparatus by which Ngo Dinh Diem sought to weld together a nation in the aftermath of Geneva. Their narrowness, their inappropriateness for most Cochinchinese and Annamites, virtually assured that the history of his regime, after its initial successes, would become an almost unbroken record of alienation of one portion after another of the Vietnamese body politic. This process of alienation accentuated the failures of the Geneva Settlement, and ultimately led to Ngo Dinh Diem's assassination.

C. Conflict with the Armed Sects

1. Defeat of the Binh Xuyen

At the time he took office, Diem controlled scarcely a few blocks of Saigon, the capital remaining firmly in the control of Bay Vien and the Binh Xuyen. Beginning in September, 1954, Diem tried to divide and conquer the sects. Four leaders from each of the religious sects were brought into his cabinet in an effort to isolate the Binh Xuyen, and with U.S. assistance he sought to integrate the sect forces into the national army. He enjoyed some initial success in rallying Cao Dai forces, and confident from assurances of direct American aid, he shut down, in January, 1955, the Binh Xuyen concessions in Saigon and Cholon. In the ensuing confrontation, the Binh Xuyen swung the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao into a United Front of Nationalist Forces, and, although French aid for their forces had formally been withdrawn, continued to draw on French funds and advice. On March 29, 1955, fighting broke in Saigon in which sections of the city were burned. Although a truce was struck, the affair polarized relations between Diem and the sects; between Diem and General Collins, whose advice to conciliate he elected not to follow; and between the Americans and the French, over the viability of Diem. Washington apparently decided at that juncture to temporize with the sects, and to find an alternative to Diem.

Before the instructions could be sent to Saigon, however, fighting was renewed. Even as the battle was joined, Bao Dai telegraphed orders to Diem to travel to France. Diem dis obeyed, and, convinced of his moral grounds in attacking the Binh Xuyen, committed his forces to combat. His brother, Nhu, coopted a "Revolutionary Committee" to confer emergency authority on Diem. They were immediately successful, and by mid-May, 1955, the Binh Xuyen had been driven into the Rung Sat swamp east of Saigon, and Bao Dai's power in Saigon was broken. Bay Vien escaped to Paris.
2. Victory over the Sects

Diem's forces then ranged out after the other armed factions. Tran Van Soai of the Hoa Hao surrendered, and was given asylum. Another Hoa Hao leader, Ba Cut -- who had cut off a finger to remind himself to fight the French, and had sworn not to cut his hair until Vietnam was reunited -- was captured while negotiating surrender in return for a commission as lieutenant general in the ARVN. Other leaders were bribed, and the remainder fled or rallied to the GVN. By the end of 1955, Diem appeared to have dealt finally with the challenge of the sects.

It was this apparent success which enabled Diem to survive successfully pressures from an even more powerful set of opponents: those among his Western allies who were determined to replace him. The dimensions of his victory in Vietnam were just becoming evident when in May, 1955, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization convened. There promptly developed a sharp division of view between the French and the Americans. Bao Dai made known his opposition to Diem, and the French threatened to pull out of Vietnam unless Diem were removed. From Paris, Secretary Dulles reported that the French held that:

"...Time something to be done to avoid civil war. France warned that armed conflict -- first civil war, then guerrilla warfare, then terrorism -- would result if we failed to take action...New Revolutionary Committee...is strongly under Viet Minh influence...There is violent campaign against French and French Expeditionary Corps. Viet Minh agents make good use of it and certain Americans do not seem sufficiently aware of this. French Govt does not wish to have its army act as platform for Viet Minh propaganda. Army will not be maintained in Vietnam at any cost...Continuing with Diem would have three disastrous results:

(1)...Viet Minh victory
(2)...focus hostility of everyone on the French, and
(3)...begin a Franco-U.S. breach..."

The French then proposed to the U.S. that the French Expeditionary Corps be withdrawn, and asked if the U.S. were willing to guarantee French civilians, and the refugees. From Washington, the following instructions to Dulles were returned promptly:

"President's only comment on Vietnam section of (your tele-
gram) was to reiterate position that U.S. could not afford to
have forces committed in such undesirable areas as Vietnam.
This, of course, is JCS view in past. Am asking Defense and
JCS views..."

Asked, the JCS took the position that the question was fundamentally beyond their purview, that neither the ARVN nor the French Expeditionary Corps seemed capable of preserving the integrity of South Vietnam against determined Viet Minh onslaught, and that being debarred from furnishing military forces by the Geneva Agreement, the U.S. was in no position to protect French
nationalists. They suggested that Secretary Dulles be advised that: 51/

"a. The government of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem shows the greatest promise of achieving the internal stability essential for the future security of Vietnam.

"b. The U.S. could not guarantee the security of the French nationals should the French Expeditionary Corps be withdrawn.

"c. Possible United States actions under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty could ultimately afford security to Vietnam equal to that provided by the continued presence of the French Expeditionary Corps."

In Paris, Secretary Dulles managed to mollify the French. A key development was a message from Malcolm MacDonald, the British representative in Southeast Asia, urging against Diem's replacement at that time. MacDonald, who was among Diem's severest critics -- he once remarked of Diem that "He's the worst prime minister I have ever seen" -- aligned the British with Dulles, and eventually the French acquiesced in further support of Diem. 52/

The defeat of the sects also opened a domestic political opportunity for Diem. The Popular Revolutionary Committee his brother Nhu had formed during the height of the sect crisis was a "front" of broad political complexion--the membership included prominent nationalists and, as the French had pointed out, two former Viet Minh leaders; it therefore had some substance as what Nhu termed the "democratic revolutionary forces of the nation." 53/ The Revolutionary Committee urged the dissolution of the Bao Dai government, and the organizing of general elections for a National Assembly. Nhu acted under its mandate, setting up a popular referendum in which, on October 23, 1955, an overwhelming vote for Diem in preference to Bao Dai was recorded. The Revolutionary Committee dissolved itself on 31 October, apparently under some pressure from Diem and his brother.

3. The Triumph Reappraised

But it is important to note that Diem's military victory over the sects, while impressive, was by no means complete, and was certainly not as decisive as some Americans were led to believe. For example, an NRC report of 1958 mentioned that the Vietnamese Armed Forces were still operating against the sects, and had "succeeded in practically eliminating the Binh Xuyen and Cao Dai forces...." 54/ The Deputy Chief, MAAG, Vietnam, stated in April, 1959, that: "The Binh Xuyen group was completely eliminated as a menace. The Cao Dai group was pacified or reoriented... The Hoe Hao had been reduced to a handful of the diehards...." 55/ These estimates notwithstanding, Binh Xuyen remnants fought off an ARVN force north of Bien Hoa, in 1956, and marauded along the Saigon River north of Saigon in Binh Duong province throughout 1957 and 1958. In 1958, an insurgent force, among whom Binh Xuyen were identified, sacked the Michelin rubber plantation.
near Dau Tieng, and in March, 1959, ARVN had a number of encounters with Binh Xuyen elements in the Binh Duong-Bien Hoa area. There is evidence, though scanty, which indicates that the Binh Xuyen survivors joined with "communist" groups for their depredations; for example, in the 1958 Michelin attack the combined gangster-communist strength was reported to be 300-400. ARVN General Nguyen Chanh Thi, who fought these particular forces, has told of capturing a Binh Xuyen soldier who died under torture without admitting more than that his band had been communicating with communist forces from Tay Ninh province. The general also described capturing in March, 1959, in the same operations, flags identical to that raised in late 1960 by the "National Liberation Front." 

In 1956, the Cao Dai Pope, Pham Cong Tac, crossed the frontier of Tay Ninh into Cambodia with a number of his followers, thence to remain in opposition to Diem. Bay Dom, who had been the deputy of the captured Hoa Hao leader, Ba Cut, also took his forces to the Cambodian border. In 1956, Diem sent Ba Cut, his hair still uncut, to the guillotine. Bay Dom and another Hoa Hao leader, Muoi Tri, then took an oath to avenge Ba Cut, and opened guerrilla warfare against Diem. Four Hoa Hao battalions are reported to have conducted operations against the GVN continuously through 1962. Muoi Tri in later years openly embraced the Viet Cong cause.

In brief, while Diem's victory over the sects was impressive, it was not wholly conclusive, and the very obduracy and determination which won him early tactical success seemed to impede his inducing the remaining sect dissidents to perform a constructive role in the nation. Rather, his policy invited a Viet Cong-sect alliance against him. That some of the more startling early defeats of Diem's ARVN forces by Viet Cong in 1959 and 1960 occurred in the regions north of Saigon, where lurked Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen remnants, is more than coincidental.

D. Rural Pacification

1. Strategy

Americans tended to look at Diem's skein of military and political successes in 1955 with satisfaction, and to regard thereafter Vietnam's internal security with growing complacency. But Ngo Dinh Diem did not. To the contrary, Diem seemed, if anything, over-conscious of the fact that his test with the Viet Minh lay ahead, and that they posed a threat more dangerous than the sects could ever have been, not only because they were politically more pervasive, and not only because they had taught a generation of Vietnamese peasants the techniques of armed conspiracy, but also because their tenets offered competing solutions to the most pressing problems of the Vietnamese people: land and livelihood. Diem's counter is difficult to fault as a broad concept: ARVN forces would reclaim for the GVN regions formerly held by the Viet Minh; political indoctrination teams moving with the troops would carry the message of Diem's revolution to the people; and then a broad follow-up program of Civic Action--political and social development, land reform, and agricultural improvement
would be inaugurated to meet fully the aspirations of the people. That these plans miscarried was due in part to the resistance of the farmers they were intended to benefit, reacting sometimes under Viet Cong leadership, sometimes simply out of peasant conservatism. But a principal portion of the blame for failure must be attributed to Diem’s inept, overbearing, or corrupt officials, to Diem’s own unremitting anti-communist zeal, and to the failure of both he and his American advisers to appreciate the magnitude of the tasks they set for themselves, or the time required to enact meaningful reform.

2. Reoccupying Viet Minh Territory

The first steps were faltering. In early 1955, ARVN units were sent to establish the GVN in the Canau Peninsula in the southernmost part of the country. Poorly led, ill-trained, and heavy-handed, the troops behaved towards the people very much as the Viet Minh had led the farmers to expect. Accompanying GVN propaganda teams were more effective, assailing communism, colonialism, and feudalism—meaning the rule of Francophile Vietnamese, such as Bao Dai’s—and distributing pictures of Diem to replace the omnipresent tattered portraits of Ho. 59/ A subsequent operation in Quang Nai and Binh Dinh, Operation Giai Phong, reportedly went off more smoothly. Under ARVN Colonel Le Van Kim, the troops behaved well toward the people, and the propagandists exploited Viet Minh errors to the extent that, as the last Viet Minh soldiers marched down toward their ships, the populace jeered them. American advisers were active, and Diem himself visited this operation a week after the last Viet Minh had left, receiving what the Americans present considered a spontaneous welcome by the peasants. 60/

Nonetheless, the Cau Mau experience became more typical of the ARVN than the Einh Dinh affair. Foreign observers frequently expressed opinion of the ARVN in terms similar to the 1957 view of correspondent David Hotham, who wrote that "far from giving security, there is every reason to suppose that the army, buttressed by the Civil Guard...is regarded by the Southern peasant as a symbol of insecurity and repression." 61/

3. Civic Action

Nor were the follow-up Civic Action teams significantly more effective. These were patterned after the GAM’s (Groupes Administratifs Mobiles) with which the French had experimented, modified to incorporate U.S.-Filipino experience. In theory, they were to have been drawn from the urban elite, to help the government establish communications with the rural folk. Acting on the doctrine of "Three Withs: eat, sleep, and work with the people"—some 1400 to 1800 "cadre" undertook: census and surveys of the physical needs of villages; building schools, maternity hospitals, information halls; repairing and enlarging local roads; digging wells and irrigation canals; teaching personal and public hygiene; distributing medicines; teaching children by day, and anti-illiteracy classes by night; forming village militias; conducting political meetings; and publicizing agrarian reform legislation.
Colonel Lansdale described their origins and operations as follows:

"One of the most promising ideas of this period came from Kieu Cong Cung, who was sponsored by Defense Minister Minh. Cung's idea was to place civil service personnel out among the people, in simple dress, where they would help initially by working alongside the people, getting their hands dirty when necessary. The Vietnamese functionaries were aghast, since they cherished their desk work in Saigon and their dignified white-collar authority, and they fought hard within the government machine to kill the idea. It took some months, with the personal intervention and insistence of President Diem, to get a pilot Civic Action program initiated. It was given administrative support by the Ministry of Defense, at first, simply because no other Ministry would help, although it was established as an entity of the Presidency and its policy decisions were made in Cabinet meetings.

"With 80% of the civil service personnel stationed in the national capital, provincial administrators were so under-staffed that few of them could function with even minimum effectiveness. A French colonial administrative system, super-imposed upon the odd Vietnamese imperial system was still the model for government administration. It left many gaps and led to unusually complex bureaucratic practices. There was no uniform legal code, no uniform procedures for the most basic functions of government. The Communists continued their political dominance of many villages, secretly.

"Cung established a training center in Saigon and asked for civil service volunteers, for field duty. With none forthcoming, he then selected a small group of young university-trained men from among the 800,000 refugees from Communist North Vietnam, after security screening. Cung was working on a shoestring, so his training had added realism in the form of rough living quarters, outdoor classes, and students learning to work with their hands by constructing school facilities. All students had to dress in the "calico noir" of farmers and laborers, which became their "uniform" later in the villages. (Provincial authorities originally refused to recognize Civic Action personnel as government officials, due to the plebian dress; Cung, dressed in the same manner, and as a high functionary close to the President, made a rapid tour of the provinces and gained grudging acceptance of this new style of government employee.)

"Originally, four-man teams were formed; during training, the members of each team were closely observed, to judge compatibility,
with the weak and unwilling being weeded out. After graduation, each team was assigned to a district of a province, with responsibility for a number of villages. When the team finished its work in the first village, it would move to a second village, revisiting the first village periodically to check on local progress. This would continue until all villages in a district were covered, at which time the civic action team directly under the government in the provincial capital would take over district work, now organized and ready for administration.

"When a team entered a village, they would call a village meeting, explain their presence and plans. The following morning, they would set to work to build three community buildings with local materials; if they had been successful in winning over the population, the villagers pitched in and helped. One building was a village hall, for meetings of village officials. Another was a primary school. The third was a combination information hall (news, information about the government, etc.) and dispensary (using the village medical kits developed by ICA). Following up was the building of roads or paths to link the village with provincial roads, if in a remote area, build pit latrines, undertake malaria control, put in drainage, and undertake similar community projects. Villagers were trained to take over these tasks, including primary education and first aid.

"The work of Civic Action teams, at the same grass-roots level as that of Communist workers, proved effective. They became the targets of Communist agents, with political attacks (such as stirring up local Cochín-Chinese against Tonkinese Civic Action personnel) and then murders. Even while the field work was in its early development stage, President Diem ordered the teams to start working directly with Army commands in pacification campaigns, as the civil government "troops" in what were essentially combat zones. As Civic Action proved itself, it was extended to all provinces south of the 17th Parallel."

Had the cadres been able to confine themselves to these missions, and had the several Saigon ministries, whose field responsibilities they had assumed, been content to have them continue to represent them, matters might have developed differently. As it happened, the cadres became preoccupied with Diem's Anti-Communist campaign, and their operations came under bureaucratic attack from Saigon agencies unwilling to allow the Civic Action teams to carry their programs to the people. Both influences converted the cadre into exclusively propagandistic and political instruments, and drew them away from economic or social activities; in late 1956, Civic Action was cut back severely. In 1957, Kieu Cong Cung died, and Nhu absorbed the remnants into his organization.

4. Land Reform

But the salesmen were less at fault than the product. Diem had to promise much and deliver well to best the Viet Minh in rural reform,
but his promises were moderate, his delivery on them both slow and incomplete. The anarchy prevalent in the countryside during the First Indochina War had benefited the peasant by driving off the French and Vietnamese large landlords. When the Viet Minh "liberated" an area, they distributed these lands free to the farmers, and generally won their allegiance thereby. Columnist Joseph Alsop visited one such Viet Minh controlled region in December, 1954, just before they withdrew their military forces, and reported that:

"It was difficult for me, as it is for any Westerner, to conceive of a Communist government's genuinely 'serving the people.' I could hardly imagine a Communist government that was also a popular government and almost a democratic government. But this was just the sort of government the palm-hut state actually was while the struggle with the French continued. The Viet Minh could not possibly have carried on the resistance for one year, let alone nine years, without the people's strong, untied support."

One of Diem's primary failures lay in his inability similarly to capture loyalties among his 90 percent agricultural people. The core of rural discontent was the large land holdings: in 1954 one percent of the population owned forty percent of the rice growing land. The Diem program to ameliorate this situation for the land-hungry peasants took the form of: (1) resettlement of refugees and others on uncultivated land, begun in 1955; (2) expropriation of all rice land holdings above 247 acres, and redistribution of these to tenant farmers, a program announced in 1956, but delayed in starting until 1958; and (3) regulation of landlord-tenant relations, enacted in 1957, which fixed rents within the range 15-25 percent of crop yield, and guaranteed tenant tenure for 3 to 5 years. Both the resettlement and redistribution programs guaranteed payments to former owners of the appropriated land; although the land was reasonably priced, and payment allowed over an extended period, the farmers faced payments, and these immediately aroused opposition. Settlers moved into a wilderness, required to clear and irrigate theretofore unused land, could not see why they should pay for their holdings. Tenant farmers were also dissatisfied, for though rents of 40 percent of crop had been common before the way, many farmers, after eight or so rent-free years, could see no justice in resuming payments to a long absent owner, particularly since the Viet Minh had assured them the land was theirs by right. Nor were many mollified by redistributed land. Land redistribution suffered according to one American expert, from a "lack of serious, interested administrators and topside command. Government officials, beginning with the Minister for Agrarian Reform, had divided loyalties, being themselves landholders." But even if the goals of the program had been honestly fulfilled -- which they were not -- only 20% of rice land would have passed from large to small farmers. Ultimately only 10% of all tenant farmers benefited. A bolder program, with a maximum holding of 124 acres, could have put 33 percent of rice land up for transfer. As it happened, however, the redistribution program was not only of limited scope, but slow; by 1958
or 1959, it was virtually inoperative. Bernard Fall has reported that despite Diem's land reforms, 45% of the land remained concentrated in the hands of 2% of landowners, and 75% in the hands of 15%. Moreover, since the immediate beneficiaries were more often than not Northerners, refugees, and Catholics, the programs acquired an aura of GVN favoritism, and deepened peasant alienation. In time there were also rumors of corruption, with widespread allegations that the Diem family had enriched itself through the manipulation of the land transfers.

As an example of Diem's rural programs in action at the village level which serves to demonstrate how they fell wide of the mark of meeting rural expectations, that of the village communal land is instructive. After the long period of disrupted public administration during the Franco-Viet Minh War, land records were chaotic. Under Diem, the GVN seized outright nearly half a million acres of land whose title was unclear. Some of this land was rented, the GVN acting as the landlord; some was farmed by ARVN units; and some was converted into communal land and the title passed to village councils. The village councils were then supposed to hold an annual auction of communal land, in which farmers wishing to use certain plots submitted sealed bids. Although this seemed to the casual western observer an equitable system, in actuality it was quite vicious. The bidding farmers were usually seeking to rent land they had been farming free for years. Whether this were the case or not, however, rice growing is a labor intensive process which requires of the farmer a substantial capital investment year by year to build up dikes and ditches. To assure himself that he would not lose this investment, a man farming a plot declared communal land felt compelled to raise his bid each succeeding year to avoid loss of that capital, and to preclude losing his hard work. The consequent competition, however modern, shook the roots of traditional Asian farming communities, for the arrangement had the major disadvantage of creating uncertainty over land from year to year -- the antithesis of security for the rice-growing peasant. To cap these disadvantages, village councils were often less than honest, and tended to be considerably less willing than a paternal landlord to tide the farmer over after a bad crop year; if his subsequent bid were low, he lost his land.

There is another chapter in the history of GVN-farmer relationships which illustrates similar clumsiness. In 1956, as the GVN launched its land reform program, Ngo Dinh Nhu enlisted the aid of the Confederation of Vietnamese Labor, which had been organizing tenant farmers in promoting the government's policies through its rural representatives. The GVN then proceeded to form its own, NRM-connected, Farmers' Associations. The latter, interconnected with province officials and with landowners, actively opposed the union organizers, with the result that many of the latter were jailed. Within a year or two, the union was destroyed for all practical purposes. Few of the NRM Farmers' Associations ever did function on behalf of the farmers; of 288 associations reported in-being by the GVN, a USOM study in 1961 could find only 35 which represented peasant interests in any active sense.
5. Village Government

A further example of Diem's maladroitness was his abolishing elections for village councils, a step he took in June, 1956, apparently out of concern that large numbers of former Viet Minh might win office at the village level. 69/ The Vietnamese village had traditionally, even under the French, enjoyed administrative autonomy, and the village council was a coterie of prominent residents who were the government in most simple civic matters, adjudicating disputes, collecting taxes, and managing public funds. Under the national regulation of 1956, members of council and the village chief became appointive officials, and their offices subject to scrutiny by the Diemist apparatus. The results were again a thrusting forward of Northern Catholics, city dwellers, or other non-local trustees of the GVN, to assume control at the key political level of South Vietnam, to handle fiscal matters, and to manage the communal lands. For the same reasons that the villagers had mistrusted the Civic Action cadre, they found the GVN officials strange, and not a little incomprehensible. Also, since these officials were the creatures of the province chiefs, corruption at the province level -- then, as in recent years, not uncommon -- was transmitted directly to the village. Dang Duc Khoi, a young nationalist who rose to become Diem's press officer, and then turned against him, regarded Diem's decision to abolish the village councils his vital error:

"Even if the Viet Minh had won some elections, the danger of doing away with the traditional system of village election was even greater. This was something that was part of the Vietnamese way of life, and the concept should have been retained without interfering with Diem's legitimate desire -- indeed, his need -- for a strong central government. The security problem existed, but it wouldn't have made much difference if the Viet Minh had elected some village chiefs -- they soon established their own underground governments anyway. Diem's mistake was in paralyzing himself. He should have adopted a more intelligent and persuasive policy and concentrated at the outset on obtaining the support of the people. In that way, he could have properly challenged the Viet Minh." 70/

Thus, Ngo Dinh began, in 1956, to place the "security problem" ahead of rural revolution.

6. The Anti-Communist Campaign

Indeed, vocal anti-communism became more central to Diem's rural programs than land reform. Like the Can Lao Party, the GVN borrowed heavily from communist technique in combating the Viet Minh and their residual influence -- urged on, in some instances at least, by their American advisers. In the summer of 1955, the government launched an Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, which included a scheme for classifying the populace into lettered political groups according to attitude toward the Viet Minh, and village ceremonies similar to communist
self-criticism sessions. Viet Minh cadres and sympathizers would appear before the audience to swear their disavowal of communism. The penitents would tell tales of Viet Minh atrocities, and rip or trample a suitable Viet Minh symbol. In February, 1956, tens of thousands of Saigon citizens assembled to witness the "conversion" of 2,000 former Viet Minh cadres. Tran Chanh Tanh, head of the GVN Department of Information and Youth, announced in May, 1956, that the campaign had "entirely destroyed the predominant communist influence of the previous nine years." 71/ According to his figures, 94,041 former communist cadres had rallied to the GVN, 5,613 other cadres had surrendered to government forces, 119,954 weapons had been captured, 75 tons of documents, and 707 underground arms caches had been discovered. One Saigon newspaper boldly referred to Tanh's proceedings as a "puppet show" -- for which it was closed down. What relationship GVN statistics bore to reality is not known. 72/

However, for many peasants the Anti-Communist Campaign was considerably more than theatrics. Diem, in a Presidential Ordinance of January 11, 1956, expanded upon an existing system of political re-education centers for communists and active communist supporters. 73/ The 1956 order authorized the arrest and detention of anyone deemed dangerous to the safety of the state, and their incarceration in one of several concentration camps. The Secretary of State for Information disclosed in 1956 that 15,000 to 20,000 communists had been in these centers since 1954, a figure probably low at the time, and undoubtedly raised thereafter. 74/ On May 6, 1959, the GVN promulgated Law 10/59, which stiffened penalties for communist affiliations, and permitted trial of accused by special military tribunals. That year Anti-Communist Denunciation was also stepped up. In 1960, a GVN Ministry of Information release stated that 48,250 persons had been jailed between 1954 and 1960, but a French observer estimates the numbers in jail at the end of 1956 alone at 50,000. 75/ P. J. Honey, who was invited by Diem to investigate certain of the re-education centers in 1959, reported that on the basis of his talks with former inmates, "the consensus of the opinions expressed by these people is that...the majority of the detainees are neither communists nor pro-communists." 76/

The Anti-Communist Campaigns targeted city-dwellers, but it was in the rural areas, where the Viet Minh had been most strong, that it was applied most energetically. For example, in 1959 the Information Chief of An Xuyen Province (Cau Mau region) reported that a five week Anti-Communist Campaign by the National Revolutionary Movement had resulted in the surrender of 8,125 communist agents, and the denunciation of 9,806 other agents and 29,978 sympathizers. 77/ To furnish the organization and spark enthusiasm for such undertakings, Ngo Dinh Nhu organized in 1958 the Republican Youth, which with Madame Nhu's Solidarity Movement, became a vehicle for rural paramilitary training, political, and intelligence activities. 78/ Nhu saw the Republican Youth as a means for bringing "controlled liberty" to the countryside, and it seems certainly to have assisted in extending his control.
The GVN also tried to reorganize rural society from the family level up on the communist cellular model. Each family was grouped with two to six others into a Mutual Aid Family Group (*lien gia*), and a like number of *lien gia* comprised a *khom*. There was an appointed chief for both, serving as a chain of command for the community, empowered to settle petty disputes, and obligated to pass orders and information down from the authorities. Each *lien gia* was held responsible for the political behavior of its members, and was expected to report suspicious behavior (the presence of strangers, unusual departures, and like events). Each house was required to display on a board outside a listing of the number and sex of its inhabitants. These population control measures were combined with improved systems of provincial police identification cards and fingerprinting. The central government thus became visible—and resented—at the village level as it had never been before in Vietnam.

7. Population Relocation

Security and control of the populace also figured in GVN resettlement plans. Even the refugee relief programs had been executed with an eye to national security. Diem visualized a "living wall" of settlers between the lowland populace and the jungle and mountain redoubts of dissidents. From flying trips, or from military maps, he personally selected the sites for resettlement projects (*Khu Dinh Dien*)—often in locales deprived of adequate water or fertile soil—to which were moved pioneering communities of Northern refugees, or settlers from the overcrowded Annam coast. Between April 1957 and late 1961, one GVN report showed 210,000 persons resettled in 147 centers carved from 220,000 acres of wilderness. Some of the resentments over payments for resettled virgin land were mentioned above. More importantly, however, these "strategic" programs drew a disproportionate share of foreign aid for agriculture; by U.S. estimates, the 2% of total population affected by resettlement received 50% of total aid.

The resettlements precipitated unexpected political reactions from the Montagnard peoples of the Central Vietnam Highlands. The tribes were traditionally hostile to the Vietnamese, and proved to be easily mobilized against the GVN. In 1959 the GVN began to regroup and consolidate the tribes into defensible communities to decrease their vulnerability to anti-government agents, and to ease the applying of cultural uplift programs. By late 1961 these relocations were being executed on a large scale. In Kontum Province, for instance, 35,000 tribesmen were regrouped in autumn 1961, about 50 percent of its total Montagnard population. Some of the hill people refused to remain in their new communities, but the majority stayed. In the long run, the relocations probably had the effect of focusing Montagnard discontent against the GVN, and facilitating, rather than hindering, the subversion of the tribes. When, in 1964, tribes around Ban Me Thoiet rebelled openly against the GVN, they rallied around FULRO, a Montagnard autonomy movement with Viet Cong ties. In the recitation of wrongs and demands that FULRO presented to the GVN, it asserted...
that "solutions must be found for the resettlement villages which have infringed upon land of the highland people, and for the highland villages which are surrounded by military camps and consequently do not have enough land to make a living." 82/

But the relocations which catalized the most widespread and dangerous anti-GVN sentiment were those attempted among the South Vietnamese farmers beginning in 1959. In February, 1959, a pilot program of political bifurcation was quietly launched in the areas southwest of Saigon which had been controlled by the Viet Minh. 83/ Its objective was to resettle peasants out of areas where GVN police or military forces could not operate routinely, into new, policed communities of two distinct political colorations. Into one type of these "rural agglomerations," called qui khu, were grouped families with relatives among the Viet Minh or Viet Cong, or suspected of harboring pro-Viet Cong sentiments. Into another type, called qui ap, were grouped GVN-oriented families. Security was the primary reason for selecting the sites of these communities, which meant that in many instances the peasants were forced to move some distance from their land. The French had attempted, on a small scale, such peasant relocations in 1953 in Tonkin; Diem encountered in 1959, as had they, stiff resistance from the farmers over separation from their livelihood and ancestral landhold. But Diem's plan also aroused apprehensions during qui khu designates over the Anti-Communist Campaign. With a rare sensitivity to rural protest, the GVN suspended the program in March, 1959, after only a month.

In July, 1959, however, Diem announced that the GVN was undertaking to improve rural standards of living through establishing some 80 "prosperity and density centers" (khu tru mat). 84/ These "agrovilles" were to be located along a "strategic route system" -- key roads, protected by the new towns. Some 80 agrovilles were to be built by the end of 1963, each designed for 400 families (2,000 to 3,000 people), and each with a surrounding cluster of smaller agrovilles, ap tru mat, for 120 families. The GVN master plan provided for each community defense, schools, dispensary, market center, public garden -- even electricity. The new communities seemed to offer the farmers many advantages, and the GVN expected warm support. But the peasants objected to the agrovilles even more sharply than they had the earlier experiment. The agrovilles were supposed to be constructed by peasants themselves; Corvee labor was resorted to, and thousands of Republican Youth were imported to help. For example, at one site -- Vi Thanh near Can Tho -- 20,000 peasants were assembled from four districts, many more than the number who could expect to profit directly from the undertaking. 85/ Moreover, even most of those who were selected to move into agrovilles they had helped build, did so unwillingly, for it often meant abandoning a cherished ancestral home, tombs, and developed gardens and fields for a strange and desolate place. The settler was expected to tear down his old house to obtain materials for the new, and received GVN aid to the extent of a grant of $5.50, and an agricultural loan to assist him in paying for his allotted 1.5 acres of land near the agroville. Peasant resistance, and then insurgent attacks on the agrovilles, caused abandonment of the program in early 1961, with only 22 out of 80 communities completed. 86/
The agroville program was eventually superseded by the GVN strategic hamlet program, formally launched by President Diem in February, 1962, which avoided the mistake of trying to erect whole new communities from the ground up. Rather, the plan aimed at fortifying existing villages, but did include provisions for destroying indefensible hamlets, and relocation of the inhabitants into more secure communities. The strategic hamlet, ap chien luc, also eschewed elaborate social or economic development schemes, concentrating on civil defense through crude fortifications and organizing the populace to improve its military capability and political cohesiveness. In some exposed sites, "combat hamlets" were established, with a wholly militarized population. High goals were established, the GVN announcing that by 1965 some 11,000 of the country's 16,000-17,000 hamlets would be fortified. In this instance, as before, the GVN encountered opposition from the peasants, and as before, the insurgents attacked it vigorously. Despite its relative sophistication, the strategic hamlet program, like its predecessors, drove a wedge not between the insurgents and the farmers but between the farmers and the GVN, and eventuated in less rather than more security in the countryside.

8. Rural Security Forces

Security was the foremost consideration of the GVN's rural programs, and American aid was lavished on the GVN security apparatus in general. It is surprising, therefore, that the GVN tolerated so ineffective a security apparatus at the village level. The Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Guard (CG), charged with rural security, were poorly trained and equipped, miserably led, and incapable of coping with insurgents; they could scarcely defend themselves, much less the peasantry. Indeed, they proved to be an asset to insurgents in two respects: they served as a source of weapons; and their brutality, petty thievery, and disorderliness induced innumerable villagers to join in open revolt against the GVN. Nor was the ARVN much better, although its conduct improved over the years; in any event, the ARVN seldom was afield, and its interaction with the rural populace through 1959 was relatively slight.

E. Urban Political Alienation.

The rigidity of GVN rural political policy was mirrored in the cities: the regime became preoccupied with security to the exclusion of other concerns, with the result that step by step it narrowed its active or potential supporters, aroused increasing fears among its critics, and drove them toward extremism. In a step similar to that he took on village council elections, Diem abolished elections for municipal councils in 1956. The Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign had its urban counterpart, but communist strength in the French-occupied cities had been less than in the countryside, and threats or imagined challenges to Diem's government were seen as coming from other elements as well. The cities, of course, had
sustained Vietnam's intellectual life, and had been the epicenters of such political life as the French had permitted the Vietnamese to pursue. Opposition to Diem formed around the old nationalist movements, including the pro-Bao Dai groups Diem labeled "feudalists," around intellectual and individual professional politicians, and eventually around military leaders. Diem's policies successively alienated each.

1. "Feudalists"

The Civic Action teams which Diem projected into the former Viet Minh areas in 1955 trumpeted against "Communism, Colonialism, and Feudalism," the last inveighing against Bao Dai, who was, at the time, still Head of state. 20/ "Feudalist" was one epithet applied sweepingly to the religious sects, and to all those whose position or fortune depended upon Bao Dai, from the Binh Xuyen who had purchased its control over Saigon-Cholon from the Emperor, to civil servants and army officers loyal to Bao Dai. The label was virtually as damning as "communist" in incurring the ungentle attentions of Nhu or Can. In the early years "feudalists" and "communists" were often tarred by the same brush. For example, the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign got underway in Quang Tri Province in 1955, under Ngo Dinh Can. But Can was also in pursuit of the anti-communist Dai Viet (Great Vietnam) Party there, which had armed units and, for a time, an anti-government radio station. As with the communists, many Dai Viet were killed, imprisoned, or driven into exile. 91/ Diem's defeat of Bao Dai at the polls in October, 1955, strengthened his hand against pro-Bao Dai groups. With the withdrawal of the French the following spring, it became imprudent for any politician or group who wished to avoid Can Lao and NRM scrutiny to maintain ties with "feudalists" in hiding in Vietnam, or operating from abroad. Despite the fact that opposition Vietnamese nationalist parties had been strongly influenced in their organization and methods by the Kuomintang, they had never developed sufficient internal discipline, cohesion or following to admit of challenging Diem after 1956. Such opposition political forces as developed centered around individuals. (Only two non-Diem, non-communist political parties survived the Diem era: the Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam (Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang, the Dai Viet) and the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, the VNQDD)). 92/

2. Dr. Dan.

Until November, 1960, Diem's most prominent political opponent was Doctor Phan Quang Dan. Dr. Dan was a northern physician who had been caught up in nationalist politics in 1945, and lived in exile after 1947. He returned to Vietnam in September, 1955, to head up a coalition of opposition to the GVN arrangements for the March, 1956, elections for the National Assembly. 93/ He was arrested on the eve of these elections, accused of communist and colonialist activities, and though released, deprived of his position at the University of Saigon Medical School. His subsequent political career underscores the astringent nature of Diem's democracy. In May, 1957 Dr. Dan formed another opposition coalition, the Democratic Bloc, which
acquired a newspaper called Thoi Luan. Thoi Luan became the best-selling newspaper in South Vietnam (all papers were published in Saigon, except Can's government paper in Hue) with a circulation of about 80,000 copies. After a series of statements critical of the GVN, Thoi Luan was sacked by a mob in September, 1957. Unheeding of that warning, the paper continued an opposition editorial policy until March, 1958, when the GVN closed the paper, and gave the editor a stiff fine and a suspended prison sentence for an article including the following passage: 94/

"What about your democratic election?

"During the city-council and village council elections under the 'medieval and colonialist' Nguyen Van Tam Administration [under Bao-Dai, in 1953], constituents were threatened and compelled to vote; but they were still better than your elections, because nobody brought soldiers into Saigon by the truckload 'to help with the voting.'

"What about your presidential regime?

"You are proud for having created for Vietnam a regime that you think is similar to that of the United States. If those regimes are similar, then they are as related as a skyscraper is to a tin-roofed shack, in that they both are houses to live in.

"In the U.S.A., Congress is a true parliament and Congressmen are legislators, i.e., free and disinterested men who are not afraid of the government, and who know their duties and dare to carry them out. Here the deputies are political functionaries who make laws like an announcer in a radio station, by reading out loud texts that have been prepared beforehand...." 95/

A month later, the Democratic Bloc collapsed. Dr. Dan attempted to obtain GVN recognition for another party, the Free Democratic Party, and permission to publish another paper. No GVN action was ever taken on either application, but a number of Dr. Dan's followers in the new party were arrested. When in March, 1959, the newspaper Tin Bac published an article by Dr. Dan, it was closed down. In June, 1959, the newspaper Ngoc Viet Tu Do was similarly indiscreet, and met the same fate. In August, 1959, Dr. Dan ran for a seat in the National Assembly, was elected by a six-to-one margin over Diem's candidate running against him, but was disqualified by court action before he could take his seat. Dr. Dan's career of opposition to Diem ended in November, 1960, when he became the political adviser to the group who attempted a coup d'etat. Dan was arrested and jailed, and remained there until the end of the Diem regime three years later.

3. The Caravelle Group, 1960

But Dr. Dan was an exceptionally bold antagonist of Diem. No other politician dared what he did. Even he, however, was unable to bring any unity to the opposition. Such other leaders as there were
distrusted Dan, or feared the GVN. There was, however, one occasion in
the spring of 1960 when opposition to Diem did coalesce. There was
change in the international political winds that year -- a students'
revolt in Korea, an army revolt in Turkey, demonstrations in Japan which
resulted in cancellation of President Eisenhower's planned visit. Diem
remembered 1960 well, as a "treasure chest for the communists."

"The United States press and the world press started saying
that democracy was needed in the under-developed countries.
This came just in time for the communists. Some of the United
States press even incited people to rebellion.

"That year was the worst we have ever had...We had problems
on all fronts. On the one hand we had to fight the communists.
On the other, we had to deal with the foreign press campaign
to incite rebellion vis-a-vis Korea. These were sore anxieties,
for some unbalanced people here thought it was time to act.
Teachers in the private secondary schools began to incite the
students to follow the example of the Korean students. And
then there were our amateur politicians who were outdated and
thought only of taking revenge...."

The last reference was to the Caravelle Group, who issued at the Caravelle
Hotel in late April, 1960, a "manifesto" of grievances against the GVN.
The eighteen signers were all old-time politicians, leaders of the Cao
Dai and Hoa Hao sects, the Dai Viet and the VNQDD parties, and dissenting
Catholic groups. Eleven had been Cabinet ministers; four had been in
other high government positions. They organized themselves as the Bloc
for Liberty and Progress, with a platform of constitutional revision
toward greater power for the National Assembly against the Presidency.
Dr. Dan could not be induced to join the Caravelle Group, but in the
Diem cleanup after the November, 1960 coup attempt, the GVN arrested most
of the eighteen, and their Bloc disintegrated. The Caravelle Manifesto
is reproduced below:

**MANIFESTO OF THE EIGHTEEN**

The President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Saigon

Mr. President:

We the undersigned, representing a group of eminent citi-
zens and personalities, intellectuals of all tendencies, and
men of good will, recognize in the face of the gravity of the
present political situation that we can no longer remain
indifferent to the realities of life in our country.

Therefore, we officially address to you today an appeal with
the aim of exposing to you the whole truth in the hope that the
government will accord it all the attention necessary so as to
urgently modify its policies, so as to remedy the present situ-
ation and lead the people out of danger.
Let us look toward the past, at the time when you were abroad. For eight or nine years, the Vietnamese people suffered many trials due to the war: They passed from French domination to Japanese occupation, from revolution to resistance, from the nationalist imposture behind which hid communism to a pseudo-independence covering up for colonialism; from terror to terror, from sacrifice to sacrifice — in short, from promise to promise, until finally hope ended in bitter disillusion.

Thus, when you were on the point of returning to the country, the people as a whole entertained the hope that it would find again under your guidance the peace that is necessary to give meaning to existence, to reconstruct the destroyed homes, put to the plow again the abandoned lands. The people hoped no longer to be compelled to pay homage to one regime in the morning and to another at night, not to be the prey of the cruelties and oppression of one faction; no longer to be treated as coolies; no longer to be at the mercy of the monopolies; no longer to have to endure the depredations of corrupt and despotic civil servants. In one word, the people hoped to live in security at last, under a regime which would give them a little bit of justice and liberty. The whole people thought that you would be the man of the situation and that you would implement its hopes.

That is the way it was when you returned. The Geneva Accords of 1954 put an end to combat and to the devastations of war. The French Expeditionary Corps was progressively withdrawn, and total independence of South Viet Nam had become a reality. Furthermore, the country had benefited from moral encouragement and a substantial increase of foreign aid from the free world. With so many favorable political factors, in addition to the blessed geographic conditions of a fertile and rich soil yielding agricultural, forestry, and fishing surpluses, South Viet Nam should have been able to begin a definitive victory in the historical competition with the North, so as to carry out the will of the people and to lead the country on the way to hope, liberty, and happiness. Today, six years later, having benefited from so many undeniable advantages, what has the government been able to do? Where has it led South Viet Nam? What parts of the popular aspirations have been implemented?

Let us try to draw an objective balance of the situation, without flattery or false accusations, strictly following a constructive line which you yourself have so often indicated, in the hope that the government shall modify its policies so as to extricate itself from a situation that is extremely dangerous to the very existence of the nation.
Policies

In spite of the fact that the bastard regime created and protected by colonialism has been overthrown and that many of the feudal organizations of factions and parties which oppress the population were destroyed, the people do not know a better life or more freedom under the republican regime which you have created. A constitution has been established in form only; a National Assembly exists whose deliberations always fall into line with the government; antidemocratic elections -- all those are methods and "comedies" copied from the dictatorial Communist regimes, which obviously cannot serve as terms of comparison with North Viet Nam.

Continuous arrests fill the jails and prisons to the rafters, as at this precise moment; public opinion and the press are reduced to silence. The same applies to the popular will as translated in certain open elections, in which it is insulted and trampled (as was the case, for example, during the recent elections for the Second Legislature). All these have provoked the discouragement and resentment of the people.

Political parties and religious sects have been eliminated, "Groups" or "movements" have replaced them. But this substitution has only brought about new oppressions against the population without protecting it for that matter against Communist enterprises. Here is one example: the fiefs of religious sects, which hitherto were deadly for the Communists, now not only provide no security whatever but have become favored highways for Viet Minh guerrillas, as is, by the way, the case of the rest of the country.

This is proof that the religious sects, though futile, nevertheless constitute effective anti-Communist elements. Their elimination has opened the way to the Viet Cong and unintentionally has prepared the way for the enemy, whereas a more realistic and more flexible policy could have amalgamated them all with a view to reinforcing the anti-Communist front.

Today the people want freedom. You should, Mr. President, liberalize the regime, promote democracy, guarantee minimum civil rights, recognize the opposition so as to permit the citizens to express themselves without fear, thus removing grievances and resentments, opposition to which now constitutes for the people their sole reason for existence. When
this occurs, the people of South Viet Nam, in comparing their position with that of the North, will appreciate the value of true liberty and of authentic democracy. It is only at that time that the people will make all the necessary efforts and sacrifices to defend that liberty and democracy.

Administration

The size of the territory has shrunk, but the number of civil servants has increased, and still the work doesn't get done. This is because the government, like the Communists, lets the political parties control the population, separate the elite from the lower echelons, and sow distrust between those individuals who are "affiliated with the movement" and those who are "outside the group." Effective power, no longer in the hands of those who are usually responsible, is concentrated in fact in the hands of an irresponsible member of the "family," from whom emanates all orders; this slows down the administrative machinery, paralyzes all initiative, discourages good will. At the same time, not a month goes by without the press being full of stories about graft impossible to hide; this becomes an endless parade of illegal transactions involving millions of piastres.

The administrative machinery, already slowed down, is about to become completely paralyzed. It is in urgent need of reorganization. Competent people should be put back in the proper jobs; discipline must be re-established from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy; authority must go hand in hand with responsibility; efficiency, initiative, honesty, and the economy should be the criteria for promotion; professional qualifications should be respected. Favoritism based on family or party connections should be banished; the selling of influence, corruption and abuse of power must be punished.

Thus, everything still can be saved, human dignity can be re-established; faith in an honest and just government can be restored.

Army

The French Expeditionary Corps has left the country, and a republican army has been constituted, thanks to American aid, which has equipped it with modern materiel. Nevertheless, even in a group of the proud elite of the youth such as the Vietnamese Army -- where the sense of honor should be cultivated, whose blood and arms should be devoted to the defense of the
country, where there should be no place for clannishness and factions -- the spirit of the "national revolutionary movement" or of the "personalist body" divides the men of one and the same unit, sows distrust between friends of the same rank, and uses as a criterion for promotion fidelity toward the party in blind submission to its leaders. This creates extremely dangerous situations, such as the recent incident of Tay-Ninh.*

The purpose of the army, pillar of the defense of the country, is to stop foreign invasions and to eliminate rebel movements. It is at the service of the country only and should not lend itself to the exploitation of any faction or party. Its total reorganization is necessary. Clannishness and party obedience should be eliminated; its moral base strengthened; a noble tradition of national pride created; and fighting spirit, professional conscience, and bravery should become criteria for promotion. The troops should be encouraged to respect their officers, and the officers should be encouraged to love their men. Distrust, jealousy, rancor among colleagues of the same rank should be eliminated.

Then in case of danger, the nation will have at its disposal a valiant army animated by a single spirit and a single aspiration: to defend the most precious possession -- our country, Viet Nam.

Economic and Social Affairs

A rich and fertile country enjoying food surpluses; a budget which does not have to face military expenditures,** important war reparations; substantial profits from Treasury bonds; a colossal foreign-aid program; a developing market capable of receiving foreign capital investments -- those are the many favorable conditions which could make Viet Nam a productive and prosperous nation. However, at the present time many people are out of work, have no roof over their heads, and no money. Rice is abundant but does not sell; shop windows are well-stocked but the goods do not move. Sources of revenue are in the hands of speculators -- who use the government/party and group to mask monopolies.

* This refers to the penetration of the compound of the 32d ARVN Regiment in January, 1960, when communist forces killed 23 soldiers and captured hundreds of weapons.

** The military expenditures of the Vietnamese budget are paid out of U.S. economic and military aid.
operating for certain private interests. At the same time, thousands of persons are mobilized for exhausting work, compelled to leave their own jobs, homes and families, to participate in the construction of magnificent but useless "agrovilles" which weary them and provoke their disaffection, thus aggravating popular resentment and creating an ideal terrain for enemy propaganda.

The economy is the very foundation of society, and public opinion ensures the survival of the regime. The government must destroy all the obstacles standing in the way of economic development; must abolish all forms of monopoly and speculation; must create a favorable environment for investments coming from foreign friends as well as from our own citizens; must encourage commercial enterprises, develop industry, and create jobs to reduce unemployment. At the same time, it should put an end to all forms of human exploitation in the work camps of the agrovilles.

Then only the economy will flourish again; the citizen will find again a peaceful life and will enjoy his condition; society will be reconstructed in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy.

Mr. President, this is perhaps the first time that you have heard such severe and disagreeable criticism -- so contrary to your own desires. Nevertheless, sir, these words are strictly the truth, a truth that is bitter and hard, that you have never been able to know because, whether this is intended or not, a void has been created around you, and by the very fact of your high position, no one permits you to perceive the critical point at which truth shall burst forth in irresistible waves of hatred on the part of a people subjected for a long time to terrible suffering and a people who shall rise to break the bonds which hold it down. It shall sweep away the ignominy and all the injustices which surround and oppress it.

As we do not wish, in all sincerity, that our Fatherland should have to live through these perilous days, we -- without taking into consideration the consequences which our attitude may bring upon us -- are ringing today the alarm bell in view of the imminent danger which threatens the government.

Until now, we have kept silent and preferred to let the Executive act as it wished. But now time is of the essence;
we feel that it is our duty -- and in the case of a nation in turmoil even the most humble people have their share of responsibility -- to speak the truth, to awaken public opinion, to alert the people, and to unify the opposition so as to point the way. We beseech the government to urgently modify its policies so as to remedy the situation, to defend the republican regime, and to safeguard the existence of the nation. We hold firm hope that the Vietnamese people shall know a brilliant future in which it will enjoy peace and prosperity in freedom and progress.

Yours respectfully,

1. TRAN VAN VAN, Diploma of Higher Commercial Studies, former Minister of Economy and Planning
2. PHAN KHAC SUU, Agricultural Engineer, former Minister of Agriculture, former Minister of Labor
3. TRAN VAN HUONG, Professor of Secondary Education, former Prefect of Saigon-Cholon
4. NGUYEN LUU VIEN, M.D., former Professor at the Medical School, former High Commissioner of Refugees
5. HUYNH-KIM HUU, M.D., former Minister of Public Health
6. PHAN HUY QUAT, M.D., former Minister of National Education, former Minister of Defense
7. TRAN VAN LY, former Governor of Central Viet-Nam
8. NGUYEN TIEN HY, M.D.
9. TRAN VAN DO, M.D., former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chairman of Vietnamese Delegation to the 1954 Geneva Conference
10. LE NGOC CHAN, Attorney at Law, former Secretary of State for National Defense
11. LE QUANG LUAT, Attorney at Law, former Government Delegate for North Viet-Nam, former Minister of Information and Propaganda
12. LUONG TRONG TUONG, Public Works Engineer, former Secretary of State for National Economy
13. NGUYEN TANG NGUYEN, M.D., former Minister of Labor and Youth

14. PHAM HUU CHUONG, M.D., former Minister of Public Health and Social Action

15. TRAN VAN TUYEN, Attorney at Law, former Secretary of State for Information and Propaganda

16. TA CHUONG PHUNG, former Provincial Governor for Binh-Dinh

17. TRAN LE CHAT, Laureate of the Triennial Mandarin Competition of 1903

18. HO VAN VUI, Reverend, former Parish Priest of Saigon, at present Parish Priest of Tha-La, Province of Tay-Ninh

The November, 1960, coup marked the end of opposition by professional politicians against Diem. In fact, all the Caravelle group were arrested and jailed. Such political activity among them as occurred in 1962 and 1963 was perforce subdued to the point that it captured attention neither from opponents of Diem, nor Diem himself. But 1960 was altogether too late for effective "loyal opposition" to form. By that time the GVN's ability to control the press, to manage demonstrations, to limit travel, and to imprison (and worse) at will, had virtually paralyzed the intellectual elite of Vietnam. Nor were labor unions politically active, despite their power potential. As early as 1956 the GVN had become alarmed over Communist influence in rubber workers' unions in Binh Duong Province, and had arrested union leaders. Farmers' unions were crippled by arrests of union cadre, and the Can lac proved itself quite capable of engineering elections within the unions as effectively as it rigged those for the National Assembly. 27/ The threat to Diem, when it came, arose from more traditional sources of power -- the religious sects and the armed forces.

4. Religious Dissenters

Diem's clash with the armed sects in 1954 and 1955 had the unfortunate political consequence of casting his regime in religious overtones which deepened as the Ngo Dinh Catholicism became more widely known. Together with Diem's obvious U.S. backing, these had the effect of accentuating his Occidental, and especially American, identity. The British Catholic writer and commentator on Vietnam, Graham Greene, observed in 1955 that:

"It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem. For his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States. An unfortunate visit by
Cardinal Spellman... has been followed by those of Cardinal Gillroy and the Archbishop of Canberra. Great sums are spent on organized demonstrations for visitors, and an impression is given that the Catholic Church is occidental and an ally of the United States is the cold war....

"In the whole of Vietnam the proportion of Catholics to the population is roughly the same as in England—one in ten, a ratio insufficient to justify a Catholic government. Mr. Diem’s ministers are not all Catholic, but Mr. Diem, justifiably suspicious of many of his supporters, has confined the actual government to himself and members of his family. He undertakes personally the granting of exit and entry visas.... The south, instead of confronting the totalitarian north with evidences of freedom, had slipped into an inefficient dictatorship; newspapers suppressed, strict censorship, men exiled by administrative order and not by judgment of the courts. It is unfortunate that a government of this kind should be identified with one faith. Mr. Diem may well leave his tolerant country a legacy of anti-Catholicism...."

While Vietnam has an ample record of religious intolerance—especially intolerance for Catholics—calling into question Mr. Greene’s contrary characterization, his prediction of Diem’s impact proved correct. Open opposition to his government by civilians finally manifested itself on the issue of “religious freedom” in Hue and Saigon in 1963, coalescing around militant Buddhists and students—two groups that were, therefore, for all practical purposes politically mute. There is no doubt, however, that Diem’s Catholicism from 1954 on acted to his disadvantage among the non-Catholic masses, and enhanced the My-Diem image of his government’s being an instrument of alien power and purpose.

F. Tensions With the Armed Forces.

The soldiers of Vietnam presented Diem with his first, and his last political challenges. Part of the Army’s political involvement stemmed from patent military inefficiency in Diem’s tight control, for which RVNAF leaders correctly held Diem responsible. Part also correctly can be attributed to vaulting ambition and venality among certain of Diem’s officers. And since the United States paid, schooled, and advised the RVNAF, it would also be correct to consider the U.S. involved, if not responsible. The record of Diem’s relations with RVNAF, like his relations with other parts of Vietnamese society, is a history of increasing tensions, and of lowering mutual understanding and support.

1. Clashes with Francophiles, 1954-1955

Diem’s first interactions with his army were insuspicious. From September to November, 1954, Army Chief of Staff General Nguyen Van Hinh—a French citizen who held a commission in the French Air Force—
seemed on the verge of overthrowing Diem. Diem ordered Hinh out of the
country; Hinh defied him. An apparent coup d'etat in late October was
blocked by adroit maneuvering by Colonel Lansdale, and by assurance
from General Collins to Hinh that American support would be promptly
withdrawn from Vietnam were his plot to succeed. As Hinh recalled it:

"I had only to lift my telephone and the coup d'etat would
have been over....Nothing could have opposed the army. But the
Americans let me know that if that happened, dollar help would
be cut off. That would not matter to the military. If necessary,
we soldiers could go barefoot and eat rice but the country cannot
survive without American help." 100/

Diem removed Hinh on 29 November 1954. The Acting Chief of Staff, General
Nguyen Van Vy, Diem found "insufficiently submissive," and replaced him on
12 December 1954 with General Le Van Ty, kicking Vy upstairs to be Inspector
General. 101/ In April 1955, during the turmoil of the sect rebellion,
Bao Dai attempted to appoint Vy as Chief of Staff with full military powers,
and to recall Diem to France. As Diem committed his army to battle with
the sects, Vy announced that, in the name of Bao Dai, and with the backing
of all but ten percent of the Army, he had assumed control of the govern-
ment. However, General Ty, Diem's Chief of Staff, remained loyal, rallied
key local commanders around Diem, and Vy fled. Within weeks both Generals
Hinh and Vy were afield against Diem in the Mekong Delta, maneuvering a
disparate army of Hoa Hao, French "deserters," and others -- Diem's forces
again beat them, and both then went into exile. 102/

2. Militarizing Public Administration

What Diem remembered from these experiences was that personal
loyalty was the prime requisite for high command. As a result, he took
an intense and direct interest in the appointments of military officers,
and -- as in other endeavors -- found it easier to place his trust in
Northerners and Catholics. Before long, the upper echelons of the officer
corps were preponderently from these groups, and closely netted to the
Diem family web of preferment. As GVN demands for loyal civil servants
willing to forego the advantages of Saigon multiplied, Diem was impelled
to shift trusted military officers into his civil administration. The
head of the General Directorate of Police and Security was a military
officer from 1956 forward; his subordinates in the police apparatus included
a growing number of military officers--for example, all the Saigon district
police chief's appointed in the year 1960 were soldiers. 103/ The govern-
ment in the provinces reflected similar moves toward militarization: 104/
Trends Toward Military Officers as Province Chiefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. Provinces</th>
<th>No. Military Chiefs</th>
<th>% Military Chiefs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a coextensive militarization of public administration at district and lower levels.

3. Dissatisfaction in the Officer Corps

But if Vietnam's soldiers found the Diem family a way to political power, wealth, and social prominence, they had ample reason to be dissatisfied with Diem's intervention in their professional concerns. The propensity of Ngo Dinh Diem to control his military with a tight rein extended to deciding when and where operations would be conducted, with what forces, and often how they would be used. Moreover, he involved himself with the arming and equipping of the forces, showing a distinct proclivity to heavy military forces of the conventional type, even for the Civil Guard, which reinforced American military leanings in the same direction. 105/ There were a few soldiers, like General Duong Van Minh, who sharply disagreed with the President on both points. And there was a growing number of young officers who resented the Catholic-Northern dominant clique within the military, who were dissatisfied with Diem's familial interference in military matters, and who were willing to entertain notions that the GVN had to be substantially modified. Nonetheless, until 1963, there was little apparent willingness to concert action against Diem.

4. The Early Coup Attempts, 1960 and 1962

On November 11, 1960, three paratroop battalions stationed in Saigon -- considered by Diem among his most faithful -- cooperated in an attempted coup d'état. The leadership consisted of a small group of civilians and military officers: Hoang Co Thuy, a Saigon lawyer; Lt Colonel Nguyen Trieu Hong, Thuy's nephew; Lt Colonel Vuong Van Dong, Hong's brother in law; and Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thai, the commander of the paratroops, who was apparently brought into the cabal at the last moment. The coup failed to arouse significant general pro-coup sentiment, either among the armed forces, or among the populace. Troops marched on Saigon, and rebels surrendered. 106/ In February, 1962, two Vietnamese air force planes bombed the Presidential palace in an unsuccessful attempt on President Diem and the Nhu's -- properly, an assassination attempt rather than a coup d'état. 107/

But the abortive events of 1960 and 1962 had the effect of dramatizing the choices open to those who recognized the insolvency of Diem's political and military policies. When Diem was overthrown in November, 1963, he was attacked by an apparatus that had been months in planning, originating in a plot by three generals, Duong Van Minh, Tran
Van Don, and Le Van Kim. Unlike the earlier incident, the 1963 coup was actively supported by virtually all the generals of RVNAF, and was openly condoned by large sectors of the populace.

G. The Viet Cong

1. Diem and Communists

Ngo Dinh Diem presided over a state which, for all the lip service it paid to individual freedom and American style government, remained a one party, highly centralized familial oligarchy in which neither operating democracy, nor the prerequisites for such existed. On 11 January, 1956, in GVN Ordinance Number 6, President Diem decreed broad governmental measures providing for "the defense of the state and public order," including authority to detain "individuals considered a danger to the state" or to "national defense and common security" at re-education centers." One month after the date of the scheduled Geneva plebescite, on 21 August 1956, the Government of Vietnam proclaimed Ordinance Number 47, which defined as a breach of law punishable by death any deed performed in or for any organization designated as "Communist." Moreover, the GVN was forced to use violence to establish itself in its own rural areas. In July, 1956, the month the Geneva elections were scheduled to have been held, the U.S. Army attache in Saigon noted in his monthly report that:

"Orders have reportedly been issued to all Viet Minh cadres in Free Viet Nam to increase their efforts to reorganize and revitalize the military units in their zones of responsibility. These cadres have, however, encountered considerable difficulty in motivating their adherents to work for the Communist cause. The military and political cadres are making little progress due to the Communist Denunciation Campaigns promoted by the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam...."

The same report submitted an ARVN estimate of 4,300 armed Viet Minh in all of Free Viet Nam, and recorded small ARVN skirmishes with Viet Minh south of Saigon, clashes with 10 Hoa Hao battalions, 8 Cao Dai battalions north and west of Saigon, and incidents of banditry north of Bien Hoa by Binh Xuyen. But, in a relatively short time, the fighting subsided, the Vietnamese Army was withdrawn from the countryside for retraining, reorganization, and modernization under the US MAAG, and South Vietnam ostensibly settled into the first peace it had known in a decade. Peace rested, however, on strong central government. In an article published in the January, 1957, Foreign Affairs, an American analyst stated that:

"South Viet Nam is today a quasi-police state characterized by arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, strict censorship of the press and the absence of an effective political opposition.... All the techniques of political and psychological warfare, as well as pacification campaigns involving extensive military operations have been brought to bear against the underground."
Police states, efficiently organized and operated, have historically demonstrated much greater ability at countering insurgency than other sorts of governments. South Vietnam in fact succeeded in 1955 and 1956 in quelling rural dissidence through a comprehensive political and military assault on sect forces and other anti-government armed bands using its army, the civic action cadre, the Communist Denunciation campaign, and a broad range of promised reforms. Moreover, at its worst, the Government of South Vietnam compared favorably with other Asian regimes with respect to its degree of repressiveness. Nor did it face endemic violence markedly different from that then prevalent in Burma, Indonesia, South Korea. And its early "counterinsurgency" operations were as sophisticated as any being attempted elsewhere in Asia. In 1957, the Government of Viet Nam claimed that its pacification programs had succeeded:

"We believe that with clear, even elementary ideas based upon facts...we can in due...first the youth and ultimately the entire population with the spirit and essential objectives of...civic humanism. We believe that this above all is the most effective antidote to Communism (which is but an accident of history)."

"...We can see that the Viet-Minh authorities have dis-integrated and been rendered powerless." 113/

P. J. Honey, the British expert on Vietnam, agreed; his evaluation as of early 1958 was as follows:

"...The country has enjoyed three years of relative peace and calm in which it has been able to carry on the very necessary work of national reconstruction. The most destructive feature in the national life of Vietnam throughout recent years has been the lack of security in the countryside, which obliged farmers and peasants to abandon the ricefields and to flee to the large cities for safety. Today it is possible to travel all over South Vietnam without any risk. The army and security forces have mopped up most of the armed bands of political opponents of the Government, of Communists and of common bandits. One still hears of an isolated raid, but the old insecurity is fast vanishing..." 114/

After a 1959 trip, however, Honey detected dangerous unease in the countryside:

"For the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese, heirs to experience of a century of French colonial rule, the Government is a remote body which passes laws, collects taxes, demands labour corvées, takes away able-bodied men for military service, and generally enriches itself at the expense of the poor peasant. 'Government' is associated in the minds of the villagers with exactions, punishments, unpaid labour, and other unpleasant matters. These people are members of families and members of villages, and their loyalties to both are strong. But these loyalties do not extend beyond the village, nor has any past experience taught the
peasants why they should. The idea that the peasants should assume any responsibility for the government themselves would be so alien to their thinking as to be comical. Educated Vietnamese are well aware of this, as many of their actions show...

"Such political parties as existed in Vietnam before the advent of independence were all clandestine, so that any political experience acquired from these by the Vietnamese peasants will have been of secret plotting for the overthrow of the Government. Since independence, they will probably have been subjected to attempted Communist indoctrination by the Viet Cong, but this too will have had an anti-Government slant. Since 1954, the peasants have been fed on a diet of puerile, and frequently offensive slogans by the Ministry of Information. These serve, if indeed they serve any purpose at all, to make the peasant distrust the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem. The peasants, for all their naiveté, are far from foolish and they are not deceived by slogans alleging to be true things which they know, from their own personal experience, to be untrue. Any political experience among the peasantry, then, is more likely to prove a liability than an asset to any Government." 115/

Diem knew that his main political dissent was centered not among his fellow mandarins, in his press, or among his military officers, but in the peasantry. And the prime challenge was, as Diem saw it, communism, precisely because it could and did afford the peasants political experience.

Communism was, from the outset of Diem's rule, his bête noire. In 1955, after the victory over the sects, and just before General John W. O'Daniel ended his tour as Chief, MAAG Vietnam, Diem talked to the General about Vietnam's future:

"He spoke about the decentralization of government that he had been advised to undertake, but felt that the time was not yet right. He felt that, since his country was involved in a war, warlike control was in order. He remarked that the Vietminh propaganda line never mentioned Communism, but only land reform...Diem wants land reform too..." 116/

In his message to the American Friends of Vietnam in June, 1956, Diem acknowledged progress, but warned that:

"We have arrived at a critical point...We must now give meaning to our hard sought liberty...To attain that goal we need technicians and machines. Our armed forces which are considerably reduced must however undertake an immense task from the military as well as the cultural and social point of view. It is indispensable that our army have the wherewithal to become increasingly capable of preserving the peace which we seek. There are an infinite number of tasks in all fields to complete before the year's end. Economic aid can be only effective once security has been restored..." 117/
Diem's preoccupation with security paradoxically interfered with his ability to compete with the communists in the countryside. In effect, he decided on a strategy of postponing the politicizing of the peasants until he had expunged his arch-foes. Diem's official biography underscores this point:

"The main concern of President Ngo Dinh Diem is therefore to destroy the sources of demoralization, however powerful, before getting down to the problem of endowing Vietnam with a democratic apparatus in the Western sense of the word." 118/

Madame Nhu, his sister-in-law, was vehement that any political liberalization would have operated to Viet Cong advantage: "If we open the window, not only sunlight, but many bad things will fly in, also." 119/ To hold a contrary view does not necessarily argue that democratization was the only way Diem could have met his political opposition in the villages; it does seem, however, that in failing to meet aspirations there by some departure from the inefficiently repressive course he adopted, Diem erred. In concluding that he did not have to reckon with peasant attitudes, Diem evidently operated from two related misapprehensions: that somehow the peasants would remain politically neutral while he eliminated the communists, and that the Viet Cong were essentially a destructive force. 120/ It was not that Diem could not vocalize a sound estimate of the communist political threat; his own description of communist operations to an Australian journalist was quite accurate:

"In China, during the Indo-China war and now here, the Communists have always sheltered in open base areas of difficult access, in areas where there are no roads. They have made their headquarters in the jungle. Cautiously, sometimes only one man at a time, they move into a village and establish a contact, then a cell until the village is theirs to command. Having got one village, they move to a second village and from a second to third, until eventually they need not live in any of these villages, but merely visit them periodically. When this stage is reached, they are in a position to build training camps and even start crude factories and produce home-made guns, grenades, mines, and booby traps.

"This is all part of the first phase. The second phase is to expand control and link up with Communist groups in other bases. To begin with, they start acts of violence through their underground organizations. They kill village chiefs, headmen, and others working for the government and, by so doing, terrorize the population, not necessarily by acts of violence against the people but by demonstrating that there is no security for them in accepting leadership from those acknowledging the leadership of the government. Even with much smaller numbers of troops than the constituted authority, it is not difficult now for the Communists to seize the initiative. A government has responsibility for maintaining supply to the civil population, of keeping roads,
railways, rivers, and canals open for traffic, of ensuring that rural crops reach the markets and that in turn commodity goods are distributed throughout the country. The Communists have no such responsibility. They have no roads and bridges to guard, and no goods to distribute.”

Diem failed to perceive that the "first phase" was crucial, or that the VC were, from the very outset, constructing while they destroyed, building a state within South Vietnam with more effective local government than his own.

Like many another issue in Vietnam, the problem was in part semantics. "Communists" during this period formally recanted for the GVN by the thousands; thousands more "communists" were incarcerated by the GVN for "political reeducation." But Ordinance No. 47 of 1956 notwithstanding, "communist" is a term which has not been used since the 1940's by Vietnamese serving the Marxist-Lenist Party headed by Ho Chi Minh of the DRV. These referred to themselves as members of the Vietnam Workers Party (Dang Tao Dong), as members of one Front or another, or as resistance fighters, or fighters for national liberation. Nor was "Viet Minh" a useful name, since Viet Minh, a nationalist front, included numerous non-communist, or at least non-party members. In 1956, the Saigon press began to distinguish between the Viet Minh and communists by referring to the latter as "Viet Cong," a fairly precise, and not necessarily disparaging, rendition of "Viet Nam Cong San," which means "Vietnamese Communist." The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) much later condemned the term as "contemptuous," and pointed out that the GVN had applied it indiscriminately to all persons or groups "who are lukewarm toward the pro-U.S. policy even on details." There can be no doubt that Diem and his government applied the term somewhat loosely within South Vietnam, and meant by it North as well as South Vietnamese communists, whom they presumed acted in concert.

2. The Viet Minh Residue

At the close of the Franco-Viet Minh War, some 60,000 men were serving in organized Viet Minh units in South Viet Nam. For the regroupments to North Vietnam, these units were augmented with large numbers of untrained young men -- who were later known among the regroupees in North Vietnam as "soldiers of Geneva." A reported 90,000 soldiers were taken to North Vietnam in the evacuated units, while the U.S. and the GVN estimated that 5,000 to 10,000 trained men were left behind as "cadre." If French estimates are correct that in 1954 the Viet Minh controlled over 60 to 90 percent of South Vietnam's villages outside the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao regions, those 5000 to 10,000 cadre must have represented only a small fraction of the remaining Viet Minh apparatus--cadre, local workers, sympathizers--in the countryside. GVN figures themselves attest to this. In 1955 and 1956 alone, the GVN claimed 100,000 communist "cadre" rallied or surrendered, and up to 20,000 "communists and communist sympathizers" were detained for reeducation. However, from all accounts--including testimony of the communist prey--the combination of the evacuation and the GVN Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign was devastating. The Viet Minh wartime apparatus was depleted and fragmented, as the GVN claimed.
Neither Diem's GVN nor the U.S. knew a great deal about the Viet Minh in the period 1954-1960. By 1967, however, new information had begun to accumulate from interrogations of prisoners and defectors, and captured documents. For example, in March, 1967, a study was published of 23 Viet Minh who stayed behind during the regroupment of 1954-1955. All the men of the sample told consistent stories, and although an admittedly narrow basis for generalization, the stories ring true. Upon departure, the Viet Minh leaders assigned some of these stay-behinds active roles; others were simply told to return to their homes as inactives, and wait for further instructions. It is quite clear that even the activists were not instructed to organize units for guerrilla war, but rather to agitate politically for the promised Geneva elections, and the normalization of relations with the North. They drew much reassurance from the presence of the IJC, and up until mid-1956, most held on to the belief that the elections would take place. They were disappointed in two respects: not only were the promised elections not held, but the amnesty which had been assured by the Geneva Settlement was denied them, and they were hounded by the Anti-Communist campaign. After 1956, for the most part, they went "underground." They were uniformly outraged at Diem's practices, particularly the recurrent GVN attempts to grade the populace into lettered categories according to previous associations with the Viet Minh. Most of them spoke of terror, brutality and torture by GVN rural officials in carrying out the Communist Denunciation campaigns, and of the arrest and slaying of thousands of old comrades from the "resistance." Their venom was expended on these local officials, rather than on Diem, or the central government, although they were prepared to hold Diem ultimately responsible. A veteran who had been a Party member since 1936 characterized the years 1955-1959 as the most difficult years of the entire revolution.

What these cadre did in those years is revealing. Only four of the 23 were engaged in military tasks. Most spent their time in preparation for a future uprising, in careful recruitment in the villages -- concentrating on the very families with Viet Minh ties who were receiving priority in the GVN's attentions -- and in constructing base areas in the mountains or jungles. The Viet Minh activists sought out the inactives, brought them back into the organization, and together they formed the framework of an expanding and increasingly intricate network of intelligence and propaganda. Few spoke of carrying weapons, or using violence before 1959, although many boasted of feats of arms in later years. They felt that they lacked the right conditions to strike militarily before 1959; their mission was preparation. In several instances, the Viet Cong used terror to recruit former Viet Minh for the new movement, threatening them with "treason" and elimination; caught between the GVN and the VC, many old Resistance members joined the "New Resistance." But most spoke of making person-to-person persuasion to bring in new members for the movement, relying mainly on two appeals: nationalism and social justice. They stressed that the Americans had merely substituted a new, more pernicious form of tyranny for that of the French, and that the My-Diem combine was the antithesis of humane and honest government. One respondent summed up this activity in these terms:
"From 1957 to 1960 the cadres who had remained in the South had almost all been arrested. Only one or two cadres were left in every three to five villages. What was amazing was how these one or two cadres started the movement so well."

"The explanation is not that these cadres were exceptionally gifted but the people they talked to were ready for rebellion. The people were like a mound of straw, ready to be ignited...."

"If at that time the government in the South had been a good one, if it had not been dictatorial, if the agrarian reforms had worked, if it had established control at the village level, then launching the movement would have been difficult."

These interviews underscored three points on which the GVN was apparently in error. First, with respect to the stay-behinds themselves, by no means were all dedicated communists in the doctrinaire sense. Many reported that they resented and feared the communists in the Viet Minh, and apparently might have been willing to serve the GVN faithfully had it not hounded them out of the society. There were several among the group, for example, who had entered Saigon, and there found a degree of freedom which kept them off the Viet Cong roles for years. Second, with regard to the peasants in general, the Viet Minh were widely admired throughout the South as national heroes, and the GVN therefore committed a tactical error of the first magnitude in damning all Viet Minh without qualification as communists. Third, the GVN created by its rural policy a climate of moral indignation which energized the peasants politically, turned them against the government, sustained the Viet Cong, and permitted "communists" to outlast severe GVN repressions and even to recruit during it.

The foregoing precis of the 1967 study presents views which are paralleled in a captured Viet Cong history, written around 1963, which describes the years after 1954 as follows:

EXPERIENCES OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS 127/

"During the past nine years, under the enlightened leadership of the Party Central Committee, the people and the Party of South Vietnam have experienced many phases along the difficult and complicated path of struggle but they have also gained many victories and experiences while pushing the South Vietnam liberation revolution and creating the conditions for peaceful reunification of the country...."

"After the armistice, the South Vietnam people reverted to political struggle through peaceful means by demanding personal rights, freedom and negotiations concerning general elections in accordance with the stipulations of the Geneva Agreement so that the country could be peacefully reunified. The Party apparatus in South Vietnam also became covert. The organization and methods of operation of the
party were changed in order to guarantee the leadership and forces of the Party under the new struggle conditions....

"From the end of 1954 until 1956 several important changes occurred in the South Vietnam situation. Imperialist America ousted and replaced imperialist France, turning South Vietnam into a colony (a new type of colony) based on U.S. military power. The Ngo Dinh Diem government was clearly shown to be a government composed of bureaucratic, dictatorial and family-controlled feudalists and capitalists who committed crimes for the American imperialists and massacred the people, massacred revolutionaries and massacred the oppositionists. Both the Americans and Diem made every effort to oppose the implementation of the Geneva Agreement and made every effort to subvert the peaceful reunification of our fatherland....

"Immediately after the re-establishment of peace, the responsibility of South Vietnam was to use the political struggle to demand the implementation of the Geneva Agreement. The struggle responsibilities and procedures were appropriate for the situation at that time and corresponded with the desires of the great majority of the masses who wished for peace after nearly 10 years of difficult resistance.

"At that time, although the Americans-Diemists used cruel force to oppose the people and the revolution, and the masses struggled decisively against this repression in many places and at many times, the contradictions had not yet developed to a high degree and the hatred had not yet developed to a point where the use of armed struggle could become an essential and popular struggle tactic. In South Vietnam since 1955, thanks to the armed movement of the sects, we were able to avoid the construction of an armed propaganda force, since we only had a few former bases which were needed in the political struggle and for the creation of a reserve force.

"From 1957 to 1958, the situation gradually changed. The enemy persistently sabotaged the implementation of the Geneva Agreement, actively consolidated and strengthened the army, security service, and administrative apparatus from the central to the hamlet level, cruelly assassinated the people, and truly and efficiently destroyed our Party. By relying on force, the American-Diemist regime was temporarily able to stabilize the situation and increase the prestige of the counterrevolutionaries. At this time, the political struggle movement of the masses, although not defeated, was encountering increasing difficulty and increasing weakness; the Party bases, although not completely destroyed, were significantly weakened, and in some areas, quite seriously; the prestige of the masses and of the revolution suffered. But in reality, the years during which the enemy increased his terrorism were also the years in which the enemy suffered major political losses and the social contradictions which existed became increasingly evident; the resentment of the
masses became more deep seeded and many individuals who formerly supported the enemy now opposed them. The masses, that is to say, the peasants, now realized that it was impossible to live under such conditions and that it was necessary to rise up in drastic struggle. Faced with the fact that the enemy was using guns, assassinations and imprisonment to oppose the people in their political struggle, many voices among the masses appealed to the Party to establish a program of armed resistance against the enemy. Within the Party, on the one hand, the members were saturated with the responsibility to lead the revolution to a successful overthrow of the enemy, but on the other hand, the majority of the party members and cadres felt that it was necessary to immediately launch an armed struggle in order to preserve the movement and protect the forces. In several areas the party members on their own initiative had organized armed struggle against the enemy.

"Since the end of 1958, particularly after the Phu Loi Massacre, the situation truly ripened for an armed movement against the enemy. But the leadership of the Nam Bo Regional Committee at that time still hesitated for many reasons, but the principal reason was the fear of violating the party line....

"Up to 1959, in South Vietnam, the Americans-Diemists had fully constructed a large army, equipped with modern weapons, along with a large and well armed administrative, police and security apparatus. During the years in which the masses were only using political struggle, the Americans-Diemists used the military, security and administrative apparatus to launch various campaigns to terrorize, mop up and oppress the movement, no different from during the period of warfare. Because they were determined to crush the revolution and control the people at every moment, they could not avoid using every type of repression.

"In opposing such an enemy, simple political struggle was not possible. It was necessary to use additional armed struggle, but not merely low level armed struggle, such as only armed propaganda, which was used to support the political struggle. The enemy would not allow us any peace, and in the face of the enemy operations and destructive pursuit, the armed propaganda teams, even if they wished to avoid losses, would never be able to engage the enemy in warfare and would never be able to become an actual revolutionary army. This is an essential fact of the movement and the actual movement in South Vietnam illustrates this fact. Therefore, at the end of 1959, when we launched an additional armed struggle in coordination with the political struggle against the enemy, it immediately took the form in South Vietnam of revolutionary warfare, a long range revolutionary warfare. Therefore, according to some opinions at the beginning of 1959, we only used heavy armed propaganda and later developed "regional guerrillas...."


** The regional headquarters for Cochinchina.
That this version of events from 1954 through 1959 is the orthodox Viet Cong account is further indicated by the report of interrogation of one of the four members of the Civilian Proselyting Section of the Viet Cong Saigon/Gia Dinh Special Zone Committee, captured in November, 1964; the prisoner stated that:

"The period from the Armistice of 1954 until 1958 was the darkest time for the VC in South Vietnam. The political agitation policy proposed by the Communist Party could not be carried out due to the arrest of a number of party members by RVN authorities. The people's agitation movement was minimized. However, the organizational system of the party from the highest to the lowest echelons survived, and since the party remained close to the people, its activities were not completely suppressed. In 1959 the party combined its political agitation with its military operations, and by the end of 1959 the combined operations were progressing smoothly." 128/

Viet Cong "political agitation" was a cunning blend of the Viet Minh nationalist charisma, exploitation of GVN shortcomings, xenophobia, and terror. Drawing on the years of Viet Minh experience in subversive government and profiting from Viet Minh errors, the Viet Cong appealed to the peasants not as Marxist revolutionaries proposing a drastic social upheaval, but quite to the contrary, as a conservative, nationalist force wholly compatible with the village-centered traditionalism of most farmers, and as their recourse against "My-Diem" modernization. One American authority summed the Viet Minh experience evident in Viet Cong operations as ten political precepts:

"1. Don't try for too much; don't smash the existing social system, use it; don't destroy opposition organizations, take them over.

"2. Use the amorphous united front to attack opposition political forces too large or too powerful for you to take over; then fragment their leadership, using terror if necessary, and drown their followers in the front organization.

"3. At all times appear outwardly reasonable about the matter of sharing power with rival organizations although secretly working by every means to eliminate them. Don't posture in public.

"4. Divide your organization rigidly into overt and covert sections and minimize traffic between the two. The overt group's chief task is to generate broad public support; the covert group seeks to accumulate and manipulate political power.

"5. Use communism as dogma, stressing those aspects that are well regarded by the people; don't hesitate to interpret Marxism-Leninism in any way that proves beneficial. Soft-pedal the class-struggle idea except among cadres.

"6. Don't antagonize anyone if it can be helped; this forestalls the formation of rival blocs."
"7. Bearing in mind that in Vietnam altruism is conspicuous by its absence, blend the proper mixture of the materialistic appeals of communism and the endemic feelings of nationalism. Win small but vital gains through communism, large ones through nationalism. Plan to win in the end not as Communists but as nationalists.

"8. Use the countryside as the base and carry the struggle to the cities later; in rural areas political opportunities are greater and risks smaller. Avoid the lure of the teahouse.


"10. Work from the small to the large, from the specific to the general; work from small safe areas to large liberated areas and then expand the liberated areas; begin with small struggle movements and work toward a General Uprising during which state power will be seized." 129/

The same expert termed General Uprising "a social myth in the Sorelian sense, perhaps traceable back to the Communist myth of the general strike," and cited Viet Cong documents which describe how the 2500 villages of Vietnam will be led toward a spontaneous final and determinant act of revolution:

"The Revolution, directed toward the goal of the General Uprising, has these five characteristics: ...It takes place in a very favorable worldwide setting...It is against the neocolonialism of the U.S.A....The government of Vietnam is unpopular and growing weaker....The people have revolutionary consciousness and are willing to struggle....It is led by the Party, which has great experience." 130/

Ho and Giap thus coated Marx and Mao with French revolutionary romanticism. Diem, the moral reformer, also drew heavily upon the same traditions for "personalism." One of the tragedies of modern Vietnam is that the political awakening of its peasants was to these, the most virulent, and vicious social theories of the era.

But doctrine was not the sole heritage the Viet Cong received from the Viet Minh. Perhaps more important was the "Resistance" organization: the hierarchy extending upward from hamlet and village through provincial to regional authorities capable of coordinating action on a broad scale. The Viet Minh complied with military regroupments under the Geneva Accords but were not obligated to withdraw the "political" apparatus; in fact, the Settlement provided guarantees for it in its provisions against reprisals (Armistice, Article 14c, and Conference Final Declaration, Article 9), and for liberation of political prisoners (Armistice, Article 21). Knowledge of the techniques of clandestine politics, appreciation for the essentiality of tight discipline, and trained personnel constituting a widespread, basic organizational framework were all advantages the Viet Minh conferred on the Viet Cong. Needless to say, Ngo Dinh Diem received no comparable legacy from his nationalist predecessors or the French.

By early 1958, Saigon was beginning to sense that pacification had eluded the GVN even as it had the French. In December, 1957, the ill-fated newspaper, Thoi Luan, pointed out that terrorism was on the rise, and that:

"Today the menace is heavier than ever, with the terrorists no longer limiting themselves to the notables in charge of security. Everything suits them, village chiefs, chairmen of liaison committees, simple guards, even former notables.... In certain areas, the village chiefs spend their nights in the security posts, while the inhabitants organize watches." 131/

"...The most urgent need for the population today is security--a question to which we have repeatedly drawn the attention of the authorities.

"Spectacular assassinations have taken place in the provinces of An Giang and Phong-Dinh [in the Mekong Delta]. In the village of Than-My-Tay, armed men appeared in the dead of night, awakened the inhabitants, read a death sentence, and beheaded four young men whose heads they nailed to the nearest bridge....

"The security question in the provinces must be given top priority: the regime will be able to consolidate itself only if it succeeds in finding a solution to this problem." 132/

Besides the incidents cited, there had been a mass murder of 17 in Chau-Doc in July, 1957; in September the District Chief at My Tho with his whole family was gunned down in daylight on a main highway; on 10 October a bomb thrown into a Cholon cafe injured 13 persons, and on 22 October, in three bombings in Saigon, 13 Americans were wounded. 133/

Also in October a clandestine radio in Vietnam purporting to speak for the "National Salvation Movement" was backing armed insurgents against Diem. 134/ In Washington, U.S. intelligence indicated that the "Viet Minh underground" had been directed to conduct additional attacks on U.S. personnel "whenever conditions are favorable." 135/ U.S. intelligence also noted a total of 30 armed "terrorist incidents initiated by Communist guerrillas" in the last quarter of 1957, as well as a "large number" of incidents carried out by "Communist-lead [sic] Hoa Hao and Cao Dai dissident elements," and reported "at least" 75 civilians or civil officials assassinated or kidnapped in the same period. 136/

Robert Shaplen wrote that:

"By 1958, the Vietminh had fully resumed its campaign of terror in the countryside, kidnapping government officials and threatening villagers who in any way co-operated with the government.... Military incidents in the countryside..."
were rising, and in an average month the local and regional units were becoming involved in a score of engagements. Usually, these were hit-and-run Communist attacks on Self-Defense Corps or Civil Guard headquarters, the purpose of which was both to seize weapons and to heighten the atmosphere of terror.\footnote{137/}

Guns should have been plentiful in the countryside of Vietnam. The Japanese, the French and even the GVN armed the sect forces. And both the sects and the Viet Minh had operated small arms factories -- for instance, General Lansdale visited a Cao Dai weapons factory at Nui Ba Den in Tay Minh in 1955. The Viet Minh cached arms as they withdrew from their "liberated areas" in 1954 and 1955. ARVN veterans and deserters from the force reductions of 1954 and 1955 carried weapons into the hinterland. The VC attacked for weapons to make up for losses to the GVN, and to equip units with similar types to simplify logistics.

In January, 1958, a "large band" of "communist" guerrillas attacked a plantation north of Saigon, and in February, an ARVN truck was ambushed on the outskirts of the capital.\footnote{138/} In March, the Saigon newspaper Dan-Cung complained that: "our people are fleeing the villages and returning to the cities for fear of communist guerrillas and feudalistic officials..."\footnote{139/} Bernard Fall published an article in July, 1958, in which he mapped the pattern of assassinations and other incidents from April 1957 to April 1958, and announced the onset of a new war:

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**THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR**
Fall's thesis was challenged by a senior U.S. adviser to the GVN, who argued that the increasing casualty figures represented not a structured attempt to overthrow the GVN, but were simply a product of police reporting in the hinterlands. 140/ There can be no doubt that the latter view was partially correct: neither the U.S. nor the GVN knew what was "normal" in the rural areas, and police reporting, with U.S. aid, had been improved. But the deadly figures continued to mount. George A. Carver of the CIA, in his 1966 Foreign Affairs article, agreed with Fall:

"A pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge, directed against the representatives of the Saigon government and concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter because their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of Communist objectives. The terror was directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society, school teachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activity mounted slowly and steadily. By the end of 1955 the participants in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Viet Cong," constituted a serious threat to South Viet Nam's political stability." 141/

Like most other statistics concerning Vietnam, figures on the extent of the terrorism varied widely. The GVN reported to the ICC that in 1957, 1958, and the first half of 1959, Viet Cong murdered 65 village officials, 51 civilians, 28 Civil Guardsmen, and 10 soldiers. 142/ GVN official reports provided the U.S. Embassy in Saigon recorded a significantly greater toll of civilians:

**CIVILIAN ASSASSINATIONS AND KIDNAPPINGS IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

By Quarter, From GVN Reports to U.S. Embassy 143/

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1958</th>
<th></th>
<th>1959</th>
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<th>1960 First 5 Months</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Murders</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abductions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>236</td>
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Journalists and scholars, studying open sources, put the figures even higher. Douglas Pike reported 1700 assassinations and 2000 abductions in the years 1957-1960. 144/ Bernard Fall estimated murders of low-level GVN officials as follows:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murders</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fall reported that the GVN lost almost 20% of its village chiefs in 1957.
and 1958, and that by the end of 1959, they were becoming casualties at the rate of more than 2% per month. Through 1963, Fall calculated, 13,000 petty officials were eliminated by the VC. 145/ The New York Times estimated that 3,000 local government officials were killed or captured during 1960 146/, and TIME magazine reported in the fall of 1960 that the GVN was losing 250 to 300 per month to a "new Communist offensive." The U.S. "White Paper" of 1961 cited losses of 1400 local officials and civilians during 1960. 148/ But if there was disparity among numerical estimates, most reports, public or private, concluded that the violence was real, anti-government, rising in intensity, and increasingly organized.

In mid-1958 Bernard Fall correlated the locus of rural violence reported in South Vietnam with complaints lodged with the ICC in Hanoi by the DRV on behalf of "Former Resistance members," alleging GVN violations of the "no reprisals" provisions of the Geneva Accords (Armistice, Article 14c). The detail in these complaints indicated an intelligence apparatus in South Vietnam.

"The conclusion is inescapable," he wrote, "that there must be some coordination between the rebels and the North Vietnamese Government." 149/ About that same time, U.S. intelligence reported that Viet Cong-bandit operations north of Saigon seemed to be part of a calculated campaign of economic sabotage. 150/ Also, reports began to come in of a new "Front" operating in the countryside. Anthropologist Gerald Hickey wrote of
the village near My Tho which he studied very intensively that around mid-1958:

"...For the first time [the village] experienced the activities of a relatively new political movement--Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong Mien Nam Viet Nam (National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam) referred to by the South Vietnamese government as the Viet Cong or Vietnamese Communists...and invariably called the Viet Minh by the villagers. In the vicinity of [the village] the initial efforts of the Viet Cong were largely confined to anti-government propaganda."

One VC pamphlet of late 1958 from the Mekong Delta reads as follows:

"Support the just struggle of the people to overthrow the government of the Americans and Diem [My-Diem], to establish a democratic regime in the South, and to work for general elections which will unify the country by peaceful means."

But, if "struggle" sounds innocuous enough in English, the word fails to carry the intensity of the Vietnamese equivalent, dau tranh. A VC rally put it this way:

"Dau tranh is all important to a revolutionist. It marks his thinking, his attitudes, his behavior. His life, his revolutionary work, his whole world is dau tranh. The essence of his existence is dau tranh."

And, the term "just struggle of the people" sheathed the terror integral to Viet Cong operations. In Pike's estimate:

"Insurgency efforts in the 1958-1960 period involved violence such as assassinations but few actual armed attacks. This was so partly because the cadres had little military capability but chiefly because doctrine counseled against violence...."

"For the true believers operating throughout the South this was a time of surreptitious meetings, cautious political feelers, the tentative assembling of a leadership group, and the sounding out of potential cadres whose names went into a file for future reference. It meant working mainly with non-Communists and, in many cases, keeping one's Communist identity a secret...."

Diem's own party newspaper, the NNM's Cach Mang Quoc Gia, published an article in February, 1959 which reported that "the situation in the rural areas is rotten," and described communist cells established in the villages collecting taxes and conducting "espionage," supporting local guerrilla forces responsive to a hierarchy of provincial and regional committees.
From mid-1959 onward, there was a definite upsurge in Viet Cong activity, marked not only by the increase in terrorism noted in the statistics presented above, but also by the fielding of large military units which sought, rather than avoided, engagement with units of Diem's regular army. On 26 September 1959 two companies of the ARVN 23d Division were ambushed by a well-organized force of several hundred identified as the '2d Liberation Battalion'; the ARVN units lost 12 killed, 14 wounded, and most of their weapons. 156/

On 25 January 1960 the same Viet Cong battalion launched an attack coordinated with four guerrilla companies -- a total force of 300 to 500 men -- which penetrated the compound of the 32d Regiment, 21st ARVN Division at Tay Ninh, killed 23 ARVN soldiers, and netted a large haul of arms and ammunition. 157/ On 29 January 1960 an insurgent band seized the town of Dong Xoai, some sixty miles north of Saigon, held the place for several hours, and robbed a French citizen of 200,000 piasters. 158/ In the same month, large VC forces opened operations in the Camau peninsula and the Mekong Delta. In Kien Hoa province VC units numbering hundreds effectively isolated the province capital from six of its eight districts. 159/ Bernard Fall, in his continuing study of Viet Cong operations, detected a new strategy operating: a shift during 1959 and early 1960 from base development in the Delta to isolation of Saigon. 160/
Whether or not the incidents plotted by Fall constituted a strategy as he thought, they were patently more coherent. A U.S. intelligence assessment submitted 7 March 1960 described VC plans, confirmed from a variety of U.S. and GVN sources, to launch large scale guerrilla warfare that year "under the flag of the People's Liberation Movement," which was identified as "red, with a blue star." 161/ The VC were reportedly moving into position to exercise one or more of three strategic options by the end of 1960: (1) incite an ARVN revolt; (2) set up a popular front government in the lower Delta; (3) force the GVN into such repressive countermeasures that popular uprisings will follow. 162/

An ARVN coup d'etat did ensue, although it was neither VC incited nor successful; nor was there any general revolt in the ranks. No popular front government was set up. But the GVN was prompted to a succession of repressive countermeasures which may have aided the Viet Cong much as they had expected. Prodded by the rural violence, Diem began his "counterinsurgency" in early 1959 with the reintensification of population classification and relocation programs. On 6 May 1959, the GVN promulgated Law 10/59, which set up three military tribunals which could, without appeal, adjudge death for crimes under Ordinance 17 of 1956 -- the anti-communist law. In actuality, these tribunals were used sparingly, usually for show-case trials of terrorists. 163/ But the existence of Law 10/59 furnished grist for VC propaganda mills for years.

On 7 July, 1959, the GVN launched its "prosperity and density centers" -- the "agrovilles" program and Ngo Dinh Mhu and his wife plunged into organizing rural youth, women, and farmers' organizations. However, just as the VC Tet offensive of 1968 attenuated "Revolutionary Development," the VC upsurge of late 1959 and early 1960 disrupted the new GVN organizational efforts, and reinforced Diem's conviction that security was the paramount consideration. The U.S. assessment of March 1960 cited widespread abuse of police powers by local officials for extortion and vendetta, and pointed out that arbitrary and corrupt local officials compromised GVN efforts to root out the VC "undercover cadres." Moreover:

"....While the GVN has made an effort to meet the economic and social needs of the rural populations through community development, the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, etc., these projects appear to have enjoyed only a measure of success in creating support for the government and, in fact, in many instances have resulted in resentment. Basically, the problem appears to be that such
projects have been imposed on the people without adequate psychological preparation in terms of the benefits to be gained. Since most of these projects call for sacrifice on the part of the population (in the form of allegedly "volunteer" labor in the case of construction, time away from jobs or school labor in the case of rural youth groups, leaving homes and lands in the case of regrouping isolated peasants), they are bound to be opposed unless they represent a partnership effort for mutual benefit on the part of the population and the government....

"The situation may be summed up in the fact that the government has tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or resentment." 164/

4. The Founding of the National Liberation Front

Despite their expanding military effort, the Viet Cong remained a formless, "faceless" foe until late in 1960, when the National Liberation Front was announced as the superstructure of the insurgent apparatus, and the political voice of the rebellion. Thereafter, the Viet Cong sought publicity, and thereby acquired identity as a South Vietnam-wide organization of three major components: the NLF itself, the Liberation Army of South Vietnam, and the People's Revolutionary Party.

a. Organization and Objectives

The precise dates of the forming of the NLF constitute one of the puzzles of the war. As mentioned above, in the years 1954 to 1960, peasants, captured documents and prisoners referred frequently to "the Front," meaning the insurgent movement, and "Front" flags had been captured as early as 1959. These were probably references to Viet Minh carry-over organizations, such as they were, rather than a specific leadership group or structure, with a set of defined objectives. Nguyen Huu Tho, the first Chairman of the NLF, stated in a 1964 interview over Radio Hanoi that:

"Although formally established in December 1960, the Front had existed as a means of action without by-laws or program since 1954 when we founded the Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee....Many of the members of the NLF Central Committee were also members of the Peace Committee...." 165/

Huynh Tan Phat, Tho's Vice Chairman in the NLF, was reported in late 1955 serving on the "Executive Committee of the Fatherland Front" (Mat Tran To Quoc), controlling Joint Minh-Heo Hao operations against the GVN in the Plain of Reeds. (CIA Memo 163/66, 1-27).
The MAAG "Narrative Statement" for January 1958 reported that "the Communists have been joining 'front' organizations to influence portions of anti-government minorities. . . . Examples are: the 'Vietnamese Peoples' Liberation Movement Forces', and the 'Vietnam-Cambodian Buddhist Association'.

A number of authorities, mainly French, have lent credence to an assertion that the NLF was formed by a group of Viet Minh veterans in March, 1960, somewhere in Cochinchina; but the NLF, as such, received no international publicity until after December 20, 1960. 166/ On January 29, 1961, Hanoi Radio broadcast in English to Europe and Asia its first announcement concerning the NLF:

"A 'National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam' was recently formed in South Vietnam by various forces opposing the fascist Ngo Dinh Diem regime. This was revealed by Reuters in Saigon and by different papers published in Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia. This Front was created after a period of preparation and after a conference of representatives of various forces opposing the fascist regime in South Vietnam. According to these forces, the 'National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam' on December 20, 1960, issued a political program and a manifesto. . . . The manifesto reads: 'For a period of nearly a hundred years, the Vietnamese people repeatedly rose up to fight against foreign aggression for national independence and freedom. . . . When the French colonialists invaded our country for the second time, our compatriots -- determined not to return to the former slavery -- made tremendous sacrifices to defend national sovereignty and independence. The solidarity and heroic struggle of our compatriots during nine years led the resistance war to victory. The 1954 Geneva Agreements re-installed peace in our country and recognized the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam. Under these circumstances, our compatriots in South Vietnam would have been able to live in peace, earn their livelihood in security and build a life of plenty and happiness. However, American imperialists who had in the past helped the French colonialists massacre our people have now replaced the French in subjugating the southern part of our country through a disguised colonial regime. . . . The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam calls on the entire people to unite and heroically rise up and struggle with the following program of action:

'NORTH VIETNAM

'Jan. 31, 1961

1--To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the imperialists and the dictatorial administration, and to form a national and democratic coalition administration.
"2--To carry out a broad and progressive democracy, promulgate the freedom of expression, of the press, of belief, reunion, association and of movement and other democratic freedoms; to carry out general amnesty of political detainees, dissolve the concentration camps dubbed 'prosperity zones' and 'resettlement centers,' abolish the fascist law 10-59 and other antidemocratic laws.

"3--Abolish the economic monopoly of the United States and its henchmen, protect homemade products, encourage the home industry, expand agriculture, and build an independent and sovereign economy; to provide jobs to unemployed people, increase wages for workers, armymen, and office employees; to abolish arbitrary fines and apply an equitable and rational tax system; to help forced evacuees from North Vietnam who now desire to rejoin their native places; and to provide jobs to those who want to remain.

"4--To carry out land rent reduction, guarantee the peasants' right to till their present plots of land, and redistribute communal land in preparation for land reform.

5--To eliminate the U.S.-style culture of enslavement and deprivation; to build a national and progressive culture and education, eliminate illiteracy, open more schools, and carry out reform in the educational and examination system.

"6--To abolish the system of American military advisers, eliminate foreign military bases in Vietnam, and to build a national army defending the fatherland and the people.

"7--To realize equality between men and women, and among different nationalities, and realize the right to autonomy of the national minorities in the country; to protect the legitimate interests of foreign residents in Vietnam; to protect and take care of the interests of overseas Vietnamese.

"8--To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality; to establish diplomatic relations with all the countries which respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam.

"9--To reestablish normal relations between the two zones of Vietnam for the attainment of peaceful reunification of the country.

"10--To oppose aggressive wars, actively defend world peace."

The manifesto concludes by calling on various strata of the people to close their ranks and to carry out the above program. The appeal was addressed to the workers, peasants, and other
TOP SECRET - Sensitive

working people, to the intellectuals, the industrialists, and trades, national minorities, religious communities, democratic personalities, patriotic army men, and young men and women in South Vietnam.

'Addressing the Vietnamese living abroad, the manifesto called on them "to turn their thoughts to the beloved motherland and actively contribute to the sacred struggle for national emancipation."'

It is clear that the NLF was not intended as an exclusively communist enterprise. Rather it was designed to encompass anti-GVN activists, and to exploit the bi-polar nature of politics within South Vietnam. In the period 1954-1960, prior to the NLF's "creation," the objectives of insurgents in the South, other than overthrow of My-Diem, were vague. Communists in the South no doubt shared the overall objectives of the DRV, and were aiming at unification of all Vietnam under the Hanoi government. Some rebel nationalists were no doubt aware of the communists' ambitions, but would have regarded such an outcome as acceptable, if not desirable. Others, disillusioned by the actions of the Diem regime after 1956, simply looked toward the establishment of a genuine democratic government in the South. Some peasants may have been fighting to rid themselves of government, or to oppose modernization, looking only to village autonomy. The sects, if not struggling for a democratic regime, were fighting for their independence, as were some of the tribal groups who chose to join the NLF. The National Liberation Front formulated and publicly articulated objectives for all these.

Subsequent editions of the NLF Manifesto differed in two substantive respects. George Carver reported that:

"On February 11, 1961, Hanoi devoted a second broadcast to the N.L.F.'s manifesto and program, blandly changing the language of both to tone down the more blatant Communist terminology of the initial version. However, even the milder second version (which became the 'official' text) borrowed extensively from Le Duan's September speech at the Third National Congress of the Iao Dong Party in Hanoi and left little doubt about the Front's true sponsors or objectives." 167

The "tone down" of communism was fairly subtle, if Hanoi so intended its revision, since the alterations consisted mainly in additions to the Ten Points of phraseology drawn from the preambles of the Manifesto: references to "agrarian reform," in those terms, were, however, cut. There was a marked increase in condemnatory citations of "My-Diem," so that, in eight of ten points in the action program, expelling the U.S. was clearly identified as the way the desired goal would be reached. 168

Pike refers to an "organizing congress" of the NLF held in December, 1960, of 60 participants, at which plans were announced for
convening the first regular NLF congress within a year. Several postponements obtruded, and the meeting did not take place until February-March 1962. Nonetheless, a Central Committee continued in the interim to further define NLF purposes; the subsequent statements differed from the 1960 Manifesto mainly on points of emphasis. For example, "reunification of the country" (Point 9 of the Manifesto) was downplayed from 1960 through 1963. On the first anniversary of the NLF Manifesto, 20 December 1961, its leaders issued a supplementary series of interim or "immediate action" demands. These called for:

1. Withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel and weapons from South Vietnam and abolition of the Staley Plan.
2. An end to hostilities.
3. Establishment of political freedoms.
4. Release of political prisoners.
5. Dissolution of the National Assembly and election of a new assembly and president.
6. Ending the resettlement program.
7. Solution of Vietnam's economic problems.
8. Establishment of a foreign policy of non-alignment.

Although "immediate action" was probably intended to open the way toward formation of a coalition government and thence to ties with Hanoi, there was no mention of reunification; nonetheless, Hanoi in December, 1961, listed NLF objectives as "peace, independence, democracy, a comfortable life, and the peaceful unification of the Fatherland." One likely reason for the NLF's omission of reunification from "immediate action" was its desire to broaden its base on anti-Diem, anti-U.S. grounds--without alienating anti-Communists who might otherwise support the movement. Again, when the first regular NLF congress met from February 16 to March 3, 1962, the earlier basic objectives of the Front were endorsed, excepting reunification. The Radio Hanoi broadcast on the congress added "advancing to peaceful unification of the Fatherland" to a list from which this objective was conspicuously absent in the NLF releases. On July 20, 1962, the anniversary of the Geneva Accords, the NLF issued a declaration that:

"The Central Committee of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam believes that in the spirit of Vietnamese dealing with Vietnamese solving their own internal affairs, with the determination to put the Fatherland's interest above all else, the forces that oppose U.S. imperialism in South Vietnam will, through mutual concessions, be able to reach a common agreement for united action to serve the people." 170/
The same statement contained a new "four point manifesto":

"1. The U.S. government must end its armed aggression against South Vietnam, abolish its military command, withdraw all its troops and personnel, as well as the troops and personnel of U.S. satellites and allies, and withdraw all weapons and other war equipment from South Vietnam.

"2. Concerned parties in South Vietnam must stop the war, re-establish peace, and establish conditions throughout South Vietnam to enable the South Vietnamese to solve their own internal affairs. The South Vietnam authority that is, government must end its terror operations.

"3. There must be established a national coalition government, to include representatives of all political parties, cliques, groups, all political tendencies, social strata, members of all religions. This government must guarantee peace. It must organize free general elections in South Vietnam to choose a democratic National Assembly that will carry out the urgently needed policies. It must promulgate democratic liberties to all political parties, groups, religions; it must release all political prisoners, abolish all internment camps and all other forms of concentration, and stop the forced draft of soldiers and the military training of youth, women, public servants, and enterprise, economic independence. It must abolish monopolies and improve the living conditions of all people.

"4. South Vietnam must carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality. It must establish friendly relations with all nations, especially with her neighbors. It must not enter any military bloc or agree to let any country establish military bases on her soil. It must accept aid from all countries free of political conditions. A necessary international agreement must be signed in which the big powers of all blocs pledge to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and neutrality of South Vietnam. South Vietnam, together with Cambodia and Laos, will form a neutral area, all three countries retaining full sovereignty."

As the anticipated fall of the Diem government drew near in 1963, NLF statements of goals increasingly stressed the anti-American, probably to shift the focus of NLF attack away from a disappearing objective—the defeat of Diem, and possibly because the NLF could not manipulate or adapt to the Buddhist struggle movement. Demands issued by the NLF five days following Diem's fall in November, 1963, were probably intended to take credit for changes in GVN policy then underway, since, except for halting conscription, the Duong Van Minh government was undertaking every reform the NLF called for. However, the first extensive official statement of the NLF Central Committee following Diem's downfall, issued

68
November 17, 1963, did reassert the reunification objective:

"Concerning the reunification of Vietnam, as was expounded many times by the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the DRV government, it will be realized step by step on a voluntary basis, with consideration given to the characteristics of each zone, with equality, and without annexation of one zone by the other." 172/  

Concerning coalition government there was less vacillation in NLF emphasis, although there was some detectable variation in the welcome extended from time to time to anti-communist political movements. Similarly, the objective of "neutralization" was constant. Cambodia was held up as a model, and there was some implication in early NLF statements that it would accept international supervision of "neutralization." Beginning in 1963 NLF statements were couched to convey the notion that "reunification" and "neutralization" were distinct one from the other, apparently out of deference to DRV reaction against proposals to neutralize North Vietnam. 173/ 

b. Leadership  

The NLF founders were shadowy figures most of whom had earned modest repute on the murky fringes of Vietnamese politics. They seem to have been chosen with an eye to avoiding known Communists, and to obtaining wide representation from South Vietnam's complicated society. Although the NLF Central Committee reserved places for 52 members, only 31 names were publicized as founding members, indicating either a large covert membership, or, more likely, simple inability to find eligible persons to fill the posts. 174/ A U.S. study of 73 NLF leaders in 1965 indicated that almost all were born in South Vietnam, and almost all were highly educated. 175/ Most had histories of anti-French political activity, or identification with religious movements, and it appears that if many were not themselves crypto-communists, they had known and worked with communists for years. The prime example of the group is Nguyen Huu Tho, who was the first formally elected chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the NLF. Tho was a Cochinchinese lawyer, once a socialist, who spent some months with the Viet Minh in the Mekong Delta in 1947. He thereafter led anti-French and anti-US demonstrations, defended a number of Vietnamese before Saigon courts for crimes related to the "Resistance," and served some time in French jails. He also edited a clandestine Viet Minh newspaper aimed at Saigon intellectuals. In August, 1954, he became vice chairman of the leftist Saigon Peace Committee, or Movement for the Defense of Peace (MDP). In November, 1954, according to CIA information, Tho and others in the MDP were arrested, and Tho spent the next seven years in Diem's detention centers. Mysteriously released in December, 1961, the CIA reported him elected to NLF office at the congress of March, 1962. 176/ Douglas Pike's information has Tho active in Saigon politics through 1958, at which time he was jailed. His NLF biography states that "he was liberated by a daring guerrilla raid on the jail in 1961," but Pike, unable to find any record of such a raid, concludes that Tho was provisional chairman of the NLF, and was elected Central Committee Chairman at the organizing meeting in December 1960. 177/
c. Development

The NLF rapidly took on organizational reality from the Central Committee down through a web of subordinate and associated groups to villages all over Vietnam. Pike estimates that within a few months of its founding in December, 1960, its membership doubled, doubled again by autumn, 1961, and then redoubled by early 1962, at which time 300,000 Vietnamese were on its rolls. 178/ These were members of the "liberation associations," NLF per se, of which there were administrative associations (e.g., provincial headquarters) and functional associations (e.g., Youth Liberation Association); or, they belonged to one of several political parties, including the communist party, affiliated with the NLF; or, they served in the Liberation Army. Normally, each man, woman and child belonged to many organizations simultaneously. A French analysis of Viet Minh organization aptly described the NLF:

"The individual is enmeshed in several networks of independent hierarchies...a territorial hierarchy...running from the family and the block to the interprovincial government, and associations that incorporate male and female youth groups, groups of mothers, of farmers, factory, and plantation workers' syndicates...they could just as well include clubs of flute players or bicycle racers; the essential thing is that no one escapes from this enrollment and that the territorial hierarchy is crossed by another one, which supervises the first and is in turn supervised by it, both being overseen by police or functionaries and the [Communist] Party...." 179/

The key operational components of the NLF were the Liberation Army and the People's Revolutionary Party, as the communists within the NLF termed themselves. The former had a lien on the services of every NLF member, man, woman or child, although functionally its missions were usually carried out by formally organized and trained paramilitary or full-time units. All "Viet Cong" units were, from 1961 on, regarded as part of the Liberation Army.

There can be little doubt that communists played a major role in organizing the NLF. Although Diem's Communist Denunciation campaign had foreclosed "Front" activity, the communists of South Vietnam possessed the leadership, tight subordination and conspiratorial doctrine necessary for them to survive; moreover, they were, as Milton Sacks characterized them, "the most persevering, most cohesive, best-disciplined, and most experienced political group in Vietnam."180/ The People's Revolutionary Party was not formed until January, 1962; it was explicitly the "Marxist-Leninist Party of South Vietnam," and it purported to be the "vanguard of the NLF, the paramount member."181/ In 1962, it had some 35,000 members. 182/ The Lao Dong Party had continued low level overt activity, as well as covert operations, in South Vietnam throughout the years 1955 to 1962. For example, leaflets were distributed over the Lao Dong imprimatur. 183/ But the FRP denied official links with the Lao Dong Party of the DRV beyond "fraternal ties of communism." 184/ The denial implies the question: what role
did the DRV and the Lao Dong Party play in the years of patient work necessary to bring the NLF to flower in so short a time after 1960? What role did they play in the insurgency overall?

The official U.S. view has been that the PRP is merely the southern arm of the Lao Dong Party, and one instrument by which Hanoi instigated and controlled the revolt against "My-Diem." 185/ Douglas Pike's analysis led him to concur, with reservations:

"The Viet Minh elements in South Vietnam during the struggle against the French had of course included many non-Communist elements.... After 1954 many Viet Minh entered the ranks of the new Diem government, and even a decade later many of the top military and civilian governmental figures in Saigon were former Viet Minh. Nevertheless the Viet Minh elements, made up chiefly but not entirely of Communists, continued to offer resistance to the Diem government.... In terms of overt activity such as armed incidents of the distribution of propaganda leaflets the period was quiet and the Communists within the remnant Viet Minh organization relatively inactive. In addition, much of the activity that did take place apparently was the work of impatient cadres operating in the South independently of Hanoi's orders....

"Such action on their part and the religious sects is understandable, and the emergence of a clandestine militant opposition group could be expected.... such an effort would be in complete harmony with Vietnamese social tradition and individual psychology. But there is a vast difference between a collection of clandestine opposition political groups and the organizational weapon that emerged, a difference in kind and not just degree. The National Liberation Front was not simply another indigenous covert group, or even a coalition of such groups. It was an organizational steamroller, nationally conceived and nationally organized, endowed with ample cadre and funds, crashing out of the jungle to flatten the GVN. It was not an ordinary secret society of the kind that had dotted the Vietnamese political landscape for decades. It projected a social construction program of such scope and ambition that of necessity it must have been created in Hanoi and imported. A revolutionary organization must build; it begins with persons suffering genuine grievances, who are slowly organized and whose militancy gradually increases until a critical mass is reached and the revolution explodes. Exactly the reverse was the case with the NLF. It sprang full-blown into existence and then was fleshed out. The grievances were developed or manufactured almost as a necessary afterthought. The creation of the NLF was an accomplishment of such skill, precision, and refinement that when one thinks of who the master planner must have been, only one name comes to mind: Vietnam's organizational genius, Ho Chi Minh." 186/
IV.A.5.

Tab 2

FOOTNOTES


9. See map, Tab 1, p.21.


13. This lack of de facto independence has figured in recent controversy over Diem's responsibility to the Geneva Agreement signed by France, e.g., Kahin and Lewis, op.cit., 56-57.


25. U.S. Dept of State, Memo for Asst. SecState Robertson, 30 April 1955, "Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Nam Situation," which foresaw trouble on the Hill if Diem were forced out.


27. U.S. Dept of State, telegram, SECTO 50 from Manila, 1 March 1955, reports that Secretary Dulles "told Diem that U.S. Government -- President and himself -- had great stake in him and in Vietnam... if there is failure here, U.S. prestige would be gravely affected"; also Resch. Memo 765, op. cit.


30. Shaplen, 106. Diem considered himself a Catholic of the Spanish
vice French tradition: fiercely militant, rather than intellectual
and tolerant in the Gallic mode. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 236-238. Cf.,
Warner, op. cit., 90.

31. Ibid., 237.

32. Scigliano, op. cit., 58. U.S. Dept of State, Memorandum for the
Secretary of State, dated 23 April 1955, "Report on Vietnamese Political
Situation," and Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of State Robertson,
30 April 1955, "Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Nam Situation."

33. Scigliano, op. cit., 60; David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire

34. Scigliano, op. cit., 56-57.

35. Ibid., 58, 75-76, 110-111; Warner, op. cit., 32, 307-308; Fall, Two
Viet-Nams, 246-252.

36. Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam

37. Ibid., 168, 169.

38. Ibid., 79-82.

39. Ibid., 165-171.


42. Warner, op. cit., 116-117, 214, 224; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 250; Scigliano,
op. cit., 75-80; Shaplen, op. cit., 128-132.

43. Scigliano, loc. cit.

44. Ibid., 77.

20-21.

46. U.S. Dept of State, telegrams: to Saigon 4756 of 27 April 1955; to
Saigon 4757 of 27 April 1955; to Saigon ---- of 28 April 1955 (draft);
to Saigon 5600 of 1 May 1955.

Memorandum from K. T. Young, Jr., to Asst Secy Robertson, 30 April 1955,
"Report on Collins Visit and Viet-Nam Situation"; Shaplen, op. cit.,
122-125; Report of the SMM, op. cit.
47. Warner, op. cit., 105-106.


49. Ibid., SECT 8 of May 8, 1955.

50. Ibid., TEDUL 2 of May 8, 1955.

51. Ibid., TEDUL 9 of May 9, 1955.


53. Ibid., 103.


57. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 111.


60. Ibid; Report of the SMM, op. cit., 43-44; CIA, NSC Briefing for 12 May 1955 on "South Vietnam."


64. Scigliano, op. cit., 121; Shaplen, op. cit., 143.

65. Ibid., 104-105, 121-124; GVN, 7 Years of the Ngo Dinh Diem Administra-
tion (Saigon: October 26, 1961), 319-368.


67. Ibid., Scigliano, loc. cit.; Pike, op. cit. 62-63.

68. Scigliano, op. cit., 177-178; Nighswonger, op. cit., 40.

69. Bain, op. cit., 122; Scigliano, op. cit., 91-98; Shaplen, op. cit., 133-134.

70. Ibid.


72. Ibid., 163.

73. Ibid., 170-171.

74. Ibid.


Today (No. 16, February, 1960), 73.

77. Scigliano, op. cit., 169.

78. Ibid., 173-174; Nighswonger, op. cit., 40.

79. Ibid., 45; Scigliano, op. cit., 169-172.

80. Ibid., 114; Nighswonger, 45-46; John D. Montgomery, The Politics of
Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1966), 72-83.


84. Ibid.

85. Ibid., 179.

86. Ibid., 180; Nighswonger, op. cit., 46.
87. Ibid., 46ff; Scigliano, 180-183.
89. Scigliano, op. cit., 33; Shaplen, op. cit., 133-134.
90. Scigliano, op. cit., 167.
92. NIS 43D, op. cit., 40; Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 109-110; Shaplen, 253-254.
96. Text is from Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 432-438.
97. Scigliano, op. cit., 177-178.
99. NIS 43D, op. cit., 39-40; CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, "Politically Significant Groups in South Vietnam" (No. 0811/66, 4 May 1966), and "The Vulnerability of Non-Communist Groups in South Vietnam to Viet Cong Political Subversion" (No. 0829/66, 27 May 1966).
100. Scigliano, op. cit., 207.
103. Scigliano, op. cit., 165-166.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., 162-165; Montgomery, op. cit., 62-70.
106. Scigliano, op. cit., 187-188; Shaplen, op. cit., 141-142.
107. Scigliano, op. cit., 187-188.


113. Quoted in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 324.


118. Quoted in Warner, op. cit., 91-93.

119. Ibid., 92.

120. This same misapprehension appears in U.S. "counterinsurgency" literature; e.g. W. W. Rostow: "Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building." W. W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Under-developed Areas," Speech at the U.S.A. Special Warfare School, June, 1961, in Raskin and Fall, eds., op. cit., 113.

121. Diem, quoted in Ibid., 127-128.

122. Hoang Van Chi, op. cit., 59.

123. Pike, op. cit., facing 1.


127. The document is known in intelligence circles as "the CRIMP Document," having been captured by elements of the US 1st Infantry Division in the Iron Triangle area of Binh Duong Province on Operation CRIMP, 6-14 January 1966. Its accuracy and authenticity have been verified by US authorities.


129. Pike, op. cit., 76-77.

130. Ibid.


132. Ibid., 185-186.

133. Ibid., 160; CIA, NSC Briefing for 23 October 1957.


135. CIA, NSC Briefing of 30 November 1957.

136. DIA, "North Vietnamese Role in the Origins...", op. cit.


138. U.S. Senate, Background Information..., op. cit., 5; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 160.

139. Quoted in ibid.

140. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 317, 324.


144. Pike, op. cit., 102.
145. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, 239; 360-361.
147. Time, 7 November 1960.
149. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 172, 184-185; and Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 317 ff.
154. Ibid., 78.
156. Warner, op. cit., 159; Saigon to State Despatch 278, op. cit.
159. Scigliano, op. cit., 140; DIAAP4, North Vietnamese Role..., op. cit., 31.
161. U.S. Dept. of State, Despatch 278 from Saigon, 7 March 1960, p. 8 of Encl 1; Cf. Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 111.
162. Ibid.
164. U.S. Department of State, Despatch 278, op. cit., Encl 1, p. 11.


166. Cf., Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 113-116. Also: "New National Front Formed in S. Vietnam," Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, 31 January 1961, pp. EEE 13-17. On 2 February 1961 (ibid., 2 Feb, EE 5), Radio Hanoi, elaborated: "The French language paper LA DEPECHE DU CAMBODGE (of Phnom Penh, Cambodia) on 24 December announced that it had received the manifesto of the front which said that it had come into existence to meet the aspiration of the South Vietnamese people, and that it undertook to liberate them from My-Diem slavery." (The same paper quoted Reuters report dated 24 December: "the front may have intensified its political activities in the countryside and among the South Vietnamese armed forces . . .) The U.S. Department of State, however, has taken the view that the NLF was formed in Hanoi; cf., the "White Papers" of 1961 and 1965, op. cit., and Letter, Under Secretary Katzenbach to Congressman Evans, 5 March 1963.


168. For the "official" (February 11, 1961) text of the NLF Manifesto, see Pike, op. cit., 82, 344-347; and CIA, Intelligence Memorandum, "The Organization, Activities, and Objectives of the Communist Front in South Vietnam" (1603/66, 26 September 1966), Annex II.


170. Ibid., 351.

171. Ibid., 350-351.

172. Ibid., 356; "zone" refers to the two "regrouping zones" established by the Armistice Agreement of 1954.

173. Ibid., 358-369.

174. CIA, Intelligence Memorandum 1603/66, op. cit., 5-6.

175. Biographical information on 73 of the leaders and key cadre of the NLF and affiliated organizations indicates that 66% (48) of this group were born in South Vietnam, and that an additional 8 are probably Southerners. Only 2 of the 73 were certainly born in the North, while an additional 2 may have been born there. (The birthplace of 13 of the 73 is unknown.) It can also be ascertained from the biographical data that at least 60 of the 73 are highly educated, particularly so by Asian standards. Ibid.

176. Ibid., I-44 to I-46.

177. Ibid., 426-427.
178. Ibid., 115.


181. Pike, op. cit., 137.

182. Ibid., 138.

183. Loc. cit.

184. Ibid., 137.


186. Pike, op. cit., 75-76.
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HANOI AND THE INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Character of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Between 1954 and 1960, Ho Chi Minh had to face in North Vietnam, as did Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, the problem of building a nation out of the ruins of nearly a decade of war. During those years, until DRV declared its support for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, Ho seemed preoccupied with the problems of consolidating his regime and securing the foreign aid he needed to assure economic growth. Certainly agricultural shortages and popular unrest in North Vietnam in the immediate aftermath of Geneva were sufficiently serious to have discouraged foreign adventures through 1956. However, by January, 1961, when Hanoi announced the formation of the NLF, the internal difficulties of the DRV seem to have been largely resolved. Inquiry into the timing and extent of the DRV's participation in the insurgency of South Vietnam, therefore, requires assessment of those conditions within the DRV which might have affected its capability and willingness to prosecute a war of aggression.

1. Structure of the Government. He possessed one distinct advantage over Diem: his government had been in existence, in one form or another, continuously since 1945. Ho and his lieutenants ruled in radically differing circumstances as the status of the regime shifted from that of a state within the French Union in 1946, to a belligerent in a colonial revolution, and back to a sovereign state in 1954, preserving remarkable continuity. The Geneva Conference of 1954 restored its actual territorial dominion to about what it had been in 1954, in that France acceded to a cease-fire based upon a territorial division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel and to Viet Minh "conduits of civil administration" in the regions to the north, pending "general elections." 1/ The withdrawal of French military forces and civil authority from northern Vietnam was coordinated with the DRV forces and leaders so that the latter systematically replaced the former; by the end of May 1955, the DRV had acquired full control of all its territory, and began to act as a sovereign state. 2/ However, formal recognition of DRV statehood dates from January, 1950 (China and Soviet Union), and best information now available to the U.S. Department of State indicates that thereafter twenty-two other nations established relations with it. 2/ Formally, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was organized under a Constitution promulgated in 1946 which, in language echoing Jefferson, guaranteed civil freedoms, and reposed principal state power in a people's parliament. A second Constitution was adopted on January 1, 1960, more explicitly drawn from communist thought, resembling the Chinese Constitution in general, but containing Soviet style clauses on civil rights and autonomy of national minorities.
a. Constitution of 1946

The 1946 basic law declared Vietnam to be a democratic republic in which all power belonged to the people "without distinction of race, class, creed, wealth, or sex." Its territory, "composed of Bac-Bo, or Northern Vietnam (Tonkin), Trung-Bo or Central Vietnam (Annam), and Nam-Bo or Southern Vietnam (Cochinchina) is one and indivisible... The capital of Vietnam is Hanoi. However, the Constitution of 1946 was never institutionalized; instead, the exigencies of the war with the French eventuated in a government which was literally an administrative extension of the rigidly disciplined political apparatus headed by Ho Chi Minh and encircled by his colleagues from the Indochinese Communist Party. Pham Van Dong (presently Premier, then Vice President) announced in 1950 that promulgation of the 1946 Constitution had been postponed "because several of its provisions require for their application the cessation of the state of war," and in 1951, after Ho had openly aligned with the Sino-Soviet powers, the Viet Minh radio explained that "a gang of traitors" had been evolved in its formulation, and hence a "progressive character was lacking." In late 1956, the DRV set up a constitutional reform committee. In December, 1958, after the Geneva Agreements, Ho invited the public to submit recommendations on a new draft basic law, and the second Constitution was promulgated in 1960.

b. Constitution of 1960

The 1960 Preamble speaks of a thousand years of struggle for independence, lauds Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong (Communist) Party, cites harshly United States "imperialists" and "interventionists," and presents this interpretation of the aftermath of Geneva, 1954-1960: "...In the South, the U.S. Imperialists and their henchmen have been savagely repressing the patriotic movement of our people. They have been strengthening military forces and carrying out their scheme of turning the southern part of our country into a colony and military base for their war preparations. They have resorted to all possible means to sabotage the Geneva Agreements and undermine the cause of Viet Nam's reunification...."

"...Under the clear-sighted leadership of the Viet Nam Lao-Dong Party, the government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and President Ho Chi Minh, our entire people, broadly united within the National United Front, will surely win glorious success in the building of socialism in North Viet-Nam and the struggle for national reunification."

Both the opening sentence of the Preamble and Article 1 of Chapter I of the Constitution itself, stipulate that Viet Nam is an entity indivisible from China to Camau in South Vietnam. Chapter II of the Constitution, which precedes the section on human rights, announces step by step that the DRV is advancing from "people's democracy to socialism...transforming
its backward economy into a socialist economy with modern industry and agriculture..." "Communism" (or a derivative term) is not mentioned as such, but the document is otherwise explicit that the economy is to be state-centered; e.g.:

"Article 12. The state sector of the economy, which is a form of ownership by the whole people, plays the leading role in the national economy. The state ensures priority for its development."

"Article 17. The state strictly...prohibits the use of private property to disrupt the economic life of the society or to undermine the economic plan of the state..."

Chapter III is a hyper-democratic guarantee of civil rights, and the remainder provides for an elected National Assembly and a centralized, statist public administration.

2. Political Parties
   a. Lao Dong Party

Unrecognized by the 1960 Constitution except in the Preamble's encomiums, the Lao Dong Party (Dang Lao Dong Vietnam, or Vietnamese Workers' Party) is the dominant political power within the DRV. It is an expressly Marxist-Leninist Party which traces its lineage back to the Indochinese Communist Party founded by Ho Chi Minh, and although the ICP was abolished in 1946, claims to have been prime mover in the major nationalist "front" movements through 1951, when the DRV "legalized" the Party. For example, Vo Nguyen Giap explained that:

"The Vietnamese people's war of liberation was victorious because we had a wide and firm National United Front...organized and led by the Party of the working class: the Indochinese Communist Party, now the Vietnam Workers' [Lao Dong] Party. In the light of the principles of Marxism-Leninism...the Party found a correct solution to the problems..." 2/

Party statutes adopted in 1960 established a National Congress, and a Central Committee elected by the Congress, as its policy-making bodies. The Congress is ponderous (600 members, meets every 4 years), and the Central Committee in fact governs. More precisely, power is exercised by the Politburo, its steering group. The Central Committee serves as a forum for the discussion of policy, the dissemination of information, and the training of future leaders. Though major decisions appear as Central Committee resolutions, in actuality they originate with the Politburo. The Secretariat of the Central Committee is the principal executive agency of the party, directing subordinate Party organizations in foreign affairs propaganda, organization, inspection (or control), the military establishment, the 'reunification' movement, industry and agriculture. The Secretariat also appears to control personnel assignments and promotions in the Party's middle and upper echelons.
The Lao Dong internal organizational principle is "democratic centralism," hierarchal subordination of elected leaders of Party entities formed in all geographic, economic, bureaucratic, social, and cultural groups, wherever at least three Party members exist. Membership in the Party is deliberately confined to an elite, and has never amounted to more than about 3% of the population. 10/
As of 1963, 80% of the Party were members of 10 years or more, less than 10% were women, and no more than 7% were non-Vietnamese. Although an elite, the Party admitted in 1960 that 85% of its members had no more than 4th grade educations. Lack of skill and drive, as well as inadequate strength, handicapped the Party in its attempts to encadre the DRV's ambitious agricultural and industrial programs. From the 1960 admissions, it appears that of 110,000 managerial personnel in the DRV, only 50,000 or so were Party members; about 10% of the Party is then employed directly in management. Nonetheless, the Party has from all appearances succeeded in lodging itself in pivotal positions in every part of the society, and certainly in the DRV's main undertakings.

b. Fatherland Front

One of the fundamental procedures of the Vietnamese Communists has been the forming of a "united front" in which Communist Party members join cause with non-communists, especially nationalist activists. The Party itself has pointed out that this is in proper Leninist fashion:

"The policy of founding the Indochinese democratic front between 1936 and 1939, the Viet Minh front between 1941 and 1951, and the Lien Viet front /1946-1951/; the decision of signing the 6 March 1946...preliminary accord /Ho's accommodation with France/... -- all these are typical examples of the clever application of the...instruction of Lenin." 11/

In 1955 the DRV organized non-communist elements into "mass organizations," within the "Fatherland Front" (Mat Tran To Quoc). 12/

SELECTED COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT

Dao Dong Party
Democratic Party
Socialist Party
General Confederation of Labor
National Liaison Committee of Peasants
Women's Union
Youth Federation

Writers and Artists Union
Journalists Association
Unified Buddhist Association
National Liaison Committee of Patriotic & Peace Loving Catholics
Industrialists and Traders Federation
Peace Committee
The Fatherland Front follows the format of the Lao Dong Party, and Party members occupy the key positions within the Front. The Front composition has not been changed since 1955, but after 1960 it became more active in the "reunification" movement, serving as the proponent, or "externalizing agent" in the DRV for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. 13/

It should be noted that the Fatherland Front included two nominally non-communist parties, and that it advocated beginning in 1955 an interestingly different scheme for bringing about reunification of Vietnam: two legislative assemblies for North and South, respectively, separate armed forces, and a confederate government. But on all other issues the Front differed not at all from Ho, especially agreeing that: "American imperialism is the chief enemy." 14/ No other deviant view is on record from either the Front or the two "independent" political parties. Moreover, while the DRV government has on rare occasions included Socialist or Democrat, none has ever occupied an important leadership position.

3. Leadership

The most remarkable aspect of the DRV and the Lao Dong Party is stability of their leadership. Most of the top leaders of the Party were old-time communists.

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<tr>
<td>Politburo Members (1950 ranking)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Truong Chinh</td>
<td>3. Pham Van Dong</td>
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<th>Alternate Members</th>
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<td>Tran Quoc Hau</td>
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<th>Former Members</th>
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<td>Hoang Giao Viet</td>
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<td>Ha Hay Quyet</td>
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<td>Tan Duc Thang</td>
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<td>Nguyen Luong Bang</td>
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**Membership in the Lao Dong Politburo 1951-60**

Source: MTB 43 C, p.26

TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Moreover, this close knit Party elite controlled the levers of power in the DRV government. The following chart shows that as of 1960 all key North Vietnamese leaders — except one on whose early life U.S. intelligence is not informed — are known to have been in the ICP in the '30's (or even in predecessor organizations).

**LAO DONG - DRV LEADERSHIP IN 1960**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>LAO DONG PARTY</strong></th>
<th><strong>DEMONCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV)</strong></th>
<th><strong>PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN)</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ho Chi Minh</td>
<td>President; Chairman, NDC</td>
<td>Supreme Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>Le Duong</td>
<td>First Secretary, Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truong Chinh</td>
<td>Chairman, National Assembly</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pham Van Dong</td>
<td>Premier, Vice Chairman, NDC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pham Hung</td>
<td>Deputy Premier; Chairman, Finance and Trade Board, Premier's Office</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vo Nguyen Giai</td>
<td>Deputy Premier; Minister, National Defense; Chairman, NDC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Duc Tho</td>
<td>Member, Secretary; Director, Organizational Department, CC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nguyen Can</td>
<td>Member, Secretary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nguyen Duc</td>
<td>Deputy Premier; Chairman, SPC; Chairman, SCC; Member, NDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinh</td>
<td>Deputy Premier; Chairman, Finance and Trade Board, Premier's Office</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vo Van Cuong</td>
<td>Vice Chairman, National Assembly</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ALTERNATE MEMBERS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinh Tien Tung</td>
<td>Minister, Public Security; Chairman, Home Affairs Board, Premier's Office; Member, NDC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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**KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS**

|------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|

* — ICP pre-WW II

**INTERLOCKING OF TOP LEADERSHIP POSITIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM**

7
From time to time certain members of this elite suffered an apparent eclipse, but Ho Chi Minh ostensibly intervened on their behalf, mediated the dispute in which they were involved, and restored them to the inner circle -- usually in a different position. Thus, Truong Chinh was "fired" as First Secretary of the Party in 1956 after the Land Reform Campaign had been pressed too far and fast, but after a period of absence from the public scene, re-emerged in 1958 as Vice Premier, and became in 1960 Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. Vo Nguyen Giap, who delivered a sharp critique of Truong Chinh in October 1956, disappeared for two months in October 1957, while Ho Chi Minh was on a Bloc trip, amid rumors of a realignment of DRV leadership. Ho's return brought Vo's resurrection. Other examples of this phenomenon attest both to the immutability of the core leaders, and to the centrality of Ho to their position. 16/

A similar testimony to Ho's eminence lies in the murky evidence of factional dispute within the Iao Dong. In 1946 Truong Chinh and Giap appeared to foreign observers as "extremists," urging violence on Ho; in 1956 Truong was the Maoist extremist, Vo a Soviet-style moderate; in 1966, Vo was rated a moderate, but Truong had become a neutral, and reportedly himself had come under fire of "extremist" Le Duan. 17/ Increasingly, Ho has risen above the politics of personalities and intramural clashes, and to the extent that he became involved, seems to have mediated and reconciled rather than disciplined. Demonstrably, his personal leadership qualities kept the DRV a cooperative, integrated team, with individual ambitions and hardline-moderate factions delicately in balance.

The larger circle of the Central Committee of the Iao Dong exhibited no different complexion from the inner leadership, except that while most of the Politburo members are considered generalists, the 33 other Central Committee members include Party administrators, State specialists, or military and internal security leaders. More than half of the Central Committee have been identified as ICP members before World War II. 18/ The DRV of 1960, was, then, a state dominated by a coterie of revolutionaries of a particularly hardened breed. Ho himself, in a 1960 speech, paid this tribute to his colleagues:

"I wish to remind you that thirty-one of the comrades who are now in the Central Committee were given altogether 222 years of imprisonment and deportation by the French imperialists before the Revolution, not to mention the sentences to death in absentia and the years of imprisonment evaded by those who escaped from prison....Our comrades made up for the years in prison in discussing and studying political theory. Once more, this not only proves that the enemy's extremely savage policy of repression could not check progress, but on the contrary, it became a touchstone, it has further steeled the revolutionaries. And the result was that the Revolution has triumphed, the imperialists have been defeated...." 19/
B. The DRV's Domestic Objectives

Ho Chi Minh was always a revolutionary. Whether he was first and foremost a nationalist, or a potential Tito, or the last of the Stalinists—and arguments can be advanced for each theory—as head of state he subscribed to internal programs for the DRV which were communist in concept and Maoist in execution. In repeated statements on the goals of the regime, he and the rest of the Lao Dong leadership made it plain that they were determined to revise radically North Vietnam's land-holding system, and reconstruct its traditional society along egalitarian and collectivist lines. Further, they were determined that North Vietnam would become agriculturally self-sufficient, and industrialized to the degree its natural resources would permit. In fact, the modernization they envisaged for North Vietnam surpassed in degree and urgency any of the My-Diem undertakings in South Vietnam. Yet the latter aroused the peasant's apprehensions, and eventually their hostility. What of Ho Chi Minh's internal security? From the record of DRV policy from 1950 to 1960, it is clear that, while "progress towards socialism" in both the agrarian and industrial realms was always one principal State/Party objective, a well-disciplined society thoroughly submissive to Party leadership was another, and frequently overriding goal.

1. Societal Discipline

By no means can it be said that at any time prior to Geneva, Ho and the Lao Dong Party held complete sway in rural North Vietnam. Aside from French supported counter-movements, the Viet Minh leaders had to contend with peasant reluctance to support them, and even outright rejection of their policy. Almost as soon as the DRV "legalized" the Lao Dong Party in 1951, the Party launched a series of land reform schemes which contravened even the popularity Ho et al enjoyed as heroes of the Resistance. Moreover, tensions developed early between the Viet Minh and the Catholics as a group—less apparently over political issues than over traditional Catholic fears of Tonkinese persecution in the absence of French protectors. The Catholics of Tonkin had developed a political and military independence like that of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao in Cochinchina, and resisted the Viet Minh as vigorously as the latter resisted the Saigon regimes. In both land reform and relations with the Catholics, the Party and the DRV encountered stiff opposition.

a. Rural Opposition, 1954-1956

Prior to 1954, the Lao Dong Party experimented in Viet Minh liberated areas of Tonkin with a Maoist-style Land Reform Campaign. 20/ Other than the war, Land Reform was the foremost undertaking of the Lao Dong Party after 1951. In essence, the Land Reform Campaign commited the party to an assault on the traditional rural social hierarchy, and to redistribution of land and wealth. Beginning with punitive taxes, the Campaign matured terror, arrests, and public condemnation, trials, and executions. Within the DRV hierarchy, the proponent of Land Reform was Truong Chinh.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

(born Dang Xuan Khu, party name translating as "Long March"), Secretary General of the Lao Dong Party, who openly espoused the Maoist version of communism, and who relied upon Chinese advisers. Truong Chinh saw land reform as a method of organizing the peasantry under the Lao Dong Party, less important for its economic or social ramifications than for its political and military significance. Truong had warned in 1947 that:

"If we neglect the organization of the people, we cannot mobilize the entire people and the army, and cannot enable them to take part in the resistance in every field. In 1918 Lenin wrote: 'To wage a real war, we must have a strong and well organized rear....' These words constitute very precious counsel for us in this long-term resistance war." 21/

As victory of the Resistance neared, Ho Chi Minh's emphasis on internal reforms, as opposed to martial undertakings, increased. In December 1953, for instance, he stated that:

"The two central tasks in the next years are to do our utmost to fight the enemy and to carry out land reform.... In 1954, we must pay particular attention to three great works:

"To combine land reform with strengthening of the armed forces...."

"To combine land reform with the training of cadres and the raising of their ideology...."

"To combine land reform with the development of agricultural production...." 22/

Moreover, Ho apparently countenanced harsh measures to carry out both "central tasks." He is reported to have stated his basic strategy to Party cadres in these terms:

"To straighten a curved piece of bamboo, one must bend it in the opposite direction, holding it in that position for awhile. Then, when the hand is removed it will slowly straighten itself." 23/

When the Geneva Conference opened the way to Viet Minh dominion over North Vietnam, and held out the prospect to Tonkinese peasants of migrating to South Vietnam, hundreds of thousands were sufficiently apprehensive over religious persecution, or over "land reform" and other communizing campaigns to the North. There is considerable evidence that many of these fears were well-founded. On the heels of the withdrawing French Expeditionary Forces, Truong Chinh's teams of Chinese advisers toured from village to village to survey for land reforms, and these were followed by an infusion of Lao Dong Party cadres to village level. 24/ People's Courts were activated and the Campaign became the vehicle not only for land redistribution, but for Communist Party penetration into rural society, and a wholesale transformation of
the penetrated community's traditional structure.

U.S. intelligence was not at the time well informed on the ensuring events, but since various sources (chiefly Northern refugees) have filled in a fairly coherent picture. 25/ From the farmers' point of view, the regime's Campaign involved three particularly onerous procedures. The first was an attack upon the position and prerogatives of the traditional village hierarchy, accomplished by the cadre's selecting and training several of the poorest, least successful villagers for a Land Reform Committee and a Special People's Tribunal, and soliciting, from the same sources, accusations against the more prosperous, socially elevated villagers. 26/ The second was the classifying of the entire populace into such lettered categories as "dishonest and ferocious landlords," "average normal landlords"; "rich peasants"; "strong middle level peasants"; or "very poor peasants." 27/ Thirdly, each village Tribunal was then assigned a quota of one landlord death sentence. According to a former Viet Minh, the initial results were displeasing to the "our Chinese comrade advisers," who felt that more "exploiters" should have been found. Accordingly, on orders from the Lao Dong Central Committee, new classifications were assigned which labeled five times the number of landlords. At the same time, the landlord execution quota was raised from one to five per village. 28/

The results of the Campaign were like the outcome of similar procedures in China earlier in the decade: widespread bloodshed. Aside from persons executed on the direct order of the Tribunals themselves, there were countless others who, evicted from their landholds, and ostracized by the community, were condemned to die of starvation.

Figures on casualties of the Campaign are inconclusive. George A. Carver states that the killed were "probably on the order of 100,000"; a French professor then in Hanoi estimates that altogether 100,000 were lost; refugees have testified that the countryside of North Vietnam was white with the clothing of mourning; Bernard Fall believed that 50,000 to 100,000 were killed. 29/ That there were significant excesses is evident from the behavior of the DRV itself, which beginning in August 1956, moved publicly to restrain Party cadres, to curb the power of the local courts, and to dampen the ardor of the "poor" peasants.

In August, 1956, Ho admitted that "errors had been committed in realizing the unity of the peasants" and promised to redress wrongful classifications and maljudgments by Land Reform Committees. 30/ At the 10th Plenum of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee on 29 October 1956, Truong Chinh was replaced by Ho Chi Minh himself as Party Secretary, and the top levels of the Central Land Reform Committee and the Ministry of Agriculture were shaken up. 31/ Vo Nguyen Giap, as the Party's spokesman, read a list of errors considered in these changes:

"(a) While carrying out their anti-feudal task, our cadres... have separated the Land Reform and the Revolution. Worst of all, in some areas they have even made the two mutually exclusive.
"(b) We have failed to realize the necessity of uniting with the middle-level peasants, and we should have concluded some form of alliance with the rich peasants, whom we treated in the same manner as the landlords.

"(c) We attacked the landowning families indiscriminately....

"(d) We made too many deviations and executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and, seeing enemies everywhere, resorted to terror, which became far too widespread.

"(e) Whilst carrying out our Land Reform program we failed to respect the principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas.

"(f) In regions inhabited by minority tribes we have attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring, instead of respecting, local customs and manners.

"(g) When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications alone. Instead of recognizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures such as disciplinary punishments, expulsion from the party, executions, dissolution of party branches and cells. Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization."

On 2 November, the DRV announced that its first postwar elections would be held in 1957, and formed a constitutional reform committee as one of several measures aimed at greater freedom in the society.

On 8 November, Ho abolished the detested Special People’s Tribunals, and ordered the wholesale release of prisoners from the regime’s detention centers. There followed then a systematic, government-wide “Campaign for the Rectification of Errors.” Notwithstanding these admissions, or perhaps because of them, violence broke out in Nghe An, the province of Ho’s birth.

b. Peasant Rebellion of 1956

The year 1956 had been a bad one for communist regimes. Obedient to the dictates of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, most communist governments, including the DRV, had launched programs of de-Stalinization and liberalization. In China these took the form of the "Hundred Flowers" movement, and in the DRV, the "Rectification of Errors Campaign." Poland and East Germany, as well as Hungary had experienced violence. Nonetheless, it was with some surprise that the world received Hanoi Radio’s announcement of 16 November 1956,
To prevent the spread of conflict, urgent measures were taken to stabilize the situation. A team was dispatched to negotiate with the populace, but the situation escalated into a clash where a few persons were killed and others rounded up, including some army men. Security services are now taking steps to maintain order and protect the cadres' lives and property.

On 21 November, the government newspaper noted that: "The province where party organizations existed as early as 1930 is in the same province that the most serious mistakes have been made..." and went on to deplore the execution and beatings of party members.

What happened indicates that the populace of North Vietnam must have been living under severe tension. The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had been deployed in strength into the rural areas to support the Land Reform Campaign, and it was reportedly through PAVN channels that the DRV first learned of impending revolt. Local garrisons had been reinforced as citizens grew restive, and units composed of regrouped southerners were sent into exceptionally tense areas.

On November 9, 1956, several hundred aggrieved peasants assembled in a market place near Vinh—a predominantly Catholic area—to petition an ICC team to arrange for some of them to migrate to South Vietnam, and for return of confiscated land to others. The following morning a special DRV propaganda team and a contingent of NVA troops arrived, and several arrests were attempted. A riot ensued, which spread into insurrection. On the night of 13 November PAVN troops stormed into the town, scattering the rebels and inflicting heavy casualties. Thousands of peasants then swarmed over their local government offices, destroying land records, and blocking roads. Some militia deserted and joined the rebels, and attacks on nearby DRV troops were attempted. Bernard Fall, in a 1957 article, described four columns of some 10,000 peasants marching in the province capital, seizing arms from troops, and forcing party cadres to sign confessions of crimes. Two reinforced army divisions, some 20,000 strong, were committed to put down the uprising.

The casualties resulting from the revolt are not known. Fall states that "close to 6000 farmers were deported or executed." Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon cited "massacres" in the North, claimed to have
evidence that the entire population of Nghe An had remained ignorant of its right to move to the South in 1954-1955, and called upon the ICC to reinstate Article 14(d). 39/ Vietnam Press, Diem's official press agency, on 9 November 1956, quoted Cong Nhan, a Saigon daily as follows:

"In the North, the fall of the illegitimate regime is near.... As soon as the people's hatred of the Communist dictatorship is sufficiently mature for it to succeed in overthrowing it, then general elections which are really free will take place in the whole of Vietnam, and will peacefully bring about the reunification of the country.

"If he refuses to have recourse to force in order to liberate the North, while yet realizing the dearest aspirations of the people, the supreme head of the Republic of Vietnam does so solely in order to avoid bloodshed and undesirable fratricidal strife." 40/

c. Reconciliation and Repression, 1957-1959

From the DRV viewpoint the Nghe-An uprising, whatever its dimensions, coincided fortuitously with the Suez and Hungarian crises. The GVN simply could not muster sufficient evidence to compete for headlines, and U.S. attention was on Europe. In any event, Ho and his regime undertook a series of conciliatory gestures which sapped popular resentment, and occluded the situation abroad. Conciliatory gestures were quickly extended to Catholics. Radio Hanoi, which in July 1955, had broadcast a Lao Dong proclamation rejecting the existence of deities consistent with the "scientific principles of the doctrine of Marx and Lenin," on 22 November 1956 announced that:

"...in the agrarian reform, we have committed errors, including errors in the observance of freedom of religion. The people in general, and the Catholic citizens in particular, want these errors corrected. These are legitimate demands." 41/

At the same time the government allocated about 48 million dong (about $15,000) for repair of Catholic churches and a seminary. 42/ On 15-16 December 1956, the DRV convened the National Committee of the Catholic Union, which issued a declaration criticizing the government for having violated the laws on religious freedom, pointing out that:

"...the errors committed during the agrarian reform have violated the policy of religious liberty of the Lao Dong Party and of the Government and have infringed on the religious rights of the faithful...." 43/

Ho Chi Minh personally received a delegation from the Committee of the Catholic Union to express his regret over the "errors" that had been committed, and Nhan Dan, the Lao Dong paper, published a series of articles on the same subject.
The Lao Dong Party itself was purged with particular attention to the demonstrably unreliable rural membership acquired during the latter stages of Land Reform, and Nhan Dan through the spring of 1957 reported on continuing difficulty in restoring the Party’s rapport in the countryside. At the same time, the press carried a number of graphic accounts of life in DRV prison camps.

In early 1957, in emulation of Mao, the DRV sponsored a “hundred flowers” campaign, and as in China, the regime was surprised by the sharpness of intellectual criticism which it evoked. The Hundred Flowers movement lasted in full bloom only about three months, but the literary license stimulated an unusual outflow of verse and fable, in which Land Reform, PAVN, foreign advisers, and the Party cadre were all criticized. Eventually the herbs became unbearable for the Lao Dong, and the flow of newspaper to opposition papers was cut, printers were on strike, and a particularly cutting journal, Nhan-Van (“Humanism,” a pun on Nhan-Dan), was forbidden to publish. Arrests and trials followed and by mid 1957 the voice of the intellectuals had all but been stilled. Nevertheless, as late as 1960, official releases were still deprecating literature which did not meet regime criteria for “proletarian writings.”

By mid 1957, the DRV had reversed its policy on Catholics—six months after the “Rectification” rapprochement of December 1956. The denunciation of priests was resumed, and the Church was accused of political activities. In 1959, a more intense campaign of harassment was undertaken, including newspaper barrages depicting the Catholic clergy as the greatest obstacle to collectives in farm regions. Church activity was severely restricted; all non-Vietnamese priests and nuns were expelled; and the movement of the native clergy was rigidly circumscribed. Catholic schools closed rather than accept DRV political instructors. Western observers in Hanoi in 1962 noted that congregations in Hanoi were composed invariably of the aged. Fall reported that as of that year there were but 5 bishops and 320 priests remaining in the DRV.

The DRV, like the GVN, also resorted to population relocations: the forced migration of Vietnamese from overcrowded, potentially dissident coastal regions into areas inhabited by minority peoples. The tribal people of North Vietnam comprised about 15% of the population thinly settled over about 40% of the country. These folk had always resisted government from outside their tribal society. The French made only a pretense of governing them. Racially differentiated from the Vietnamese, the highlander-lowlander relationship historically proceeded from hostility on the one hand and contempt on the other. Even Truong Chinh was unwilling to press strongly his Land Reform Campaign against the patriarchal tribal system, but to the extent that he did, violence ensued. In Vo Nguyen Giap’s catalog of mistakes recited on 29 October 1956 (supra), these difficulties were admitted, and concessions to the minorities were part of the Rectification of Errors. The Constitution of 1960 guaranteed the preservation of minority languages and cultures, and autonomy for local government. More than 70% of public administration in the northeast border region was placed...
in the hands of non-Vietnamese, and the proportion was almost 50% on the Lao frontier. Minority leaders were given seats in the National Assembly and on the Lao Dong Party Central Committee, and in both the Party and government bureaucracies numerous special minority boards and commissions were formed. Nonetheless, the first DRV Five-Year Plan (1960) included an expanded agricultural resettlement program in which 1,000,000 Vietnamese farmers were to move from the delta into the tribal regions to open new farmlands. In fact, the new farms were seldom self-sufficient, much less a contribution to the national food supply. But they aided internal security: their presence debilitated the traditional tribal society, and provided a quasi-military presence on the borders. In 1959, security forces in the border regions were further strengthened with Armed Public Security Forces to counter alleged airdrops of "ranger spies" from South Vietnam.

In most respects, the DRV had gone further in its self-accusation than had the de-Stalinization campaigns in other communist countries. Its recovery was equally exaggerated. Hoang Van Chi, a former Viet Minh cadre, believes that the Land Reform's advance into mass terror, followed by "Rectification" and reconciliation, had been carefully calculated by Ho as a "bamboo bending" in deliberate emulation of the Chinese, and that Ho, no less than Mao, was fully aware that bloodshed would eventually follow. Aiming ultimately at nothing less than a rapid and total transformation of traditional society, both leaders resorted to terror, followed by calculated relaxation and retightening of government control, as necessary steps to a disciplined populace. If such was in fact Ho's views, events bore him out, for by 1959 the DRV was able to resume a forced advance toward collectivization of agriculture, which, though afflicted with occasional administrative setbacks and by production decreases, did not again prompt revolt.

Other internal security measures taken by the DRV included strict controls over personal mobility, the allocation of large manpower resources to internal security functions, and the employment of the Lao Dong Party as a control mechanism and security censor. The regime eventually acquired, through its duplicate Party and governmental bureaucracies, contacts with and control over virtually every citizen. The formal internal security apparatus was effectively supplemented by population control documentation (identification cards, licenses, travel permits), by incessant propaganda, by networks of informers, and by surveillance in compulsory mass organizations. By 1959, following 5 years of oppression, relaxation, and repression, the people of the DRV were effectively disciplined.

2. Progress Towards Socialism

The assertion of the DRV Constitution of 1960 that the nation was "transforming its backward economy into a socialist economy with modern industry and agriculture..." had substance, but entailed a substantial input from abroad. Though a primarily agricultural society,
North Vietnam emerged from its war with France in 1954 as a food-deficit area. Densely populated, war-torn, it found itself more than customarily dependent upon outside supplies of rice and supplemental foods, which it had usually imported from South Vietnam. Soviet stop-gap aid filled the food deficit until DRV production was improved. The negative attitude of the GVN toward any economic relations with the DRV beyond those necessitated by the Geneva regroupment, in which Diem became progressively more adamant, created one pressure upon the DRV to seek dependable sources of further aid abroad. A second stemmed from lack of human and material capital to take advantage of its natural resources: the North contained all the developed mineral lodes and most of the established manufacturing in the two Vietnams, as well as the bulk of electric power capacity in Indochina. 50/ The DRV needed substantial foreign aid either to press toward modernizing its basic industry or to collectivize its farms.

a. Agriculture

Foreign aid to the DRV in agriculture, aside from relief shipments of food, took the form chiefly of technical assistance, both in management and technique. 51/ Chinese experts in Maoist land reforms figured prominently in the concept and direction of the collectivization drives. Russian advisors are believed to have advocated DRV concentration on mineral and tropical products valuable in communist international trade, and to have furnished methodological assistance in irrigation, fertilizing, and the like, but to little avail: labor intensive, hand tool farming in the traditional fashion persisted. Progress towards collectivization was perceptible. After retrenching in 1957 following the peasant flare-up, the regime moved ahead, although more cautiously. At the beginning of 1958, less than 5% of the farm population was in producer cooperatives; enrollments increased thereafter, and sharply in 1960, from about 55% of peasant households in July to about 85% in December. About one third of the collectives were in advanced stages of communal land ownership and shared production; the remainder represented inchoate socialization, with market incentive still a mainstay. Performance in agriculture was generally poor, output never rising above subsistence levels, and slow and erratic growth depressing progress in other sectors of the economy.

There was, however, perceptible progress:

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DRV gross national product, owing to improvements in both the industrial and agricultural sectors, grew steadily some 6% per year after 1958. The most promising years for the DRV were 1958 and 1959, when performance in both sectors was extraordinarily good; thereafter, consecutive years of poor harvests and rapid population increases cut into gains.
b. Industry

In industry, as compared with agriculture, foreign aid was more relevant, and visibly more effective. The DRV claimed in 1963 that new capacity had raised the total value of factory and handicraft industrial output two and two-thirds times above the 1956 level; an average annual increase of some 20%. Socialization was pronounced: by 1963 state-owned enterprises accounted for 60% of production, and partially state-owned about 6%. The North Vietnamese themselves possessed at the outset little capacity to carry out a balanced program of industrial development; in fact, handicapped as the DRV was by annual fluctuations in their agriculturally based economy and shortages of native technicians, its capability to absorb foreign aid was distinctly limited. Initially, to restore existing industrial plant, to improve communications, and to import consumer goods. Thereafter aid was extended in the form of credits for specified projects. The first DRV long range development plan, a three year program in 1958, proved too ambitious; targets were revised down annually, and at the end of the plan agricultural growth had averaged a little over 4%, compared with 21% for industry. A Five Year Plan for 1960-1965 was designed for more "rational development" of heavy industry, but precisely how this was to be achieved, and the pace of improvement, apparently remained subjects of contention up until the exigencies of the war overtook the plan.

U.S. intelligence is not informed as to how precisely foreign aid was related to either DRV economic plans, but in terms of government budget revenues, the DRV reported that foreign aid and loans comprised 39.5% of its 1955 income, but dropped to only 15.7% of its 1960 income. By contrast, and as a measure of return on both foreign aid and its own investment, profits from state enterprises contributed only 6.5% to 1955 income, compared with 58.0% in 1960. Total aid for 1955 to 1963 was as follows:

**ECONOMIC AID TO DRV**

**1955-1963**

(In Millions of U.S. Dollars) 53/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor (1)</th>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>Credits</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist China</td>
<td>225.0</td>
<td>232.0</td>
<td>457.0</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>263.9</td>
<td>368.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>372.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>534.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>906.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Albania and North Korea also aided, insignificantly.
(2) Does not include 1962 agreement for agricultural development assistance, value unknown.
(3) Includes $16.2 million extended in 1955 as a consortium.
U.S. intelligence estimated that through 1963 DRV used about $334 million of aid extended by China, $324 million from the USSR, and about $106 from East Europe.

The Chinese Communists played a leading role in assistance for transportation, communication, and the irrigation system. Between 1957 and 1964 they built 14 rice mills, 28 sugar refineries, plus a number of consumer goods factories. A 1959 loan financed expansion in metallurgy, chemicals, and electric power. Chinese trainers, advisers, and technicians averaged 1500 to 3000 per annum. Soviet aid was at first centered on heavy industry. Technicians -- about 150 to 300 persons yearly -- were concentrated in heavy manufacturing, mining and electric power. After 1960, Soviet assistance was also provided for telecommunications and agriculture.

The DRV's foreign trade tripled from 1955 to 1963, and although exports increased from 8% of total trade in 1955, to 37% in 1963, a deficit remained which had to be financed from aid -- from grants in 1955-1957, and from credit thereafter.

The pattern of trade was also Bloc oriented, as follows:

**GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF DRV TRADE**

(1962 Data in Percentages) 54/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist China, N.K., Cuba</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Communist</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Together China and USSR accounted for two-thirds of all trade. Total exports were 60% from agriculture, forestry, fishing and handicrafts, 30% from minerals; 50% of imports were machines and allied equipment. Less than 15% of all trade was with non-communist nations, consisting mainly of manufactured goods and chemicals for DRV coal.

Again, 1959 and 1960 were banner years. Compared with 1955, total trade more than doubled by 1959, and nearly tripled by 1960.
Value of DRV Foreign Trade *
(Millions of U.S. Dollars) 55/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>140.5</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>171.8</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>207.8</td>
<td>127.9</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>224.2</td>
<td>143.7</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>238.8</td>
<td>149.4</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Derived from DRV data. Total imports are believed to include all goods imported into the country except grant military assistance materiel.

Ho was explicit in spurning Western assistance for DRV development. In September, 1955, he extolled aid from the "other democracies" and pointed out that:

"This selfless and unconditional aid, beneficial to the people, is completely different from the 'aid' conceived by the imperialists. Through their 'aid' the imperialists always aim at exploiting and enslaving the peoples. The Marshall Plan, which has gradually encroached upon the sovereignty of the recipient countries, is eloquent proof of this." 56/

C. Foreign Policy Objectives

In the aftermath of the Geneva Settlement of 1954, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pursued beyond its borders national objectives which inevitably drew the DRV into a broader, more direct role in the southern insurgency, and, therefore, into conflict with the United States. The following examination of DRV national interests -- perforce speculative -- probes maximum and minimum objectives to delimit the range of DRV choice, and to determine the approximate apparent timing of those major foreign policy decisions which took it southward.

1. Independence

From the outset, Doc Lap, Independence, had been the battle-cry of Vietnamese of the Resistance, much as "liberty" rings for Americans. For Ho Chi Minh it was sine qua non: in 1946, he told a U.S. writer that "What follows will follow, independence must come first." 57/ Independence of Vietnam from foreign domination -- from colonialism in its political forms, its economic exploitation, its military occupation, its social subservience and racism -- has been the primary goal of the redoubtable
revolutionary's entire mature life. His main obstacles, as he saw them, were first France, then a Franco-American combine, and finally the U.S. alone; toward the expulsion of U.S. power and influence from Vietnam Ho, after 1954, directed most of the international power of the DRV. Nonetheless, while Ho's testimony is extensive on his deep antipathy to U.S. imperialism as the major danger to the DRV, his behavior in the Chinese-Russian rivalry indicated that he perceived yet another serious threat to Vietnamese independence in his northern neighbor: China, ancient overlord of the Viet peoples. Accordingly, the foreign policy of the DRV, though pivoted upon anti-Americanism, has guarded against encroachment by the Communist Chinese.

As an upper limit on reasonable expectations after 1954, the DRV might have hoped, in the context of a worsening political climate within South Vietnam, or of some form of plebiscite per the Geneva Settlement, that foreign military forces would be withdrawn from the South and foreign influence attenuated. A Franco-American withdrawal could have acceptably taken place under a neutralization formula, provided that the formula permitted pursuit of other DRV policies, such as reunification, and socialization.

Minimally, the DRV might have been willing to accept a continued foreign presence in the south, especially a French presence, with assurance of eventual withdrawal, and compensatory concessions to the DRV on the issue of reunification.

In the literal sense, the DRV won its independence at the Geneva Conference of 1954, as attested by Pravda upon the close of the Conference, July 22, 1954: "the freedom-loving peoples of Indo-China...have won their national independence." In January, 1957, the Soviet UN delegate requested entry of the DRV into the UN as a separate, distinct state, as it then existed in North Vietnam. But Ho Chi Minh, also on 22 July 1954, issued an appeal stressing the temporary nature of the partition, and the impermanence of the French military presence in the South. Moreover, he said: "North, Central and South Vietnam are territories of ours. Our country will certainly be unified, our entire people will surely be liberated." By 1957 the bar to independence and unification, the baleful foreign presence in Vietnam was plainly, in Ho's view, the US:

"The Vietnamese people have perseveringly carried on the struggle for the implementation of the Geneva Agreement to reunify the country, because South Viet-Nam is still ruled by the US imperialists and their henchmen. In completely liberated North Viet-Nam, power is in the hands of the people; this is a firm basis for the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam, a task which receives ever-growing and generous help from the Soviet Union, China, and other brother countries. Thanks to this assistance, the consolidation of the North has scored good results."
2. Reunification

The goal of independence, because of American "imperialist" support of the Diem government, thus became closely allied with, if not inseparable from, that of reunification. But the DRV-Lao Dong leaders, though widely acknowledged by all Vietnamese as heroes in the struggle for independence, did not win similar acceptance as political spokesmen for Cochinchina or Annam. Indeed, in all the modern history of Vietnam there has been little real unity. Vietnam's record is, rather, one of violence and political division. The conquest of Vietnam's current territory by the Dai-Viet people of the Red River Delta (modern Tonkin) from the Chams (of modern Annam) and Khmers (of modern Cochinchina) took place throughout this millennium; the Mekong Delta did not come under Viet suzerainty until ca 1780. In the meantime, civil war had fractioned the Dai-Viet; for 150 years (ca. 1640-1790) two high walls divided North from South Vietnam at approximately the 17th parallel. A unified Vietnam came into being in 1802 under the Emperor Gia Long, but scarcely half a century elapsed before the French conquests began. Under the French, Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin were politically separate. 64/

Present-day South Vietnam—by Viet Minh terms Zone V (Annam) and VI (Cochinchina or Nam Bo)—has always been of secondary importance to the DRV. Ho Chi Minh's government can claim to have ruled Saigon, for example, for only twenty days in September, 1945, and neither the DRV government nor the Lao Dong Party ever commanded the strength in South Vietnam that they did in Tonkin. During the War of Resistance, 1945-1954, Zone V was less a theater of operations than a source of supplies and recruits for the Viet Minh in Tonkin, and in both Zone V and Nam Bo the Viet Minh practiced economy of force: only some 20% of organized Viet Minh military units were in either at end 1953, even though the areas supported nearly half of all Vietnam's population. Douglas Pike's study of the Viet Cong led him to conclude that:

"The Cochinchinese regarded the resistance as Northern-oriented: the center of fighting was in the North, the Vietminh was strongest in the North, most of its leaders were Northerners, and the French were most vulnerable in the Red River delta. The South had less tradition of revolution, and inevitably a variety of North-South policy conflicts arose. The communication channel between Hanoi and Saigon was undependable, and liaison within the South was difficult. The Northern leadership exhibited little knowledge about southerners and even less patience with Southern lethargy...." 65/

Even Ho Chi Minh was fairly explicit in assigning to South Vietnam a lesser role in the revolution. For example, in his December, 1953, address to the National Assembly on Land Reform, he was careful to point out that Zones V and VI were not yet ripe for "progress toward socialism":

---

22

TOP SECRET - Sensitive
"Land reform is a policy applied throughout the country, but it must be carried out step by step; first in localities where sufficient conditions have been obtained and then in other localities....

"The Government will deal with the regions inhabited by the national minorities, the Fifth Zone, South Viet-Nam, and the guerrilla bases later on. In guerrilla--and enemy--occupied areas, land reform will be carried out after their liberation." 66/

Nonetheless, though South Vietnam had been relegated to a low operational priority, its eventual unification with the DRV became an article of faith which the Lao Dong leaders repeatedly and solemnly affirmed; for example, Ho Chi Minh:

"'Our compatriots in the Southern area are citizens of Vietnam. Rivers can dry up and mountains wear away, but this truth stands.' [Letter to Southerners, May 3, 1946.]
'Each day the Fatherland remains disunited, each day you [of the South] suffer, food is without taste, sleep brings no rest. I solemnly promise you, through your determination, the determination of all our people, the Southern land will return to the bosom of the Fatherland.' [October 23, 1946.] 'National reunification is our road to life. Great unity is the power that will surely triumph. Thanks to this great unity, the Revolution was successful and the Resistance victorious. Now, with great unity, our political struggle will certainly be victorious, our country will certainly be reunified.' [July 5, 1956.]
'South Vietnam is our flesh and blood....Vietnam is one country. South and North are of the same family, and no reactionary force can partition it. Vietnam must be reunited.' [September 2, 1957.]
'Every hour, every minute, the people of the North think of their compatriots in the South. The South Vietnamese people relentlessly have fought for nearly twenty years, first the French colonialists, then the American-Diemists. They are indeed the heroic sons and daughters of the heroic Vietnamese nation. South Vietnam truly deserves the same: Brass Citadel of the Fatherland.' [May 9, 1963.]

After the Geneva Conference of 1954, the most Ho and the DRV leaders might have expected was that France and the U.S. would permit a plebiscite to occur, or withdraw under some one of the formulae mentioned above, with reunification to follow. However, for reasons which shall be set forth below, the actual course of events forced them to adopt what they probably regarded as a minimally acceptable policy, as follows: 63/

-- Consolidate power in North Vietnam, and expect the South to collapse from internal dissension.
-- Expect general elections, but in prudence, anticipate their not being held, and prepare to take the South by force if necessary.

-- Move north the bulk of the Viet Minh forces in the South, and upgrade as a reserve.

-- Foster strong ties among the regroupees with families in the South.

-- Establish an effective political infrastructure in the South, and work to weaken the government as well as the position of foreign powers there.

In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem, with patent U.S. backing, refused to open consultations with the DRV preliminary to the expected plebiscite. There followed in rapid succession Diem's own plebiscite, the casting off of Bao Dai, and the withdrawal of the French. When July, 1956, passed, hope that the Geneva Settlement might lead toward reunification waned in the North. It was thereafter increasingly clear that peaceable reunification was not in prospect for the foreseeable future. Ho Chi Minh, in a 1956 letter to the 90,000 to 130,000 regroupees who had gone North in the expectation of returning that year, explained the seeming inaction of the DRV on their behalf as follows:

"Our policy is: to consolidate the North and to keep in mind the South.

"To build a good house, we must build a strong foundation. To have a vigorous plant with green leaves, beautiful flowers, and good fruit, we must take care of it and feed the root.

"The North is the foundation, the root of the struggle for complete national liberation and the reunification of the country. That is why everything we are doing in the North is aimed at strengthening both the North and the South. Therefore, to work here is the same as struggling in the South: it is to struggle for the South and for the whole of Viet-Nam.

"Struggle is always accompanied by difficulties. But your difficulties are our common difficulties. After fifteen years of devastating war, the newly liberated North is suffering many privations...."

"...our political struggle will...be a long and hard struggle, then the tendency to become impatient, pessimistic, and to succumb to other cares will disappear.

"The political struggle will certainly be victorious, national reunification will certainly be achieved."
After the internal turmoil of 1956-1957, the DRV's domestic decks were cleared for more direct action abroad. Internal dissension died down as the regime effectively suppressed or mollified the farmers and the Catholics, the epicenters of discontent. Also, privations afflicting the society stemming from the war and the regroupment were somewhat alleviated.

3. Support from Abroad

The DRV, within its own resources, probably could not have achieved or maintained its independence, and it certainly could not look for reunification without foreign support. During the period 1950-1954, the Viet Minh had accepted significant amounts of foreign aid, especially Chinese aid, and the Geneva Agreements were in large measure the product of the diplomacy of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, rather than their Vietnamese allies. The DRV, as it emerged from Geneva in 1954, consisted of a society torn by the war and undergoing the trauma of a 900,000 person exodus, a food deficit, a modest and war-damaged industrial plant, and a drastic shortage of technicians and public administrators. Internal and external defense were almost immediately a principal policy aim -- certainly through the 1956 peasant rebellions, and their consequences. Whatever extraterritorial ambitions the DRV may have had, these were necessarily subordinate to survival as a state. In the view of the Lao Dong leaders, apparently even the realization of even that minimal goal hinged upon the DRV's receiving substantial military assistance from abroad. Additional foreign aid dependency stemming from the broad domestic reform programs which the DRV undertook -- discussed above -- further impelled Ho Chi Minh and his government to turn to the Chinese and the Russians. The DRV's dependence upon its communist allies increased markedly over the decade following Geneva.

a. Foreign Military Assistance

The DRV had sound reason to maintain a large military establishment in the aftermath of Geneva. The presence of the French forces in South Vietnam through 1956, and the US-aided GVN military forces thereafter, taken together with the GVN's claims to DRV territory and people, GVN diplomatic hostility, and GVN belligerent propaganda, probably justified a large army for national defense. Moreover, internal security placed heavy demands upon DRV forces, at first to deal with the exigencies of establishing DRV control, pushing the Land Reform Campaign, and coping with the refugee problem. Large forces were also needed in 1956 to suppress uprisings, particularly in the predominantly Catholic rural areas. Beyond simply security, however, in orthodox communist fashion, the DRV regarded the armed forces as a primary instrument for indoctrination of the masses and for support of other Lao Dong Party programs; they also served as a reserve labor force to meet agricultural crises. And the foreign policy of the DRV required a military instrument of extensive capabilities in insurgency operations -- subversion, infiltration, and guerrilla warfare.
Manpower for such an establishment was available, although in poor crop years, diversion was necessary. But equipment was in short supply, and extensive training was in order. Most military equipment and supplies had to be imported, as DRV industry was incapable of more than small scale production of rudimentary small arms, small arms ammunition, and simple impediments, such as uniforms. 76/ Accordingly, virtually from the moment of its independence, the DRV sought and obtained military materiel from abroad, risking being caught at contravention of Article 17 of the Geneva Agreement to build a large, modernized land army of 10-14 divisions. 77/

b. Solidarity with the USSR and CPR

But military assistance and economic aid were conditioned on the quid pro quo of DRV identification with and support for the "Communist Bloc." The price of Bloc support had been high; it included sacrificing French cooperation after Geneva. 78/ In subordinating its interests to those of the USSR and CPR at Geneva, the DRV impaired its own negotiating strength. Thereafter, similar subordination obstructed its attempts to achieve reunification. It was with France that the DRV had contracted to hold elections on reunification, and it tried after 1954 to pursue a policy calculated to encourage France's honoring its Geneva commitments. Moreover, the DRV, short of human and material capital, wished to maintain access to French economic resources. Pham Van Dong assured the French in January, 1955, that the DRV:

"....sincerely desires to establish economic relations with France for reasons which are both political and economic.... That does not prevent us from establishing relations with friendly countries like China, but we are used to working with the French and can continue to do so on a basis of equality and reciprocity." 79/

But Paris was faced, as Pham put it, with a choice between Washington and Hanoi, though he assured the French that "the unity of Viet Nam will be achieved in any case, with France or against France." The French opted for withdrawal in 1956; the price of protracted intimacy with a solidly Bloc nation proved too high for France, both in its internal politics and in the Western alliance. 80/

For the DRV, solidarity with the Bloc entailed costs beyond French cooperation, for by the test of deeds, neither the Soviets nor the Chinese firmly supported its quest for reunification. It was the DRV's fate that the historically invincible monolith with which it cast its fortunes in 1950 was, by 1957, definitely disintegrating. Soviet policy vis à vis Vietnam had always been subordinated to its European interests. This was evident as early as 1945, when the success of Ho and the ICP were accorded less importance than success of the French
Communist Party, and in 1954 it appeared that France, by rejecting the
European Defense Community bought Soviet cooperation in settling the
Indochina War—at the DRV’s expense. 81/ Post Geneva, Soviet support
of the DRV came into tension with its strivings toward detente with
the U.S. Generally, the Soviets seemed willing to accept the Cold War
line SEATO drew at the 17th parallel, and were quite cool to DRV "reunifi-
cation" talk. But the most disruptive factor in Moscow-Hanoi relations
after Geneva was not Washington, but Peking. The CPR, like the USSR,
seems to have regarded the DRV as a pawn in a world-wide test of power.
The Chinese would probably have been disinterested in having on its
southern border a unified, strong Vietnam, even though it were communist.
They seem to have always regarded support of the DRV as a way to embarrass
the Soviets, to attack the U.S. position in Southeast Asia, and to frus-
trate the US-USSR detente. Nonetheless, the Chinese had earned high
regard in the DRV because they were willing, as the Soviets were not,
to succor Ho with military aid in his hour of need. Moreover, Mao’s form
of revolution seemed far more relevant to the Lao Dong leaders than the
Russian version. Propinquity thus reinforced the attraction of China both
as a source of aid and as a socialist model, and offset much traditional
Viet-Chinese antipathy. However, like the Soviets, the Chinese maneuvered
in Vietnam for broader goals than DRV success. In 1954 and 1955, possibly
seeking to encourage an American withdrawal from the Taiwan Straits, the
CPR adopted a soft line which blurred their stance on Vietnam just as
the Geneva elections came into view. 82/ In 1956, Khruschev’s depiction
of Stalin’s monstrous leadership at the 20th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union called into doubt the validity of Soviet pre-
eminence within the Bloc. Mao’s bids for Stalin’s former position then
split the Bloc.

Ho’s isolation was borne home to him within the year
after Geneva, as the deadline approached for consultations preliminary
to the elections. Although the Soviet Ambassador to Hanoi had joined a
chorus of dark threats from DRV representatives that "violent action"
would follow if the consultations were delayed, the 20 July 1955 deadline
passed while the parties to the Agreement were in the Summit Conference
at Geneva on ways to decrease world tensions, and the Bloc did not press
the point. Ho took the extraordinary step of a formal appeal to Dien, but the GVN on 7 August 1955 strongly rejected Hanoi’s overtures for
talks. 83/ A subsequent DRV appeal to the UK and USSR co-presidents
of the Geneva Conference was also of no avail. In January 1956, China,
and then the USSR, did request another Geneva conference; but the USSR and the
UK responded only by extending sine die the functions of the International
Control Commission beyond the expiration date. 84/

All indications are that Ho preferred to follow the
Soviet lead, probably from both repugnance at the prospect of further
dependency on China, and realization that the Soviet was in a better posi-
tion to provide the kinds and amount of foreign aid and trade the DRV

27
required. 85/ From 1956 through 1960 Ho, at some cost, honored the principle Mao intoned at the Communist summit meeting in Moscow in November, 1957: the Communist bloc must have a head and the Soviet Union must be that head. 86/ Soviet rebuffs of the DRV must have therefore been particularly painful for Ho. In the 9th Plenum of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee (19-24 April 1956) Ho—who was in person the DRV's prime political asset, especially in view of Diem's ascendancy—dutifully recited the de-Stalinizing cant of the 20th Congress of the CPSU extolling collective leadership, and damning the evil cult of the individual. 87/ Two weeks later, as the outcome of the meeting of Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference at which the Soviets tacitly accepted status quo in Vietnam, Ho received a message, dated 8 May 1956, signed by A. Gromyko, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, acting with the authority of his government, addressed to two sovereign states: the Governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam. 88/ Immediately after the deadline for elections passed, in August 1956, Ho penned a Pravda article deprecating notions that the DRV reunification "struggle" was a Vietnamese affair, denying that the DRV might develop a "national communism" of the Tito model, and rejecting ideas that the DRV might usefully pursue a course independent of the Bloc. 89/ The following January, 1957, after a stormy autumn of insurrection, the Rectification of Errors Campaign, and "Hundred Flowers," Ho was surprised by the Soviet proposal at the United Nations to formalize Vietnamese disunity by admitting both the DRV and the GVN as member states. 90/ Nor were these the only instances of tepid support or countervailing policy from the Soviets. The DRV forwarded messages to the GVN in July 1955, May and June 1956, July 1957, March 1958, July 1959, and July 1960, urging a consultative conference on elections, offering to negotiate on the basis of "free general elections by secret ballot," and urging liberalization of North-South relations. Throughout, the Soviet Union never went beyond words and gestures of solidarity.

For Ho Chi Minh, the major international difficulties in securing foreign aid had internal ramifications as well. There is evidence of a rising tide of conviction within the Lao Dong Party that more forceful measures were necessary towards reunification, which took the form in 1957 of an attack upon Ho Chi Minh's own position, and upon the Soviet-oriented faction within the Party elite. 91/ There was also an evident realignment of the DRV hierarchy in which Le Duan, an advocate of forceful resolution of the impasse with Dien, came to prominence in mid-1957. 92/ (Le Duan who served in the South, through 1956, appears to have been de facto the Secretary General of the Party 1957-1960; thereafter, he openly held the office, and is considered the second ranking member of the Politburo.) 93/

Ho Chi Minh, despite rumors that he was dead or discarded, survived the 1957 crisis seemingly intact.

By 1958 the DRV elite were apparently more disposed to seek their own solutions in Vietnam, less sensitive to the persistent coolness of Khrushchev, and more responsive to Mao than theretofore. After
1958, in the developing Sino-Soviet dispute, the DRV tended to indorse Chinese doctrine and methods, but was careful to avoid Peking-style abuse of the Russians. Ho, on occasion, served as mediator in the dispute, but on such central issues as disarmament, "peaceful coexistence," and Moscow's call for "democratic centralism" in the world communist movement, Ho's view by 1960 approximated that of Mao: Independent, activist and bellicose, at least insofar as Diem's GVN was concerned. Nonetheless, DRV support for the Soviet Union, qualified though it was, paid off. In the period 1954 to 1960, the USSR supplanted the CPR as its prime foreign aid donor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>USSR &amp; East Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955-1957</td>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Credits</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1960</td>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Credits</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Vietnamese Hegemony

The foregoing discussion has been confined to the immediate foreign policy goals of the DRV in the aftermath of Geneva. There remains, however, a more far-reaching objective: Vietnamese domination over Indochina. As mentioned, modern Vietnam is the product of conquest. The Khmers (Cambodians) and the tribes along Viet Nam's Lao frontier have historic cause for apprehension over Viet forays westward. In the nineteenth century, just ahead of French imperialism in Indochina, Vietnamese forces occupied and annexed contiguous Lao frontier provinces (those which were roughly the territory controlled by DRV-linked Pathet Lao in 1963). But in current era, the furthest reaching of all Viet expansionist aspirations were those of the Communist Party of Indochina (ICP), which from its foundation aimed at the establishment of political control over Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam, and which regarded a workers and peasants government over a unified Indochina both feasible and necessary. According to a Lao Dong Party history published in Hanoi in 1960: "The Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao proletariat have politically and economically to be closely related in spite of their differences in language, custom, and race." The history quoted echoes the sense of one of the earliest known Lao Dong Party directives, captured in South Vietnam, dated November, 1951, entitled: "Remarks on the Official Appearance of the Vietnamese Workers Party."
Division Into Three Parties And For the Change in the Party Name," the
document states that the Communist Party would continue to promote revo-
lution throughout Southeast Asia as it had in the past, and stressed its
essential unity despite outward appearances:

"The creation of a separate party for each of the three
Nations does not prejudice the revolutionary movement in
Indochina.

"(a) In 1930, we recommended the creation of an Indo-
Chinese Communist Party, not only because Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos suffered under the same yoke of domination and had the
same enemy, but also because at that time only the Revolutionary
Movement in Vietnam was in a state of development, while it was
still weak in Cambodia and Laos. If at that time there had not
been one Communist Party for the three countries, the creation of
a Communist and revolutionary movement in Cambodia and Laos would
certainly have been retarded.

"Today, however, the situation has changed. The Cambodian
and Lao People are rising to oppose the French and obtain
their independence. Communist Party sections exist in Cambodia
and Laos and are beginning to grow. Cambodia and Laos already
have a united Liberation Front (Issara in Cambodia; Issara in
Laos). Cambodia has a National Liberation Committee; Laos a
Resistance Government, etc....Within these organizations there
are already groups of faithful Communists who act as Delegations
to the Indochinese Communist Party from which they receive direc-
tives. For that reason, the creation of a separate Communist
Party for the working class of Vietnam does not risk weakening
the leadership of the revolutionary movements in Cambodia and Laos
or the carrying out of Marxist-Leninist propaganda action. In addi-
tion, the Vietnamese Party reserves the right to supervise the
activities of its brother Parties in Cambodia and Laos.

"(b) Each Nation - Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, has its own
Party, but unity of leadership and action remain between the
three Parties. There are several means of unifying the leader-
ship and action. For example, the Central Executive Committee
of the Vietnamese Workers Party has designated a Cambodian and
a Lao bureau charged with assisting the revolutionary move-
ments in these countries. It organizes periodic assemblies of
the three parties in order to discuss questions of common interest;
it works towards the creation of a Vietnamese-Khmer-Lao United
Front.

"(c) Militarily Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos constitute a
combat zone; Vietnam has substantially assisted Cambodia and Laos
militarily as well as from all other points of view. The creation of a separate Vietnamese Party will not therefore weaken the military cooperation between the three Nations in the fight they are waging against the imperialists. Later, however, if conditions permit, the three revolutionary Parties of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos will be able to unite to form a single Party: the Party of the Vietnam-Khmer-Laotian Federation."

P. J. Honey stated in 1965 that one of the main requirements of DRV foreign policy was "to impose Communist Vietnamese rule over Laos and Cambodia," but noted that:

"It is open to debate whether this ambition for territorial aggrandisement springs from the expansionist nature of Communism, from the imperialist character of the Vietnamese people which has shown itself repeatedly through their history over the past millennium, or from the feeling that they had played the major role in driving out French colonial power and were therefore entitled to the fruits of their efforts. What emerges very clearly is that the actions of the Vietnamese Communists since 1951 are entirely consistent with the aim set out in the document quoted above...."

"North Vietnam shares a common frontier with Laos and undetermined numbers of North Vietnamese soldiers have been operating on Laotian territory for several years. Moreover, the nominal head of the Pathet Lao, Prince Souphanouvong, has spent more years in Vietnam than in Laos and is the husband of a senior Vietnamese Communist. For both reasons Laos presents her with the ideal circumstances for the pursuit of her expansionist aims. Additionally, the prosecution of the war in South Vietnam requires that men and supplies be infiltrated into that state, and eastern Laos provides the most secure and convenient route for such traffic...."

"Cambodia touches the territory of no Communist state and is, in consequence, not amenable to the same tactics as those employed in Laos. Instead, the Vietnamese Communist leaders have attempted to cement relations with the established, non-Communist government of Norodom Sihanouk in order to induce that government to create as many embarrassments and difficulties as possible for the rival Vietnamese regime in Saigon. By exploiting historic Cambodia antagonisms towards neighbouring Thailand and South Vietnam, they have achieved the rupture of diplomatic relations between Cambodia and these two states, but....Norodom Sihanouk has reached the conclusion that China, not North Vietnam, will exercise the dominant influence over South East Asia in the years to come and has evinced a readiness to reach an accommodation with the Chinese, whose objectives do not necessarily coincide with those of the North Vietnamese at all points...."
The 1951 Lao Dong document quoted above stipulated that:

"Not only is it our duty to aid the revolutionaries in Cambodia and Laos, but we must also aid the revolutionary movements in the other countries of Southeast Asia, countries such as Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, etc." 101/

Since DRV independence in 1954, its foreign policy has openly supported neutral regimes in Laos and Cambodia, while covertly it has undertaken major politico-military operations in Laos, and supported subversive organizations in Cambodia and Thailand. 102/ It is possible to infer, as has P. J. Honey, that the ultimate DRV objective is Vietnamese hegemony over Indochina: quasi-independent, communist governments controlled by the Hanoi leaders through the Lao Dong apparatus. However, it is also possible to interpret the Lao Dong Party tracts as bombast, and DRV extra-territorial operations as a necessary part of its thrust toward reunification of Vietnam. It is clear that DRV control of the Laotian Panhandle and the Mu Gia and Keo Nua Passes would be essential to any contemplated large scale infiltration of men and material from North to South Vietnam.

D. Links With the Viet Cong

From 1954 on, the DRV possessed four principal ties with insurgents within South Vietnam: the Southern Viet Minh who were regrouped to the North; the "Fatherland Front," the DRV mass political organization devoted in part to maintaining identification with Southerners, and promoting the cause of reunification before the world; some commonality of leaders; and the Lao Dong Party. Each of these deserve discussion preliminary to analyzing the extent to which these links permitted Hanoi to influence the form and pace of the insurgency in South Vietnam.

1. Southerners in the North. The estimated 130,000 "regroupees" of Geneva in North Vietnam after the evacuations of 1954-1955 included as many as 90,000 "soldiers," and possibly half that number of dependents. There were among them possibly 10,000 children, and about the same number of Montagnards. Of this entire group, U.S. Intelligence estimates indicate that about 30-35,000 have since returned to South Vietnam. 103/ Regroupees provided virtually all the infiltrators in the period 1959-1964. Thereafter, known infiltration has been almost exclusively by Northerners, which has led U.S. intelligence to conclude that the DRV had by 1964 exhausted its "pool" of trained and able manpower among the regroupees. 104/ As of July, 1967, the GVN had only a small fraction of the Southern regroupee infiltrators under its control: 180 POW, and an undetermined (probably very much smaller) number of defectors. 105/ In August, 1966, a DOD contractor published a study based on detailed interrogation of 71 of these regroupees (56 POW and 15 defectors) plus 9 other NLF members. 106/ Two out of three in the sample were Communist Party members; all regroupees had undergone intensive training in the DRV before being sent south. The earliest trip South by any among the group was 1960, the latest 1964. The survey of their experiences and attitudes affords some insights into the policy and operations of the DRV.
Most of the physically fit Southerners had been placed in the North Vietnam Army (NVA) where they acquired military training and discipline, and political indoctrination—the 305th, 324th, 325th, 330th, and 338th NVA Divisions were filled with Southerners, and remained so until 1959, when infiltration started on a large scale. Those Southerners with non-military professional skills were placed in DRV civilian society where they could be useful. But all, no matter where placed, were apparently watched to assess their reliability, and eventually selected for return to the South by DRV authorities. Civilians were urged to "volunteer" to return, soldiers were ordered to do so. Almost all were pleased to comply, not only because it meant a return to family and land of birth, but because few liked North Vietnam, and because they had heard of the sufferings inflicted upon their people by the GVN, and wanted to "liberate" them from Diem and the Americans. The chosen were then sent to special training centers—the most important of which for the interviewed regroupees was at Xuan Mai—where they attended courses of several weeks to several months, depending on their background. The emphasis—about two-thirds of instructional time—was on political indoctrination. Themes included an impending victory in the South, to be followed by "peace, neutrality, and reunification." They were taught that after infiltration, they were to approach uncommitted Southerners, by stressing the land reform policy of the Viet Cong, by urging families to call back sons serving in ARVN, and by castigating the agrovillagestrategic hamlet program of the GVN. One propaganda specialist related that he was instructed to press three programs: political struggle, armed struggle, and "military proselyting" (vinh van)—the latter again aimed at sapping the will of ARVN to fight, and causing desertions.

Following training, the regroupees were formed into units of 40 to 400 for the trip south. A few were infiltrated by sea, but the majority were taken by truck through North Vietnam to Laos, and thence walked south on foot. The journey took at least two and one-half months; most reported the trails were well organized, with camps built at intervals, and guides available at each camp to conduct arrivals on the next leg of their trip. Strict camouflage discipline was observed, and conversations with camp attendants or guide personnel was forbidden. On arrival at their destinations in South Vietnam, they were smoothly integrated into local Viet Cong organizations. (Little subsequent friction was reported by the regroupees between themselves and the Viet Cong, but some southern VC recruited in the late Fifties or early Sixties, the "winter cadres," have expressed animosity toward the "autumn cadres," as the regroupees were called.)

The interviews with the regroupees suggest that:

-- The DRV quite deliberately organized, and trained an infiltration force of Southerners.

-- The infrastructure for doing so—the training centers and the infiltration routes south—indicate extensive preparations for the process before it was started in earnest in 1960.
-- The DRV had specific political, as well as military, objectives in returning the Southerners, including the overturning of Diem, and eventually, reunification.

The interrogations of the regroupees also indicate that the DRV viewed the regroupees as a long-range political asset, establishing special schools and educational programs for Southern children. A captured Viet Cong Lieutenant Colonel stressed this point, and quoted Phan Hung of the Lao Dong Politburo, speaking at the Third Party Congress in September 1960:

"The Party has tried to develop 10,000 teenage children regrouped from the RVN into a cohesive group of engineers, doctors, professors, and other specialists for the future. This is proof that the Party has looked out for the welfare of the South Vietnamese too." 108/

The informant stressed that at least until he left North Vietnam in November, 1961, none of this shadow national elite had been conscripted: in his view, the DRV had yet to use a powerful political force, a cadre for South Vietnam whose attitudes had been carefully conditioned by more than a decade of education in the DRV, the Soviet Union, or other communist countries. As of 1963, there is no information that the DRV had committed these cadres in South Vietnam.

In early 1967, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, an interagency study group was convened from CIA, DIA, and the Department of State for a comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence concerning: "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and Support of the War in South Vietnam." 109/ The resultant study validates the foregoing observations on the regroupees in all respects, as do other captured documents and interrogation reports. Taken together, available evidence indicates that infiltration of regroupees from North to South Vietnam began as early as 1955. For example, a U.S. intelligence report of November, 1955 reported on the arrival of 50 regroupees in October, 1955; and the Lieutenant Colonel mentioned above, an intelligence officer, described trips to South Vietnam and back in 1955, 1956, and 1958.

However, from all indications, the early infiltration was quite small scale, involving no more than a few hundred persons in all. There are no reports indicating DRV preparations of an apparatus to handle large-scale, systematic movements of people and supplies before 1958. Early in that year, according to one prisoner, Montagnards from Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces began to receive training in North Vietnam in the establishment and operation of way-stations and guide systems in Laos and South Vietnam; the prisoner left North Vietnam in March, 1959 with a group of other cadre to organize tribesmen for those missions. He testified that thereafter he made several inspection trips along the routes to check on the building of troop shelters in the encampments. 110/ Several other POW have disclosed that in early 1959 they were chosen to man "special border-crossing teams" for moving drugs, food, and other materiel across
the DMZ into Quang Tri and Thua Thien. 111/ In April, 1959, a prisoner reported that the Lao Dong Party Central Committee directed the forming of a headquarters to control this effort, which came into being on May 5, 1959, as the 559th Transportation Group, directly subordinate to Party headquarters. 112/ Another prisoner served with the 70th Battalion of the 559th Group, which was formed in 1959 and sent into southern Laos. The 70th Battalion received weapons, ammunition, mail, and supplies from Hanoi and transported them to another organization in charge of distribution to insurgent units. The 70th Battalion was in charge of 20 way-stations, furnished escorts for infiltrating groups from North to South Vietnam, and transported sick and wounded personnel from Thua Thien Province back to North Vietnam. 113/ While the 559th Group was being deployed on land, other prisoners reported that the 603d Battalion was formed in June, 1959, to manage maritime infiltration into South Vietnam. 114/ According to prisoners, the 603d Battalion had 250 men upon formation, and by December, 1959, had 11 infiltration "cells" and supporting bases in operation.

Still other POWs stated that in January, 1960, a training center for infiltrators was in operation at Son Tay, northwest of Hanoi, and that in early 1960, the NVA 324th Division in Nghe An was directed to begin infiltrator training. 115/ About the same time the Xuan Mai Infiltration Center was established southwest of Hanoi, a school which by 1961 could accommodate several 1000-man classes simultaneously. 116/

Moreover, available evidence points to 1959 as the year in which significant numbers of regroupees began to be funneled from North Vietnam through the way-station system into South Vietnam. George Carver, of CIA, has conservatively estimated that 1959 infiltration amounted to a "few hundred." 117/ Altogether, during 1959 and 1960, twenty-six groups of infiltrators, comprising 4500 personnel, were confirmed by interrogations of two or more prisoners from each group. 118/ The same sources established that most of the infiltrators were military officers, senior non-commissioned officers or trained political cadre. Captured documents and interrogations also indicate that at least half—military and civilian—were regular Lao Dong Party members. The following table shows U.S. intelligence estimates of infiltration into South Viet-Nam from 1959 through 1965; during 1963 "regroupee" resource waned visibly, and in 1964 apparently dried up; by early 1965 at least three out of four infiltrators were ethnic North Vietnamese. 119/
Infiltration from North to South Vietnam
1959-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Confirmed (1)</th>
<th>Probable (2)</th>
<th>Total (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4556</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4118</td>
<td>2177</td>
<td>6295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5362</td>
<td>7495</td>
<td>12857</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4726</td>
<td>3180</td>
<td>7906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>9316</td>
<td>3108</td>
<td>12424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>23770</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>25680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) A confirmed unit/group is one which is determined to exist on the basis of accepted direct information from a minimum of two prisoners, returnees or captured documents (any combination, in addition to indirect evidence).

(2) A probable infiltration unit/group is one believed to exist on the basis of accepted direct information from one captive, returnee, or captured document, in addition to indirect evidence.

(3) The total does not represent all the data on hand. In 1965 a "possible" category was added to show units/groups thought to be in South Vietnam on the basis of unconfirmed evidence. Adding the "possible" category raises the totals for 1965 to 33,730. Still other information, though available, has been considered insufficient to warrant adding to the totals.

(4) The figure shown is for both 1959 and 1960.

There is no evidence that the regrouped themselves exerted significant pressure upon the DRV leaders to undertake the infiltrations or force reunification by other means. Many were dissatisfied with the North, but there is no record that they openly and collectively agitated for return to the South. Rather, they appear to have been retained in large groups only within disciplined military units, and otherwise they had no appreciable collective identity outside the formal groupings organized or authorized by the DRV. The DRV did appeal to them as a group from time to time, but principally when it wished to mobilize opinion against some deed of the GVN. For example, in December, 1958, in Diem's "political re-education center" at Phu Loi (Thu Dau Mot), just north of Saigon, there was an epidemic food-poisoning in which at least twenty prisoners died. Hanoi launched a major propaganda effort to exploit the mishap, claiming that: 120/"Six thousand former resistance members and fighters for peace and national reunification, six thousand patriots, men
TOP SECRET - Sensitive

and women of all ages and ways of life, detained without trial in a concentration camp as an act of reprisal, were victims of a wholesale food-poisoning which resulted in more than a thousand dead on the very first day. The survivors were hurriedly taken to other camps or left dying behind the Phu Loi barbed wire...."

The Phu Loi Massacre became one of the cases which underwrote Hanoi's appeal to the world in 1959 and 1960 to end:

"...this regime of terror and massacre set up by Ngo Dinh Diem in the south of our country at the behest of the U.S. imperialists. It is the duty of all honest people to extinguish this hotbed of war....According to available data which cannot be complete from July, 1954, date of the signing of the Geneva Agreements, to February, 1959, 180,843 former resistance members were arrested, 50,000 others were subjected to a regime of forced labour in the so-called 'Agricultural colonies.' The Phu Loi camp is part of this network of sorrow and affliction which Ngo Dinh Diem, the henchman of the American imperialists, hopes to quench the aspirations for freedom, independence and national unity of our people. ...[Footnote] The famous declaration of Diem, during his visit to Washington in 1957: 'The United States' frontier extends as far as the 17th parallel in Vietnam.'"

At the forefront of the "movement of protest" were Southerners in North Vietnam, who could write or speak with special poignancy about the event. Thus, the regroupees became a strategic propaganda as well as personnel resource for the DRV.

2. The Fatherland Front. Policy on the regroupees, and orchestration of propaganda relating to reunification with South Vietnam, was apparently reserved to the top echelon of the Lao Dong Party. There is some evidence of the existence as early as 1957 of a branch of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee called the "Reunification Department," which had purview over all matters relating to regroupees; the Department or Commission was surfaced at the Third Party Congress, September, 1960. 122/ A prisoner taken in 1964, a regroupee from Binh Dinh Province, indicated that he worked for this Department for some years prior to infiltrating in 1963, with duties of supervising civilian cadres. He described the Department's having a personnel management system, with formal records and reports, education programs for cadres and their children; he also stated that the Committee decided which regroupees would be ordered South. 123/ The head of the Reunification Department of the Lao Dong Party possibly since 1957, and at least since 1960, was Nguyen Van Vinh, an NVA Major General, a Deputy Chief of Staff of the NVA, a Vice Minister of Defense and a member of the Party Central Committee.
Vinh was in South Vietnam up until late 1956. 124/ However, overt DRV political activities with the regroupees or on behalf of reunification, were normally carried out through the Fatherland Front, which, as mentioned above, from its foundation in 1955 advanced proposals for rejoining North and South Vietnam. With the founding of the NLF in late 1960, the Fatherland Front became its DRV counterpart, its propaganda counterpoint, its sounding board, and international sponsor. 125/ In fact the NLF was set up as a mirror image of the Fatherland Front:

SELECTED COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Liberation Front (South Vietnam)</th>
<th>Fatherland Front (North Vietnam)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)</td>
<td>Lao Dong Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Socialist Party</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
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<td>General Confederation of Labor</td>
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<td>Association of Women</td>
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<td>Youth Federation</td>
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<td>Association of Artists and Writers</td>
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<td>Association of South Vietnamese Buddhists</td>
<td>Unified Buddhist Association</td>
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South Vietnam Committee for the Defense of Peace

South Vietnamese Committee for Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity
3. Common Leadership. North and South Vietnam have shared leaders throughout the last three decades, a commonality which has lately developed into Northerners holding the top posts both within the GVN and within the NLF. Tran Van Giau, an old ICP leader, headed the "front" government in Saigon in 1945, and then returned to Hanoi to hold high DRV posts. His successor was Nguyen Phuoc Thao (alias Nguyen Binh), a northerner, who led the Southern Resistance through 1951, and subsequently died in the North. Nguyen Phuoc Thao (alias Nguyen Binh) was succeeded by Le Duan, who became First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party openly in 1960, and probably de facto in 1957.

Le Duan's deputy was Le Duc Tho, in 1960 director of the Organizational Department of the Lao Dong Party, and a member of its Central Committee. Pham Hung, in 1960 a member of the Lao Dong Secretariat and a Deputy Premier of the DRV, and Ung Van Khiem, in 1960 on the Lao Dong Central Committee, were also among the leaders of the Southern Viet Minh through 1954.

Le Duan remained in the South after Geneva, or at least is mentioned in intelligence reports as being in the South frequently through 1957. His return to North Vietnam in mid-1957 precipitated, according to some sources, a struggle among Ho's lieutenants between a moderate faction opposing DRV support of guerrilla war in the South, and a militant faction led by Le Duan. 128/ He is also reported to have been sent on an inspection trip to the South in 1958, and in early 1959, to have presented a series of recommendations for immediate action in the South to the Lao Dong Central Committee. 129/ General Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff of the NVA and alternate Politburo member, was reportedly a member of the Party's southern apparatus from mid-1955 through 1956, having been sent south to contract alliances with Hoa Hao and Cao Dai armed bands; Nguyen Van Vinh, one of his deputies, also served there at the same time. 130/ Intelligence is vague on Le Duan's replacement in 1957. However, among those northern leaders mentioned by intelligence sources as serving in the South in the period after 1956 are Tran Van Tra, Le Duan's pre-1954 military adviser in the South, and now a NVA deputy chief of staff; and Muoi Cuc (Nguyen Van Cuc), one of Le Duan's close followers. 131/

Both the infiltrated regroupees and the relatively few northerners who accompanied them in the years 1959-1963 were lower-level leaders. As George Carver put it:

"They were not foot soldiers or cannon fodder (at least not until Hanoi began sending in whole North Vietnamese units in late 1964 or early 1965). Instead they were disciplined, trained and indoctrinated cadres and technicians. They became the squad leaders, platoon leaders, political officers, staff officers, unit commanders, weapons and communications specialists who built the Viet Cong's military force into what it is today. They also became the village, district, provincial and regional committee chiefs and key committee members who
built the Viet Cong's political apparatus.

"The earlier arrivals had had at least five years of indoctrination and training in North Vietnam, or elsewhere in the Communist bloc, before departing on their southern missions..." 132/

The monopoly of Viet Cong leadership by the infiltrators from the North became evident after 1960. By 1965, they were clearly dominant. For example, while southerners still controlled the Viet Cong of the Mekong Delta, in the provinces just north of Saigon -- Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Binh Hoa, and Phuoc Tuy especially -- regroupes and northerners had assumed most of the principal command positions.

A document captured in January 1966 listed 47 VC officials attending a top-level party meeting for that region, of whom 30 had infiltrated from 1961 through 1965. Seven of these, all holding high posts in the regional command, were North Vietnamese. 133/ U.S. intelligence has estimated that one-third of the infiltrators from 1962 through 1964 were military officers or political leaders. 134/ A high-level defector from the VC 165A Regiment, charged with the Saigon region, stated that in 1965 8 of its 20 top officers were infiltrators. Other prisoners and ralliers have provided evidence that from one-quarter to one-third of Viet Cong officers in Liberation Army units were infiltrated from the North. At Viet Cong central headquarters in Tay Ninh -- Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) -- Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh of the NVA and Major General Tran Van Tra of the NVA and the Lao Dong Central Committee, his deputy, both North Vietnamese, held the top positions in the Communist Party Secretariat, under which there was a Military Affairs Committee heavily weighted with North Vietnamese military Officers. By 1966 it was clear that in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, the NVA was in direct command. General Hoang Van Thai, a deputy chief of staff of the NVA, and Major General Chu Huy Man, a member of the Lao Dong Central Committee, commanded all VC/NVA operations there. 135/

4. The Communist Party. U.S. intelligence has been relatively well assured that throughout the years since 1945 the Communist Party of North Vietnam -- in its several guises -- has remained active in South Vietnam and in control of the Communist Party there. Public statements by Ho, by Truong Chinh, and other DRV leaders confirmed intelligence collected by the French that the Party went underground upon its formal disestablishment in 1945, but stayed operational and united throughout Vietnam. 136/ The Party publicly and privately took credit for organizing and leading the Viet Minh in the years 1945 to 1951, and upon the DRV's legalizing the Lao Dong Party in 1951, openly identified the latter with both the Indochinese Communist Party pre-1945, and the covert Party of the years thereafter. By 1954, the Party seems to have asserted itself in virtually all of the Viet Minh's sprawling undertakings. Party members held the key positions in the Front, both in the North and in the South, and Party cadre served as the chain of command for both operational intelligence and decisions. 137/ The Viet Minh administered South Vietnam as two "interzones" or regions (see map), and established
a principal subordinate Party headquarters on Ca Mau Peninsula called the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headed by Le Duan. 138/ However, the 1951 statutes of the Lao Dong Party, like other DRV official pronouncements, recognized in principle no separate identity for South Vietnam or South Vietnamese communists. 139/ It was the Lao Dong Party cadre which sorted out the southern Viet Minh for regroupment or stay-behind missions, and the regrouped themselves felt that their fate was thereafter in the hands of the Lao Dong leaders. 140/

As the Viet Minh military apparatus was dismantled, COSVN was apparently closed down. There is convincing evidence, however, that from 1955 on, there were two Party headquarters -- or at least communications centers -- in South Vietnam, each communicating directly with Lao Dong headquarters in Hanoi. 141/ One of these was located in "Nam Bo" (South Zone), the other was located in "Trung Bo" (Central Zone, Region Five). Captured documents and prisoners indicate that these headquarters were active in handling the infiltration between North and South Vietnam in the years immediately after Geneva; they are also mentioned as the site of conferences between southern Vietnamese and northern leaders like Le Duan and Van Tien Dung. 142/ While prisoners and captured documents have established these links between Hanoi and the South, reports are too few in number and insufficiently comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that Hanoi was always in a position to dictate or even manipulate events in South Vietnam; they do offer persuasive evidence that the Lao Dong Party continued conspiratorial, political, and military activities in South Vietnam throughout the years 1954 to 1960. Moreover, the documents and interrogations are supported by circumstantial evidence. The village level organization of the Viet Cong, even that in the early years of the insurgency, VC propaganda techniques, and the terror-persuasion methodology employed by the early Viet Cong, all closely followed the doctrine of the Lao Dong Party. 143/ The eventual appearance of a "front" structured like the Fatherland Front; the reiteration by Cong of propaganda themes being trumpeted by Hanoi; and indications of preoccupation within the Viet Cong leadership over following the Lao Dong Party line also support the conclusion that the Party was playing a significant role in the mounting rebellion against Diem.

In 1961, when the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam came into being, there was some effort in both North and South to portray it as an indigenous South Vietnamese party, independent of the Lao Dong. But documents and prisoners have since proved that if this were the case, neither the Viet Cong hierarchy nor rank-and-file believed it so. A document captured in 1962, a provincial party directive, stated that the creation of the PRP "is only a matter of strategy . . . to deceive the enemy . . . Our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam, unified from North to South, under the direction of the Central Executive Committee of the Party, the chief of which is President Ho." 144/ Another party directive captured in 1966 provided that: "the masses who have good sympathy towards the Party should be well informed that the Lao Dong Party and the People's Revolutionary Party are one party headed by the Central Committee with
Chairman Ho at the head." An NVA naval officer captured in 1966, a second generation Party member, asserted that: "Once South Vietnam has been liberated, the NLF will suffer the same fate as the Viet Minh did in North Vietnam after independence was gained from the French. The Front will atrophy and quickly disappear ..." This officer was emphatic that: "The Lao Dong and the PRP are one and the same organism ... the PRP and the Lao Dong will emerge into the open (after reunification) as one party ... under Ho's authority." 

In March, 1962, the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) was reactivated, built around the Nambo Inter-Zone Committee, and given purview over Cochinchina and Annam. The 1962 reorganization is believed to have been intended to improve the coordination of insurgent activity and to lend substance to the newly created PRP.

Available evidence indicates that the PRP is the southern element of the DRV Lao Dong Party. But whether the PRP is a subsidiary of the Lao Dong Party or merely a territorial department of the Party is unclear. Pointing to a parent-subsidiary relationship are the facts that membership requirements in the PRP are considerably less stringent than in the Lao Dong Party, that the PRP regulations are designed for an independent entity, and that the SVN military party system is subordinate to COSVN, whereas the DRV military party system is not subordinate to analogous party committees. But Vietnamese Communists assert that there is only one Vietnamese Communist Party because Vietnam is one country; the Lao Dong Party appears to count PRP members in its official membership figures; and infiltrating Lao Dong Party members are automatically accorded PRP membership. The fact that some members of the Lao Dong Central Committee are officials of COSVN could be consistent with either relationship; whatever the exact relationship, COSVN is the extension of the Lao Dong. COSVN's immediate superior in the Lao Dong Party hierarchy seems to be the Party's Reunification Department, which is believed to have issued specific orders to COSVN based upon the directives of the Lao Dong Central Committee. The principal function of the Reunification Department seems to be to act as the COSVN liaison office in DRV, where it forwards correspondence and recruits and trains political cadre before infiltration south. COSVN leadership of the military party system in SVN appears to have been subject to the technical supervision of the Lao Dong Central Military Committee.

George Carver has summarized well presently available information concerning command linkage between Hanoi and the South:

"As the organizational structure of the Viet Cong movement has expanded over the past four years, its general outlines have become fairly well known. In the insurgency's initial phase (1954-1959), the Communists retained the Viet Minh's division of what is now South Vietnam into 'Interzone V'..."
(French Annam below the 17th parallel) and the 'Nambo' (Cochin China), with each area under Hanoi's direct control. In late 1960 or early 1961, this arrangement was scrapped and field control over all aspects of the Viet Cong insurgency vested in a still existing, single command headquarters, originally known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (or C.O.S.V.N. -- a term still in circulation) but now usually referred to by captured Viet Cong as simply the P.R.P.'s Central Committee. This command entity, which also contains the headquarters of the N.L.F., is a mobile and sometimes peripatetic body, usually located in the extreme northwestern tip of Tay Ninh province in prudent proximity to the Cambodian border. . . At the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, a member of the North Vietnamese delegation inadvertently commented that the published roster of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee did not include some members whose identities were kept secret because they were 'directing military operations in South Viet Nam.' One of the four examples he cited was 'Nguyen Van Cuc,' which is one of the aliases used by the Chairman of the P.R.P. This Lao Dong Central Committee member, whose true name we do not know, is probably the overall field director of the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam. The overall commander of Viet Cong military forces (who would be a subordinate of Cuc's within the Communist command structure) is almost certainly the Chairman of the (P.R.P.) Central Committee's Military Committee--a man who uses the name Tran Nam Trung but whom several captured Viet Cong cadre members have insisted is actually Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra, a Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese army and an alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee. The director of all Viet Cong activity in V.C. Military Region 5 (the northernmost third of South Vietnam) is Nguyen Don, a Major-General in the North Vietnamese army and another alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee, who in 1961 was commander of the North Vietnamese 305th Division but came south late that year or early in 1962. In short, not only does the P.R.P. control all aspects of the Viet Cong movement, including the N.L.F., and not only is it a subordinate echelon of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, but the P.R.P.'s own leaders appear to be individuals who themselves occupy ranking positions within the Lao Dong Party hierarchy."

However, while the fact of extensive DRV control over South Vietnam's insurgents after 1960 sheds light on recent DRV policy, it does not answer the questions of when and why that control was imposed. These are best addressed in the broad context of world events, which, as much as DRV domestic politics, or U.S. and GVN policies, seem to have governed DRV strategy.
E. DRV Strategy: Objectives and Timing

From the close of the Geneva Conference on 22 July 1954, through Hanoi's announcement of the founding of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on 29 January 1961, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam appears to have passed through four distinct phases in striving toward its national objectives of independence, reunification, assured foreign support, and Vietnamese hegemony in Southeast Asia.

1. Political Struggle: Summer, 1954 -- Summer, 1956. In the year following Geneva, the DRV executed its regroupings and pressed hard towards land reform and economic recovery. In February, 1955, the Malenkov clique fell from power in the USSR, and the Soviet Union came under a collective leadership within which Khrushchev was pre-eminent. Intimations that the new leaders were interested in pursuing a conciliatory policy in the Cold War distinctly at variance with the national interests of the DRV were manifest in Soviet inaction when the deadlines for consultations concerning the Geneva Plebiscite passed in July, 1955. 149/ Doubly disappointed that Diem was not overturned by the sects, and that its principal ally seemed ill-disposed to back its cause, the DRV maneuvered frenetically to precipitate a reconvening of the Geneva Conference and to stymie Diem. U.S. intelligence was aware of a directive passed down through Iao Dong Party channels in August, 1955, for subordinates to struggle against the Americans and Diem "... so that there may be a less dangerous administration that will go to a conference with us." 150/ In September, 1955, the newly created Fatherland Front brought out its proposal for a confederation of North and South Vietnam, coupled with assurances that in both entities landlords would get free treatment. In South Vietnam in the same month, on three occasions soldiers fired on crowds agitating for the Geneva Plebiscite. 151/ Captured reports from Party field operators in South Vietnam were pessimistic, containing predictions of "long, painful and complex struggle," and reporting weaknesses such that "it is not time ... to meet the enemy." 152/

But within South Vietnam, Diem moved smoothly through his own plebiscite ejecting Bao Dai, announced plans for a new constitution, and proclaimed Ordinance No. 6 (11 January 1956), giving the GVN powerful legal recourse against "struggle movements." And just as the flurry of DRV diplomatic notes finally elicited help in the form of Chou En Lai's letter of 26 January 1956, calling for a new Geneva Conference, Khrushchev dropped the "de-Stalinization" bombshell: at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, in denigrating Stalin, undermined the Soviet position as the fount of Communist international policy, and fractured the Communist Bloc. In April, 1956, just after the United Kingdom issued a note castigating the DRV for violation of the letter and spirit of the Geneva Accords, Khrushchev committed the Soviet Union to "peaceful competition" with the West.
"We say to the representatives of the capitalist world: 'You are for the development of capitalism. We are for socialism. We do not want to impose our institutions on you, but we will not allow you to interfere in our affairs. Therefore, there is only one way open to us -- peaceful competition.'"

The Soviet softening, taken with the U.K. position, plus Diem's successful elections in March, 1956, seemed to write off action by the Geneva powers, and evidently caused serious reconsideration by the Lao Dong leaders. On 24 April 1956, Ho Chi Minh issued a statement reporting on the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, in which, in Hanoi's ca. 1960 version, he held that:

"... We have grasped the great significance of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This Congress has:

"Analyzed the new situation prevailing in the world, and pointed out the new conditions favorable to the preservation of peace and the advance toward socialism by the Revolutionary Parties of the working class and the laboring people;

"Clearly shown the Soviet Union's victorious road, giving us still greater enthusiasm and making us believe still more strongly in the invincible forces of the Soviet Union, the bastion of revolution and of world peace;

"Pointed out the tasks of the Communist Party in the ideological and organizational fields. The Congress particularly emphasized the application of Marxist-Leninist principles to collective leadership and opposed the cult of the individual.

"While recognizing that war may be averted, we must be vigilant to detect the warmongers' schemes; for as long as imperialism exists, the danger of war still exists.

"While recognizing that in certain countries the road to socialism may be a peaceful one, we should be aware of this fact: In countries where the machinery of state, the armed forces, and the police of the bourgeois class are still strong, the proletarian class still has to prepare for armed struggle.

"While recognizing the possibility of reunifying Viet-Nam by peaceful means, we should always remember that our people's principal enemies are the American imperialists and their agents who still occupy half our country and are
preparing for war; therefore, we should firmly hold aloft the banner of peace and enhance our vigilance." 154/

The text of this statement reported by U.S. intelligence at the time, however, had Ho coupling his statement that "the enemies of our people still occupy one half of our national territory and are preparing for war . . ." with the ominous assertion that the DRV must "be in a position to change the form of the struggle . . ." Moreover, Truong Chinh, the Party First Secretary, was reported to have addressed the notion that "peaceful unification" of Vietnam might be "illusory and reformist." 155/

In May the Soviet Co-chairman of the Geneva Conference signed the letter calling upon the two Vietnams to observe the Accords, but in effect committing the Geneva powers and ICC to status quo in Vietnam. At this juncture, the DRV appeared resigned to partition for the foreseeable future, as evidenced in the public letter of 19 June 1956 from Ho Chi Minh to the restive regroupes, in which he undertook to explain and defend a "socialism in one country" strategy (see supra, p. 24), but stressed that "the present political struggle is a stage in our national democratic revolution . . . in the present political struggle, as in the Revolution and the Resistance, our compatriots in the South are in the vanguard, closely united and struggling heroically and perseveringly." 156/ As the deadlines for the Geneva Elections (July) 1956 approached, NVA troops were drawn back from the Demilitarized Zone in Vietnam to defensive positions; DRV diplomats wooed the neutral nations in search of support, openly advocating neutralization of Southeast Asia. Captured orders to Party cadre in South Vietnam stressed "an ideology of lying low for a long time . . ." 157/

The Geneva deadline passed uneventfully, the DRV by July being well impressed with the futility of looking to the Conference for aid. Ho's Pravda article of 2 August 1956 underscored the DRV's rejection of a go-it-alone strategy, and its continued fealty to the Bloc led by the Soviets. 158/

2. Internal Dissent and Reassessment: Summer, 1956 -- Fall, 1957.

By mid-1956, the Lao Dong Party leaders faced at home not only a crisis of confidence over their foreign policy failure, but the serious threat to internal security arising from reaction to the Land Reform Campaign. To stem deterioration of public morale, Ho announced on 18 August 1956 the "successful completion" of Land Reform, admitting to "errors" by the Party, and closing his statement with an appeal for unity under the Fatherland Front:
"Unity is our invincible force. In order to consolidate the North into a solid base for the struggle to reunify our country, our entire people should be closely and widely united on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance in the Viet-Nam Fatherland Front. It is all the more necessary for veteran and new cadres of the Party and Government to assume identity of ideas, to be united and single-minded, and to compete to serve the people." 159

All through the fall of 1956, with the Party and the government under patent stress, the public statements of the Lao Dong leaders reiterated the theme. At the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, in late October, 1956, Truong Chinh, as the protagonist of Land Reform, was publicly sacrificed to "rectification of errors" and to national unity. Vo Nguyen Giap's confessional at the Tenth Plenum took place on 27 October 1956, the day after Diem proclaimed the new Constitution of the Republic of South Vietnam and took office as its first president. North Vietnam's peasant uprisings in November further deepened the contrast between North and South, much to the DRV's disadvantage internationally. After a fence-mending December, the DRV summoned its National Assembly for one of its rare sessions. The Assembly took cognizance that "the struggle for unity would be long and difficult," and that "consolidation" of the North would have to take priority; on 22 January 1957 it passed a resolution stating that:

"The National Assembly confirms that in 1956, the work of strengthening the North and struggling for national reunification was crowned with great successes, though errors and shortcomings still existed in some work. Our successes are fundamental, and will certainly be developed. Our errors and shortcomings are few and temporary, and will certainly be removed, and are now in the process of being overcome." 160

The National Assembly adjourned on 25 January 1957, the day after the Soviets proposed admitting North and South Vietnam to the United Nations as separate, sovereign states -- a move concerning which the DRV evidently had no warning, and which probably dates the nadir of DRV fortunes post-Geneva. 161 Ho Chi Minh promptly denounced the Soviet action in a message to the UN, but at no time was the DRV more isolated.

It was about this period that mounting dissatisfaction with the Party leaders in South Vietnam began to be felt in Hanoi. Prisoners and documents attest that Le Duan, the Lao Dong chieftain in South Vietnam, had lost faith in "political struggle" as early as 1955; one source reported that it was Le Duan's view that Hanoi was "wasting time," and that the Diem government should be "forcibly..."
overthrown" as soon as possible if the DRV were to expect to "succeed in gaining control of South Vietnam." In February, 1956, Le Duan is reported to have conferred with southern leaders on tactics, and concluded that "military pressure" was essential for reunification. He is alleged to have called for a military campaign in the Highlands, and a revitalizing of the Communist Party apparatus in the South. There is some evidence of his having published these views in a book in late 1956. Hanoi, preoccupied with internal problems, was in no position to act on such proposals, but it could not ignore the "mood of skepticism and nonconfidence" as a southern communist later described it -- pervading the South.

Sometime in early 1957 Le Duan returned to Hanoi from South Vietnam to assume a key role in Tao Dong policy formulation. In any event, Ho Chi Minh evidently deferred to southern sentiment when on 15 February 1957 he applauded the "appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the banning of atomic weapons and on reduction of armament," reaffirmed the DRV's similar devotion to peace, but went on to note that:

"The National Assembly has discussed the question of national reunification. The struggle waged by our people for this purpose is long and difficult but will certainly be victorious. To achieve national reunification, all our people must unite closely, make further efforts to consolidate the North and make it a basis for national liberation. Our deputies have voiced the iron will of our people in the work of national reunification. The National Assembly has many a time warmly welcomed the firm and consistent combativeness of our compatriots in the South. . .

" . . . the National Assembly has called on our compatriots throughout the country and residing abroad and on our People's Army to unite closely in their struggle, consolidate the North, maintain and extend the struggle waged in the South, and strengthen our international solidarity.

"The National Assembly has appealed to our compatriots in the South to struggle perseveringly and to strengthen their will for national reunification and independence. 'No force can hamper the determination of our people for unity and fraternal love.' . . .

"We are duty-bound to unite and struggle in order to carry into practice the decisions of the National Assembly, implement the policies and political lines of the Party and Government, speed up the tasks set for this year, increase production, practice savings, consolidate the North, and unite the people throughout the country on the basis of the program of the Fatherland Front for the struggle for national reunification."
The U.S. is not well informed on how the Lao Dong leaders decided which to pursue of the several policy courses open to them, but there is evidence that the developing of consensus took several turnings. There appeared to be at first a move led by Ho and Giap toward strengthening DRV ties with the Soviets, crowned with some immediate success. On 28 February 1957 the UN General Assembly recommended to the Security Council that South Vietnam (and South Korea) be admitted to the UN. In early May, Diem paid a state visit to the U.S., where he received assurances of continued strong U.S. support. Whatever its reasons, the Soviet thereupon took a position against the admission to the UN of South Vietnam, and on 20 May 1957, Marshal Kliment E. Voroshilov, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, arrived in Hanoi for a state visit billed in DRV newspapers as a "most important event." It then appears that Truong Chinh and other Sinophile leaders pressed hard for orientation toward Peking. Amid evidence of haste and confusion, Ho left the country to visit East Europe in July, 1957, returning after stops in Moscow and Peking on 30 August 1957. Ho was in Moscow in July when Khrushchev expelled Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich -- the anti-party group -- from the Presidium of the CPSU, and probably gained some first hand insight into the ideas of the new leaders. In his absence, the DRV signed a new economic agreement with the CPR, and on his return, he appears to have been plunged into a power struggle of some proportions. Ho Chi Minh issued a statement on 2 September 1957 that the government of South Vietnam had to respect the desire of its people for reunification, and averred that his European trip demonstrated a "complete unity of views" with fraternal countries and that the trip had "splendid" results. Also in September, Le Duan was formally admitted to the Politburo. In late October or early November, Ho left, somewhat mysteriously, for Moscow. Although Hanoi newspapers had announced a six week long fete in honor of the 40th anniversary of Russia's October Revolution, the actual celebrations were limited to a few, simple events, and handled low-key by the DRV and its press. Such speeches as were recorded had distinct Maoist overtones. Truong Chinh re-emerged from eclipse as the principal party spokesman, while Giap dropped from sight. Le Duan also went to Moscow, but returned without Ho Chi Minh. Then, in late December, amid rumors that Ho and Giap were dead, both reappeared in Hanoi, and resumed their former position. In 1958, the Soviets replaced the CPR as the DRV's prime aid donor.

In subsequent years, Lao Dong Party historians identified the meetings in Moscow in the fall of 1957 as one of the pivotal events in the modern history of Vietnam. Western commentators have focused on Khrushchev's speech in which he pointed out that capitalism was doomed but that, "the only correct path in the development of international relations is a policy of peaceful coexistence ... We work from the premise that wars are not necessary to advance socialism ... "
But DRV attention has been directed to the Moscow Declaration of 1957, embodied in the "Communique on the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries," which took quite a different line:

"The communist and workers parties are faced with great historic tasks . . . In present day conditions in a number of capitalist countries, the working class has the possibility . . . to unite the majority of the people, when state power without civil war can ensure the transfer of basic means of production to the hands of the people . . . However, in conditions in which the exploiting classes resort to violence against the people, it is necessary to bear in mind another possibility -- nonpeaceful transition to socialism. Leninism teaches and history confirms that the ruling classes never relinquish power voluntarily. In these conditions the severity and forms of class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance of the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on the use of force by these circles at one or another stage of the struggle for socialism." 173/

The congruence of this Declaration with Ho's April, 1956, statement to the Ninth Plenum of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee (supra, 46-47) and with the rhetoric Hanoi had been using to condemn Diem seems more than coincidental. Le Duan returned from Moscow ahead of Ho to present the results to the Lao Dong leaders, and issued on 7 December 1957 a public statement that the Declaration:

". . . not only confirmed the line and created favorable conditions for North Vietnam to advance toward socialism, but has also shown the path of struggle for national liberation and has created favorable conditions for the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam." 172/

Some authorities have viewed the "crisis of 1957" within the Lao Dong leadership as a clash of factions over whether to align with the bellicose Mao (pro Truong Chinh, Nguyen Duy Trinh) or remain loyal to the tempering Soviets (pro Ho and Giap). 173/ P. J. Honey, for example, found it significant that even Mao acknowledged Soviet leadership at the 1957 Moscow Conference, and notes that in February, 1948, the spokesman for the DRV National Assembly's Political Sub-committee announced that:

"Our firm international position is to stand in the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union . . . This position proceeds from our people's fundamental interests and from
the requirements of North Vietnam's advance towards socialism." 174/

Honey deprecated contrary statements issued by Hanoi about the same time -- e.g., that the NVA would "always stand ready by the side of the CPR in its struggle to recover Quemoy and Matsu, and to liberate Taiwan..." -- and thought that:

"It is very probable, although not a scrap of evidence has so far come to light which would corroborate it, that Ho Chi Minh was secretly reassuring the Soviet leaders, explaining that North Vietnam was supporting China only with empty words, while her actions proved that she had not been taken in by Macist innovations." 175/

D. S. Zagoria interpreted the DRV strategy debate as less a dispute over external relations than over internal priorities: "The crucial local issue has resolved around the relative priority to be assigned to economic development of the North and struggle in the South." He concluded that "pro-Soviet" view prevailed simply because "between 1957 and 1960, northern leaders agreed on the need to concentrate on economic development." 176/

Proponents of both interpretations conclude that Hanoi's predilection for the USSR was ipso facto a deferral of support for the insurgency in the South. But the evidence supports a third interpretation. It is quite possible that the DRV leaders sought and won Soviet support because they found it impossible amicably to set priorities between internal and external national objectives. It seems evident that only the Soviets could offer the wherewithal to pursue both sets of goals simultaneously, and it is possible that the Lao Dong leaders opted for "guns and butter" rather than "socialism in one country." The apparent harmony among the pro-China and pro-Russia "factions" by early 1958 bespeaks such a compromise solution. Of course, serious doubt remains whether the Soviets would have valued DRV fealty high enough to pay the price, yet it seems that such could have been the case. The new DRV-USSR understanding reached during 1957 definitely included the extension of material aid which North Vietnam needed for its economic advancement. It evidently also included Soviet concurrence in a more adventurous policy toward reunification. Whether or not specific DRV advances upon South Vietnam were countenanced, it is evident that the DRV leaders had obtained Soviet recognition that North Vietnam's circumstances placed it outside the range of strategic and doctrinal considerations which had lead Khrushchev, et al., into "peaceful competition" and "peaceful coexistence."
3. Preparations: Winter, 1958 -- Spring, 1959. In the autumn of 1957, and throughout 1958, violence in rural South Vietnam mounted, and increasingly manifested strategic direction. There is, however, only sparse evidence that North Vietnam was directing, or was capable of directing that violence. Yet even had the DRV determined in late 1957 to support insurgency in South Vietnam, there probably would have been little sign of that decision in 1958, so soon after it had been reached. The Lao Dong leaders were possibly the most experienced and dedicated group of professional revolutionaries in the world -- and probably the most cautious. Perhaps more than any other such group, the North Vietnamese communists had subjected their past to intense and objective scrutiny, striving to detect errors in strategy and tactics, and to derive lessons applicable to the future. The writings of Ho, Giap, Truong Chinh, and others have revealed that they were by no means satisfied that they had always made correct choices in the past on questions of war or peace. The salient lesson they have drawn is that premature revolution is significantly worse than no revolution at all, and they have repeatedly cited the abortive uprisings of 1930 and 1940 as cases in point. In both instances, amorphous, mainly spontaneous insurrection lead to failure, and then to reprisals and heavy losses among exposed middle and lower echelon Party leaders, which set back Party progress several years.

The 1940 rebellion has seemed particularly poignant to DRV commentators. When the Japanese invaded Tonkin in September, 1940, the Indochinese Communist Party, together with other Vietnamese nationalists, elected violent resistance. Demonstrations took place throughout the country. Ho Chi Minh was at the time in Kunming, with the ICP "External Bureau." He and his colleagues there counseled their in-country counterparts against proceeding beyond demonstrations, but the ardent of local leaders could not be dampened. In November, 1940, peasants in the Plain of Reeds took up arms, and there was shortly a series of peasant jacquerie, which spread throughout the Mekong Delta. As Ho, et al., had predicted, the uprising failed and the French administration in Saigon launched a savage repression which virtually destroyed the ICP organization in rural Cochinchine. 177/ In May, 1941, at the Eighth Plenum of the ICP Central Committee, there was an exhaustive review of the 1940 debacle, and a re-direction of party effort toward forming an alliance of all social classes and political parties, nationalist movements, religious sects, and anti-Japanese resistance groups. Social reform and communist slogans were de-emphasized. All the resources of the Party were to be thrown behind a new front group which would carry out the Party strategy; that group was the League for Independence of Vietnam, or the Viet Minh. 178/ Again and again thereafter, communist leaders in their speeches and published works have returned to the lessons of the abortive revolt and the Eighth Plenum: never squander Party grassroots
organizations in futile causes; submerge the Party in a broader cause, behind a national front.

The example of successful revolution most often held out by DRV leaders has been the "August Revolution" of 1945. The official DRV history points out that this uprising was successful because, under Party leadership, there had been: (1) a careful preparing of the people in both ideology and organization, including the training of cadres, the build-up of bases of resistance, and the organization of armed forces -- peoples' war, peoples' army; (2) a seizing of the right opportunity; (3) "launching the revolutionary high tide of the whole people" -- meaning the forming of a "national front" organization which could command the support of the majority of the people, including "all classes, nationalities, and religions"; (4) a skillful combining of military and political "struggle" -- that is, the employment of both forms of revolutionary endeavor, and the gradual shift in emphasis from political to military methods; (5) dividing the enemy by proselyting his armed forces, civil service, and citizenry. 179/ The first two lessons, on preparation for and careful timing of revolution, have received particular stress. Party history is accurate: Ho Chi Minh carefully husbanded his forces and waited for the moment to strike. Virtually all the energies of the Viet Minh from 1943 through the spring of 1945 were devoted to the patient development of a political infrastructure in rural areas, and the building of guerrilla strongholds in the mountains adjacent to China. Ho permitted his armed forces to begin systematic guerrilla warfare only after the Japanese set up an independent Vietnam under Bao Dai in March, 1945. Even then, however, he used them sparingly. There was supposed to have been a Viet Minh conference in June, 1945, to signal the "general uprising," but Ho Chi Minh delayed convening of this conference because he was convinced that uprising would be premature. Although DRV histories do not say so, there is, in fact, every indication that when the "August Revolution" was launched, it came not as a conscientious, coordinated effort controlled by Ho and his lieutenants, but as another more or less spontaneous rebellion. 180/ Confronted with the prospect of being a bystander while others won victory, Ho hastily convened the deferred conference on 16 August 1945, and formally committed the Viet Minh to the overthrow of Bao Dai and the expulsion of the French and Japanese. Within three weeks, the independence of the DRV was proclaimed, and Ho was installed in Hanoi as its president.

One example DRV historians do not often cite is the inception of the long and ruinous Resistance War which began in December, 1946. From all appearances, the DRV leaders still entertain serious doubts over the wisdom of going to war against France at that juncture. There is evidence that the incidents which opened the war in December, 1946, had not been condoned by Ho, and that he re-committed the Viet Minh to military action only reluctantly, and after events had issued their own dictum. Moreover, communist literature on the Resistance War of 1945-1954 abounds with reproach for local leaders.
launching too-venturesome, costly enterprises without proper preparation. Even top leaders were not immune to criticism on that score; e.g., Le Duan was apparently relieved of command over COSVN in late 1952 or 1953 for pressing too fast and hard. 181/ From the highest strategic level to the lowest tactical level, Vietnamese communist doctrine underscores the essentiality of careful preparatory work, and the criticality of timing initial overt operations. 182/ It is not likely, then, that a decision to proceed toward the reunification of Vietnam by force was lightly taken by the Lao Dong leaders; it would in any event have countenanced extensive, painstaking, covert groundwork.

Such preliminary efforts might have been the refurbishing of the Communist Party in South Vietnam, which had been seriously weakened by Diem's persistent Communist Denunciation Campaign. It seems probable that, whenever they were started, the initial steps of the DRV were directed to reinvigorating the Lao Dong apparatus in the South. For this purpose it would have needed relatively few cadre -- for instance, with 400 men, the Lao Dong could have dispatched 10 organizers to each of South Vietnam's provinces. From all indications, organizers were sent South in 1958; the numbers are not known. Similarly, in all likelihood the DRV would have looked to base preparations. Again, evidence is scanty, but there were definite indications that guerrilla secure-areas were being prepared in the Highlands, in the Plain of Reeds, and in the War Zone C - War Zone D region north of Saigon. 183/

There are also indications, however, that debate over strategy continued through 1958. Reports captured while being forwarded via Lao Dong channels from South Vietnam to Hanoi indicate that some subordinates there clung to the belief that the Diem regime could be toppled without recourse to guerrilla warfare, and that others despaired of success without substantial military aid from the North. There is also evidence throughout 1958 that Viet Cong tactics were being subjected to careful study in Hanoi. 184/

Whatever preparations were in progress during 1958, in December, 1958, or January, 1959, Hanoi apparently decided that the time had come to intensify its efforts. On December 1, there was an incident at a "political re-education camp" north of Saigon -- the "Phu Loi Massacre" -- which the DRV promptly seized upon to launch a worldwide propaganda offensive against Diem. U.S. intelligence came into possession of a directive from Hanoi to its subordinate headquarters in Inter-Sector V during December, 1958, which stated that the Lao Dong Party Central Committee had decided to "open a new stage of the struggle" 185/; the following month, January, 1959, U.S. sources also acquired an order directing a Viet Cong build-up in Tay Ninh province to provide a base for guerrilla operations; the same order mentioned similar bases in the mountains of western Inter-Sector V. 186/
In February, Viet Cong guerrillas successfully attacked a GVN outpost near Trang Sup, in Tay Ninh, and Diem told a French correspondent that "at the present time Vietnam is a nation at war." George Carver has recorded that in late 1958 or early 1959, Le Duan journeyed to South Vietnam for an on-the-spot appraisal of affairs there, and that his report lead to a DRV decision to step up support of the insurgency.

"Consolidation of the North" proceeded apace during 1958. Societal discipline advanced to the point that by early 1959 the land reform campaign -- under a different name -- was re-initiated without difficulty. 187/ Crops were good, and economic prospects in both the agricultural and industrial sectors were excellent. 188/ In January, 1959, the DRV contracted with the Soviet Union for a 50% increase in trade, and in February another large loan was negotiated with the CPR. 189/ Against this background of domestic success -- progress and plenty within North Vietnam -- and of international finesse -- cooperation with both the great communist powers without domination by either -- the DRV implemented the next step in its strategy.


a. Surfacing the Strategy, 1959

However the DRV privately viewed the war in South Vietnam during 1959 and 1960, the public statements of its leaders were aggressive. If the numbers of infiltrators and the amount of supplies dispatched to the South were insignificant or unimpressive to the beleaguered insurgents, the pose adopted by the Lao Dong principals must have greatly enheartened insurgents in South Vietnam.

On 4 April 1959, President Eisenhower, in an address at Gettysburg, declared that South Vietnam could not, without U.S. aid, "meet the dual threat of aggression from without and subversion within its borders." He stated that U.S. national interests compelled the U.S. to help South Vietnam sustain its morale, economic progress, and military strength. 190/ On 30 April 1959, Pham Van Dong applauded Khrushchev's rejoinder to President Eisenhower as follows:

"Comrade Khrushchev's strong statement was a powerful blow to the US imperialists aggressive bloc. The Vietnamese people are very grateful to the Soviet Union, head of the socialist camp, for its constant sympathy for and support to their righteous struggle for national reunification. Comrade Khrushchev's statement powerfully encourages our people to enthusiastically build North Viet-Nam and advance gradually toward socialism and to struggle for national reunification . . .

"Just as observed by Comrade Khrushchev, the intervention by US imperialism in South Viet-Nam is the cause of the continued partition of Viet-Nam . . . The struggle for the reunification
of our country is still meeting with difficulties and hardships, but we are confident that the Vietnamese people ... will certainly triumph in the complete liberation of our country from the US-Diem clique's dictatorial yoke just as they had gloriously succeeded in their valiant struggle in the past. The American imperialists and their lackeys, who are being opposed and isolated, surely will not be able to avoid the ignominious defeat of those who go counter to the march of history." 191/

Ho Chi Minh's May Day speech of 1959 opened with an encomium from the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist powers who were promoting the movement for national liberation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. According to the Hanoi Radio report, Ho pointed out "that the earnest desire of the Vietnamese people from North to South is peace and national reunification. On orders from the U.S. imperialists the South Vietnamese authorities are sabotaging the implementation of the Geneva Accords and strangling all democratic freedom of the southern people." Ho concluded on the note that:

"Under the leadership of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party and the government, all our people will further strengthen solidarity and unity of mind with other countries in the socialist camp, headed by the great Soviet Union . . . [and] strengthen solidarity within the national united front . . . By so doing the north of our country will steadily advance toward socialism as a strong basis toward victory in the struggle for national reunification."

On 1 May 1959, the official DRV newspaper declared that:

"The glorious South Vietnamese people surely will not remain with folded arms before the continuous and cruel repressive acts of the U.S.-Diem clique. The Vietnamese people have many times compelled their enemies to pay for their bloody crimes. The U.S.-Diem clique has by its own will contracted a big debt of blood toward the Vietnamese people, and have dug their own graves."

The foregoing were issued while the Lao Dong Party conducted the Fifteenth Plenum (Enlarged Session) of its Central Committee in Hanoi. The session featured speeches on foreign and domestic programs, but it is fairly certain that a plenum of the Lao Dong Central Committee is not a debating society nor a parliament -- decisions were not reached there, they were presented.

On 13 May 1959, Hanoi broadcast in English the communiqué of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee; on the Plenum, a bellicose tone was unmistakable:
The Central Committee of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party has held its 15th enlarged session to review the developments in the struggle for national reunification and lay down the tasks for the whole party and people in connection with that struggle...

North Vietnam, now completely liberated, has carried through its task of national people's democratic revolution and is carrying out the socialist revolution and building socialism. This is an extremely important change which determines the direction of development of the Vietnamese revolution in the new stage. Meanwhile, the southern part of our country is still under the domination of the American imperialists and their lackey -- Ngo Dinh Diem. They have turned South Vietnam into a new-type colony and a military base for preparing war...

The interventionist policy of the U.S. imperialists and the South Vietnam authorities' policy of dependence on the United States have undermined and deliberately continue to undermine the implementation of the Geneva agreements and the cause of peaceful national reunification, thus cutting across the desire and interests of the Vietnamese people. The U.S. Imperialists and their followers are scheming to perpetuate the division of our country and prepare a new war.

To carry out this perfidious scheme, over the past few years the U.S.-Diem clique has been actively increasing its military forces, carrying out a policy of ruthless exploitation of the people, abolishing all democratic functions, repressing and terrorizing the people in a most barbarous manner, causing ever more serious dislocation of the South Vietnamese economy, and making the life of local people more and more precarious and wretched...

To achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy, the session mapped out the following tasks: the entire people will unite and strive to struggle for national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy to endeavor to consolidate the North and actively take it step by step toward socialism, to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous and strong Vietnam; and to contribute to the safeguarding of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

The session expressed its unshakable belief that our whole people, uniting and struggling heroically and
persecutively, will certainly smash the U.S. imperialists' scheme to seize our land and their lackeys' plot to sell out our country. On the basis of the consolidation of North Vietnam and its steady development in all fields, of the broad and powerful development of the patriotic movement in the South, and will the approval and support of the peace loving people all over the world, our struggle for national reunification will certainly be successful."

The following day the official press carried an editorial (also broadcast by Radio Hanoi in English) commenting on the communique:

"At present, the world and home situation has become basically different from that of the past. It has been developing in a way which is fully advantageous to our people and very disadvantageous to the imperialists and their lackeys. Our strength in all fields in the North, which is the firm base for the revolutionary struggle in the South, has constantly been consolidated and increased. The magnificently heroic struggle of the southern people has constantly developed and their united strength has broadened without a halt. Strength in all fields of the socialist camp has grown majestically.

"On the basis of an unprecedently firm North Vietnam and socialist camp, our compatriots in the south will struggle resolutely and persistently against the cruel U.S.-Diem regime . . .

"Our people, always cherishing peace, are determined to struggle to compel the other side to carry out correctly the Geneva agreements, to re-establish normal North-South relations and to hold consultations on general elections to reunify the country. However, our people are determined not to give the imperialists and feudalists a free hand to oppose our people's aspirations and to keep the southerners in slavery. Our people are determined to struggle with their traditional heroism by all necessary forms and measures so as to achieve the goal of the revolution."

On 10 July 1959, the Belgian Communist publication Red Flag published an article under Ho Chi Minh's by-line which reported that:

"We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution."
On 8 July 1959, the United States armed forces sustained the first combat deaths in the war; two U.S. servicemen were killed by a terrorist bomb inside a U.S. compound at Bien Hoa. Other Viet Cong terrorist activities mounted to new levels of intensity. In the fall of 1959, as recounted above, communist guerrillas began to attack openly units of the Army of Vietnam, and to occupy province and district capitals for short periods. /193/ On 12 September 1959, Premier Pham Van Dong told the French Consul in Hanoi, that:

"You must remember, we will be in Saigon tomorrow, we will be in Saigon tomorrow." /194/

In November, 1959, Pham Van Dong twice told Canadian ICC Commissioner Erickson-Brown that "we will drive the Americans in the sea" -- statements deemed significant enough by the Lao Dong hierarchy to elicit a visit from General Giap to "reassure" Erickson-Brown of the DRV's peaceful intent. /195/

But the U.S. and Diem were both inured to threatening communist invective; what should have been more ominous was the DRV's willingness to act, first evident in Laos.

b. DRV Intervention in Laos

During the First Indochina War, 1945-1954, a nominally independent national movement developed in Laos, the paramilitary Pathet Lao, and its political arm, the Lao Fatherland Front (Neo Lao Hak Xat). /196/ It was quite clear, however, that the Viet Minh -- and the Lao Dong Party -- dominated the Resistance in Laos; in fact, the Viet Minh negotiated the Geneva settlement on behalf of its Lao allies. After the Accords were signed, some Lao men were regrouped to North Vietnam itself, and like the South Vietnamese, were formed into NVA units. In 1954-1955, the DRV openly assisted the Pathet Lao in consolidating political and military strength in Phong Saly and Sam Neua, two provinces on Laos' northeast border with North Vietnam, designated as regroupment zones by the Geneva Agreements. /197/ U.S. intelligence obtained evidence that DRV cadres remained in these provinces following regroupment, some as advisors, but some occupying key political and administrative positions in the Pathet Lao and Neo Lao Hak Xat. Captured documents indicate that a North Vietnamese headquarters for this effort was set up in Laos, with the following missions assigned from Hanoi:

(1) implementation of the truce and the political struggle;

(2) establishment and training of the Lao (Communist) Party;
(3) assistance in fiscal matters; and
(4) improvement of Pathet Lao military forces.

A captured report to Hanoi, probably from this headquarters, indicated that by 1956 the Laotian Communist Party had expanded from less than 100 to more than 2,000 members, and that a light infantry, guerrilla force of more than fifteen battalions had been created. Apparently, Hanoi had planned to withdraw the Vietnamese cadre in late 1956, and there is evidence that some withdrawals took place by early 1957; there is also evidence that most DRV cadre remained. However, in 1957, with the aid of the ICC, a political settlement was reached. Two battalions of Pathet Lao surrendered to the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) to be incorporated into its army, and the Pathet Lao agreed to demobilize 5,000 other troops. Two officials of the Lao Fatherland Front were admitted to the Royal Laotian Government, and the movement ostensibly integrated into the national community.

During 1958 and early 1959, the Royal Laotian Government became increasingly pro-Western, and DRV activities in Laos were evidently attenuated. However, in May, 1959, when the Royal Laotian Army (RLA) attempted to disestablish its two Pathet Lao battalions, one escaped and marched for the DRV. DRV reaction was quick. Immediately thereafter U.S. intelligence was reliably informed that a military headquarters similar to the Viet Minh's Dien Bien Phu command post had been set up near the Laos border to control operations in Laos by the NVA 335th Division, which had been formed from the "Lao Volunteers" regrouped to the DRV in 1955. 198/ From mid-1959 onwards, the U.S. acquired convincing evidence of an increasing DRV military involvement in Laos, and beginning in late 1960, of USSR entry into the conflict with substantial military aid for the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao aided by a severe weakening of the RLG from a neutralist coup by Kong Le in 1961, and a counter coup by right-wing forces in 1962, mounted an offensive against the RLG to expand Pathet Lao controlled territory, which continued through a "cease-fire" of May, 1961.

It was not, however, until December, 1960, that the DRV announced to foreign diplomats resident in Hanoi its decision to intervene in Laos; during 1961 the DRV presence in Laos was transformed from a semi-covert MAAG-like undertaking to an operational theater. Beginning in December, 1960, and throughout 1961 and early 1962, Soviet aircraft flew 2,000 to 3,000 sorties from the DRV to Laos, delivering more than 3,000 tons of supplies to communist forces, which expanded their territory to hold the northern half of the country. Ethnic North Vietnamese appeared in Pathet Lao formations, and Kong Le himself admitted that NVA officers and soldiers were serving as "technicians" with his paratroops. North Vietnamese from NVA formations were captured by RLG forces and captured documents substantiated the presence of entire NVA units. In December, 1961, a convoy of Soviet-made tanks was sighted entering Laos.
from the DRV, and shortly thereafter DRV officials formally presented
45 tanks to Kong Le. U.S. aerial photography identified also Soviet-
made artillery and radar in use by the Pathet Lao. Truck convoys of
20 to 300 vehicles were observed entering Laos carrying munitions,
rice, motor fuel, and NVA troops. Altogether, the combined communist
forces demonstrated significant military superiority over the RLG
forces. Rightist forces (under Phoumi Nosavan), U.S. military aid
notwithstanding, were markedly unsuccessful in stemming the communist
drive. In May, 1961, a truce was struck, and the conflict was carried
into international conference; at Geneva on 23 July 1962, a new
political settlement was reached. As of that period, U.S. intelligence
reported 12 NVA battalions in Laos, some 6,000 strong. In addition,
3,000 NVA personnel were serving with PL units. 199/

The Geneva Agreement on Laos of 1962 consisted of
joint declaration by the several nations concerned with Indochina --
including the U.S., the DRV, and the GVN -- agreeing that Laos would
be neutralized:

"All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-
military formations and foreign military personnel shall be
withdrawn from Laos . . . the introduction of foreign regular
and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and
foreign military personnel into Laos of armaments, munitions,
and war material generally, except such quantities as the
Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the
national defense of Laos, is prohibited . . ."

In concert with the Pathet Lao, the DRV circumvented these agreements.
Although measures were taken to conceal DRV presence and ostensibly
to withdraw DRV forces -- 40 North Vietnamese were removed under ICC
observation -- U.S. intelligence obtained good evidence, including
a number of eye witness statements, that the bulk of the NVA forces
remained in Laos; U.S. estimates placed NVA strength in Laos in early
1963 at 4,000 troops in 8 battalions, plus 2,000 Pathet Lao advisors. 200/

In any event, by late 1960 the DRV could look upon
its Laotian enterprise as successful in substantially expanding its
sphere of influence in Laos, to include control over the territory
adjacent to South Vietnam over which passed its "Ho Chi Minh Trail"
of infiltration (see map). Eventually the enterprise brought about
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from Laos, per the Geneva
Agreement of 1962. If the Vicntlener government, braced with broad
U.S. aid, surprised the DRV with its resiliency, it at least proved
unable to challenge the Pathet Lao -- and DRV -- gains. Whatever the
DRV longer term goal in Laos, reunification of Vietnam seemed there-
after to take priority over further extension in Laos. In any event, the
DRV succeeded in securing its Laotian frontier from U.S. or Laotian
1962
ESTIMATED STRENGTH
OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES
Area under control of anti-government forces
TOTAL ESTIMATED ANTI-GOVERNMENT STRENGTH 37,000
(Based on evidence available as of February 1962)

SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Source:
SNIE 10-62
21 Feb 1962
p. 11
efforts to mobilize the tribal peoples against it, and in opening access to South Vietnam via the Laotian panhandle.

It is not clear whether the DRV found it necessary to pressure or subvert the Cambodian government in order to bring it into line with its general strategy, but align the Cambodians did. As in Laos, the Viet Minh had fronted for Khmer Resistance at the Geneva Conference of 1954, and there is evidence that in the years following it supported subversive organizations in Cambodia. In 1958, a crisis between South Vietnam and Cambodia erupted over boundary disputes and border violations. Cambodia formally laid claim to all of Cochinchina in a declaration to the United Nations, while South Vietnam laid claim to off-shore islands and other nominally Cambodian territory.

Beginning in 1958, Cambodia declared for "neutralism," and thereafter its relations with the DRV were marked with increasing cordiality and cooperativeness. Evidence collected since 1963 indicates that the Viet Cong built bases adjacent to the Cambodian border, used sanctuary areas across it, operated trans-frontier supply routes, and had sources of supply within Cambodia. Insofar as the minimal evident objectives of DRV policy were concerned -- use of Cambodian territory to further the campaign to reunify Vietnam -- Cambodia proved to be incapable of interfering even when, apparently, it wished to police its territory.

c. Explication of the Strategy, 1960

During 1958 and 1959 work had progressed on a revision of the DRV Constitution. On 1 January 1960, with much fanfare, the new basic law was proclaimed. The Preamble recounted the modern history of Vietnam, in part as follows:

"Vietnam is a single entity from Lang-Son to Camau.

"The Vietnamese people, throughout the thousands of years of history, have been an industrious working people who have struggled unremittingly and heroically to build their country and defend the independence of their Fatherland . . . With the Dien Bien Phu victory, the Vietnamese people defeated the French imperialists and the U.S. interventionists . . .

"This major success of the Vietnamese people was also a common success of the liberation movement of the oppressed peoples, of the world front of peace, and of the socialist camp.

"Since the restoration of peace in completely liberated North Viet-Nam, our people have carried through the National People's Democratic Revolution. But the South is still under
the rule of the imperialists and feudalists; our country is still temporarily divided into two zones . . .

"The Vietnamese revolution has moved into a new position. Our people must endeavor to consolidate the North, taking it toward socialism, and carry on the struggle for peaceful reunification of the country and completion of the tasks of the National People's Democratic revolution throughout the country.

"In the last few years, our peoples in the North have achieved many big successes in economic rehabilitation and cultural development. At present, socialist transformation and construction are being successfully carried out.

"Meanwhile, in the South, the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen have been savagely repressing the patriotic movement of our people. They have been strengthening military forces and carrying out their scheme of turning the southern part of our country into a colony and military base for their war preparations . . . But our southern compatriots have constantly struggled heroically and refused to submit to them. The people throughout the country, united as one, are holding aloft the banners of peace, national unity, independence, and democracy, resolved to march forward and win final victory. The cause of the peaceful reunification of the Fatherland will certainly be victorious."

Strangely, even so formal a statement of aims escaped attention in the West, even though the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia had now become sufficiently grave to cause concern throughout the world. Within the U.S. Government, extensive reappraisals of U.S. policy were launched. Aid to Laos was stepped-up, and the U.S. country team in Vietnam was directed to prepare a counter-insurgency plan for bringing U.S. aid more efficiently to bear the GVN's internal defense. The inflamed situation in Laos and South Vietnam were among the major international irritants toward which hopes for the Summit Conference in Paris in May, 1960, were directed. The breakdown of the Paris talks, and the subsequent hardening of relations between the United States and the USSR, formed the backdrop against which the Soviets moved into deeper commitment to support of the DRV, and the DRV into more open support of the insurgents in South Vietnam.

In early September, 1960, the Lao Dong Party held its Third Congress, and passed the following resolution:

"In the present stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam; second, to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yolk of the U.S. imperialists and
their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country. These two strategic tasks are closely related to each other and spur each other forward...

"The two revolutionary tasks of the North and South belong to two different strategies, each task being aimed at satisfying the definite requirement of each zone under the specific conditions of our divided country. But these two tasks have one common aim -- to achieve peaceful national reunification and resolve one common contradiction of our whole country -- the contradiction between our people and the imperialists and their henchmen.

"The common task of the Vietnamese revolution at present is: to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace, to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the National People's Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam;...

"The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary power of the masses. During this process we must pay special attention to the work of organizing and educating the people, first and foremost the workers, peasants and intellectuals, promoting to the highest degree the revolutionary fighting spirit of the various strata of our patriotic countrymen. We must unceasingly expose the criminal schemes and acts of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, doing our utmost to divide and isolate them.

"To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants, and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front directed against the U.S.-Diem clique and based on the worker-peasant alliance. This front must rally all the patriotic parties and religious groupings, together with all individuals inclined to oppose the U.S.-Diem clique. The aims of its struggle are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's living conditions, and peaceful national reunification.
"The front must carry out its work in a very flexible manner in order to rally all forces that can be rallied, win over all forces that can be won over, neutralize all forces that should be neutralized, and draw the broad masses into the general struggle against the US-Diem clique for the liberation of the South and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

"The revolutionary movement in the South plays a very important role in relation to the reunification of the country. Simultaneously with the effort to build the North and advance toward socialism our people must strive to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in the South and create favorable conditions for peaceful national reunification...." 203/

Ho Chi Minh, in his speech at the Congress, attributed the "victory of the Vietnamese revolution" in part to the "whole-hearted assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China." He identified the DRV with the world "forces of peace" and stated that "the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is a member of the big socialist family headed by the great Soviet Union." 204/ Giap's speech at the Congress cited the example of the August, 1945, general uprisings, noting that victory came because "our party kept a firm hold on the national democratic revolutionary line," and paid appropriate attention to preparing the people for their tasks. Le Duan's address stressed that:

"The southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle -- from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal -- and based on the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South...and must uphold the revolutionary fighting spirit of all strata of patriotic compatriots." 205/

Le Duan also called for a "worker-peasant-army coalition bloc," and a "broad national united front against the US-Diem clique."

In a policy-cycle similar to that of 1957 -- strategy announced around September, followed by international exposure and confirmation at Moscow in November -- the DRV obtained at the "Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties" held in Moscow in November, 1960, fairly explicit endorsement of its line of action in South Vietnam. As in 1957, the Moscow Declaration distinguished between war in general and anti-colonial wars, noting that "national-liberation revolutions have triumphed in vast areas of the world" and emphasized that:
"The complete collapse of colonialism is inevitable. The downfall of the system of colonial slavery under the impact of the national-liberation movement is a phenomenon ranking second in historical importance after the formation of the world system of socialism.

"The United States of America is the chief bulwark of present-day colonialism...."

"....the working class of many capitalist countries, by overcoming the split in its ranks and achieving unity of action of all its detachments, could deliver a heavy blow to the policy of the ruling circles of the capitalist countries and force them to step up preparations for a new war, repel the offensive of monopoly capital, and ensure satisfaction of its vital everyday and democratic demands.

"....The Communist Parties, guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching, have always been against the export of revolution. At the same time, they resolutely struggle against imperialist export of counter-revolution. They consider it their international duty to call on the peoples of all countries to unite, to mobilize all their internal forces, to act vigorously and, relying on the might of the world socialist system, to prevent or decisively rebuff the interference of the imperialists in the affairs of the people of any country who have risen in revolution.

"The Communist Parties reaffirm the propositions of the 1957 Declaration concerning the question of the forms of transition of various countries from capitalism to socialism.

"In conditions when the exploiting classes resort to the use of force against the people, it is necessary to bear in mind another possibility—that of nonpeaceful transition to socialism. Leninism teaches, and historical experience confirms, that the ruling classes do not relinquish power voluntarily. In these conditions the degree of bitterness and the forms of the class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the extent of the resistance of the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on the use of force by these circles at one or another stage of the struggle for socialism." 266/

It is interesting, in the light of the foregoing, to read the Communist Party history, written in South Vietnam around 1963 and captured on Operation CRIMP in 1966 (see Tab 2, p. 51 ff.). While such a history must be regarded with caution—Soviet historians have not hesitated to establish that the Bolsheviks overthrew the Czar—the CRIMP history, consistent with other captured documents and prisoner interrogations, dates the insurgency in South Vietnam from the Lao Dong Party conclave of May, 1959:
"...Particularly after 20 July 1956, the key cadres and Party members in South Vietnam asked questions which demanded answers: 'Can we still continue the struggle to demand the implementation of Geneva Agreement given the existing regime in South Vietnam? If not, then what must be done?' A mood of skepticism and non-confidence in the orientation of the struggle began to seep into the party apparatus and among some of the masses.

"At the end of 1956 the popularization of the volume by Comrade Duan (Le Duan) entitled 'The South Vietnam Revolutionary Path' was of great significance because the ideological crisis was now solved. After analyzing the character of the South Vietnam society, the character of the American-Diemist enemy etc., the volume outlined a new strategic orientation for the South Vietnam revolution, a strategic mission in which everyone could have some confidence: It is necessary to continue the national democratic revolution in South Vietnam and it is necessary to use force to overthrow the feudalist imperialist regime in order to establish a revolutionary democratic coalition and create the conditions for the peaceful reunification of the Fatherland.

"After the Resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the Central Committee was issued all of South Vietnam possessed a clear and correct strategic policy and orientation. The Resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the Central Committee clearly delineated the general responsibility of the Vietnam revolution, analyzed the special characteristics of the South Vietnam situation, clearly spelled out the revolutionary tasks in South Vietnam and at the same time outlined the path which the South Vietnam revolution should take.

"Thanks to this correct and clear delineation of the strategic orientation and path, the South Vietnam people and party clearly understood the aims and enlightened path to follow....The volume 'South Vietnam Revolutionary Path' and the Resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the Central Committee provides the cadres and Party members with a pair of wings with which to fly and lamps to shine upon the path ahead, a feeling of encouragement and confidence, a determined will because the goals were clear and the path bright....

"Since the end of 1958, particularly after the Phu Loi Massacre, the situation truly ripened for an armed movement against the enemy. But the leadership of the Nam-Bo Regional Committee at that time still hesitated for many reasons, but the principal reason was the fear of violating the party line. The directive of the politburo in May 1959 stated that the time had come to push the arms struggle against the enemy. Thanks to this we closely followed the actual

* Not available.

** Reference is to the 15th Plenum of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee
situation in order to formulate a program which we felt would be essential, and in October 1959, the armed struggle was launched.

"Was the armed struggle slow in coming? We realize that it was not possible to launch the armed struggle too soon, before the situation had ripened. At any rate, a short period of time was lost because although many areas were engaged in armed propaganda and insufficient strength existed to maintain continued opposition to the enemy. Although slow in coming, it was not too slow because there was still time to transform the situation into one where the proper conditions existed. However, if the change had been even slower, even more difficulties would have been encountered and the change in the movement would not have been as easy."

"The Resolution of the 15th Conference of the Central Committee officially and concisely specified the responsibilities and strategic aims of the South Vietnam revolution.

"But problems still existed: how were these responsibilities, aims, and progress of the South Vietnam revolution to be implemented? What must the main forms and procedures of the struggle be? Although the Resolution outlined some of these factors, at the time of the Conference, the details of the South Vietnam movement as well as revolutionary experiences of friendly nations were not sufficient enough for the Conference to formulate a precise program. Only 2 years later, were there sufficient factors available, based partly on the experiences of Laos but mainly on the experiences of the South Vietnam revolutionary movement, the Central Committee was able to formulate a clear and concise program concerning these problems...."

The latter reference is to a January, 1961, Resolution of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, which directed concentration on peasant problems, stressed political action—"The political aspect is truly the basic one," said the CRIMP history—and warned against "revisionism." The Lao Dong newspaper carried an editorial, broadcast by Radio Hanoi on 13 January 1961 which described the 1961 Resolution as a document which:

"Reaffirms and sheds more light on the thesis of the Declaration of 1957 concerning the forms of transition from capitalism to socialism in different countries and clearly points to the lines and methods of struggle of the communist parties of capitalist countries...."

"As for the colonial countries, the statement points out that the struggle for national independence should be waged through armed struggles or by non-military methods, according to the specific conditions in the country concerned. The working class, which plays a major role in the national liberation struggle, is determined to
carry through the tasks of the national and democratic revolution against all schemes of reaction to hinder progress of society...."

"The Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communists and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1957, and the new statement are a profound summary of the experiences of revolutionary struggle and of building a new life of our time. They represent a development of Marxism-Leninism for the new conditions of history." 207/

But none of the communist statements--neither the Moscow Declaration of 1957, nor that of 1960; neither the Lao Dong Resolution of September, 1960, nor that of January, 1961--attracted much attention in the West. Neither did the Manifesto of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, proclaimed, in December, 1960, seemingly in response to the Lao Dong Third Congress Resolution. But N. S. Khruschev made news with his 6 January 1961 "wars of national liberation" speech. Khruschev's remarks were actually little more than a precis of the Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960; nonetheless, they shocked the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his "A Thousand Days," declared that Khruschev's "elaborate speech...made a conspicuous impression on the new President, who took it as an authoritative exposition of Soviet intentions, discussed it with his staff, and read excerpts from it aloud to the National Security Council...Underneath the canonical beat of language, the oration sounding a brutal joy over a world where democracy was everywhere on the retreat and communism everywhere on the march." 208/ The President and his principal cabinet officers returned to this speech again and again in their explanations of Administration policy. 209/

Khruschev offered an analysis of the world situation as it appeared at the beginning of the 1960's and declared that, as of that moment, "the prevention of a new war is the question of all questions," He described three categories of wars: "world wars, local wars, and liberation wars or popular uprisings." World wars, he declared, were unlikely. Local wars were also improbable. But, he said, "liberation wars and popular uprisings will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists...such wars are not only admissible but inevitable...an example...is the armed struggle of the Vietnamese people...." He asserted unequivocally that "the communists support just wars of this kind whole-heartedly and without reservation and they march in the van of the peoples fighting for repression." But Khruschev's speech notwithstanding, by 1961 the strategic course of the DRV was well set, and the new President was already at war in South Vietnam with the DRV.
FOOTNOTES


Countries Maintaining Relations with DRV

(* Resident in Peking)

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U.S. Dept. of State, Ltr, Under Secretary Katzenbach to Congressman Evans (March 5, 1968) gives 24 countries, 12 communist.


5. Ibid., 176, 181; DA Pamphlet 550-40, op. cit., 235.

6. Ibid., 179. It should be noted that this announcement followed the peasant revolt in Nghe-An Province in November 1956.

7. A translated text of the 1960 Constitution is in Fall, Two Viet-Nam, op. cit., 409 ff.

8. The National Assembly is elected for 4 years by universal, direct, and secret suffrage on the basis of one deputy for every 50,000 citizens. Article 44 establishes the Assembly as the "only legislative authority." Two meetings per year are prescribed. The Assembly
elects the President and Vice President, and may amend the Constitution. It appoints the Premier upon recommendation of the President, and the Ministers upon recommendation of the Premier. In the interval between the sessions of the National Assembly, its powers are exercised by the permanent Standing Committee. One-seventh of the Assembly seats are reserved for national minorities. The Council of Ministers "the executive organ of the highest state authority" (Art. 71) is responsible to the National Assembly (or the Standing Committee). Following diagram is from NIS 43C, op. cit., 31.

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**CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT**


12. NIS 43C, op. cit., Figure 12, 30.


16. Ibid.


18. NIS 43C, op. cit., Figure 11, compared with CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.


Vietnam Today (New York: Praeger, 1962), 107-108. For Ho's statement on Land Reform in late 1953, see Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1967), 258-269; the statement was made to the Third Session of the National Assembly of the DRV (Dec 1-4, 1953), in which the Assembly enacted an Agrarian Reform Law based on reports by Ho and Pham Van Dong.


22. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, loc. cit.

23. Hoang Van Chi, op. cit., 211.


25. Hoang, op. cit., and Gerard Tonges, L'Enfer communiste du Nord Vietnam (Paris: Les Nouvelles Editions Debress, 1960), are both sometime residents of the DRV, the former a Viet Minh defector of 1955, and the latter a French professor who left Hanoi in 1959. Their accounts of the agrarian reform campaign are consistent with eye witness reports recently collected from prisoners and defectors in South Vietnam, reported in J. J. Zasloff, Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: the Vietminh Regroupes (U) (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, Memorandum RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, August 1966) (Confidential), 44-53, 159-160. The best short summary is that of CIA Staffer George A. Carver, op. cit. For contemporary intelligence estimates, see: U.S. Intelligence Board, National Intelligence Estimate:

NIE 63-5-54 (3 Aug 1954)  
NIE 63.1-55 (19 Jul 1955)  
Special NIE 63.1-4-55 (13 Sep 1955)  
NIE 63.1-3-55 (11 Oct 1955)  
NIE 63-56 (17 Jul 1956)  
NIE 63-59 (26 May 1959)


27. DRV Government Decree No. 239 of March 1953, translated in Fall, The Viet Minh Regime, op. cit., 172-178, is an early example; the process was considerably refined thereafter. A particularly vivid eye-witness account is in Zasloff, op. cit., 47-48.


29. Carver, op. cit., 354; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 124; Hoang, op. cit., 166. Ellen Hammer: "at least 50,000 were killed"; Hammer, op. cit., 341.

30. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution, op. cit., 305-309.


34. Ibid.

35. Hoang, op. cit., 224-228. For data on employment of Southerners against the uprisings, see DIA "The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin...." op. cit., esp. Vol II, Item 81, 80, Text, p. 74.


38. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 157.


40. P. J. Honey, ed., North Vietnam Today, op. cit., 33. It is significant that the DRV armed forces near the border assumed a defensive posture in 1956; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (31 May 1956).

41. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 102; Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit., 169.

42. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, loc. cit.

43. Fall, Le Viet Minh, op. cit.

44. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, op. cit., 124.

45. Ibid., 25, 39; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, 188-190; Hoang, op. cit., 228-239.

46. Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 187.
47. NIS 43C, op. cit., 39.
49. NIS 43C, op. cit., 25, 43.
50. Ibid., 41.
51. Ibid., 35-38, 41-50, 52-53.
52. Ibid., 45.
53. Ibid., 53.
54. Ibid., 52.
55. Loc. cit.
56. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, 296. It should be noted that in the same context Ho offered "preferential" economic relations with France; no such offers were repeated after 1956, when it was clear that France would not meet its Geneva commitments to the DRV, and was pulling out of Vietnam.

62. Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 272

63. Ibid., 334

64. Cf., Bain, op. cit., 54-78; Hoang, op. cit., XIV, XV; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., 4-6, 16-19. Even the name of the country reflects the turmoil of its history. Gia Long called his empire Nam Viet (South Viet). Since the Dai Viet were ethnically related to the people of Kwang-si and Kwang-tung, the Chinese decided that the name Nam Viet implied an irredecent, and reversed the name to Viet Nam. Up to 1945, Gia Long's successors used the more pretentious name Dai Nam (Great South), but only internally, when the DRV revived "Vietnam."


68. Cf., J. J. Zasloff, Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: The Vietminh Regroupes (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, August, 1966, RM-4703-ISA/ARPA), 25-26; Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (2 February 1956) SECRET. The former speculation on interviews with POWs and defectors, but reaches conclusions similar to those of the latter. A like 1954 estimate by the U.S. Army Attaché, Saigon, is included in Current Intelligence Weekly Review (7 October 1954), 6.

69. Fall, Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 302.

70. Some 1,000 Chinese advisers entered North Vietnam; hundreds of Vietnamese were trained in China; and a steadily increasing stream of war material, variously estimated at 400 to 4,000 tons per month, flowed south from China: Central Intelligence Agency, "Probable Developments in Indochina through mid-1954" (NIE-91, June 4, 1953) SECRET; Memorandum, OSD, Robert H. B. Wade to Brig. Gen. Bonesteel, April 13, 1954 (SECRET). J. J. Zasloff, "The Role of the Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China's Support of the Vietminh, 1946-1954," (Santa Monica: RAND, RM-4618-PR, May 1967), passim.

71. Hammer, op. cit., 331-337.

72. NIS 43C, 32-35.


76. Ibid., 59.

77. NIS 43C, op. cit., 59.


79. Ibid., 346; also 342-344; cf., Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 276-277; and P. J. Honey, ed., *North Vietnam Today*, 30-32.


87. Fall, ed., Ho on Revolution, op. cit., 290-299.

89. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (2 August 1956).


93. CIA, Biographic Handbook, op. cit.

94. SNIE 14.3-63, op. cit., 4-5.


97. Hoang, op. cit., 13. The French administered two provinces of Laos from Hanoi (Kien Quang and Sam Neua), RAND Corporation, "DRV Relations with Laos and the Pathet Lao, 1954-1962" (Attachment (2) to 1-14982, 11 August 1967).

98. Ibid.


100. Ibid., 12-14, 18-19.

101. DIA, "The North Vietnamese Role...," loc. cit.

102. NIS 43C, op. cit., 33.


109. DIA AP-4 (May, 1967), op. cit. This study was designed to answer queries from Congressman Evans (f. Katzenbach Letter), and was considered for publication, modified, as a "White Paper."

110. Interrogation of a Montagnard originally from Quang Tri Province, infiltrated into South Vietnam in October, 1961. DIA, "Role," 69-70; Katzenbach letter.

111. Interrogation of a member of one of the "special border-crossing teams." DIA, "Role," 70.

112. Ibid., 71. Interrogation of two members of the 603d Battalion.

113. Ibid., 71, 72. Interrogation of Senior Sergeant of VC 5th Military Region (Zone V) captured in Quang Ngai.

114. Ibid., 73. Interrogation of several agents captured in June and July, 1961; Interrogation of a member of a VC communications cadre.

115. Ibid., Interrogation of a 1962 infiltrator.

116. Ibid., Interrogation of several former NVA officers who surrendered in 1963; interrogation of officer of "1st VC Regiment," who defected in April 1963.


118. DIA, "Role...", op. cit., Katzenbach letter.

119. Ibid.


121. Ibid., 15-16.

123. Zasloff, RM 4703, 73.


125. NIS 43C, op. cit., 30.

126. DIA, "Role . . .", op. cit., 10-11; CIA, Biographic Data.


130. DIA, "Role . . .," 14-15.

131. Ibid., 28-29.

132. Carver, op. cit., 369-370. One prisoner attended an infiltration course at Son Tay in January, 1960, with a group of 60, and infiltrated with the same group in March, 1960. All 60 were officers or NCO's. One became a company commander of a VC unit in Quang Ngai; another a political officer of a battalion in the same province; another a deputy commander of the same battalion. DIA, "Role . . .," 77.

133. Ibid., 61-62.

134. This judgment is based on interrogations of 19 Vietnamese officers and senior NCO's who infiltrated in the years 1959-1963, and of NVA officers who surrendered in 1963. Under Secretary Katzenbach Letter, op. cit., 19.

135. DIA, "Role . . .," 62-64.

136. Ibid., 4-8.

137. Ibid., 9-13; Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex," op. cit., 185-199.

139. Ibid., 9-10.

140. Zasloff, FM 4703-ISA/ARPA, 25-37. A senior captain in the Viet Cong intelligence service wrote a record of his experiences in a document entitled Regroupment Diary: according to this document, his political officer lectured the unit as follows: a/

"(1) Have confidence in the leadership of the General Committee. In two years, the country will be re-unified, because that was the decision of an international body, which gives us reason to trust it. This does not mean that we should be too trustful, but we must continue to struggle.

"(2) The Party will never abandon the people of the South who will stay to fight; when the time comes, they will be led.

"(3) Those who go north should feel happy in their duties. Those who remain behind should carry out the glorious missions entrusted to them by the Party, standing side by side with the people in every situation of struggle."

The political officers also stressed the dangers to which the stay-behinds would be subjected. A cadre whose party history extended back to 1930 stated that: b/

"Those who did regroup did it voluntarily, after realizing that it was the thing to do. They did it to protect themselves from being arrested by the authorities in the South. They were afraid of being charged with having participated in the Resistance before. All cadres were afraid of future persecution by the South Vietnamese authorities; they all wanted to regroup . . . They were afraid . . ."

Still, the Regroupment Diary records that one cadre bet his comrades "three to ten, the country won't be reunified in two years," and that many cadres were worried about leaving family and friends behind. c/ In the RAND Study, the regroupes were asked, "Were you a volunteer for regroupment?" The following responses were typical: d/

(A Defector) At the time it was said that we were volunteers. In reality, they took measures to make sure that everyone left. At the time of regroupment, we had to go. If I had remained, I would have been arrested. I believed that I would remain in the North two years.
(Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections.

(A PW) Our political officer explained that: we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.

\( a/ \) RM 4703, 27, 35.
\( b/ \) Ibid., 34.
\( c/ \) Ibid., 35.
\( d/ \) Ibid., 36.

141. DIA, "Role . . .", 50-53; CIA, " . . . Evidence of North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam Since 1955" (SC No. 2955/64, 10 March 1964), Section I.

142. DIA, "Role . . .", 20-26; CIA, "Evidence . . ." (SC No. 2955/64), loc. cit.


144. DIA, "Role . . .", 47-48.

145. Ibid., 49-50.

146. Ibid., 46-47.


149. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 July 1955, mentions the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi's hint that violent action would ensue were consultations delayed, but there was little other indication of Soviet intention to act.
150. CIA, CIWR, 27 October 1955.

151. CIA, CIWR, 22 September 1955.

152. CIA, CIWR, 10 November 1955.


154. Ho on Revolution, (Signet) op. cit., 269-270; cf., Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (10 May 1956).

155. Ibid., and CIA NSC Briefing for 2 July 1956. The difference in the two texts is readily explained in that Fall used the version of the speech published in the presumably edited four-volume edition of The Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, 1961, 1962); see Fall, Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (Signet edition), page x.

156. Fall, Ho on Revolution (Signet), 274.


158. CIA, CIWR, 2 August 1956.

159. Fall, Ho on Revolution (Signet), 277.


161. CIA, Memo for Record of 8 February 1957.

162. CIA, Singapore CS-82270 of 16 January 1956, and FVS-1071 of 21 September 1956; DIA, "Role ...," 23-29. For further evidence of impatience and diminished faith in the South see CIA, Saigon CS-3,311,416 of April 1957.

163. Ibid.

164. The sequence of events concerning this UN action went as follows:

- **23 Jan 1957** U.S. and 12 other UN members (in a resolution) call upon the UN Security Council to recommend South Vietnam and South Korea for membership in the UN.

- **24 Jan 1957** Soviet delegate in UN Security Council, Arkady A. Sobolev, proposes that North Vietnam and North Korea, as well as South Vietnam and South Korea, be recommended for membership in the UN, as a "package deal."
30 Jan 1957  UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee endorses a resolution (backed by the U.S. and 12 other nations) calling for UN membership for South Vietnam and South Korea. On the same day, the Committee declines to endorse a "package deal" proposed by the Soviet Union for simultaneous admission of North Vietnam and North Korea.

28 Feb 1957  UN General Assembly recommends to the Security Council UN membership for South Vietnam and South Korea (40 to 8 with 18 abstentions, and 40 to 8 with 16 abstentions respectively).

9 Sep 1957  After making an unsuccessful attempt to postpone consideration of the question until Vietnam had been unified, the USSR vetoed the admission of the RVN to the UN.

25 Oct 1957  UN General Assembly (by votes 49 to 9, with 23 abstentions) passes resolution declaring that South Vietnam is eligible for membership in the UN. The resolution "noted 'with regret' the continued inability of the Security Council to recommend the admission of South Korea and South Vietnam... to the UN because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union." (Asian Recorder, New Delhi, Vol. 111, No. 51.)


166. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit., 50.

167. Ibid., 50-51.


171. Ibid., 3-7. For examples of the subsequent import attached to the
Declaration of 1957, cf., "The Statement of Conference of Representa-
tives of Communist and Workers' Parties," The Current Digest of the
Soviet Press (Vol XII, No. 48, 28 Dec 1960, and No. 49, 4 Jan 1961),
No. 49, p. 6, which refers to the "1957 Declaration" and quotes the
cited text verbatim; also Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Bulletin, "Nhan Dan Views Moscow, Party Statements" (13 January
1961, p. EE 9 ff.), which relates the proceedings of the Lao
Dong's Third Party Congress (September, 1960) to the 1960 Moscow
Conference, and to the "declaration of 1957."

172. Quoted in Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit.

173. E.g. Bernard B. Fall, "Power and Pressure Groups in North Vietnam,"
China Quarterly (No. 9, January-March 1961), 36-39; P. J. Honey,
"The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi
Minh," Ibid., 32-34.


175. Ibid., 61-62.


177. Cooper, et al., Case Studies in Insurgency ..., op. cit., 77-80.

178. Ibid.


180. Fall, "Two Viet-Nems," op. cit., 63, 66-71; U.S. Department of
State, Political Alliance of Vietnamese Nationalists, (Office of
Intelligence Research, Report No. 3708, October 1, 1949), 66-67,
quoting the Factual Record of the August Revolution (Hanoi,
September, 1945).


182. Ibid., 207-210.

183. CIA, "The Organization, Activities, and Objectives of the Communist
Front in South Vietnam," Intelligence Memorandum 1603/66, 26 Septem-
ber 1966; CIA, memorandum, "The Organization, Activities, and
Objectives ...," dated 7 September 1965; CIA, ... Evidence
of North Vietnamese Violation of the Geneva Agreements on
Vietnam," op. cit., Section I, II.

184. Ibid.
186. CIA, "... Evidence of North Vietnamese ...", op. cit.
188. Ibid., 43-56.
190. Ibid.
191. Quotations of Lao Dong leaders are from the English language broad-
casts of the Vietnam News Agency, Radio Hanoi, as reported in the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Bulletin, April 30 - May 15,
1959.
192. U.S. Department of State, A Threat to the Peace (White Paper, 1961),
op. cit., II, 3.
193. U.S. Department of State, Saigon Dispatch 278 to State, March 7,
1960, 1-6.
194. Ibid., 7.
195. Ibid.
(National Intelligence Estimate 63.2-57, 14 May 1957); CIA, "Signi-
ficance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort," (Special
National Intelligence Estimate, 26 January 1967).
197. NIS 43C, op. cit., 33. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op. cit.,
168-181; Central Intelligence Agency, "North Vietnamese Violations
of the Geneva Agreements on Laos," (SC No. 02988/64, 20 April 1964),
TOP SECRET, and CIA, same subject (SC 03026/64, 19 May 1964), TOP
SECRET.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid., 3, Appendices II & III. "Protocol to the Declaration on the
Neutrality of Laos," in U.S. Congress, Senate, Background Information
Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (Committee on Foreign Relations,
CIA, "North Vietnamese Violations...", op. cit.

Following a rupture between Kong Le and the Pathet Lao and the
assassination of the pro-Communist Foreign Minister of the RIG in
April 1963, the DRV apparently determined to reinforce the Pathet
Lao, for the U.S. began to receive reports of renewed NVA operations in Laos from multiple sources, including a Pathet Lao defector and a Polish ICC member. By mid-1963, NVA strength was over 10 battalions, with some 5000 to 7000 men plus 3,000 advisers, and new arms and supplies were arriving constantly. For example, members of the Polish ICC team in Hanoi, told their counterparts in Laos in August 1963 that the DRV was dispatching daily shipments of military equipment into Laos. a/ and in February 1964 a Pathet Lao officer in southern Laos stated that the DRV was shipping in new and heavier arms, including tanks. b/

a/ Central Intelligence Agency, CIA/TDCSDB 3657725, 4 November 1963, cited in "North Vietnamese Violations...."

b/ CIA/TDCS 3572046 of 4 February 1964, in ibid.


204. Ibid., 3.

205. Ibid., 3-5.


# Chart - Principal Personalities, 1954-1960

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## PRINCIPAL PERSONALITIES, 1954-1960

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>20 Jan 1953 - 20 Jan 1961</td>
<td>Dwight D. Eisenhower</td>
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<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>21 Jan 1953 - 15 Apr 1959</td>
<td>John Foster Dulles</td>
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<td>16 Apr 1959 - 20 Jan 1961</td>
<td>Christian A. Herter</td>
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<td>Ambassador to SVN</td>
<td>25 Jun 1952 - 20 Apr 1955</td>
<td>Donald R. Heath</td>
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<td>20 Apr 1955 - 14 Mar 1957</td>
<td>G. Frederick Reinhardt</td>
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<td>Elbridge Durbrow</td>
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<td>26 Jan 1953 - 8 Oct 1957</td>
<td>Charles E. Wilson</td>
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<td>9 Oct 1957 - 2 Dec 1959</td>
<td>Neil H. McElroy</td>
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<td>1 Oct 1960 - 30 Sep 1962</td>
<td>General Lyman B. Ridgway</td>
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<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
<td>15 Aug 1953 - 30 Jun 1965</td>
<td>General Matthew B. Ridgway</td>
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<td>General Lyman B. Ridgway</td>
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<td>General George E. Decker</td>
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<td>General Nathan F. Twining</td>
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<td>General Thomas B. White</td>
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IV. A. 5.
Tab 4.


A. U.S. Intelligence, 1954-1959

In electing to support Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954 and 1955, and to assume responsibilities from France for providing economic and military assistance to South Vietnam in the years thereafter, the United States deliberately set out to establish in South Vietnam a political environment markedly different from that which France had fostered in the period 1945-54. In 1960, however, there were still similarities to the French period, and these were perhaps more fundamental than were differences.


The pattern that was to confront the U.S. throughout the 1950's was noted in a National Intelligence Estimate of 29 December 1950 (NIE-5), which began: "The French position in Indochina is critically in danger by the Viet Minh, a communist movement that has exploited native nationalism." Under the circumstances prevailing, "there is only a slight chance that the French can maintain their military position long enough to build up an independent Vietnamese government and an effective national army which might win the support of non-communist nationalists, and, in conjunction with French forces, contain the Viet Minh." Despite French efforts to weaken the political, nationalistic base of the Viet Minh by supporting "a semi-autonomous pro-French government under native leadership, ... concessions to nationalistic sentiment leading to full sovereignty for the Bao Dai government have been forthcoming so slowly and with such seeming reluctance on the part of the French, that the Bao Dai government has not in fact won a strong nationalistic following in any quarter. As a result the French so far have been unable to undermine the political strength of the Viet Minh."

Meanwhile, however, the Estimate noted that military pressure from the Viet Minh, assisted by the Chinese Communists, could eject the French from Tonkin, and ultimately from all of Vietnam; without a strengthening of the French military position, defeat seemed inevitable, even if the French and the Bao Dai government should begin to transform the political situation. A political mutation was essential to victory, and had to be timely - were a military defeat to be averted. The NIE concluded that if Chinese Communist aid
were continued, and French strength and military resources were not substantially increased above those then programmed, "the Viet Minh probably can drive the French out of North Vietnam (Tonkin) within 6 to 9 months."

But half a year later, an NIE of 7 August 1951 (NIE-35, pp. 1-2), reported, "The present military situation in Indochina is one of stalemate." General de Lattre de Tassigny had repulsed the Viet Minh regime's drive to conquer Tonkin, this "success" resulting from a number of factors including French reinforcements, Viet Minh mistakes in their initial foray into large-scale conventional warfare, and "the timely arrival of U.S. military aid, including aircraft, napalm bombs, patrol and landing craft, and ground combat materiel," which had helped de Lattre "to inflict heavy losses on the Viet Minh . . ." But, the Estimate noted, "Political developments . . . have been less favorable . . ."

In other words, the French and Bao Dai showed no intention of using the time thus purchased by averting military defeat to bring about political progress: *

". . . Despite the gradual French transfer of certain responsibilities, the Vietnamese government has been slow to develop and has continued to suffer from a lack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a) French reluctance to relinquish ultimate control of political and economic affairs; (b) lingering Vietnamese suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with the apathetic and 'fence-sitting' attitude of the bulk of the people, which has deprived the government of broad-based popular support; (c) the difficulty common to all new and inexperienced governments, of training the necessary personnel and building an efficient administration; and (d) the failure of factional and sectional groups to unite in a concerted national effort.

"In January 1951 the opportunity arose of forming a broad-based cabinet representing most non-Communist group in Vietnam; instead Premier Huu formed a cabinet composed primarily of members of his own pro-French faction. Although Huu has displayed some administrative skill and his government has gained slowly in effectiveness, the weakness of the Huu cabinet and its alleged 'French puppet' status have limited its appeal to Vietnamese nationalism and have alienated strong nationalist groups, including the powerful Dai Viet group in Tonkin. Communist control of much of the country and Viet Minh infiltration of large areas under nominal French control have also discouraged many people from openly allying themselves with the government."

* In this and all following citations, italics are added, unless otherwise noted.
There had been more progress in efforts to create a national Vietnamese army, "an essential prerequisite to growth in the political stature of the Vietnamese government and to ultimate non-communist solution in Indochina," but "progress in the formation of the Army is retarded by lack of capable officers at all levels of command, shortages of equipment, and the apathetic attitude of the populace." (Weaknesses in officers -- in large part the policy of officer recruitment and promotion -- have fatally weakened Vietnamese army operations ever since.) In the end, the French neither built a genuinely Vietnamese army, nor allowed the native armed force any role or status which might have made it an effective adjunct of nationalism.

On the communist side, the estimate noted that:

"The communist party role has been strengthened, with strict party liners coming more into the foreground ... in the absence of further military victories, Viet Minh popular support appears unlikely to increase ... while we are unable to determine whether the Viet Minh is actually losing any of its popular appeal, the regime apparently is dependent more and more on tightened communist controls ... these tightened controls may prevent defections and facilitate the exploitation of people already under Viet Minh control."

Two years later, NIE-91 of 4 June 1953 continued to emphasize the critical problems of lack of support for the Bao Dai regime and lack of Indochinese will and ability to resist the Viet Minh. Some political progress could be pointed to during the preceding year, including local elections in secure areas, and decisions in March 1953 to increase the size of the Vietnamese National Army; and, a note that reads familiarly nearly fifteen years later:

"Another Vietnamese program, undertaken with U.S. economic assistance, which involves the relocation of scattered villages in the Tonkin delta into centralized and defensible sites may be an important step toward the eventual 'pacification' of heavily infiltrated areas."

However,

"Despite these advances, Vietnam still lacks the degree of political strength essential for the mobilization of the country's resources. Tam's 'action' program remains more shadow than substance. Elected local councils have no real power, promised land reform and other social and economic reforms which might generate popular support have not left
the planning stage, and the Vietnamese government is handicapped by incompetent cabinet ministers and the lack of competent administrators. While Bao Dai refuses to assume active direction of the affairs of state, he remains hostile toward new leadership and democratic activities."

"Of more basic importance in the failure of Vietnamese to rally to the Vietnamese government following the French grant of independence within the French Union in 1949 have been the following:

a. Many Vietnamese doubt the ability of French Union forces to defeat the Viet Minh and prefer to remain apart from the struggle.

b. The French Government had not dared to promise complete national independence at some future date, as demanded by the Vietnamese, because of the fear that the French national assembly would then refuse to support a war in a 'lost' portion of the French Union.

c. The Vietnamese, despite many evolutionary steps toward complete independence since 1949, are generally inclined to believe that the French intend to retain effective control over the affairs of Vietnam.

d. The nationalist appeal and military prestige of the Viet Minh remains strong among significant numbers of the Vietnamese."

2. Geneva, 1954

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 brought to an end nine years of open warfare between the French and the Viet Minh. In 1950, the conflict had been transformed from a purely colonial into a quasi-civil war, in which the Viet Minh found themselves pitted against a non-communist Vietnamese state with nominal independence, enjoying significant U.S. support. Nonetheless, the conflict was settled by the original protagonists: France and the DRV. As of the summer of 1954, U.S. assessments anticipated that a continuing French presence in Indochina would offset the Viet Minh menace in North Vietnam. The U.S. expected its own "political action"—e.g., forming SEATO—further to buttress "free Vietnam." Initially, at least, the U.S. locked on Diem as an unknown quantity with uncertain chances of succeeding against two sorts of challenges: the political turbulence within South Vietnam on the one hand, and on the other organized, communist-led remnants of the Viet Minh apparatus operating in concert with the DRV. In the years through 1960, estimates of the relative urgency of these two challenges varied. U.S. intelligence estimates rarely expressed confidence that Diem could overcome both
these threats, and usually the odds were judged to be against his surmounting either in the long run.

However, U.S. estimates in the immediate aftermath of Geneva held that a forceful direct communist challenge was unlikely through 1956. Diem was expected to enjoy a respite in which he could deal with other internal opposition, and shore up his government. Most estimates then concluded that the principal reason why the communists were unlikely to make an open challenge during that period was the very likelihood that Diem would prove unable to consolidate his power, and that South Vietnam would fall to the communists in the general elections scheduled for 1956, if not as a result of earlier internal turmoil. Thus, a National Intelligence Estimate of 3 August 1954 (NIE 63-5-54, p. 1) stated:

"We believe that the Communists will not give up their objective of securing control of all Indochina but will, without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by political, psychological, and paramilitary means."

"Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese, even with firm support from the U.S. and other powers, may be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we believe that the chances for this development are poor and, moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the next year. . . ."

In the light of the lessons of the first Indochinese War, the possibility of meeting the longer term challenge from the communists was seen as requiring not only the establishment of an efficient government in South Vietnam (thus circumventing the short-term tendencies toward chaos in the south), but a government under "strong Nationalist leadership," that could enlist the loyalty and active participation of the people in a united struggle against communist forces. This, in turn, at that time, was seen to depend on swift, firm, French action to back such leadership. But such a change in French policy appeared unlikely. (Ibid., p. 6)

"On the basis of the evidence we have at this early date, however, we believe that a favorable development of the situation in South Vietnam is unlikely. Unless Mendes-France is able to overcome the force of French traditional interests and emotions which have in the past governed the implementation of policy in Indochina, we do not believe there will be the dramatic transformation in French policy necessary to win the active loyalty and support of the local population for a South Vietnam Government. . . ."
As the year 1954 wore on, the near paralysis of the government and the increasing challenges to Diem's leadership from non-communist elements seemed increasingly to confirm the judgment U.S. estimates ascribed to the communists: that no forceful measures -- open violations of the Geneva Agreement, risking U.S. intervention -- would be necessary to achieve the eventual extension of DRV authority throughout Vietnam. These developments reinfoced the U.S. expectation that the communists would stand back from open intervention, at least until the scheduled date of elections in July 1956.

Yet, as early as November, 1954, a National Estimate projected the likelihood that if -- contrary to expectations -- the communists should be denied a victory by political means on or before July 1956, they would turn to violent means, using their remaining apparatus in the south for terrorism and guerrilla action and reinforcing it by infiltration. According to NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954 (p. 9):

"We believe that the Viet Minh will continue to gain in political strength and prestige and, with Chinese aid, to increase its military striking power in North Vietnam. The Viet Minh probably now feels that it can achieve control over all Vietnam without initiating large-scale warfare. Accordingly, we believe that the Communists will exert every effort to accomplish their objectives through means short of war. . . ."

"If, on the other hand, South Vietnam should appear to be gaining in strength or if elections were postponed over Communist objections, the Communists probably would step up their subversive and guerrilla activities in the South and if necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort to gain control over the area. . . ."

As of late 1954, the Estimate stated the "present key to political power in South Vietnam" was still held by the French. "Under present circumstances, only the French can provide to the legitimate governing authority in Vietnam the power it now lacks, and force the coalescence of the various factions, groups, and individuals." (Ibid., p. 5) As for Diem himself: "Diem, the leading lay Catholic in Vietnam, is honest, austere, and widely respected for his integrity and nationalistic zeal. . . . However, Diem is rigid, unwilling to compromise, and inexperienced in the rough and tumble of politics. He is acutely suspicious of his colleagues on the political scene and is inclined to seek advice among a small group of relatives and close friends who, for the most part, are incapable of proffering sound counsel . . . None of the groups opposing Diem has any broad-based popular support. It is the weakness of Diem rather than any genuine political strength of their own that enables them to prolong the political crisis in Saigon. . . ." (Ibid., p. 4)
TOP SECRET - Sensitive

The Estimate noted that the French might decide that in order to preserve their relationship with the U.S., "it is essential to support an anti-Communist South Vietnam, postponing elections if necessary. The French would feel, however, that such a course would involve a substantially increased risk of renewed hostilities with the Viet Minh. . . ." (Ibid., p. 8)

"We believe that the French estimate that South Vietnam cannot be held over the long term, except at very high cost." (Ibid., p. 8)

The French were unlikely to provide Diem with the "full and positive support" - despite a French-U.S. understanding of September 29, in which the French agreed "to support Diem in the establishment of a strong, anti-Communist regime in Vietnam" (ibid., p. 7). "Diem will probably not be able to reestablish the authority of the government throughout South Vietnam and to tackle effectively the multitude of pressing problems now facing the country." (Ibid., p. 8) Thus, the Estimate ended on a gloomy note: "We believe, on the basis of present trends, it is highly unlikely that South Vietnam will develop the strength necessary to counter growing Communist subversion within its border; it almost certainly would not be able to defeat the Communists in countrywide elections. Even before the elections scheduled for 1956, the probable growth of Communist influence in the South may result in strong pressures within South Vietnam for coalition with the North." (Ibid., p. 9)

Subsequently, reassured by Diem's successes in subduing a variety of non-communist challenges to his leadership, the U.S. moved into the key role in support of Diem it had earlier hoped the French might undertake. Yet the question posed by the French appreciation of the situation remained hanging: Was it possible to hold South Vietnam "over the long term" without a "very high cost"?


By the spring of 1955, Diem was engaged in a sharp confrontation with the Binh Xuyen gangsters and with the religious sects of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, and the possibility was recognized that he might (as in fact, he did) win victory and increase his prestige and authority. Nevertheless, an estimate of 26 April 1955 was still pessimistic about his longer-term prospects:

"Even if the present impasse were resolved, we believe that it would be extremely difficult, at best, for a Vietnamese government, regardless of its composition, to make progress toward developing a strong, stable anti-Communist government capable of resolving the basic social, economic, and political
problems of Vietnam, the special problems arising from the Geneva agreement, and capable of meeting the long-range challenge of the Communists..." (NIE 63.1-2-55, 26 April 1955, p. 3)

Meanwhile, it continued to appear likely that open communist pressure would be postponed until mid-1956, but only until then. An estimate of probable developments in North Vietnam to July 1956 concluded:

"...The resumption of widespread guerrilla activities appears unlikely prior to the election deadline, unless the DRV should come to the conclusion that South Vietnam can be won only by force. Such a conclusion would become more likely should the Diem government persist in refusing to enter the election discussions, should election discussions not proceed favorably for the DRV, or should the Diem government succeed, with US assistance, in consolidating its strength to the point of becoming a nationalist alternative to the Ho regime. Moreover, if during the period of this estimate little progress is made towards relaxing tensions, Peiping and Moscow might permit the DRV greater freedom of action. Should the DRV decide to use force short of open invasion, it would probably attempt to undermine the Saigon government by initiating a campaign of sabotage and terror, seeking the formation of a new government more amenable to demands for a national coalition. These tactics are likely to include the activation of DRV guerrilla units now in South Vietnam and their reinforcement by the infiltration in small units of regulars from the North." (NIE 63.1-55, 19 July 1955, p. 2)

By the fall of 1955, although Diem and his army were still struggling with Hoa Hao and Cao Dai (having scattered the Binh Xuyen), it seemed likely that they would prevail, and emerge with unchallenged authority, at least for a time:

"Nevertheless, the success of Diem's efforts to establish a viable anti-Communist government in South Vietnam is still in doubt. Although Diem has established control over the apparatus of government, he has dealt only in part with such fundamental problems as: (a) the development of an effective administration, particularly on provincial and local levels; (b) the institution of a popularly-sanctioned constitutional basis for the regime; (c) the elimination of armed opposition and the extension of government authority throughout all areas of South Vietnam; (d) the suppression of Viet Minh military and political capabilities remaining in South Vietnam; and (e) the restoration of the econoy." (NIE 63.1-3-55, 11 October 1955, p. 3)
In the fall of 1955, the time was approaching when Diem had to reckon with communist reaction to a denial of their hopes for peaceful political victory.

"Diem will almost certainly not agree to hold national elections for the unification of Vietnam by July 1956. Although Diem, under pressure from the Western Powers, might reluctantly agree to indirect consultations with the DRV concerning elections, he would insist on conditions which he felt certain the Communists would be unable to accept. Aware that such a position will probably cause the Viet Minh to increase their efforts to destroy his government, Diem will probably seek to bind the US more specifically to the defense of Vietnam."

"The Viet Minh, despite their relative quiescence, present the greatest potential threat to Diem. Should the Viet Minh elect openly to invade the south with regular forces, they are capable of defeating the VNA and any French forces (if committed) now present in South Vietnam. Moreover, with an estimated 10,000 military personnel in South Vietnam, the Viet Minh have the capability to undertake local sabotage and terrorist actions; and small-scale but widespread guerrilla warfare. The Viet Minh can reinforce these forces by infiltrating into South Vietnam. The Viet Minh apparently exerts political influence in many areas scattered throughout South Vietnam." (MB 65.1-3-55, 11 October 1955, p. 1)

"Should the Viet Minh initiate large-scale guerrilla operations supported by substantial infiltration from the north, the South Vietnamese government would be hard pressed to do more than maintain control in the Saigon-Cholon area and in a few other major urban centers. If the operation were prolonged, the government probably could not survive without military assistance from outside." (Ibid., p. 2)

Diem's greatest assets in this struggle were:

"... his reputation for honesty and unsullied nationalism, his control of the Vietnamese National Army, and the moral and financial support of the U.S. In addition, Diem has gained considerable popular following, especially in urban centers and in recently pacified areas and has the loyalty of the refugees from North Vietnam. However, should he lose army or US support, his regime would probably collapse." (Ibid., p. 3)
As early as the fall of 1955, limitations that later were to loom large on his ability to attract subordinate leadership were perceived:

"... His cabinet is composed primarily of loyal technicians who lack political stature. Most well known political figures of the pre-Diem period have been alienated by Diem's unwillingness to trust them and by his insistence that unquestioned acceptance of his leadership is the only basis for cooperation. Diem has depended heavily on his unpopular brothers for advice and entrusts them with positions of great responsibility. His tendency toward 'one man rule,' his dependence on his brothers for advice, and his rejection of Vietnamese leaders whom he does not trust, has denied his government many of the few trained administrators." (Ibid., pp. 3-4)

As for the public, when he took office in July 1954, the most significant political convictions of most South Vietnamese were "antipathy for the French combined with a personal regard for Ho Chi Minh as the symbol of Vietnamese Nationalism..." (Ibid., p. 2)

Diem's efforts to "galvanize mass popular support" concentrated initially on "exploiting popular antipathy for Bao Dai and the French" and subsequently on developing "strong anti-Communist sentiment." (Ibid., p. 4) Nevertheless, confronting a communist regime in North Vietnam "possessing a far stronger Army, a more experienced administration, greater cohesion of leadership and greater drive than the government of South Vietnam," and led by Ho Chi Minh, "Premier Diem will almost certainly not agree to a test of relative popular strength in national elections." (Ibid., p. 5)

Although no estimates in the 1955-1956 period assumed the communists would open guerrilla operations immediately upon the final frustration of their election hopes in July 1956, the estimates recognized increasing pressures upon the communists for recourse to violent methods of achieving their long-run objectives. The 19 October 1955 NIE held that:

"... They probably estimate that unless they effectively challenge the position of the Diem government the latter will gradually strengthen and stabilize its position. Moreover, they have probably concluded that Diem will not agree to elections or unification schemes which would favor the Communists. Under these circumstances the chances for a Communist take-over of the south by means short of open force might decline. On the other hand, the Communists also probably realize that the use of force against South Vietnam..."
either through open invasion or by infiltrating sufficient troops across the 17th Parallel to insure a successful 'liberation' -- would jeopardize current Bloc peace policies and risk provoking US intervention. In addition, the Communists may not presently have sufficient strength in South Vietnam quickly to overthrow the Diem government and may therefore estimate that to undertake widespread guerrilla warfare without substantial infiltration from the north might lead not only to the weakening of their exposed organization in the south but also to a drastic loss of public support."

(Ibid., p. 6)

However, a July 1956 NIE noted that if substantial infiltration from the DRV were deemed necessary, it possessed the resources:

"... Ninety-five thousand men were evacuated from the south in the first few months following the Armistice. The DRV probably views this group as a possible instrument for subversive activity in South Vietnam and some may have been retrained, re indoctrinated, and perhaps even reinfiltrated." (NIE 63-56, 17 July 1956, p. 6)

By March 1956, Diem had reduced the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao groups to political impotence, and had won a substantial majority in South Vietnam's first national elections: "no openly anti-Diem Deputy was elected ... due in part to government manipulation of the election campaign, and in part to a boycott of the elections by most of the opposition parties." (Ibid., p. 7)

The same NIE stated that it was likely that "organized non-communist resistance" would virtually disappear by 1957 and, indeed, that South Vietnam's military and security forces could maintain "the government in power against any potential armed opposition now located south of the 17th parallel," even against communist armed strength in the south estimated at "8,000 - 10,000, with approximately 5,000 organized in skeletal company and battalion sized units which could be expanded through recruitment." (Ibid., 10-11) However, longer-run prospects of the regime still depended on the decision of the North Vietnamese regime whether, and when, to activate their apparatus in the south and infiltrate "regroupees" from the north.

"... In the event of large scale, concerted guerrilla warfare supported by infiltration of men and supplies from the north, relatively large areas of rural Vietnam probably would be lost to government control..." (Ibid., p. 10)
"... if the Communists decide to exercise their capability for armed intimidation and terror they could quickly reassert political control or influence, at least in some rural areas where GVN authority is tenuous.

"During the past year the Communists in South Vietnam have remained generally quiescent. They have passed by a number of opportunities to embarrass the Diem regime. Although some cadres and supplies are being infiltrated across the 17th parallel, the DRV probably has not sent any large scale reinforcement or supply to the south. Communist activity in the south appears to concentrate on protecting vital bases and supply caches, developing clandestine paramilitary organizations, and implementing a broad program of infiltration and subversion. While seeking to maintain intact as much of their armed strength as possible, their main activity seems to be an effort to weaken the Diem government by subversive and political tactics. Communist directives indicate that penetration and subversion of the GVN military and security forces is a major objective. ..." (Ibid., p. 11)

But the communists' choices were narrowing all the time:

"The DRV probably estimates that its chances for securing control of South Vietnam by means short of open attack or large scale guerrilla action supported from the north will gradually diminish with the passage of time. ... The DRV probably also believes that its covert assets in South Vietnam will gradually decline if the Diem government is permitted to concentrate on internal security and economic problems free of external harassment." (Ibid., pp. 12-13)

Thus,

"The only remaining course of action holding out some promise for the early achievement of Communist control in South Vietnam appears to be the development of large scale guerrilla warfare in the south. In recent weeks a number of reports from sources of untested reliability have indicated that the Communists may have started preparations in both South Vietnam and in the north to begin guerrilla action. DRV allegations of Vietnamese violations of the demilitarized zone along the 17th parallel and Communist claims of US-Diem plans to violate the Armistice could be propaganda cover for the initiation of guerrilla action against the south." (Ibid., p. 13)
However, the July 1956 NIE took the position that the DRV was unlikely to use its capabilities for instituting such large-scale guerrilla action within South Vietnam during the next year or so. Yet, Diem's unforeseen success in dealing with non-communist challenges led to increasing hope that he would be able to survive even a later confrontation with the communists.

"... Diem's success in by-passing the July 1956 election date without evoking large scale Communist military reaction will reassure many Vietnamese and encourage them to cooperate with GVN programs to expose and root out Communists. Continued improvement in internal security will depend in some measure on the government's ability to deal with economic and social problems and on the effectiveness of the administrative apparatus.

"If the Communists were to undertake large scale guerrilla action in South Vietnam, they probably would not be able to develop widespread popular support, especially if the VNA were to register some early military success. The GVN is being increasingly accepted as a nationalist alternative to Communist leadership. Public confidence in the GVN, combined with general war-weariness, may have already reached the point where any effort to upset the government by force would lead to a strong popular reaction against the guerrillas. (Ibid., p. 14)

This NIE came close to being a high-water mark in optimism concerning Diem's ability to meet his dual challenges, both short and long run. But political trends that could restore the vigor of his non-communist opposition were seen:

"...The trend toward authoritarian rule through the political parties led by Diem's relatives and small circle of trusted associates will probably continue. Isolation and neutralization of government critics and men disliked or distrusted by Diem will also continue. Diem and his associates are likely to exert strong pressures against any opposition in the Assembly. Thus it is not likely that Diem or his government will meet any serious opposition in the National Assembly during the period of this estimate [through mid-1957]; however, over a longer period the accumulation of grievances among various groups and individuals may lead to development of a national opposition movement...." (Ibid., p. 14)

In January, 1957, MAAG Vietnam's semi-annual report to the Secretary of Defense (Country Statement on MDAP, Non-NATO Countries, date cited) noted hopefully that:

"The internal security situation in Vietnam has improved during the last year in regards to the dissident sects. Viet Minh armed cadres total approximately 1,370 effectives, Hoa Hao
dissidents total approximately 850. No effective resistance is anticipated from the few remaining Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen. Activity of Viet Minh cadres in Free Vietnam has accelerated. While primarily political in nature, it does pose a threat to internal security. These cadres are attempting to infiltrate and take over the dissident sects. Reports indicate that they have succeeded in these efforts with a fraction of the Hoa Hao. On the other hand, approximately 7,000 sect troops have indicated their loyalty by joining forces with the government and have recently been integrated as a part of the National Army.

"...It appears that the Communist efforts are mainly in a passive stage of long-range subversion of the 'will to fight.' The Vietnamese Psychological Action Section is increasing its efforts to counter 'Red propaganda.' Improvement of social status, security, and living standards are essential elements in preventing susceptibility to Communist subversion which may detract from the effectiveness of military forces."

"The Vietnamese Army is considered capable of establishing and maintaining internal security throughout the populous areas of Free Vietnam against dissident sects and other anti-government elements...."

"The Binh Xuyen have been destroyed as an effective anti-government military force and a major portion of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao forces have been integrated into the National Army."

"Intelligence reports indicate that despite heavy losses due to military operations and desertions, the Viet Minh organization in Free Vietnam remains a serious problem. Recent mergers of other dissident and rebel elements with the Viet Minh, have considerably strengthened the Viet Minh cause."

"The Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps (in villages throughout Free Vietnam) are of material assistance in supplementing the efforts of the Vietnamese Army in the accomplishment of the internal security mission. As these para-military units become better equipped and trained, their increased capability for assuming the major role in maintaining internal security will afford necessary relief of Army units for training. Simultaneously, this will add to Free Vietnam's potential for providing resistance to external aggression."

An NIE of May 1957 on "The Prospects for North Vietnam" (NIE 63.2-57), considered that the communist leaders in North Vietnam, despite "sporadic outbursts of violence," remained "in firm control largely because of loyalty and effectiveness of the army." However, they were considered crucially dependent on the USSR and CPR, and were
deemed unlikely to launch an attack on the South unless there were unforeseen serious disturbances there:

"Not only are the DRV leaders bound to the Bloc by strong ideological ties, but the very existence of the Communist regime in North Vietnam is dependent on continued Bloc diplomatic, military, and economic support. The Chinese Communists seem to exercise somewhat greater influence than the USSR and have given the DRV greater economic and diplomatic support... However, there is no evidence that Soviet and Chinese Communists are at odds over North Vietnam."

"The Bloc has recently given less than full support to Vietnamese reunification, to the perceptible discomfort of the DRV. At the May 1956 meeting of the Geneva co-chairmen, the Soviet Union tacitly accepted the status quo in Vietnam for an indefinite period. In January 1957 the USSR further recognized the long term nature of the division of Vietnam when it proposed, as a countermove to Western proposals for the admission of South Vietnam and South Korea, that both North and South Vietnam and North and South Korea should be admitted to the United Nations. Nevertheless, the DRV will almost certainly continue to be guided in its external course of action by the general policy set down by Moscow and Peking, although it will continue to advocate a stronger policy on reunification."

"The DRV continues to maintain its apparatus for subversion within South Vietnam and has the capability to infiltrate fairly large numbers of military and political personnel into South Vietnam. Although the Communists in the South have largely quiescent, some trained military personnel remain, loosely organized in small units that presumably could be reactivated for missions of assassination, sabotage, or limited guerrilla activity. South Vietnamese security forces intermittently discover cached Communist arms.

"Because the country-wide elections envisaged by the Geneva Agreements have not been held and because military action has been prevented, the DRV has been frustrated in its hopes of gaining control of South Vietnam. This has caused some discontent among cadres evacuated from the South in the expectation that they would soon return. Unification of the country remains a principal objective of the DRV regime, and it continues to seek support for its pretentions to emerge as the government of the whole of Vietnam. Its 'liberalization' measures are designed to appeal to the population of the South as well as the North. The DRV has maintained its pose of adherence to the terms of the cease-fire agreement concluded at Geneva while accusing the Republic of
Vietnam and the US of violations. It is seeking to enhance its international prestige and position, and to secure the broadest possible support for the political settlement envisaged at the Geneva Conference which it still insists must eventually be implemented."

"The DRV will probably continue for the next year or two to restrict its campaign for reunification to 'peaceful' means. However, the DRV will continue its efforts to infiltrate and to subvert official and unofficial organizations and to exploit dissident and dissatisfied groups in South Vietnam. It would probably not use its paramilitary forces in South Vietnam to initiate widespread guerrilla activity unless it estimated that the situation in South Vietnam had deteriorated to such action could overthrow the government. The DRV will continue to have the capability to overrun South Vietnam in a relatively short time if opposed only by South Vietnamese forces, but it would only launch such an attack if the DRV together with Moscow and Peiping were to estimate that such action carried little risk of military intervention by the US."

By mid-1957, the security outlook in South Vietnam, according to MAAG's intelligence, was rosy indeed; the only dark clouds hovered over the Viet Cong (MAAG, "Country Statement..., 15 July 1957):

"In the past six months Dissident Sect strengths have fallen off. Numerically the Hoa Hao Sect has remained about the same (estimated at 850-950 armed men) but its power has been greatly diminished due to continuous government military operations, the improvement of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, the capture of bases and equipment by government forces, and the resulting loss in morale. Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen military forces are negligible....

"The Viet Cong guerrillas and propagandists, however, are still waging a grim battle for survival. In addition to an accelerated propaganda campaign, the Communists have been forming 'front' organizations to influence at least portions of all anti-government minorities. Some of these organizations are militant, some political. An example of the former is the 'Vietnamese Peoples' Liberation Movement Forces,' a military unit composed of ex-Cao Dai, ex-Hoa Hao, ex-Binh Xuyen, escaped political prisoners, and Viet Cong cadres. An example of the latter is the 'Vietnam-Cambodian Buddhist Association', one of several organizations seeking to spread the theory of 'Peace and Co-existence.' The armed strength of Viet Cong-controlled units in Free Vietnam is now estimated at approximately 1,500."

The Department of State sponsored an intelligence estimate for the U.S. SEATO Council Representatives, dated 3 April 1958, entitled "Nature and Extent of the Communist Subversive Threat to the Protocol States of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos." This estimate held that the DRV continued to pose a basic threat to the GVN:

"Although Communist tactics have shifted over the past few years, the real objective -- ultimate Communist control of all Vietnam -- has remained unchanged. Overt aggression, employed by the Communists prior to the Geneva Agreements and ceasefire, has been at least temporarily put aside in favor of demands for 'peaceful reunification,' more in accord with the general Soviet line of peaceful co-existence. The Communist peaceful pose, however, has not brought any relaxation in the build-up of DRV military strength or repressive Communist control over the population in North Vietnam. Moreover, support and assistance provided by the DRV for Communist subversive activities in South Vietnam (as well as in Laos and to a lesser extent Cambodia and Thailand) has not been reduced...."

"...The continuation of the Communist program to infiltrate and support subversive cadres in South Vietnam is the clearest indication of the unchanged nature of their objective in Vietnam and the threat which this constitutes for the GVN. The strongly anti-Communist policy of the GVN has forced the Communists to operate underground rather than through legal parties or front groups. Little concrete information is available concerning the organization and leadership of the Communist subversive apparatus in South Vietnam. At the time of the armistice, a considerable number of armed and trained Communist military personnel were left behind in South Vietnam, organized into a basic structure of a hierarchy of Administrative and Resistance Committees. Effective security measures carried out by the Diem government have reduced these armed Communist cadres to an estimated 1100-1400. The remaining cadres probably retain a roughly similar organizational pattern, although they have reduced their unit size and reportedly have changed their structure at the lowest level to make it more difficult for the GVN to penetrate the network.

"Alongside the guerrilla nucleus (and undoubtedly with some duplication of personnel), the Communists have maintained and sought to expand their political network in South Vietnam. The latter organization probably encompasses a considerably larger number than the armed cadres, which, operating underground, are more difficult to identify or assess...."
"Leadership and direction for Communist subversive activity in the GVN is provided from North Vietnam by the Communist Lao Dong Party. In the past, several South Vietnamese Communist leaders who went North at the time of the armistice have been identified as playing important roles in directing and coordinating Communist operations within the GVN. Most powerful of these is Le Duan, who has recently enjoyed a swift rise to top-ranking status in the DRV hierarchy...."

"...The Communists are now believed to be actively cultivating the remnants of the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen dissident bands, dispersed by GVN security forces in 1955. As many as 1,500 armed non-Communist dissidents are believed still in hiding in bands of various size in the delta region south of Saigon, the Plaine des Joncs, along the Cambodian border and northwest of Saigon. Through the years, the weapons of these outlaw bands have deteriorated, and ammunition has run low. The Communists are believed providing many of these bands with both assistance and guidance, in return for support or at least lip service to DRV aims. The DRV has also included a few minor sect leaders in its "Fatherland Front" in hopes of attracting support from sect adherents in the South. In its propaganda, the DRV claims to pursue a policy of religious tolerance and denounces the GVN for alleged religious persecution.

"A degree of success in the Communist efforts to subvert the sects and sect leaders was indicated by a recent raid on a French plantation about 50 miles north of Saigon. In addition to robbing and some wanton destruction, an estimated 3-700 bandits claiming to be 'religious men' harangued the workers concerning the benefits of life in the North and warned them not to cooperate with the 'American-controlled' Diem government. The Cao Dai Pope, living in exile in Phnom Penh, has published statements in line with Communist themes, and an organization combining various sect remnants has reportedly been formed with a Communist advisor."

The MAAG intelligence estimate included in its mid-1958 report ("Narrative Study," 24 August 1958) was, however, more directly focused on DRV conventional military strength, and displayed a somewhat different view of "Viet Cong" than had been evident in earlier MAAG reports:

"ENEMY THREAT & PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION

"Viet Cong (North Vietnam Communists):

"(1) Strength: It is estimated that the Viet Cong in North Vietnam, currently have available approximately 268,000 regular army troops organized into 14 Infantry Divisions, 1 Artillery Division, 1 Anti-aircraft Artillery Groupment,
ll independent Infantry Regiments, 5 Security Regiments, plus combat support and service support units. In addition, there are para-military forces estimated to number up to approximately 235,000 personnel, which are organized as two separate forces, the Provincial Forces and the Armed Militia. . . .

"(2) Capabilities: . . . Although it is highly probable that some advance indication or warning will be received, an attack on South Vietnam by Viet Cong forces could occur without warning at any time. With or without warning, it must be realized that the initiative, at least during the initial stages of a war, will rest with the Viet Cong. Accordingly, it must be assumed that the enemy will be able to provide for the necessary build-up of his forces, execute planned deployments and launch his attack at selected points at his own time and convenience. . . . In conjunction with the conduct of operations by military forces, the Viet Cong will employ to the maximum guerrilla forces and subversive/dissident elements already in place in South Vietnam. The strength of these elements is currently estimated at approximately 2000 personnel, a majority of whom are armed. It can be expected that the Viet Cong will make every effort to reinforce these elements prior to and during the initiation of hostilities in order to enhance their capability for the conduct of guerrilla warfare, create internal disorder, and execute sabotage and conduct attacks on pre-selected critical targets within South Vietnam for the primary purpose of impeding or interfering with operations being undertaken by South Vietnam armed forces. . . .

"(3) Possible Courses of Action:

"(a) Continuation of Viet Cong attempts to gain control of South Vietnam through a combination of diplomatic, economic, political and subversive means.

"(b) Overt use of military force against neighboring states is most likely to be undertaken unilaterally by the Viet Cong, but would be most likely a part of an all-out Communist effort to take all of Southeast Asia."

Washington estimates were, however, beginning to reflect concern over Diem's political solvency. For example, an Operations Coordinating Board Progress Report on U.S. policy in mainland Southeast Asia, dated May 28, 1958, drew attention both to an increase in communist subversive and terrorist pressures against the Diem regime, and to aspects in Diem's political style that could limit the ability of his regime to cope with those pressures:
"Political and Security Problems of the Diem Government. President Ngo Dinh Diem's policy of strict control in the political and economic fields has caused a certain amount of internal dissatisfaction. Should the President's exercise of personal authority develop too far there may be danger that the resultant frustration of government officials might preclude the united support for his regime which the situation requires. Otherwise, the President's stern police measures and his emphasis on internal security have led to some criticism of the government. This emphasis on internal security stems from the recent emergence of the country, the continuation of communist-inspired violence and subversion, and such phenomena as the assassination of local officials in rural areas of southern Viet-Nam."

Half a year later, on January 7, 1959, a similar OCB Progress Report asserted:

"Internal Security. It has become increasingly clear that the communists, no longer expectant that Free Viet-Nam will fall to their control through peaceful methods, are executing a carefully planned campaign of violence aimed at undermining the stability of the Diem Government. Their concentration of activities in rural areas where communications and terrain make it difficult for the government to cope with them recalls the tactics used against the French during the Indochina War. Assassinations, particularly of officials in rural areas, continue at an alarming rate of about fifteen to thirty-five a month. Attacks on rubber plantations and reported communist plans to break up the land development, land reform and agricultural credit programs indicate deliberate efforts to interfere with Viet-Nam's economic programs."

The first National Intelligence Estimate to assess the new situation—and the first NIE or SNIE on South Vietnam since 1956—was issued in May, 1959 (NIE 63-59, "Prospects for North and South Vietnam," 26 May 1959):

"The prospect of reunification of Communist North Vietnam (DRV) and western-oriented South Vietnam (GVN) remains remote. In the DRV the full range of Communist techniques is used to control the population, socialize the economy, impose austerity and direct investment to economic rehabilitation and development. The DRV maintains large armed forces. In South Vietnam, despite the authoritarian nature of the regime, there is far more freedom. Local resources and US aid are devoted to developing the armed forces, maintaining internal security, and supporting a relatively high standard of living, with lesser emphasis on economic development...."

"In South Vietnam political stability depends heavily upon President Diem and his continued control of the instruments of
power, including the army and police. Diem will almost certainly be President for many years. The regime will continue to repress potential opposition elements and depend increasingly upon the effectiveness of the Can Lao, the regime's political apparatus, which is run by Diem's brothers Nhu and Can....

"The capabilities of the GVN armed forces will improve given continued US material support and training. Continuance of the present level of training is threatened by a recent finding of the International Control Commission (ICC) that the US Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) should end its activities by mid-1959. In any event, GVN forces will remain incapable of withstanding more than temporarily the larger DRV forces. The internal security forces will not be able to eradicate DRV supported guerrilla or subversive activity in the foreseeable future. Army units will probably have to be diverted to special internal security assignments....

"The GVN is preoccupied with the threat to national security and the maintenance of large military and security forces. It will probably remain unwilling to devote a significantly greater share of resources and attention to longer range economic development. Assuming continued US aid at about present levels, modest improvement in South Vietnam's economic position is likely. However, development will lag behind that in the North, and the GVN will continue to rely heavily upon US support to close the gap between its own resources and its requirements....

"There is little prospect of a significant improvement in relations between South Vietnam and Cambodia so long as the present leaders of the two countries remain in power. Relations with Laos will probably remain generally friendly. Continued suspicion that the French are intriguing in the area to recapture a position of major influence will probably prevent an improvement of Franco-GVN relations....

"Despite widespread popular discontent, the Government of the DRV is in full control of the country and no significant internal threat to the regime is likely. With large-scale Bloc aid, considerable progress has been made in rehabilitating and developing the economy with major emphasis on agriculture, raw materials and light industry. The regime will probably soon have laid the foundations for considerable economic expansion....

"The DRV has no diplomatic relations with any country outside the Bloc and its foreign policy is subservient to the Bloc. We believe that it will continue its harassment of the GVN and of Laos, though a military invasion of either is unlikely...."
"President Diem continues to be the undisputed ruler of South Vietnam; all important and many minor decisions are referred to him. Although he professes to believe in representative government and democracy, Diem is convinced that the Vietnamese are not ready for such a political system and that he must rule with a firm hand, at least so long as national security is threatened. He also believes that the country cannot afford a political opposition which could obstruct or dilute the government's efforts to establish a strong and secure state. Although respected for his courage, dedication, and integrity, Diem has remained a somewhat austere and remote figure to most Vietnamese and has not generated widespread popular enthusiasm.

"Diem's regime reflects his ideas. A facade of representative government is maintained, but the government is in fact essentially authoritarian. The legislative powers of the National Assembly are strictly circumscribed; the judiciary is undeveloped and subordinate to the executive; and the members of the executive branch are little more than the personal agents of Diem. No organized opposition, loyal or otherwise, is tolerated, and critics of the regime are often repressed. This highly centralized regime has provided resolute and stable direction to national affairs, but it has alienated many of the country's educated elite and has inhibited the growth of governmental and political institutions which could carry on in Diem's absence...."

"Although the popular enthusiasm attendant on the achieving of independence and the end of colonial rule has subsided and some disillusion has arisen, particularly among the educated elite, there appears to be little identifiable public unrest. There is some dissatisfaction among military officers largely because of increasing Chinese meddling in military affairs. The growth of dissatisfaction is inhibited by South Vietnam's continuing high standard of living relative to that of its neighbors, the paternalistic attitude of Diem's government towards the people and the lack of any feasible alternative to the present regime.

"The Communist apparatus in South Vietnam is essentially an operating arm of the North Vietnamese Communist Party (Laodong), but there have been recent indications of Chinese Communist participation in its operations. It is estimated that there are about 2,000 active guerrillas. They are in small units scattered along the Cambodian border, the south coast, and in the remote plateau region of the north. There are probably several thousand others, now inactive, who have access
to arms and would participate in guerrilla activities if so ordered. The guerrillas are able to marshal a force of several hundred men for major hit-and-run raids, as they demonstrated twice during 1958. They have recently stepped up their intimidation campaign, assassinating local officials in remote areas, terrorizing local populations and disrupting government operations. The dissident armed remnants of the religious sects are largely broken up. About 2,000 such dissidents surrendered to the government during 1958 and the few hundred remaining in the jungle are probably now absorbed or dominated by the Communists.

"The government has been able to restrict but not eliminate the subversive and espionage activities of clandestine Communist agents. It is probable that Communists have penetrated some local army and security units, village councils, and local branches of the government. There is no evidence, however, that such penetration is sufficient to hamper government operations seriously or that it extends to the higher echelons of the government. There is probably a widespread Communist underground in the urban areas, especially Saigon, and Communist intelligence of GVN plans and activities is probably good. Communist agents are also stimulating unrest among the tribal minorities in the central highlands, a relatively inaccessible and sparsely populated area which the government is attempting to settle and develop, primarily for security reasons.

"South Vietnam's 136,000-man army, supported by the Civil Guard, the Self-Defense Corps and the police services, is capable of maintaining effective internal security except in the most remote jungle and mountain areas. Until mid-1957, the army had the primary responsibility for internal security, and had considerable success. By that time major responsibility for internal security had been given to the provincial Civil Guard (48,000) and the village Self-Defense Corps (47,000). These organizations have proven to be inadequately trained and equipped for the job, and units from the armed forces have continued to be called in to meet special situations. The size and scattered distribution of the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps add to the problems of training and equipping them and of coordinating their activities. In some regions, they are infiltrated by Communists. The police services, which include the 7,500-man Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation and 10,500-man police force stationed in the main cities, have had considerable success in tracking down subversives and terrorists and are developing into efficient organizations."
"South Vietnam has made only limited progress toward basic long-term economic development in the five years since independence...."

"The prospects for continued political stability in South Vietnam depend heavily upon President Diem and his ability to maintain firm control of the army and police. The regime's efforts to assure internal security and its belief that an authoritarian government is necessary to handle the country's problems will result in a continued repression of potential opposition elements. This policy of repression will inhibit the growth of popularity of the regime, and we believe that dissatisfaction will grow, particularly among those who are politically conscious...."

It was not until 1960 that U.S. intelligence estimates began to reflect conviction that Diem's political base had in fact been seriously eroded, and that the DRV-supported Viet Cong posed a vital threat. The intelligence of 1960 is treated in detail in Section C, below; suffice to say for the purposes of this summary, mounting rural violence validated the estimate of the 1959 NIE that a concerted and dangerous Viet Cong attack on the GVN was underway.

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<tr>
<td>Assassinations of GVN Officials &amp; Backers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>239</td>
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But the most remarkable index of the Viet Cong upsurge was their reported zooming strength:
**SECRET**

**VIET CONG STRENGTH**

*1954 - 1964*

(Rounded to nearest thousand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main and Local Force (Regulars)</th>
<th>Guerrillas, Self-Defense Units, Secret Self-Defense Units (Irregulars)</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955*</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NSC Briefing, 16 March 1956. Open sources give 5-10,000. Weekly Intelligence Digest, 18 May 1956, suggests 10,000 number should be revised to 6-8000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956*</td>
<td>5,000-7,500</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Weekly Intelligence Digest, 10 August 1956.</td>
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<td>1957*</td>
<td>1,000-2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Weekly Intelligence Digest, 30 May 1958; Weekly Intelligence Digest, 18 July 1958.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958*</td>
<td>April-2,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Weekly Intelligence Digest, 19 December 1958.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959*</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NIE 63-59, 26 May 1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960*</td>
<td>April-4,000, Sept.-7,000, Dec.-10,000</td>
<td>3,000 (SNIE 63.1-60)</td>
<td>Weekly Intelligence Digest, 17 February 1961; Weekly Intelligence Digest, 19 December 1961.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961*</td>
<td>June - 15,000, Sept. - 16,000 - 17,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Weekly Intelligence Digest, 13 October 1961; Weekly Intelligence Digest, 29 October 1961.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962*</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, OII 2 November 1962.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963**</td>
<td>June - 25,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Military Fact Book, DIA/305. Based on MACV data. Date not retroactively adjusted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964**</td>
<td>June - 31,000, Dec - 34,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimate of Viet Cong strength for this period is subject to great uncertainty. The numbers here should be treated as order of magnitude.

**Add approximately 40,000 in the Viet Cong "infrastructure". The infrastructure is defined as the PRP, PRP Central Committee, and the NLF. See MACV, Monthly Order of Battle Summaries, for a discussion. Also add 23-25,000 in Administrative Service, i.e., staff and technical service units subordinate to various headquarters.

#From letter, Rand Corporation, L-1498Z (attachment 1, 8-11-67). Data in table are SECRET.
The statistical picture presented above of an insurgent force declining in numbers from 1954 through 1959, and then mushrooming rapidly in 1960 and thereafter, is obviously misleading. What U.S. intelligence focused on in the immediate aftermath of Geneva were the remnants of the Viet Minh military force following the regroupment. These, whatever their strength, probably represented only a fraction of the numbers of former Viet Minh in active opposition to the GVN after 1956, and apparently did not reflect the total numbers of armed dissidents from 1957 onward, nor the locally recruited political and logistic apparatus which supported the Viet Cong "armed propaganda teams," or guerrilla bands. The phenomenal growth of the Viet Cong, given the low estimates on infiltration from North Vietnam (some 5,000 through 1960), means either than the DRV cadres were extraordinarily effective in organizing and motivating rural people among whom U.S. intelligence detected little unrest through mid-1960, or that U.S. estimates were low. The latter seems probable.

Much of what the United States knows now about the origins of the insurgency in South Vietnam rests on information it has acquired since 1963, approximately the span of time that an extensive and effective American intelligence apparatus had been functioning in Vietnam. Before then, our intelligence was drawn from a considerably more narrow and less reliable range of sources, chiefly Vietnamese, and could not have supported analysis in depth of insurgent organization and intentions. It is surprising, therefore, that from 1954 to 1960 U.S. intelligence estimates at the national level correctly and consistently estimated that the threat to GVN internal security was greater than the danger from overt invasion. They pegged the Viet Cong general offensive as beginning in late 1959, with some preparations noted as early as 1957. In general, they were critical of Diem, consistently expressing skepticism that he could thread his way through recognized internal political difficulty. To be sure, the same estimates misjudged the numerical and political strength of the Viet Cong, the extent of popular disaffection, and miscalculated the ability of the GVN to cope with the Viet Cong. But as strategic intelligence, U.S. estimates were remarkably sound.

B. U.S. Policy and Programs, 1954-1960

U.S. national policy statements of the period, in the records of the National Security Council, did not exactly reflect U.S. intelligence in treating insurgency as the GVN's primary threat. U.S. "counterinsurgency" policy--though not so termed until 1960--proceeded from the premise that U.S. national interests required the U.S. to provide political support, economic aid, and military assistance to the GVN to preclude its domination by communists. The policy governing in the immediate aftermath of Geneva was laid out in NSC 5105 and 5129/5 of 1954. On July 11, 1956, the Operations Coordinating Board published a "Progress Report" on the programs directed by these two policy papers, noting among "major problems or areas of difficulty" that:
"The Diem Government’s resistance to communist demands for all-Vietnam elections, under the Geneva Accords, and its success in achieving internal security increase the likelihood of enlarged communist subversive efforts. This underlines the necessity of assisting the Diem Government to develop further counter-measures with considerable emphasis on police and para-military forces and civic action. The Vietnamese are increasingly critical of the general orientation and specific procedures of our aid program. Their request for an increased emphasis on capital development with consequent diminution of the flow of consumer goods entering the country will require careful review.

a. NSC 5612/1

During the summer of 1956 the NSC Planning Board conducted a review of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, and on September 5, 1956, the NSC adopted a new "Statement of Policy" (NSC 5612/1) which after stipulating that "the loss to Communist control of any single free country would encourage tendencies toward accommodation by the rest...", noted that:

"Although Communist policy now emphasizes non-military methods, the danger of overt aggression will remain inherent so long as Communist China and North Viet Nam continue a basically hostile policy supported by substantial military forces. There is only a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic hostilities continue in Laos. At present overt aggression and, except in the cases of Viet Nam and Laos, militant subversion are less likely than an intensified campaign of Communist political, economic and cultural penetration in the area."

NSC 5612/1 laid out the following objectives for Vietnam:

"Assist Free Vietnam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone."

"Work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist leadership."

"Support the position of the Government of Free Viet Nam that all-Viet Nam elections may take place only after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both zones of Viet Nam."

"Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh."
"Encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against external aggression along lines consistent with U.S. planning concepts based upon approved U.S. policy, and discreetly manifest in other ways U.S. interest in assisting Free Viet Nam, in accordance with the SEATO Treaty, to defend itself against external aggression."

**SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY on THE SPECIAL SITUATION IN NORTH VIET NAM**

"Treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government, and discourage other non-Communist states from developing or maintaining relations with the Viet Minh regime."

"Prevent the Viet Minh from expanding their political influence and territorial control in Free Viet Nam and Southeast Asia."

"Deter the Viet Minh from attacking or subverting Free Viet Nam or Laos."

"Prove weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit them internally and internationally whenever possible."

"Exploit nationalist sentiment within North Viet Nam as a means of weakening and disrupting Sino-Soviet domination."

"Assist the Government of Viet Nam to undertake programs of political, economic and psychological warfare against Viet Minh Communists."

"Apply, as necessary to achieve U.S. objectives, restrictions on U.S. exports and shipping and on foreign assets similar to those already in effect for Communist China and North Korea."

b. **NSC 5609**

In 1958, NSC 5612 was reviewed, and the portions on Vietnam reapproved without significant change. Proposed revisions, underlined below, indicated increased awareness of the GVN's deteriorating internal security:

"Assist Free Viet Nam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone. In this regard encourage and assist..."
public relations and public information programs of the government of Viet Nam directed both internally to the free Vietnamese and externally to north Viet Nam...”"**

"Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh." **

Otherwise, however, the new policy paper (NSC 5809 of April 2, 1958) was identical to its 1956 predecessor.

In late May of 1958 the Operations Coordinating Board submitted a progress report on U.S. programs in Vietnam which held that "in general we are achieving U.S. objectives in Viet-Nam." Among major operating problems facing the U.S., the report cited Vietnam's continued dependence on foreign aid: "in spite of some evidence of greater economic stability, Viet-Nam continues to depend on foreign aid, the largest part of which goes to support the military establishment. U.S. aid still accounts for approximately 85 percent of imports in two-thirds of the budgetary revenues." Also cited were the "political and security problems of the Viet-Nam Government":

"President Ngo Dinh Diem's policy of strict control in the political and economic fields has caused a certain amount of internal dissatisfaction. Should the President's exercise of personal authority develop too far there may be danger that the resultant frustration of government officials might weaken the united support for his regime which the situation requires. Otherwise, the President's stern police measures and his emphasis on internal security have led to some criticism of the government. This emphasis on internal security stems from the recent emergence of the country, continuation of communist-inspired violence and subversion, and such incidents as the assassination of local officials in rural areas of southern Vietnam...."

The OCB report took up the note that the U.S. should "encourage and assist elements of the Army of Vietnam to establish and utilize specific anti-subversive guerrilla formations and operations," but stated that anti-guerrilla operations interfered with the efficient training of the army:

* Proposed by CIA and evidently adopted, although this is not altogether clear in DOD files. A further CIA revision, not adopted, would have added: "In this effort priority should be given to areas of greatest dissidence, particularly in the extreme south."

** A CIA proposed amendment, evidently not approved, would have added: "Also encourage and assist elements of the Army of Viet Nam to establish and utilize specific anti-subversive guerrilla formations and operations. In the anti-guerrilla campaign encourage the government of Viet Nam to use the Vietnamese Army in a way which will help win the favor of the local populace in order to obtain its support for their campaigns, particularly for intelligence purposes."
"Viet-Nam. While continuing reorganization and training along U.S. lines the Vietnamese Armed Forces...are still conducting operations against fragments of dissident sects and Viet Cong guerrillas. These military operations have succeeded in practically eliminating the Binh Xuyen and Cao Dai forces. The Hoa Hao, operating along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border, even though small, still give the Vietnamese some embarrassment and required the employment of a small portion of the Vietnamese Army against their operations. The over-all success against these anti-government forces has facilitated the release of the majority of the Vietnamese units from pacification missions, thus increasing emphasis on unit training and the concomitant increased effectiveness of the armed forces. In addition, the activation of two corps headquarters within the army was completed last month and has resulted in a more satisfactory command structure which will materially increase the combat efficiency of the army.

In 1959 U.S. policy papers began to emphasize that GVN pre-occupation with internal security interfered with its ability to prosecute other desired programs, and particularly that economic development lagged what was "politically necessary" to "compete" with the DRV. The following is from the OCB Progress Report of January 7, 1959:

"A. SUMMARY EVALUATION

"32. Developments related particularly to a U.S. course of action to assist Free Viet-Nam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government which would work toward the weakening of the communists in both North and South Viet-Nam. President Diem remained firmly in control despite some political dissatisfaction with his government....The communists and dissidents continued their campaign of assassinations, especially of officials in rural areas and carried out attacks aimed at disrupting Viet-Nam's economic progress. Although the government gave increasing attention to development of the economy, such development continued to be inhibited by almost pre-emptive military requirements which utilized a substantial portion of Viet-Nam's total resources, including U.S. aid....

"B. MAJOR OPERATING PROBLEMS FACING THE UNITED STATES

"33. Diem's Internal Political Position. Diem increased his travels throughout the country for the purpose of popularizing his regime. Increasing accomplishments of the government in the economic and social fields should also have beneficial political results. Nevertheless, the failure of the government to fully rally certain elements of the middle class, the intellectuals and former officials to its support, the frustration and restlessness of some of the present officials, and some
discontent in the army are sources of political weakness. This dissatisfaction is caused primarily by the authoritarian and pervasive political controls of the Ngo family and its associates.

Status of U.S. Actions: The desirability of liberalizing political and administrative controls is brought to the attention of the Vietnamese Government, when considered appropriately by the U.S. Ambassador. Possible lines of U.S. action are greatly limited due to the extreme sensitivity of Vietnamese leaders on this subject.

"34. Internal Security. It has become increasingly clear that the communists, no longer expectant that Free Viet-Nam will fall to their control through peaceful methods, are executing a carefully planned campaign of violence aimed at undermining the stability of the Diem Government. Their concentration of activities in rural areas where communications and terrain make it difficult for the government to cope with them recalls the tactics used against the French during the Indochina War. Assassinations, particularly of officials in rural areas, continue at an alarming rate of about fifteen to thirty-five a month. Attacks on rubber plantations and reported communist plans to break up the land development, land reform and agricultural credit programs indicate deliberate efforts to interfere with Viet-Nam's economic programs."

The subsequent OCB Progress Report of August, 1959--by which time the insurgency was spreading rapidly--illustrates well the policy difficulties of the United States in responding to the situation within the constraints of the Geneva Settlement. The report noted that the GVN:

"...Has undertaken or planned such countermeasures as the use of armed force, special military courts for the prompt trial of terrorists, the removal of peasants from isolated spots to larger villages, and the publicizing of internal security incidents to counteract the 'peaceful' propaganda of the North Vietnamese communist regime. Vietnamese military forces have improved under the MAAG training program, but the continuance of training at present levels would be inhibited by any action of the International Control Commission arising from its opposition to the indefinite retention in Viet-Nam of certain United States military personnel originally sent out for equipment salvage work and now largely used to supplement MAAG personnel in training duties. This necessitates efforts to work out with the Canadian, British and Indian Governments an acceptable basis in consonance with the Geneva Accords for an increase in MAAG personnel adequate
to replace the special mission personnel referred to above. Implementation of the United States aid project for re-training and re-equipping the Civil Guard has begun with the signing of the ICA project agreement with the Vietnamese Government and the despatch of ICA personnel to administer this project in Saigon. In spite of substantial U.S. assistance, economic development though progressing, is below that which is politically desirable."

c. Public Statements

Despite the increasingly pessimistic intelligence, however, and despite the notations in NSC reports of formidable problems in Vietnam, the public statements of Administration spokesmen, through August 1959 presented a generally sanguine picture of U.S. programs there. For example, in November, 1957, Ambassador Durbin and General Williams appeared before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations and reported that Diem's government "had made remarkable progress." However, they did report that "Communists and sect remnants have regrouped and stepped up their terrorist activities in the past several months, and the Communists are infiltrating down the sparsely inhabited Mekong Valley and are becoming fairly active, particularly in the south. For this reason, [Diem] still has to use considerable number of his armed forces and a large number of his police force to carry on pacification work. Because of the terrorist activities in the fertile Delta area, the peasants, through fear or intimidation, cannot till their fields properly and thus produce more rice and other exports...." The Ambassador stressed that Diem was aware of the problem -- indeed, acutely aware -- but that he was impelled to defer all other considerations to the creation of an environment of security. The Ambassador quoted Diem as follows: "If we don't have assurances on the security front, what good will it do to build up the economy only to have it destroyed by Communist terrorists?" The Ambassador described Diem as "a devoted, honest, hard-working, Nationalist with a fine understanding of the internal political situation as well as the international political picture, particularly in Asia; but in consideration of his preoccupation of [security] he moves slowly in these fields...."

In March 1958 Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific, appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to testify for the Mutual Security Act of 1958. Admiral Stump invited one of his questioners on Vietnam to visit the country on the conviction that "he would be astonished at the improvement that has taken place. It has been beyond what would have been our wildest and most optimistic

dreams three years ago to see what has happened in South Vietnam." The Admiral also reported that while the Hoa Hao were still presenting difficulties in some areas, the Binh Xuyen and the Cao Dai were "pretty well eliminated."

But U.S. policy in Vietnam did not again achieve the status of a national issue until the summer of 1959, when a Scripps-Howard newspaperman published a series of articles alleging that the U.S. aid program in Vietnam was ill-directed, encumbered by waste and delay, and administered by bumbling, plush-living bureaucrats. Both the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs thereupon conducted hearings, and Ambassador Durbrow and General Williams were among the Administration officials called to testify.** The picture presented in their testimony was so rosy that Senator Mansfield, for one, was inclined to look for an early termination of U.S. aid:

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. It would be correct to say, would it not, that a principal purpose of U.S. policy in Vietnam has been to prevent Communist aggression from the north?

"MR. DURBROW. That is one of our basic policies, sir.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. And in a general way, another principal purpose has been to foster internal political and economic stability in South Vietnam, is that correct?

"MR. DURBROW. Correct.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. Still another would be to maintain friendly ties with the Vietnamese?

"MR. DURBROW. Yes, sir.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. You have instructed the various missions along these lines, have you not?

"MR. DURBROW. I have, sir.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. Have you ever instructed them to the effect that one of our purposes was to encourage the development of conditions of economic self-support in Vietnam which would enable us to reduce and eventually eliminate grants of aid?

"Before you answer that, I want to compliment General Williams for what he had to say relative to his contacts with


the Vietnamese Government, because he has told them, if I remember his words correctly, that he was there to work himself out of a job.

"Mr. Ambassador?"

"MR. DURBROW. That is one of the principal jobs we are doing there. We work on this at all times, working out the projects and plans for aid needed, discussing them with the Vietnamese officials and trying to do all we can to build up a sound basic economic structure so that they will become economically independent.

"I might add that this is the goal of all of these newly-developing countries and, particularly, Vietnam.

"The President has said to all of us many times:

"We are grateful for your aid, but we hope we can get on our feet as soon as possible," and that is one of the principal objectives we are trying to carry out.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. You are to be commended for it. That is a sound statement.

"So far as the aid programs are concerned, we have sought to achieve our various objectives, have we not, primarily through support of the Vietnamese armed forces and by assistance in the rehabilitation of the Vietnamese economy."

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. Now, Mr. Durrow, in the opening statements at this hearing we have had a picture drawn of some very significant changes in the situation in Vietnam since 1955.

"We know, for example, that in that year the survival of a free Vietnam and a free Vietnamese Government was still in grave doubt; was that a correct statement?"

"MR. DURBROW. Quite correct.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. The stability of the government was threatened by the Binh Xuyen, by dissident political-religious sects such as the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai.

"There was a very substantial armed Communist Vietminh underground in the south; is that correct?"
"MR. DURBROW. Not only in the south, sir; they were concentrated down there, but they were all over the country, the Communists, in particular.

"The sects were in the southwest basically, and in Saigon, but as far as the Binh Xuyen is concerned, they were primarily in the Saigon-Cholon area.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. Yes.

"There was little real military strength to resist a Vietminh invasion from the north had it come about at that time?

"MR. DURBROW. Very little, sir.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. South Vietnam was a war-prostrated area with very extensive devastation?

"MR. DURBROW. Quite correct. There is still evidence of that, sir.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. There were hundreds of thousands of refugees from the north waiting to be resettled, the figure being somewhere between 600,000, the official figure, and 1 million?

"MR. DURBROW. Correct.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. These conditions have changed in significant degree in the past 4 years, have they not?

"MR. DURBROW. Very much so."

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. And there is a far greater degree of internal stability and security in Vietnam than there was in 1955?

"AMBASSADOR DURBROW. Very definitely.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. I should like to read into the record at this point a statement by Maj. Gen. Samuel L. Myers, former Deputy Chief of MAAG in Vietnam. General Myers stated on April 17 of this year, and I quote:

'The Binh Xuyen group was completely eliminated as a menace. The Cao Dai group was pacified or reoriented through political means to a point where it ceased to be any considerable obstacle. The Hoa Hao had been reduced to a handful of the diehards still holding out against the Government and still conducting extremely limited armed raids and assassinations. The Vietminh guerrillas, although constantly reinforced by men and weapons from outside South Vietnam, were gradually nibbled away until they ceased to be a major menace.'
to the Government. In fact, estimates at the time of my departure indicated that there was a very limited number of hostile individuals under arms in the country. Two territorial regiments, reinforced occasionally by one or two regular army regiments, were able to cope with their depredations.'

"That would indicate a far greater degree of internal stability in Vietnam than that which existed 4 years ago; would it not?

"MR. DURBROW. Yes, sir.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. I read further from Major General Myers' statement. Speaking of the Vietnamese armed forces, he says, and I quote:

'They are now able to maintain internal security and have reached the point where that responsibility could be turned over to the civilian agencies. If there should be renewed aggression from the north on the part of the Vietminh, they can give a really good account of themselves. There are many Vietnamese who are even more optimistic than that statement implies and feel that they have the capability of counterattack.'

"That statement would indicate, would it not, considerable reduction of the danger of invasion from the north as it existed 4 years ago, or at least a far greater capacity to cope with it; would it not?

"MR. DURBROW. I would say the latter, sir.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. A far greater capacity to cope with it?

"MR. DURBROW. Because there are still Communists around, the danger is always there, ever present. But the possibility of countering it is much greater than it was before....

"SENATOR MANSFIELD: What is the nature and purpose of military aid in Vietnam at the present time?

"GENERAL WILLIAMS (Chief, MAAG, Vietnam). I would answer that in this way: The purpose of military aid in Vietnam is to enable the Vietnamese armed forces to provide for the internal security of their country and act as a deterrent against outside aggression.

"SENATOR MANSFIELD. Would that explanation hold for 1955 as well?

"GENERAL WILLIAMS. Yes, sir....
"SENATOR MANSFIELD. Assuming no drastic change in the general situation in Indochina, what do you see in the next 4 years as to the requirements of military aid in Vietnam? Are they likely to be substantially higher, are they likely to continue to be reduced in size or do you think they will remain just about the same? This calls for an estimate and an informed guess."

"GENERAL WILLIAMS. I would like to caution that what I say now will be a guess, based, however, on past experience and considered judgment.

"I would say that for 1960 the military budget should be practically the same as 1959. I should think beginning in 1961, I hope not later than 1961, it should start to decrease again."

4. Program Data.

U.S. aid programs in Vietnam through the Eisenhower Administration are summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. AID FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (Millions of Dollars by Fiscal Year)1/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total2/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY Economic Aid Expenditures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Source: Montgomery, op.cit., 284.
2/ Total aid program for the Associated States of Indo-China, including deobligations and adjustments, 1954-1961.
3/ Total grants and loans, 1946-1961: 3587.6

This program was among the largest in the world, reflecting a U.S. commitment sufficiently deep to assert a high priority for Vietnam among the numerous claimants for U.S. aid. From FY 1946 through FY 1961, Vietnam was the third ranking non-NATO recipient of aid, and the seventh worldwide; in FY 1961, the last Eisenhower program, South Vietnam was the fifth ranking recipient overall (behind India, Korea, Brazil, and Turkey):
U.S. Economic and Military Aid, FY 1946-1961

($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>8,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>4,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vietnam $3,588

U.S. Economic and Military Aid, FY 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>669.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>472.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>328.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>318.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>215.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In per-capita assistance, Vietnam also ranked high in comparison with its Asian neighbors.

U.S. Aid, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Aid per Inhabitant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>$17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>13.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>8.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scigliano, op. cit., 112.

A recent study* of U.S. assistance establishes that of all U.S. economic aid programs for less developed countries, 1945 to 1965, Vietnam has been the fifth ranking recipient and the sixth ranking per capita. In the decade 1956 to 1965, Vietnam was the fourth ranking recipient and the fourth per capita.

The relative importance of Vietnam in the U.S. world-view is further attested to by the fact that MAAG Vietnam, though limited in size out of regard for the Geneva Accords 1955-1960, was the only military aid mission commanded by a Lieutenant General. MAAG strength was held at 342 (plus 350 personnel in TERM), but the U.S. economic aid mission grew rapidly over the years, becoming by mid-1958, the largest in the world:

FOUR LARGEST U.S. ECONOMIC AID MISSIONS
(As of 31 May 1958)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ICA Employees</th>
<th>Contract Employees</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Montgomery, op.cit., 177.

However, it has been argued that despite this largesse of treasure, technical help, and goods, the U.S. failed to provide for Vietnam's security precisely because its aid emphasized security, rather than ameliorating those economic and social problems which formed the basis for popular discontent. It is certainly true that the bulk of U.S. assistance was concentrated on security. Although from the table above Military Grants comprised only 25% of the total U.S. program 1955-1961, more than 75% of the economic aid the U.S. provided went into the GVN military budget. Out of every $10 of U.S. economic aid the U.S. obligated for Vietnam, about $8 were extended through an import-subsidization program. The U.S. would purchase goods with dollars outside Vietnam, sell them to Vietnamese importers for piasters, and then deposit this local currency in a drawing account for the GVN. This defense supporting assistance was very crucial to Diem, since in the period 1956-1960, some 43% of GVN public expenditures were allocated directly to the military for the armed forces and Self-Defense Corps (Scigliano, op.cit., 113).

U.S. DEFENSE SUPPORTING AID FOR GVN
Calendar Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Local currency</th>
<th>Deposits</th>
<th>Withdrawals in Support of GVN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>167.1</td>
<td>239.4</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>593.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>256.0</td>
<td>202.5</td>
<td>204.5</td>
<td>663.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>203.4</td>
<td>152.9</td>
<td>176.0</td>
<td>532.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>170.2</td>
<td>166.6</td>
<td>166.6</td>
<td>493.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>181.8</td>
<td>999.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>1181.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1218.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* MAAG, Vietnam had a TD authorization of 342 spaces; TERM, 350; the 1960 authorization for MAAG's amalgamation with TERM was 685.
As may be seen by comparing the totals above with the table on total U.S. aid, (ignoring the calendar year-fiscal year differences in accounting):

A. FY Economic Obligations 55-61

B. FY 55-61 Economic Aid Expenditures

C. Local Currency Deposits

D. Withdrawals for Defense

\[ \frac{C}{B} \] is 94%; \[ \frac{D}{A} \] is 77%; \[ \frac{C}{A} \] is 79%; and \[ \frac{D}{A} \] is 65%.

Approximately 94% of all money expended on U.S. aid found its way into counterpart funds, and of these expenditures about 77% went into the GVN defense budget. Hence, the GVN spent more than two-fifths of its total revenues, including over three-quarters of the funds it obtained from the U.S., on security.

The 23% or so of remaining U.S. economic aid was allocated principally to "project aid".

**U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM**

(Millions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Economic FY Obligations</td>
<td>322.4</td>
<td>210.0</td>
<td>282.2</td>
<td>189.1</td>
<td>203.7</td>
<td>182.0</td>
<td>150.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Project FY Obligations</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Project Aid</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Montgomery, op.cit., 289.

The 1959 Project Aid program was, like that of the other years, broken down among the following major categories:
U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO VIETNAM, 1959
(Thousands of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>% of Project Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and Mining</td>
<td>2,042</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>21,335</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration and Safety</td>
<td>3,983</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development, Social Welfare, Housing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Support</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General and Miscellaneous</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid

The predominance of aid to transportation in 1959 was typical of the other years:

TOTAL PROJECT AID, 1955-1961
(Thousands of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>% of Project Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture</td>
<td>16,622</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and Mining</td>
<td>15,520</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>75,921</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>16,086</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9,296</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration and Safety</td>
<td>26,437</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development, Social Welfare, Housing</td>
<td>8,011</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Support</td>
<td>12,260</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General and Miscellaneous</td>
<td>6,045</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid

Even these figures conceal a further concentration on security. The "public administration" funds (14% of total) went chiefly to the police and state security services. The "transportation" category supported mainly the road building program, and while roads aided the economy, the routes were chosen for "strategic, military" purposes. For example, General Williams opposed...
President Diem's plan to rebuild the coastal highway to Hue, and succeeded in asserting priority for a road into the Pleiku area of the Highlands. General Williams acceded to only so much of the Saigon-Hue road (Highway No. 1) as extended to Bien Hoa (some 20 miles north of Saigon) because "there is no road out of Saigon now that could take care of heavy military traffic and will not be until Bien Hoa Highway is completed."*

The 20-mile stretch of highway to Bien Hoa cost more money than all project aid allocated for labor, community development, social welfare, health, and education in the years 1954-1961.**

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** Scigliano, op.cit., 115.
C. Recognition of Crisis, 1960

1. Country Team Assessment, March, 1960

By January 1960 communist terrorism and guerrilla action moved in U.S. estimates from the status of a long run threat to the viability of the Diem regime to crisis status as the GVN's "number one problem." In a long "Special Report on Internal Security Situation in Vietnam" (Incl 1 to Despatch #278 from Saigon, 7 March 1960), the U.S. Mission in Saigon submitted an appreciation of the problem which highlighted so many characteristics of the difficulties confronting Diem and U.S. policy that were to prove critical in subsequent years that it deserves extensive quotation and precis:

Internal security had once again become the primary problem of the GVN as a result of: (1) "intensification of Viet Cong guerrilla and terrorist activities"; (2) "weaknesses apparent in the GVN security forces"; and (3) "the growth of apathy and considerable dissatisfaction among the rural populace." "The situation has grown progressively more disturbing since shortly after the National Assembly elections at the end of August 1959, despite the fact that President Diem was claiming, to the end of December, that internal security was continuing to improve."

a. "Viet Cong Activity"

Government operations had intensified during the spring of 1955 when it increased its forces engaged in internal security operations, added precautions taken by the GVN during the period prior to and immediately following the August 30 National Assembly elections further suppressed VC activity. The upswing in VC operations first showed up in a sharp increase in assassinations and kidnappings in the last half of September. Where the total for assassinations in 1958 had been 193, there were 119 assassinations in the last four months of 1959 (for a yearly total of 233); in January 1960, there were to be 96 civilians killed and in February, 122. Meanwhile, significant Viet Cong attacks on GVN military forces also began in September, revealing characteristics on both the Viet Cong and GVN sides that were to become dishearteningly familiar in the next five years:

"The post-election intensification of VC attacks began with the completely successful engagement of two ARVN companies on September 26. The poor performance of ARVN during this operation exposed a number of weaknesses which have been commented upon by many CAS and MAAG sources in the Vietnamese Government. MAAG's evaluation of the factors contributing to ARVN's failure include security leaks, inadequate planning, lack of aggressive leadership, failure to communicate information to other participating units and the failure of supporting units to press forward to engage the VC (they were close enough to hear the sound of gunfire at the time). Another factor of importance illustrated in this ambush was the
confidence of the VC in their ability to successfully conduct such operations. This self assurance and aggressiveness appear to be characteristic of many actions taken by the VC since September and have probably contributed to the low state of morale reported in GVN security units by CAS sources."

(Despatch 278 from Saigon, Encl. No. 1, p. 3)

It was incidents like this and "particularly an attack on an ARVN regimental post near Tay Ninh in January, that brought on "the full impact of the seriousness of the present situation":

"The Viet Cong attack on the Vietnamese Army installation near Tay Ninh on January 26 is a dramatic illustration of the increasingly aggressive tactics of the Viet Cong and of the difficulty the GVN is having in controlling the internal security situation. The audacity of the Viet Cong in conducting the attack, the likelihood of VC infiltration into ARVN, the indications of secret support of the VC by some of the local populace, the successful planning and coordination in carrying out the attack as opposed to apparent failure of ARVN which had been told there might be an attack to be sufficiently alert for such an attack and effectively counter once the attack had been launched, are indications of many of the problems faced by the GVN and discussed in this report." (Ibid, p. 1)

Armed propaganda operations involving large numbers of Viet Cong in daylight were a third category of Viet Cong activities.

"...The fact that the VC can, and have on a number of occasions, entered fair sized communities, spent several hours or a day propagandizing the population and then retired without meeting GVN resistance would indicate that the VC have an effective intelligence system." (Ibid, p. 5)

"CAS sources have reported a gradual increase of the infiltration of VC cadres and arms from the DRV over the past few months which has increased the VC strength to about 3000 in the Southwest. (Based on available information CAS estimates that the Viet Cong strength in all South Viet-Nam is presently 3000-5000 men.) Many of these new infiltrators, according to a CAS source who is a GVN Official, are cadres who were regrouped in the North at the time of the Geneva Accords and have had a number of years of intensive military and political training. The principal infiltration route of VC cadres from the North continues to be through Laos to Cambodia although reports are received of infiltration by sea. A CAS source with similar access reports that some of the cadres arriving in SVN from the North have the mission of establishing a VC headquarters to
include a general staff, a political section and a supply section and to effect a large-scale reorganization of VC cadres in the southwestern provinces (Fifth Military Region)." (Ibid, p. 7)

Behind all this activity were verbal indications of DRV intent:

"In May 1959, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party passed a resolution or statement stating that the struggle for reunification would have to be carried out by all 'appropriate measures'. British observers have taken this to mean measures other than peaceful.

"'You must remember we will be in Saigon tomorrow, we will be in Saigon tomorrow', these words were spoken by Premier Pham van Dong in a conversation with French Consul Georges-Picot on September 12, 1959.

"In November, Pham van Dong twice told Canadian Commissioner Erichsen-Brown that 'we will drive the Americans into the Sea'." (Ibid., pp. 6-7)

b. "ARVN Weaknesses"

"...Numerous high-ranking GVN officials have very recently stressed the necessity of more anti-guerrilla training for the security forces. From a military point of view an outstanding deficiency in the GVN effort has been the government's inability, or lack of desire, to recognize the following factors:

(1) It is actively engaged in an internal war and, therefore, must take the measures which this situation entails.

(2) There is a great need for a strong central military command with wide powers for the conduct of internal security operations in the unpacified areas.

(3) There is a need for a capable, well-equipped, well-trained, centrally-controlled Civil Guard to take over from the Military in pacified areas.

"It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the apparent lack of success in the GVN attempts to reduce the internal threat of the VC until now has stemmed from the lack of unity of command in a single operational commander who has the means and the authority to utilize all of the potential in the area of operations without regard to province or regional boundaries and without regard to the existing political subdivision of the area. Unity of command is the most important basic principle
of administration lacking here. The Province Chief structure has caused a breakdown of coordination and a fragmentation of command structure which has blocked an effective attack on the internal security problem." (Ibid., pp. 8-9)

(The splitting of responsibility for internal security between the Province Chief, who controlled Provincial forces, and the military chain of command controlling ARVN was a constant complaint by MACV during the later Diem period.)

c. "Political Factors"

"...The VC reportedly estimate that 70% of the people in the rural areas of South Viet-Nam are either embittered by or indifferent toward the present government..." (Ibid., p. 8)

"It is highly unlikely that any final solution can be found to the internal security situation in South Viet-Nam if the GVN does not enjoy the support and cooperation of the rural population. At the present time indications are that the rural population is generally apathetic towards the Diem Government and there are signs of considerable dissatisfaction and silent opposition. In part this attitude appears to result from widespread fear of the Viet Cong and a belief that the GVN is relatively helpless to protect the rural population from Viet Cong depredations. Unfortunately the longer serious insecurity continues to exist in the countryside despite GVN efforts to control it, the more serious is the effect on the GVN's prestige. Another effect is a growing belief among the peasants that the Viet Cong will always be here as long as North Viet-Nam remains under Communist control and that they must adjust to live with them. (A realization of the long-range nature of the problem among officials responsible for dealing with it could be an advantage. In Malaya it has taken 11 years to reduce the security situation to the minimum, and it is even more difficult to deal with it in a divided country with long exposed frontiers).

"There appear to be other reasons contributing to the difficulty experienced by the GVN in attempting to rally the rural population:

(a) Until recently it was becoming more and more apparent that Diem was not being given accurate information on the internal security and political situation in rural areas. As late as the end of December, 1959, he was telling all callers how much better the internal security situation had become, despite many doubts raised by his listeners. Information was apparently being presented to him by local officials
in such a manner as to reflect well upon the officials giving it. The President's trips to the provinces have appeared to be carefully 'laid on' by local officials. The President himself cannot be absolved entirely from the blame, however, since his system of personal rule which permits direct appeal from the individual provincial authorities to himself, in a sort of intra-executive check and balance system, serves to further weaken the administrative apparatus.

"Recently, however, as indicated in the subsequent section on 'GVN Reactions', the Vice President and others who are not his usual informers on security matters have spoken frankly with him and he now seems well aware of the situation.

(b) Provincial and district authorities exercise almost autonomous control in the areas under their jurisdiction. Too often the personnel holding these positions have been incompetent, having been chosen for reason of party loyalty. Moreover, some have tended to view their jobs as a means to personal advancement or financial gain often at the cost of the population under their control. Press editorials have attacked local officials for extorting money from peasants, using torture to wring false confessions from innocent people and conducting themselves in such a manner as to reflect adversely on the prestige of the national government. In addition rumors continue to circulate among the population concerning the alleged nefarious activities of and favoritism shown to members of the Can Lao party. While officials have been largely unable to identify and put out of commission Viet Cong undercover cadres among the population, they have often arrested people on the basis of rumors or of denunciations by people who harbor only personal grudges. Police powers justified on the basis of the needs of internal security have reportedly been misused to extort money not only from the peasants but from land owners, merchants and professional people in the towns. This misuse of police powers and the kind of broad scale arrests on suspicion are weakening the support of the population for the regime. On the other hand, the application of swift, summary justice (such as the Special Military Tribunals were created to hand out) designed to protect the population against the Viet Cong threat, if carefully administered and 'advertised' as such, can do much to restore a feeling of security;

(c) While the GVN has made an effort to meet the economic and social needs of the rural populations through community development, the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, etc., these projects appear to have enjoyed only a measure of success in creating support for the government and, in fact, in many instances have resulted in resentment. Basically, the problem appears to be that such projects have been imposed on the people without adequate
psychological preparation in terms of the benefits to be gained. Since most of these projects call for sacrifice on the part of the population (in the form of allegedly 'volunteer' labor in the case of construction, time away from jobs or school in the case of rural youth groups, leaving homes and lands in the case of regrouping isolated peasants), they are bound to be opposed unless they represent a partnership effort for mutual benefit on the part of the population and the government. (See subsequent section on 'GOVN Reactions' for indications of Diem's current awareness of this problem.)

"The situation may be summed up in the fact that the government has tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or resentment. The basic factor which has been lacking is a feeling of rapport between the government and the population. The people have not identified themselves with the government. There has been a general lack of 'a sense of mission' in the building of the country among both the local population and local authorities." (Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 11, 12; footnotes excluded)

2. Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 1960

The Country Team report on internal security concluded that Diem was now aware of the gravity of the problem and was taking some countermovements. But the inadequacy of his response was recognized in a Special NIE of 23 August 1960 (SNIE 63.1-60). The VC terrorism had continued to intensify: in the first five months of 1960, 780 government officials and sympathizers were assassinated by insurgents. Since January armed attacking units had been operating over wider areas than at any time since 1954.

"...Support from North Vietnam appears to have increased over the past several months. In particular, senior cadres and military supplies such as communications equipment are believed to be moving south through Laos and Cambodia and by junk along the eastern coastline." (SNIE 63.1-60, p. 3)

But along with this further increase in communist pressure came increasing threats to stability from non-communist quarters reminiscent of the 1954-55 period:

"...At the same time, grievances against the government, which have long been accumulating, have become increasingly urgent and articulate."

Throughout this August estimate, dual threats from communist and domestic opposition were presented in parallel, with priority
going to the non-communists. In its discussion of Diem's political problems, this estimate followed closely the analysis of the Mission report of six months earlier. The problems were seen as not only continuing, but intensifying:

"Discontent with the Diem government has been prevalent for some time among intellectuals and elite circles and, to a lesser extent, in labor and urban business groups. Criticism by these elements focuses on Ngo family rule, especially the roles of the President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Madame Nhu; the pervasive influence of the Can Lao, the semi-clandestine apparatus of the regime; Diem's virtual one-man rule; and the growing evidence of corruption in high places. In late April, 18 prominent Vietnamese publicly petitioned Diem to 'liberalize the regime, expand democracy, grant minimum civil rights, (and) recognize the opposition in order to let the people speak without fear.' This unprecedented public attack on Diem by a non-Communist group may embolden other urban elements to become more vocal.

"A new and even more important element in the political situation is the growing criticism of Diem's leadership within government circles, including the official bureaucracy and military; this criticism has become more intense than at any time since 1956. Since the early part of this year, Vice President Tho, other members of the cabinet, and middle echelon officials have made known their serious concern over Diem's handling of the internal security problem and have privately criticized the power and influence exerted by Nhu and his entourage. In addition, there is considerable uneasiness concerning the operations and activities of the Can Lao organization.

"Although most of the Vietnamese peasants are politically apathetic, they also have their grievances against the government. These include the ineptitude and arrogance of many local and provincial officials, the lack of effective protection from Viet Cong demands in many parts of the country, the harshness with which many peasants have been forced to contribute their labor to government programs, and the unsettling economic and social effects of the agroville (government-sponsored settlements) program. As a consequence, Diem's government is lacking in positive support among the people in the countryside." (Ibid., pp. 1-2)

Although the estimate confirmed that Diem had become concerned over the deteriorating internal security situation, he appeared still to underestimate the non-communist political threat:

"... He still tends to discount the amount of discontent both in the countryside and among urban elements. Although he has
taken some steps to meet the internal security problem, he tends to view it almost entirely in military terms. He believes that increased military activity against the Viet Cong, along with an expansion of the agroville program, will greatly improve internal security. He has been openly contemptuous of the views of oppositionists in Saigon and regards them as uninformed and dupes of the Communists. Diem also has failed to take any major steps against corruption and arbitrary conduct on the part of the Can Lao organization."

After this discussion of the political situation, the estimate discussed the Viet Cong pressures as: "aggravating many of the government's problems." (Ibid., p. 2) (Underlining added) The earlier report on internal security had commented, "It is not completely clear why the DRV has chosen this particular time to mount an intensified guerrilla campaign in South Vietnam," (Saigon 278, p. 2) and had advanced several hypotheses including Diem's view that it represented "a somewhat desperate attempt to disrupt the progress of South Vietnam," in the face of steady GVN progress and DRV failure to interfere successfully with the National Assembly elections in August. The list of hypotheses in March did not include the possibility that the communists might have judged that the political situation within SVN had significantly deteriorated (earlier foreseen as the likely occasion for an increase in overt communist activities), but the August estimate emphasized this possibility.

"... The indications of increasing dissatisfaction with the Diem government have probably encouraged the Hanoi regime, supported and guided by the Chinese Communists, to take stronger action at this time ... given '... a sizable and effective indigenous guerrilla apparatus responsive to Communist control'; and 'a government lacking in positive support from its people'; ... " (SNIE 63.1-60, p. 3)

The estimate concluded with the pregnant comment that:

"In countering the Viet Cong challenge, Diem faces many of the same problems which confronted the French during the Indo-China War . . . "

Some relevant portions of much earlier U.S. intelligence estimates might be recorded here:

"Despite these advances which included 'the relocation of scattered villages in the Delta into centralized and defensible sites' as 'an important step toward the eventual 'pacification' of heavily infiltrated areas' and increases in the size of the Vietnamese National Army/ Vietnam still lacks the degree of
political strength essential for the mobilization of the country's resources... elected local councils have no real power, promised land reform and other social and economic reforms which might generate popular support had not left the planning stage and the Vietnamese government is handicapped by incompetent cabinet ministers and the lack of competent administrators."

(NIE 9 of 4 June 1953, p. 3)

"Finally, unless the French Union forces prove strong enough to provide security for the Vietnamese population, it will not be possible to sweep the guerrillas out of the areas as planned. Not only will the populace fail generally to provide the intelligence required to rout the guerrillas but, as in the past, they will frequently give warning of the presence of the French Union forces, thus permitting the guerrillas to take cover and later to emerge when the danger is past." (Ibid., p. 5)

Seven years later, the estimate of August 1960 was pointing out:

"... Viet Cong guerrilla units have succeeded in exploiting their natural advantages of surprise, mobility, and initiative. In many of their areas of operations, they have exploited the tendency of the largely passive population to accommodate to their presence and thereby avoid reprisals. In some areas of operations, however, they have obtained the active cooperation of the local population." (SNIE 63.1-60, p. 3)

"In the absence of more effective government measures to protect the peasants and to win their positive cooperation, the prospect is for expansion of the areas of Viet Cong control in the countryside, particularly in the southwestern provinces.

"Dissatisfaction and discontent with the government will probably continue to rise unless the security situation improves and unless Diem can be brought to reduce the corruption and excesses of his regime..."

The conclusions of the estimate were the most ominous since 1956:

"Developments within South Vietnam over the past six months indicate a trend adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem's government..."

"Although Diem's personal position and that of his government are probably not now in danger, the marked deterioration since January of this year is disturbing. These adverse trends are not
irreversible, but if they remain unchecked, they will almost
certainly in time cause the collapse of Diem's regime. We do
not anticipate that this will occur within the period of this
estimate. However, if Diem is not able to alter present trends
and the situation deteriorates substantially, it is possible
during the period of this estimate that the government will lose
control over much of the countryside and a political crisis will
ensue." (Ibid., p. 1)

The U.S. view of its policy in Vietnam could not yet be
said to be "crisis management"; but a crisis was portended.

3. Contrasting DOD and State Appreciations

The August SNIE notwithstanding, however, subsequent
analyses appearing in the Department of State and the Department of
Defense disclosed differing views on the relative urgency of the threat
to Diem from communist machination as opposed to simple rebellion. In
general, Department of Defense papers tended to emphasize the threat
from rural, communist-led insurgents, and to highlight relative military
capabilities; Defense papers usually deprecated the significance or
urgency of non-communist political dissent in South Vietnam. In contrast,
analyses by the Department of State in Washington and Ambassador Durbrow
in Saigon recognized, at least in principle, the importance of both
the military threat posed by the VC, and the problems which stemmed
from Diem's political insolvency. Department of Defense analyses, there­
fore, usually regarded proposals by State or Saigon which aimed at
pressuring Diem into a more enlightened domestic policy as being com­
petitive with measures to improve internal security. The Pentagon and
its field commands tended to regard military assistance to
Diem as the
key to the situation. Indeed, the Pentagon tended to oppose U.S.
leverage on Diem because it might jeopardize his confidence in the
U.S. and cooperation from him which was essential to improve his
military posture.

The divergence in view sketched above emerges in several
papers written not long after the 30 August 1960 SNIE. For example,
alarmed by the ominous conclusion of the SNIE's Deputy Secretary of
Defense Douglas asked ASD/ISA for comments and recommendations on how
to remedy the "deteriorating situation in South Vietnam." As input for
the reply, Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, OSD/OSD, one of Ngo
Dinh Diem's earliest U.S. advisors, wrote a memorandum holding that:

"As noted by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, conditions
in Vietnam are deteriorating. The key element in the situation
is the activity of the Viet Cong. While criticism of Diem's
government in metropolitan areas adds to his problems and
interacts with Viet Cong plans, the Viet Cong remains the primary
threat to security . . . " (Memo for Admiral E. J. O'Donnell,
Regional Director, Far East, ISA, from Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, OSO/OSD, 13 September 1960, Subject: Possible Course of Action in Vietnam, p. 1) (Underlining added)

To the end of meeting the threat from the Viet Cong, Lansdale suggested (among other items):

"... The emphasis of the MAAG function should be shifted from purely training and organizational advice in preparation for defense against external aggression to include on-the-spot advice and assistance in the conduct of tactical operations against the Viet Cong." (Underlining added)

"... Concomitantly, the MAAG should be staffed to a greater extent with officers skilled in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations and who are capable of operating in the field. This might include Marines for amphibious instruction on Mekong River operations ..."

"... During the emergency, the Civil Guard should be temporarily put under the Ministry of Defense in order to integrate the activities of the ARVN and the Civil Guard. The Ambassador's concern that the Civil Guard will lose all identity as a civil police force, if this action is taken, is invalid, providing a strong US position to the contrary is announced and maintained." (Ibid., pp. 1-2)

(Subsequent development of the Regional Forces, which grew out of the Civil Guard after transfer to the Ministry of Defense in December 1960, showed this particular concern of the Ambassador to have been a valid one -- whatever the countervailing advantages of the move -- in that its role and capabilities as a police force atrophied almost entirely; no "strong U.S. position to the contrary" was, however, taken by MAAG, AID, or CAS.)

"... Emphasis on civic action type activities by the ARVN should be encouraged and advisory and material assistance in this field furnished through MAP and ICA channels."

"... Most importantly for the purpose of strengthening the morale of the Vietnamese, President Diem should be informed as soon as possible through appropriate channels of the gravity with which the US government views the internal security situation, of our intent to provide material assistance, and of our unswerving support to him in this time of crisis." (Underlining added) (Ibid., p. 2)

Meanwhile, Ambassador Durbrow in Saigon proceeded to elaborate upon the various political threats described in the August 30 SNIE. A week after the August 1960 SNIE was published, Ambassador Durbrow
found it appropriate to send an assessment of the potentialities of various groups for coups and demonstrations in the short run. Among these were:

"1. Peasants. Various factors discontent exist such as lack of adequate protection against communist attacks and pressures, low prices paddy, compulsory labor on agrovilles and other projects, and arbitrary methods of authorities. Diem has taken some steps to try alleviate sources of discontent (our G-79) but it is important he take others because peasantry represent key to success or failure communist guerrilla warfare in countryside and thus to gradual undermining of regime. However, any sudden demonstration or coup against GVN likely to center in Saigon and seems improbable that peasantry in view lack organization, transport problems, etc. would play significant role therein." (Saigon 538 to SecState, 5 September 1960, p. 1, Section 1 of 2)

(It is worth noting that this list of peasant grievances against the regime, like most such analyses by CIA or State, includes a number of separate factors, of which "lack of protection against communist attacks and pressures" is only one. This assessment of peasant attitudes toward the GVN was in some contrast to: (a) other analyses, particularly originating in the Department of Defense, but also from Diem himself, emphasizing lack of security as the single significant peasant grievance, or the overwhelmingly predominant one, or the basis of the others; and (b) effective U.S. advice and influence, which increasingly centered upon the security problem.)

Urban groups, including labor and students (who were just beginning to show political ferment) were judged unlikely to begin a demonstration but increasingly likely to join one begun by other oppositionists either within or outside the government. Dissatisfaction with the regime existed even among Catholic refugees, some of this stemming "paradoxically... from what they feel is too heavily Catholic leadership of regime (with potential reaction to follow)..." (This worry appeared less paradoxical in the summer of 1963.)

As for the Army:

"... Some discontent exists because of political promotions and favoritism throughout armed forces structure. Some disturbing indications of possible development spirit frustration and defeatism in fight against Viet Cong also received, such as statement allegedly made by General Duong Van Minh that for every Viet Cong killed by armed forces government creating ten in their rear; however indications are that generals remain imbued by non-political approach and that discontent is not of such..."
proportions that any general is ready to take initiative in leading coup. We cannot of course exclude emergence of a 'Kong Le' from ranks below general but key units in and around Saigon are commanded by officers believed to be close and loyal to Diem."

(Saigon 538 to SecState, 5 September 1960, Section 2 of 2, p. 1)

Two months later, in November 1960, an abortive "Kong Le" coup came close to succeeding, led by LTC Nguyen Chanh Thi, one of those believed to have been most close and loyal to Diem.

The cable concluded that:

"... Real possibility demonstrations in Saigon exist ... any demonstration more likely to be initially loyal protests calling for changes in policies and personnel around Diem but could develop into anti-Diem riot ... " (Ibid., p. 2)

Ten days later, Durbrow sent a long analysis of the threats confronting Diem, with recommendations for counter-measures, as a precursor to presenting Diem with strong U.S. representations on the need for changes. This discussion well expressed the complex problems in which Diem was enmeshed, all of which had to be met adequately if the regime was to survive; and it was an unusually explicit listing of the sort of "reforms," so often alluded to since the Eisenhower letter of October 1954, felt to be required if the Diem regime were to be politically viable.

"As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-communist in origin but communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-Nam to communists. These two dangers are related because communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent communist take-over in Viet-Nam.

"Essentially two sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers." (Saigon 624 to SecState, Section 1 of 2, 16 September 1960, p. 1, underlining added)
The Ambassador proposed to "have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position."

"... I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most unpolitic for an Ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following..."

Limiting his recommendations to the political and economic sphere, since other messages had dealt with security recommendations, Durbrow suggested measures, including:

"... Rumors about Mr. and Mrs. Nhu are creating growing dissension within country and seriously damage political position of Diem Government. Whether rumors true or false, politically important fact is that more and more people believe them to be true. Therefore, becoming increasingly clear that in interest Diem Government some action should be taken. In analogous situations in other countries as important, useful government personalities have had to be sacrificed for political reasons. I would suggest therefore that President might appoint Nhu to Ambassadorship abroad.

"... Similarly Tran Kim Tuyen, Nhu's henchman and Head of Secret Intelligence Service, should be sent abroad in diplomatic capacity because of his growing identification in public mind with alleged secret police methods of repression and control."

"... One or two cabinet ministers from opposition should be appointed to demonstrate Diem's desire to establish Government of National Union in fight against VC.

"... Make public announcement of disbandment of Can Lao Party or at least its surfacing, with names and positions of all members made known publicly. Purpose this step would be to eliminate atmosphere of fear and suspicion and reduce public belief in favoritism and corruption, all of which party's semi-covert status has given rise to."
"... Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question any official except President himself. This step would have threefold purpose: (A) Find some mechanism for dispelling through public investigation constantly generated rumors about government and its personalities; (B) Provide people with avenue recourse against arbitrary actions by some government officials; (C) Assuage some of intellectual opposition to government.

"... Require all government officials to declare publicly their property and financial holdings and give National Assembly authority to make public investigation of these declarations in effort dispel rumors of corruption."

"... Adopt following measures for immediate enhancement of peasant support of government: (A) Establish mechanism for increasing price peasant will receive for paddy crop beginning to come on market in December, either by direct subsidization or establishment state purchasing mechanism; (B) Institute modest payment for all corvee labor; (C) Subsidize agroville families along same lines as land resettlement families until former on feet economically; (D) Increase compensation paid to youth corps. If Diem asks how these measures are to be financed I shall suggest through increased taxes or increased deficit financing, and shall note that under certain circumstances reasonable deficit financing becomes a politically necessary measure for governments. I should add that using revenues for these fundamental and worthy purposes would be more effective than spending larger and larger sums on security forces, which, while they are essential and some additional funds for existing security forces may be required, are not complete answer to current problems."

Finally, in requesting State Department approval for an approach to Diem along these lines, Durbrow concluded with a recommendation on the nature of the political objectives the U.S. should set with respect to the GVN:

"We believe U.S. should at this time support Diem as best available Vietnamese leader, but should recognize that overriding U.S. objective is strongly anti-communist Vietnamese government which can command loyal and enthusiastic support of widest possible segments of Vietnamese people, and is able to carry on effective fight against communist guerrillas. If Diem's position in country continues deteriorate as result failure adopt proper political, psychological, economic and security measures, it
may become necessary for U.S. government to begin consideration alternative courses of action and leaders in order achieve our objective." (Ibid., p. 3, underlining added)

In its reply (Deptel 581 to Saigon, 7 Oct 60), the State Department concurred on the necessity of an approach to Diem on moves to increase his popular support. Among other comments, it was suggested that Durbrow state that after thorough study it was his "... carefully considered view GVN will face increasingly difficult internal political situation unless dramatic moves made to reverse present deteriorating trends. Small or gradual moves not repeat not adequate." On the question of Nhu and Tuyen, "since this important demarche would be most unpalatable," careful handling was stressed.

"... Agree main point should be that whether rumors true or false we are convinced that if they ignored, regime likely lose support it needs in struggle against Communists and that in all governments, such decisions have to be made... convinced decision regarding Nhu and Tuyen would remove major cause of resentment against regime. It would, we believe, increase support of Diem within the GVN and among the educated classes. Support these groups is as necessary as support of peasants..."

(Deptel 581 to Saigon, 7 Oct 60, underlining added)

Among other suggestions, the Department proposed that Diem fix and announce a date on which villages would be asked to elect at least some of their own officials. In connection with Diem's program of agrovilles, the Department raised problems that were to recur repeatedly in the context of the later program in strategic hamlets.

"Suggest inform Diem we agree agroville program good way meet security problem but are concerned re execution. Urge he announce corvée labor on agrovilles and elsewhere be paid and agroville families receive some aid (possibly rice) during period realignment (could be less than in High Plateau since Delta peasants still produce rice their own fields.) If he asks how such measures be paid for, concur suggested reply re higher taxes and deficit financing. Devaluation should also be emphasized. Diem might announce heavier taxes on rich for benefit peasants and agroville program. You might inquire whether training program for Vietnamese administrators and technicians should be increased to provide personnel needed for agrovilles and other insecure areas. Also might inquire re status information teams assigned to explain to peasants why they should leave homes and tombs ancestors to go to agrovilles." (Ibid., underlining added)

(From these implied criticisms of the execution of the agroville concept, it could be -- correctly -- inferred that many of the defects
in "implementation" later associated with the strategic hamlet program were already discernible in the administration of the agrovilles by the Diem regime.)

One dissent by the Department from Durbrow's recommendations was on the Can Iao:

"As to surfacing or abolishing Can Iao suggest that to ask for this and removal Nhus and Tuyen simultaneously would be too much ... If considered necessary, question could be raised later." (Ibid.)

On 14 October, Ambassador Durbrow had his opportunity for frank discussion alone with Diem. He began by reading, in French, a 14-page paper containing the suggestions agreed to by the Department.

"... Before reading text I stated that on October 13 I had been in Viet-Nam for three and one half years, had found my assignment edifying, interesting, and most worthwhile. I mentioned solid and worthwhile progress I had noted in country since 1957 and congratulated President on his many fine accomplishments. I then stated that since I admired his courage and determination I personally desired to do all I could to help him, particularly in these trying times. I added that personally, and other friends of his here as well as those in Washington, have been giving much thought about how we might be helpful to him. Results of our thinking led to conclusion that we could be most helpful if we should make several suggestions which I could put to him in a frank manner as a friend. I then read the paper.

"... When I finished reading President stated that most of suggestions I had made conformed to his basic ideas, but added as much as he would like to put these into effect, stepped-up activities of the Viet Cong made it most difficult. He added that many people have been intimidated by Viet Cong and some had been won over so that it would be difficult to carry out some of steps regarding countryside. I replied while I realized difficulties I was firmly convinced after most careful consideration that it essential now to take many if not all of these suggested steps on a calculated risk basis in order to create the psychological shock which I believed essential at this time. President made no further comment except to tell me that he would consider the suggestions I had given him.

"I then again begged his indulgence and asked if I could bring up a most sensitive and delicate matter which I felt in his interest and in interest of Viet-Nam I should discuss very frankly. From notes in French which I read but did not leave
with him, (copy by pouch) I discussed growing criticism of his brother and Madam Nhu, as well as Dr. Tuyen and suggested that they should be assigned abroad. Diem did not interrupt me but assumed somewhat grim, and I detected, slightly hurt manner. His only comment was that these rumors about the Nhus were spread by communists. I replied that I was sure that communists were doing all they could to spread such rumors but I repeated that the unfortunate part about it is that more and more people are believing these reports - Vietnamese loyal to him, those who might be considered in the opposition, foreign civilians and foreign diplomats to say nothing of the press. I repeated, as I had previously, these reports were seriously damaging prestige of his regime.

"After discussing the Nhus, I again apologized, first of all for bringing up this personal and sensitive subject, as well as the other suggestions I had made. I again asked his indulgence and forgiveness for speaking so frankly and added I hoped he would understand that I was talking as a sincere friend."

(Saigon 802 to SecState, 15 October 1960, corrected copy)

The same day, September 16, 1960, as the Ambassador's recommendations for a political demarche to Diem, the JCS informed CINCPAC and the Chief of MAAG that they and the Deputy SecDef had approved a CINCPAC draft plan for counterinsurgency operations by the Government of South Vietnam. This had its origins in CINCPAC's staff study of April 26, 1960, subsequently endorsed by the JCS on June 6, 1960, with the recommendations:

"a. That appropriate U.S. Government Departments and agencies encourage the Vietnamese and Lao Governments to adopt a national emergency organization to integrate civil and military resources under centralized direction for the conduct of counter-insurgency operations.

"b. That these U.S. departments and agencies encourage the Vietnamese and Lao Governments to develop coordinated national plans for the progressive reduction of Communist influence.

"c. That these U.S. Government departments and agencies be authorized and directed to support the training for and conduct of emergency operations . . ."

"e. That the U.S. Government provide sufficient material and budgetary support to insure the successful accomplishment of these emergency campaigns."
"The JCS also recommended that the Secretary of Defense initiate the action to obtain such U.S. Government support of counter-insurgency operations in Laos and Vietnam." (CINCPAC study and JCS memorandum 232-60, June 6, 1960, enclosed in letter, Rear Admiral E. J. O'Donnell, USN (Director, Far East Region, NSA, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense), to J. Graham Parsons (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs), September 16, 1960, secret (file 611.5IK); cited in Department of State, Division of Historical Policy Research, Research Project No. 630, January 1965, "Recent American Policy and Diplomacy Concerning Vietnam, 1960-1963, pp. 10-11)

In a subsequent memo for the Secretary of Defense (JCSM-382-60, dated August 30, 1960) the JCS asserted that

"'encouraging the Government of South Vietnam to adopt a national course of action designed to reduce the growing threat of Communist insurgent actions' was vital to the continued freedom of that country and an important action 'to preclude the necessity for implementing U.S. or SEATO war plans.'" (Cited in Department of State Research Project No. 650, January 1965, "Recent American Policy...", op. cit.)

The draft plan forwarded to MAAG stressed organizational matters, including the formation of a National Emergency Council and a Director of Operations to integrate civil and military efforts and formulate the Vietnamese National Counter-Insurgency Plan, with subcouncils at regional, provincial and village levels, but concluded with a concept of operations:

"(1) Politico/Military Operations. In order to provide protection which the people require, it is necessary to exercise more than an ordinary degree of control over the population. Among the more important operations required are those for exercising control in such manner as to isolate insurgents and sympathizers from the support of the populace. Such techniques as registration and identification, food control, and control of movement, should be implemented as offering the best prospects for success. Control measures instituted should require support by psychological warfare and information programs to gain and maintain popular confidence and support.

"(2) Military Operations. An effective continuing defensive system should remain in place, with a capability for reinforcing the permanent local security establishment since it is not sufficient temporarily to defeat or suppress insurgents or to establish control in one area and then move the counter-insurgency forces to a new area thus allowing insurgents to
re-establish themselves. The regular military establishment of South Vietnam has the capability to fight either guerrillas or external aggressors. Militia type home guards and civil guards should be trained and equipped. Accelerated efforts should be undertaken to develop the para-military and police forces. For the duration of the emergency campaign, operational control of all security activities should be under centralized direction. Border and Coastal Patrol operations, being fundamental to the campaign to prevent insurgents receiving support from areas outside of South Vietnam, should be closely coordinated with Vietnamese ground, air, and naval operations in the counter-insurgency campaign. These operations should also be coordinated with Cambodia and Laos, as feasible." (Defense 982994 to CINCPAC, 1621562 Sep 60)

The State Department, accepting the recommendations of the Department of Defense, sent a State-Defense message instructing the Ambassador of the country team to develop an overall plan

"... for encouraging and supporting GVN in national emergency effort defeat insurgents and bring about order and stability in that country. Such action determined necessary in order check disruptive influences which could cause dis-integration of the Government and the possible loss of South Viet-Nam to Communist Bloc." (Deptel 658 to AmEmbassy Saigon, 19 October 1960)

Before making known such a plan to the GVN it would be reviewed in Washington and a U.S. position established.

After these somewhat differing analyses of the problem had been recorded, an abortive coup by troops which had been regarded as among the most loyal in ARVN, the airborne brigade, appeared to validate concerns (expressed by the State Department and the August 30 SNIE) over non-communist dissatisfaction with the Diem regime. Yet Washington interpretations of the coup and its aftermath were that it confirmed not only the Ambassador, but his critics within the DOD in their respective convictions.

Ambassador Durbrow described certain measures of reform promised by Diem after the coup but commented:

"... It is hoped that these reforms are not just reforms on surface with little or no substance. Despite these signs, there is basically quite serious under-current malaise and skepticism whether effective reforms will be taken soon enough. This uneasy feeling not confined to intellectuals or opposition groups; but to sizeable number of others, i.e., cabinet
Ministers, other loyal officials, deputies and some military. Nhu and Thuan have indicated that Diem, who not particularly interested fundamental political matters is resisting some suggested basic reforms." (From Saigon 1151, 4 December 1960)

The Ambassador reiterated the emphasis in his September analysis both upon the threat from non-communist quarters and the measures necessary to reduce it; however, it was apparent that one effect of the coup had been to make one of the most important measures, the transfer of Nhu, politically infeasible at the time.

"Just below surface there is much talk about another coup unless Diem relaxes some controls, puts in effective reforms, takes more effective action to fight VC and give protection to population. There is still strong under-current of resentment against entourage but because any action he took this score would be under pressure and indicate weakness, and particularly his resentment of press stories about entourage, coupled with fact Diem feels he needs Nhu as loyal adviser, prospects Diem will transfer Nhu to other work or abroad not in sight, at least for some time. Despite this malaise and feeling about entourage, most critics still respect Diem as only leader at moment but this feeling could easily change unless he takes fairly drastic action to meet criticism and basic desires most strata population.

"We believe also that unless Diem takes early effective action on political front, coup has increased chances for development neutralism and for anti-Americanism among those critical of GVN. Despite our close identification with Diem and his regime critics have not to date bracketed us with government in expressing their dissatisfaction. Many have told us however that only we can induce Diem adopt changes which will save his regime, thus indicating they look to us to help them. If, after failure of clearly anti-Communist coup attempt to bring about changes we are not successful in inducing Diem to make peaceful changes, critics may well become frustrated, turn against U.S., seek other means bring about change and might even move toward neutralist position in middle. If Viet Cong guerrilla successes in countryside continue at rate registered during past year, this will also increase frustration of armed forces and populace and could provide soil in which neutralism may grow." (Ibid., pp. 2-3)

Since Diem was assuring the mission he was working on reforms, the Ambassador concluded "... we should not at moment press too hard," but it was still necessary to take appropriate
opportunities to urge Diem and others to adopt at least the most important suggestions of his demarche of October 14; moreover, the Ambassador now emphasized the necessity for leverage, as well as persuasion, in inducing him both to institute political reforms and to accept the basic principles of the MAAG Counter-Insurgency Plan:

"Since it far from certain Diem will introduce sufficiently appealing and effective new programs and use his present security forces in most efficacious manner, we must find suitable means to bring pressure on him. As I outlined in Embtel 1105 as well as in memorandum this subject (letter to Parsons Nov 8) I am convinced, even if we eventually should agree, that we should not now accord his request for 20,000 additional force or concur in his unilateral action to raise force level. (Chief MAAG 1537 Dec 1 - copy JCS). To do so without his having relaxed controls, instituted effective reforms and having permitted efficient use present forces, would not save the day for Diem but might even induce him follow his instinct to rely primarily on use of force both to control population and fight VC. While I am not fully convinced need for extra 20,000 men, I would be willing to concur in such addition if careful study by all concerned concurred in this recommendation. (MAAG views on urgent need for 20,000 increase forwarded Parsons my letter Nov 30th) therefore, suggested this matter be carefully studied Washington and if final recommendation is favorable it be kept secret as ace in the hole to grant Diem provided he has taken other necessary steps which are to me much more fundamental, and provided he needs extra force after taking more essential steps. If, for instance, at the beginning next year he has taken effective steps along lines suggested above and it is still considered he needs increased force level we could so inform him then. But in meantime, in view his threat to raise force level unilaterally, I should be instructed soonest to taut suitable opportunity to state while force level increase is under consideration Washington cannot now see its way clear to grant such increase when other more important steps are essential at present in fight against VC and to make further progress Viet-Nam.

"In summary, situation in Viet-Nam is highly dangerous to US interests. Communists are engaged in large-scale guerrilla effort to take over countryside and oust Diem's Government. Their activities have steadily increased in intensity throughout this year. In addition Diem is faced with widespread popular dissatisfaction with his government's inability to stem the communist tide and its own heavy-handed methods of operation. It seems clear that if he is to remain in power he must meet
these two challenges by improvements in his methods of conducting war against communists and in vigorous action to build greater popular support. We should help and encourage him to take effective action. Should he not do so, we may well be forced, in not too distant future, to undertake difficult task of identifying and supporting alternate leadership." (Saigon 1151 to SecState, 4 December 1960, Section 2 of 2, pp.2-3)

At the same time that Durbrow turned to an emphasis on pressure, his dispatch contained strong hints that U.S. ability to influence Diem and his immediate entourage without pressure might have declined, as an immediate result of the abortive coup and the perceived relation of the U.S. to it.

"Nhu and Diem still deeply rankled particularly by critical American press stories about autocratic regime and entourage, and Diem made the ridiculous statement to Ladejinsky November 30th that he believes some Americans may have backed coup because one of coup leaders, Colonel Dong, 'told him so during negotiations.' This may represent rationalization blame others not selves . . . both Nhu and Diem now expressing deep displeasure because both anti-Communists and therefore we urged both sides negotiate. While under circumstances their attitude understandable, we have made point clear to them that we did all in our power to prevent that he should be given active role in any government established . . . " (Ibid., Section 1 of 2, p. 2)

At best, a state of affairs in which Diem believed we had been sympathetic to a rebellion against him could only be ominous for our relationship with him, and Durbrow implicitly acknowledged this in recommending a consolatory gesture of reassurance, of a type that was to characterize our relations with the Diem regime in subsequent years:

"Since Diem believes we do not understand seriousness of VC threat and he suspects we may have encouraged rebels, we should make arrangements immediately to ship six H-34 helicopters which are not only most urgently needed fight VC effectively but would reassure Diem we trying give effective help." (Ibid., Section 2 of 2, p. 2)

In the eyes of those who regarded Diem as the indispensable kingpin of effective anti-communist policy in Vietnam, and thus a mutual feeling of confidence and trust between Diem and the U.S. of paramount importance, such a gesture seemed pitifully inadequate -- and, indeed, Durbrow's continuing presence as Ambassador possibly counter-productive -- in the situation prevailing after the attempted coup. For example, another Lansdale memorandum:
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: BrigGen Lansdale, OSO/OSD

Subj: Vietnam

As desired by you, I visited Vietnam 2-14 January 1961. After twelve days of intensive looking and listening over some old familiar ground, I have come to the following personal convictions:

a. 1961 promises to be a fateful year for Vietnam.

b. The Communist Viet Cong hope to win back Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel this year, if at all possible, and are much further along towards accomplishing this objective than I had realized from reading the reports received in Washington.

c. The free Vietnamese and their government, probably will be able to do no more than postpone eventual defeat - unless they find a Vietnamese way of mobilizing their total resources and then utilizing them with spirit.

d. The U.S. team in Vietnam will be unable to help the Vietnamese with real effectiveness, unless the U.S. system of their operation is changed sufficiently to free these Americans to do the job that needs doing, and unless they do it with sensitive understanding and wisdom.

e. If Free Vietnam is won by the Communists, the remainder of Southeast Asia will be easy pickings for our enemy, because the toughest local force on our side will be gone. A Communist victory also would be a major blow to U.S. prestige and influence, not only in Asia but throughout the world, since the world believes that Vietnam has remained free only through U.S. help. Such a victory would tell leaders of other governments that it doesn't pay to be a friend of the U.S., and would be an even more marked lesson than Laos.

f. Vietnam can be kept free, but it will require a changed U.S. attitude, plenty of hard work and patience, and a new spirit by the Vietnamese. The Viet Cong have been pushing too hard militarily to get their roots down firmly and can be defeated by an inspired and determined effort.

SECRET
g. Ngo Dinh Diem is still the only Vietnamese with executive ability and the required determination to be an effective President. I believe there will be another attempt to get rid of him soon, unless the U.S. makes it clear that we are backing him as the elected top man. If the 11 November coup had been successful, I believe that a number of highly selfish and mediocre people would be squabbling among themselves for power while the Communists took over. The Communists will be more alert to exploit the next coup attempt. At present, most Vietnamese oppositionists believe that the U.S. would look favorably upon a successful coup.

h. Vietnam has progressed faster in material things than it has spiritually. The people have more possessions but are starting to lose the will to protect their liberty. There is a big lesson here to be learned about the U.S. aid program which needs some most serious study.

Recommendations

Before I left Saigon, I discussed my impressions with Ambassador Durbrow who was most gracious towards me during the visit. Included in these impressions was my feeling that many of the Americans in Saigon perhaps subconsciously believed in defeat, probably had spent too much time and energy on the political situation in Saigon instead of on the very real Viet Cong menace, and were in need of some bolstering up by the Chief of Mission. In this feeling of defeat, I would have to except the Chief of MAAG and the local CIA Chief who believe we can win. Ambassador Durbrow told me of the memo he had issued to all Americans in Saigon after the 11 November coup attempt. I said this was a good move, but much more than writing a paper was needed.

He asked me what suggestions I had. I said that I didn't have much immediately and would have to do a lot of thinking about it. The situation in Vietnam is not black and white, but a most complex one in all shades of gray. Many Americans and Vietnamese expected me to come up with some sort of a miracle, to turn Ngo Dinh Diem into an Americanized modern version of the ancient Vietnamese leader Le Loi. However, the task requires more than a gimmick or some simple answer. It will take a lot of hard work and follow-through. In 12 days, all I could do was learn as much as I could and to "plant a seed or two" with Ngo Dinh Diem and other Vietnamese leaders who know that I speak out of deep affection for the free Vietnamese.
SECRET

Since leaving Vietnam, I have spent many hours thinking about the situation there. I am far from having a complete proposal to solve the situation. However, I do have some recommendations now for steps which should be taken to start remedying the downhill and dangerous trend in Vietnam. They are:

a. The U.S. should recognize that Vietnam is in a critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the cold war, as an area requiring emergency treatment.

b. When there is an emergency, the wise thing to do is to pick the best people you have, people who are experienced in dealing with this precise type of emergency, and send them to the spot with orders to remedy the situation. When you get the people in position and free them to work, you should then back them up in every practical way you can. The real decisions will be made in little daily actions in Vietnam, not in Washington. That's why the best are needed on the spot.

c. Our U.S. team in Vietnam should have a hard core of experienced Americans who know and really like Asia and the Asians, dedicated people who are willing to risk their lives for the ideals of freedom, and who will try to influence and guide the Vietnamese towards U.S. policy objectives with the warm friendships and affection which our close alliance deserves. We should break the rules of personnel assignment, if necessary, to get such U.S. military and civilians to Vietnam.

d. Under emergency conditions, our aid to Vietnam should be treated as contingency business and be given expedited priority handling until we can afford to take a breathing spell.

e. Ambassador Durbrow should be transferred in the immediate future. He has been in the "forest of tigers" which is Vietnam for nearly four years now and I doubt that he himself realizes how tired he has become or how close he is to individual trees in this big woods. Correctly or not, the recognized government of Vietnam does not look upon him as a friend, believing that he sympathized strongly with the coup leaders of 11 November.

f. The new Ambassador should arrive as many weeks as possible before the April elections, for which the Communists are now actively preparing with their "political struggle" tactics almost unhindered. The new Ambassador should be a person with marked leadership talents who can make the Country Team function harmoniously and spiritually, who
can influence Asians through understanding them sympathetically, and who is alert to the power of the Mao Tse Tung tactics now being employed to capture Vietnam and who is dedicated to feasible and practical democratic means to defeat these Communist tactics.

g. Serious consideration should be given to replacing USOM Chief Gardiner. A number of Vietnamese pointedly answered my questions about Gardiner by talking about his deputy, Coster, while admitting that "Gardiner seems to be a nice man who has fallen asleep in our climate."

h. U.S. military men in Vietnam should be freed to work in the combat areas. Our MAAG has a far greater potential than is now being utilized. U.S. military men are hardly in a position to be listened to when they are snug in rear areas and give advice to Vietnamese officers who have attended the same U.S. military schools and who are now in a combat in which few Americans are experienced. MAAG personnel from General McGarr on down expressed desire to get more into real field work; let's give them what they want as far as U.S. permission is concerned and let them earn their way into positions of greater influence with the Vietnamese military in the field.

i. A mature American, with much the same qualifications as those given above for the selection of the next Ambassador, should be assigned to Vietnam for political operations which will start creating a Vietnamese-style foundation for more democratic government without weakening the strong leadership required to bring about the defeat of the Communists. This must not be a "clever" type who is out to gain a reputation as a "manipulator" or a word-smith who is more concerned about the way his reports will look in Washington than in implementing U.S. policy in Vietnam.

j. We must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another strong executive can replace him legally. President Diem feels that Americans have attacked him almost as viciously as the Communists, and he has withdrawn into a shell for self-protection. We have to show him by deeds, not words alone, that we are his friend. This will make our influence effective again.

K. We must do much, much more constructive work with the oppositionists. I suspect that the U.S. has taught them to be carping critics and disloyal citizens by our encouragement of these traits. They need to put together a constructive program which can save.
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Vietnam from the Communists by building something worth a man's life to preserve. If it's a good program, we should encourage one strong political opposition to emerge, without endangering the national security. Here is where our political skill needs to be used. This political work is needed as a matter of grave urgency. Unless a constructive outlet is found quickly, the opposition in Saigon is going to explode in violence again and the Viet Cong are wide awake to exploit it this time.

The Communist Threat

It was a shock to me to look over maps of the estimated situation with U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence personnel, as well as with President Diem who held similar grim views. The Communist Viet Cong now dominate much of the 1st and 5th Military Regions, as well as being active in spots in other regions, according to these estimates. The probable strength of the Communist armed forces in South Vietnam was given to me in various guesses from 3,000 to 15,000. My guess is that the strength is now closer to the latter figure and that only Hanoi knows accurately.

This strength estimate by itself isn't what shocked me. The shocking part was to realize that the thousands of disciplined and trained Communist graduates of "proletarian military science" had been able to infiltrate the most productive area of South Vietnam and to gain control of nearly all of it except for narrow corridors protected by military actions and for a few highly-localized spots where loyal paramilitary forces (Civil Guards and Self-Defense Corps) have undertaken inspired counter-guerrilla actions or where villagers work closely with the military.

The Viet Cong have the initiative and most of the control over the region from the jungled foothills of the High Plateau north of Saigon all the way south down to the Gulf of Siam, excluding the big city area of Saigon-Cholon. This is Vietnam's "bread-basket" where most of its rice and rubber are grown.

Unlike the Philippines or Malaya, the Communists cannot be cordoned off at the country's borders and then dealt with as an internal security problem alone. The borders of Vietnam are long and include some of the most difficult terrain in the world to patrol. It is apparent that many of the Viet Cong infiltrate from Cambodia, particularly from Svayrieng Province. Also, southeastern Laos has a reported Communist
build-up, with RLG forces committed elsewhere, and increasing infiltration into Vietnam is reported.

There is an intense psychological attack being waged against Free Vietnam by the Communists. This not only includes an almost constant barrage from powerful Radio Hanoi, which is reportedly relayed from Cambodia and is received as a loud and clear signal in South Vietnam, but also a heavy campaign by on-the-spot agitprop agents. A part of the psychological attack is directed against Americans, particularly against U.S. MAAG personnel, along the lines of the Chinese Communist "hate America" campaign. I did not have the time or means to assess the effect of this psychological attack which has been going on for years.

The big city area of Saigon-Cholon undoubtedly is a target of Communist operations, although I was able to find out little about either the Communist organization or its operations in this city area. U.S. intelligence personnel believed that Vietnamese counter-intelligence organizations were so actively "hustling" so many suspects that the Communists have been unable to institute much of an organization. President Diem believed that the Communists were concentrating their work elsewhere, following the dictum: "first the mountains, then the countryside, and then the city." The attitude of Vietnamese and U.S. officials reminded me of the French and Vietnamese officials in Hanoi in 1953-54, who were so surprised later to discover that a complete, block-by-block clandestine Communist apparatus existed there. Or, of Filipinos and Americans who believed the Huk were in central Luzon in 1950 and were so surprised when an entire Communist politburo was captured in the city of Manila. I believe that the people in Saigon-Cholon have been the target of considerable subversive effort by the Communists and that it takes an in-place organization to carry this out.

Communist strength figures are difficult to determine due in part to the different categories of personnel. I was able to get no estimate on the number of Communist political-psychological operators, although the DRV reportedly have trained many for work in the south. Also, the Communist military personnel include regulars who have infiltrated from the north, plus territorial forces and guerrillas who apparently are recruited locally. Colonel Tranh Thien Khiem, who commands the 5th Military Region, broke his estimate of some 7,000 Viet Cong military in his region into 3,320 regulars, 1,170 territorials, and 2,590 guerrillas. When the Vietminh troops were transferred to the north in 1954-55 under the Geneva Agreement, many left families.
behind in the south, along with stay-behind organizations and arms caches. Although the pacification campaigns of 1955-56 cleaned up what the Communists had left behind to some extent, there were remnants remaining which the Viet Cong have since exploited and augmented greatly over the past 5 years.

President Ngô Đình Diệm

President Diem and I are friends. Also, he is a man who put other Vietnamese friends of mine in jail or exiled them. It is hardly a blind friendship.

Prior to my departure from Washington, Jeff Parsons asked if I would please size-up President Diem carefully to see if he had changed much from when I had worked with him so closely in 1954-56. In our first meeting, he was a bit cautious with me. I suspected that he was waiting for me to drop Washington's other shoe as a follow-up to the Ambassador's demands that he reform his ways. So, I reminisced on what we had been through together in the past and he joined in, adding the story of the 11 November coup as he saw it. Our meetings from then on became more like the old days, with plenty of give and take, but only after I convinced him that I still had affection for the Vietnamese people and was trying to understand their problems before sounding off.

He seems to have a better grasp of economic matters than formerly. Also, I believe he sincerely wants to pass some of his daily burden of work to others. He said that he had found this extremely hard to do, since too many others were soft in carrying out responsibilities or else were too vain to knuckle-down to hard work. This has forced him to over-burden Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency, who doesn't hesitate to make tough decisions when needed, who has had to act as hatchet-man when others were too soft to get rid of incompetents, and who has been loyal to his boss (although he speaks right up for his own views). Vice President Tho is so soft-hearted that he really never takes corrective action against wrong doers. Vu Van Thai is a "blackmailer" by threatening to resign after convincing the Americans that he is the most brilliant Vietnamese in economic matters, although he is a poor executive whose work is in bad shape; if Diem accepted Thai's resignation, the Americans would feel that the Vietnamese Government was going to hell. (Unfortunately, there's some truth in these feelings of Diem's about Tho and Thai).
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I believe President Diem is more screened in by his "palace guard" than he realizes -- but then much the same could be said of other leaders elsewhere. I noted that he still has a personal informant net and I managed to talk to some of them privately. The largest influence, but not the only one, is wielded by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. However, I found President Diem unusually well informed on the situation in Vietnam, including the bad aspects -- better informed than any other Vietnamese among the many with whom I talked.

In reflecting on our conversations, I have concluded that most folks who talk to him have little empathy for, or sensitive understanding of, him. They fail to realize that Diem is human and doesn't like the idea of people trying to kill him out of hatred; the coup attempt of 11 November opened at 3 a.m. by bursts of heavy machine gun fire into his bedroom in an obvious try at liquidating him in his bed. On top of this, he has now had nearly 7 years of venomous attack by the Communists who know that he is a major obstacle which must be destroyed before they can win. This is a daily psychological attack on him in his own country, in his own language, and listened to by his own people. The only way he could shut this off today would be to give up what he, and we, believe in. On top of this, he has criticism heaped on him by many who are simply being destructive, he has administrators who are disloyal or whose vanity is expressed in talking a better job of work than in doing it. And then, to cap the criticisms, he feels that many Americans have contempt for him -- that the U.S., which should be Vietnam's staunchest friend is somehow taking the same psychological line with him as do the Communists, that somehow our notly-expressed policies get carried out with much pettiness in actual practice.

If the next American official to talk to President Diem would have the good sense to see him as a human being who has been through a lot of hell for years -- and not as an opponent to be beaten to his knees -- we would start regaining our influence with him in a healthy way. Whatever else we might think of him, he has been unselfish in devoting his life to his country and has little in personal belongings to show for it. If we don't like the heavy influence of Brother Nhu, then let's move someone of ours in close. This someone, however, must be able to look at problems with understanding, suggest better solutions than does Nhu, earn a position of influence.

The next time we become "holier than thou", we might find it

...storing to reflect on the DRV. Do the Soviets and the Chinese Communists give Ho Chi Minh a similar hard time, or do they aid and abet him?
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U.S. Political Efforts

The United States has been the main foreign political mentor for Free Vietnam since it became an independent nation. Of course other nations have had their influence. But we were the ones who have spoken with authority, who have held the purse-strings, who trained and advised the government personnel, and to whom most Vietnamese in political life have looked for guidance. It is only human to want to find someone else to blame for what has gone wrong. But, we won't be able to start doing effective political work until we admit that our own actions carry responsibilities with them. There are plenty of Aaron Burr's, a few Alexander Hamilton's and practically no George Washington's, Tom Jefferson's or Tom Paine's in Saigon today...largely as a result of our U.S. political influence. This certainly is not the U.S. policy we had hoped to implement.

Ambassador Durbrow seemed genuinely surprised when I told him that the Can Lao Party in Vietnam was originally promoted by the U.S. State Department and was largely the brain-child of a highly-respected, senior U.S. Foreign Service professional. Several weeks after this action was undertaken originally, I learned of it and warned that the benefits were extremely short-term and that great lasting harm could result by a favored party forcing older parties to go underground. However, the decision had been made, the Can Lao party had been started, and we had to start working from that reality. We cannot go back to living in the past and must keep moving ahead, but that doesn't mean that we have to pay forever for our mistakes.

However, the real point is that we don't seem to have very long memories or enough solid feeling of responsibility for our acts. Many U.S. Foreign Service officials leap into attacks on the Can Lao Party. I agree with their reasons. Any thinking American would. But I sure would feel better about it if they could only remember the consequences of their own actions for a few short years - and learn from that memory. I cannot truly sympathize with Americans who help promote a fascistic state and then get angry when it doesn't act like a democracy.

So, what should we do about it? I have a concrete recommendation. We need an American in Saigon who can work with real skill, with great sensitivity to Vietnamese feelings, and with a fine sense of the dangerous limits of Vietnamese national security in a time of emergency. This unusual American should be given the task of creating...
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an opposition party which would coalesce the majority of the opposition into one organization, of helping this new party adopt a platform which contains sound ideas for building national entities which the Vietnamese people would find worth defending against the Communists, and of strongly influencing it to play the role of loyal opposition while President Diem is in power and the nation is in such great danger.

This work with the opposition is a matter of grave urgency. Unless the energies of the malcontents, the frustrated, the patriots on the outs are quickly channeled into constructive political works, they are going to explode into destructive political work. This opposition situation in Saigon-Cholon is at the bursting point, and there is no safety valve. When it next blows, and if Diem cannot cope with it, the Saigon political scene has all the makings of turning into anarchy. It can happen, and soon.

I saw a number of opposition people, officials of various parties, members of the National Assembly, and disgruntled members of President Diem's administration. They eagerly told me how they were criticizing Diem's actions more and more openly. I asked them what their own program was, other than to seize power for themselves or to have me pat them on the head for being critics. Few of them had any sensible ideas. I told them they'd better get busy scratching for a better program themselves or else I could only assume that they were being disloyal or treasonous in a time of great national danger. I trust that other Americans talking to these oppositionists will do the same or we will be inviting disaster by listening to this and keeping mum when we should be working like beavers to turn it into constructive channels.

If we can get most of the oppositionists meeting with each other to try to put together a platform they can all agree on, and can protect such work so that it can be done fairly openly, we will have an extremely useful political action in motion. It will absorb months of political energies which otherwise will go towards the solution of armed overthrow. A major opposition party, once it starts becoming a reality, will tend to make the several governmental groupings such as the Can Lao, MNR, and Nhu's labor organizations start coalescing into one stronger group. In this way, we can help promote a two-party system which can afford to be surfaced, end much of the present clandestine political structures, and give sound encouragement to the development of new political leaders. There are many fine younger patrons who need this sort of a healthy political atmosphere to develop in, if we ever expect Vietnam to have a real future.
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Comments

Here are some additional thoughts:

a. President Diem said that if it hadn't been for the dedicated anti-communism of about a million Catholics, Vietnam could never have kept going this long. Yet his brother, Archbishop Thuc, told me that the refugees from the north (including many Catholics) had been settled into such remunerative new lives in the south that they had gone soft, no longer wanted to fight, and criticized the government for wanting to continue the war. Also, the Saigon-Cholon area is seething with political discontent while the people are far better off in material possessions than ever before. The shops are full of goods for Tet and the people are buying heavily. Somehow, the U. S. has filled their bellies but has neglected their spirit.

b. Many of the Vietnamese in the countryside who were right up against the Viet Cong terror were full of patriotic spirit. Those who seemed to be in the hardest circumstances, fighting barefoot and with makeshift weapons, had the highest morale. They still can lick the Viet Cong with a little help. There's a lesson here on our giving aid. Maybe we should learn that our funds cannot buy friends or a patriotic spirit by mere materialistic giving. Perhaps we should help those who help themselves, and not have a lot of strings on that help.

c. The Viet Cong crowded a lot of action into the year 1960. They infiltrated thousands of armed forces into South Vietnam, recruited local levies of military territorials and guerrillas, and undertook large scale guerrilla and terroristic operations. In so doing, they neglected doing sound political work at the grass roots level and broke one of Mao Tse Tung's cardinal rules. Many people in the south now under their thumb are unhappy about it, but too terrified to act against these new rulers. The Viet Cong apparently have been working hard recently to rectify this error, and now have political cadres in the field. We still have a chance of beating them if we can give the people some fighting chance of gaining security and some political basis of action. Since both of these actions will have to be carried out by Vietnamese forces in their Defense establishment, it is worthwhile to make U.S. help to the Vietnamese in the contested provinces along these sorely needed lines a priority mission of the U.S. military in Vietnam. The political actions should be the implementing of Vietnamese governmental policy by Vietnamese
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force commanders, aided by Vietnamese psychological warfare units. If the U.S. military doesn't ride herd on this, it is apt to be neglected and is too vital to keeping Vietnam free to be made a secondary work.

d. I am passing a copy of this to Admiral Felt at CINCPAC. Suggest that copies be passed also to selected persons in Defense, State, and CIA.

Edward G. LANSDALE
Brigadier General, U.S.A.F.
General Lansdale seems on sound ground in arguing that continued nagging, let alone stronger pressures, to win Diem's acceptance of political changes he did not want and which he regarded as specific threats to his regime, could only subtract from Diem's confidence in the U.S. This in turn imperiled hopes of winning his cooperation on military measures believed crucial to security. Nevertheless, the State Department endorsed the Ambassador's notions for continued representations to Diem on the urgency of political reforms, and instructed him to follow up his 14 October demarche on the liberalization of his regime. In his approach to Diem, the Department suggested the Ambassador follow the line:

"... Would prefer, for moment, put aside questions internal reforms GVN calculated primarily increase its efficiency (such as Internal Security Council) and focus on liberalization since any announcements GVN makes this subject will be matter great public interest ..." (Underlining added)

"... It Embassy's observation events November 11 and 12, whatever their cause, have led to increased atmosphere uneasiness and some doubt projected reforms will be adequate (Embtel 1151). This adds emphasis to basic premise against which, we believe, program of liberalization should be tested: it should be genuine, if limited, liberalization on several fronts to be announced simultaneously ... if liberalization not clear cut and genuine and not made on several fronts, public will feel deceived and GVN will lose rather than gain popular support ..." (Deptel 898 to AmEmbassy Saigon, 15 December 1960, pp. 1-2)

The Department picked out several "liberalization" measures from the 14 October demarche, including the right of the National Assembly to investigate the GVN; greater freedom for domestic press; better relations with the foreign press; and several rural measures.

Durbrow reported on the resulting conversation with Diem:

"... While Diem was pleasant during hour and three-quarters of discussions, he was basically negative. Diem did not reply to my remarks immediately but insisted essential have additional 20,000 troops since would do no good to try to put in reforms, build factories, roads and bridges, etc., unless these things and people could be protected. He referred several times to the need for 20,000 men streaming need because of deteriorating Lao situation. I then remarked we had just learned that he had increased force level of civil guard to 64,000 and asked if this increase would not fill security force needs.
Diem replied civil guard not trained so needs bring back 20,000 reservists. He asked that I urge Dept to give favorable consideration force level request and I reiterated matter under careful study in Washington . . . " (Saigon 1216 to SecState, December 24, 1960, pp. 1-2)

When the Ambassador told Diem of approval to give him eleven H-34 helicopters as soon as possible, "he made no comment." He rejected notions that the Assembly might investigate executive departments (dismissing Durrow's comment that we have the same system in America) and then commented on the Department's earlier recommendations with respect to the agroville program:

"... Although I had not mentioned corvee labor this time, Diem stated this only way collect equivalent of taxes from peasants and that this system is in Vietnamese tradition, but peasants in Cochin-China under French had not been asked to contribute labor. Therefore they now resent corvee labor and of course would not think of paying any monetary taxes. He pointed out peasants in central Viet-Nam willingly contribute free labor instead of taxes. I remarked one reason for discontent in south is arbitrary action of officials and the failure to explain needs to peasants before forcing them to work. Diem insisted peasants had been told of needs but they just lazy." (Ibid., p. 3)

In view of Diem's expressed attitudes in this area, and the actual practice of his regime in implementing the agroville program, there was scarcely a basis for surprise when U.S.-urged provisions for paying peasants for their labor on the strategic hamlets went generally unfulfilled. In any event, Durrow's report left little doubt that persuasion in pursuit of liberalizing reforms that Durrow and State -- but not Diem, or, it would appear, MAAG or the DOD -- believed essential to counter the Viet Cong, had reached an impasse:

"On few occasions he let me talk, I urged he adopt reforms soonest since it essential to win further support of the people if Viet Cong menace is to be overcome, but he gave me no indication of reforms he may adopt. Before leaving I again expressed hope that he would accept our suggestion that he announce all liberalizing programs at one time in order to make best impact. Diem replied he would think about this but made no commitment.

"Comments. We have heard that Nhu, Thuan and others have been running into resistance when urging Diem to adopt worthwhile reforms. I also received impression he very reluctant to adopt reforms and is still basically thinking in terms of force to save the day, hence his insistence several times that
we approve force level increase and his action raising civil guard ceiling by 10,000. While I still believe it absolutely essential he adopt more liberal programs, it is not certain from his attitude and remarks that he will take effective action in these matters, although I learned later he has agreed to engage the services of a public relations expert suggested by CAS to make a survey of GVN foreign public relations needs." (Ibid., pp. 3-4)

4. The Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP)

The expectations of the Department of Defense for the amelioration of Diem's security situation, as well as those of State and the Embassy, were embodied in a Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam (CIP), prepared over the months April to December 1960, and forwarded to Washington for approval on 4 January 1961 (Saigon despatch 276, date cited). The CIP represented a considerable evolution in the U.S. concepts of how to cope with Vietnam's internal security. During 1959 and early 1960, Diem, recognizing the precariousness of his position, had begun to experiment with the structure of his security forces, seeking to find a mix of police, paramilitary, and regular military forces capable of countering the Viet Cong. The U.S. MAAG, Vietnam, though constantly handicapped by personnel ceilings imposed out of respect for the Geneva Accords, had labored to build a modern national army, capable of both delaying invading forces from North Vietnam and of coping with internal threats; in the pre-1960 MAAG view, Diem was trifling with his army. * In early 1960 the US decided,

Geneva and the ICC notwithstanding, to amalgamate the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) with the MAAG; action was initiated to obtain ICC concurrence. Early in May the press learned of this plan, and a story was published that "the US is doubling its military training staff in South Vietnam and stepping up the training of Vietnamese troops for guerrilla warfare against Communist terrorists:" The release stated that:

"The decision reflects concern about the mounting strength and boldness of Communist bands which are raiding the villages and assassinating Vietnamese officials. However, US military and diplomatic officials said the Communist campaign is not a 'crisis' and in itself, is not likely to become a major threat to the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Guerrilla warfare specialists will be included among the 350 additional military trainee officers and men sent to Vietnam."

On 5 May 1960, the day this story was released, Senator Mansfield wrote a letter to General Williams in Saigon quoting the press dispatch, and asking the General to explain:

"I do not mind telling you that I was personally very impressed with that portion of your testimony which suggested to me that you were directing the military aid program in a fashion which was, wisely, aimed at working MAAG 'out of a job' and that you had about reached the point where the scaling down could begin. Therefore, it came as something of a surprise to me to learn...that we intend to double the training staff of MAAG in Vietnam by adding to it 350 men."

General Williams' reply (MAAG Saigon, telegram to OSD/ISA, MAGCH-CH691, of 200711Z, May 1960) informed the Senator of the MAAG-TERM merger, but went on to say:

"It is my personal opinion MAAG should and can work itself 'out of job' with possible reduction approximately 15% in June 1961 and approximately 20% reduction yearly thereafter. Depending of course on readings taken at subsequent dates."

General Williams' ideas, however, were not integrated into the CIP. He left Saigon prior to the completion of the plan, and in any event the mounting intensity of the internal war precluded any further consideration of "phased withdrawal" before 1962.
a. General McGarr Replaces General Williams

A study prepared at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, * dated 10 June 1960, noted that:

"From a loose conglomeration of combat battalions and various supporting units under French command in 1954, and under the aegis of, and with the impetus furnished by the U.S. MAAG, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have evolved into a balanced defense force. This force consists of 3 corps, with 7 infantry divisions (tailored to meet the existing situation in Vietnam, rather than 'mirroring' U.S. or other divisions) and supporting arms and services, together with small but appropriate naval and air forces . . . These total forces have the mission of (1) maintaining internal security (eventually to become the primary mission of the civil guard and other civil security forces when these organizations reach a satisfactory state of organization, training and equipment, at which time the armed forces will become the 'back-up' force), and (2) providing limited initial resistance to attack from Communist North Vietnam . . . The President continues to organize military units outside the aegis, and contrary to the advice, of the U.S. MAAG. These non-U.S.-supported units are of questionable value and tend to drain the best people away from U.S.-supported units. Also, they may result in a requirement for U.S. support, not previously programmed."

The same study noted as a major deficiency the unwieldy high command of the RVNAF:

"An example of complicated and duplicating channels of command is where a division commander receives orders from both the corps commander (who should be his undisputed boss) and the region commander in whose region his division is stationed. Another example is where the President, by means of his SCR-399 Radio Net (NCS in a radio van in the garden of the presidential office) sends operational orders to a regiment direct, bypassing the Department of National Defense, the General Staff, the field commander, the corps, and the division. Still another example is where a chief of an arm gives orders to a unit of that arm, the unit being at the time assigned to a corps."

The study quoted above was produced at the behest of Major General Lionel C. McGarr, who was at the time the Commandant at Leavenworth, *

* "Study on Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam (U)," 10 June 1960.
but programmed to become Chief, MAAG, Vietnam, in September 1960. General McGarr was informed by this study, and by his other preparations for his new assignment, of the increasing concern in Washington about the military situation in Vietnam.

On 24 March 1960, the Chief of Staff of the Army had called for urgent measures to improve the counterguerrilla capabilities of RVNAF. * On 30 March 1960, the JCS advised CINCPAC (telegram JCS 9748202, date cited) that:

"The JCS agree that anti-guerrilla capability should be developed within organization of the regular armed forces by changing emphasis in training selected elements ARVN and other forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare."

On 27 April 1960, CINCPAC submitted a study on counterinsurgency in South Vietnam to the JCS. On 6 June, JCS forwarded this study to the Secretary of Defense, recommending his acting to obtain U.S. Government support of counterinsurgency operations. ** The initial recommendation was followed by a proposed outline plan. The Secretary of Defense obtained the necessary concurrence in Washington, and on 20 October CINCPAC and Ambassador Durbrow were directed to develop the detailed plan and submit it to Washington (Joint State-DOD Message 192020Z October 1960).

In the meantime, Chief, MAAG, with the assistance of additional U.S. Army Special Forces, began in June a new training program for RVNAF designed to improve its counterguerrilla capabilities. Also, in September by SM-906-60 (15 September 1960), the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed subordinate commanders to take steps to improve guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare training. In early 1961, the Director of the Joint Staff, Lt. General Earle G. Wheeler (DJSN-159-61, 9 February 1961) circulated a paper prepared by General McGarr to improve that training in Vietnam. The paper, entitled "Information, Guidance and Instructions to MAAG Advisory Personnel by Lt. General Lionel C. McGarr, November 10, 1960," called for the training of RVNAF to produce the "anti-guerrilla guerrilla." General McGarr pointed out that the guerrilla derived his principal strength from conventional opponents, and that he had to be defeated in his own chosen form of combat:

"There is only one way he can survive -- capitalize on the conventional concept by taking advantage of the inherent


** CINCPAC, Command History for 1960, 143-144.
weakness of its built-in inflexibility and the longer reaction
time required for its conventional type action -- and yes,
even its conventional type thinking! Thinking which is too
often geared to highly sophisticated weapons systems, complex
logistics, stylized or rigid tactics, and vulnerable lines of
communications.

"Thus, from the purely military point of view, the solution
hinges on the capability of the armed forces to protect the
very lives of the people - to include government functionaries,
from mounting communist assassination and intimidation. In the
far-flung villages, especially those isolated from governmental
protective power in point of time, space and force, this is
most difficult. The guerrilla, because of mobility and a
battle-tested plan, together with the unique situation here,
has been able to seize the initiative by taking the military
offensive. This is because all of the elements of national
power have not been adequately coordinated in the past. The
government of the armed forces are literally blind due to a
lack of information on VC guerrilla actions and intentions. As
indicated previously, the military particularly must have adequate,
evaluated, collated military intelligence if it is to be able to
best apply its present force. To the military man - especially
the commander of a small military group defending his country
against the VC guerrillas in the swamps or jungles - timely,
accurate, evaluated intelligence - not false rumor - spells
the difference between success or defeat - life or death. With
both the present military and political situation a matter for
serious concern, it appears logical that the time has come when
the armed forces must have the necessary force to give the
population full and complete physical protection from the VC.
Because of various reasons - some within and some beyond the
immediate control of the Government of Vietnam - this cannot
be done to the required degree at present.

"Now, let us examine the broad objective of the MAAG in
South Vietnam. As advisors, you must not only advise but follow
through! Therefore, you must clearly understand that proper
advising requires an instructor-pupil relationship with explana-
tion, illustration and close personal supervision. It is not
even as you cannot make a 'template type solution' of conventional
concepts work on varied terrain, the same is true of solutions
based on unconventional concepts... Objective, creative-type
thinking is required here. Our thinking must be beamed
towards evolving a new concept of action - a synthesis of the
useable portions of history, the closely coordinated military
and political concepts of our enemy, and the application of
both conventional and unconventional warfare. All of these
welded together by proper application of the principles -
which will still remain valid - must be employed in the
operations of our hunter-killer teams of 'antiguerrilla
guerrillas.' For we must find a better way but only to
counter the Viet Cong guerrilla in the swamps, the canal-
gridded, inundated Mekong River delta, and the rugged
mountains and jungles of both the high plateau and the
entire land border region - but to crush him! . . .

"... Militarily, our problem appears two-fold: First,
reduce or eliminate VC intervention from outside. Second,
prevent the growth and possible final complete military
success of VC military action, while awaiting solution of the
political 'causes'. This VC military success can happen
here - it is our job to prevent it. At present, better use
of military resources is Vietnam's only readily available
solution - and it is at best a marginal one.

"And finally, as a basis for your analysis, remember that
the conventional organizations such as corps, divisions and
regiments can be very adaptable to antiguerrilla operations. . . .

"I feel we should now reemphasize the basic actions and
recommendations already implemented by this MAAG to assure a
better RVNAF capability in fighting VC internal subversion by
setting up the framework of a more responsive organization and
command procedure. These actions included the following:

a. MAAG recommended the transfer of the Civil Guard
(CC) from the Department of Interior to the Department of
Defense for equipping, training and operational control with
command vested in RVNAF. . . .

b. MAAG recommended to the RVNAF and the GVN that the
overall RVNAF command structure be modified to give clear
lines of military control for all military type operations. . . .

c. MAAG recommended a rotation plan which would
re-establish tactical unity and integrity of units, give
military commanders responsibility for pacification of a
permanently assigned area, and allow for rotation within
division or even possibly regimental size units - as a
minimum.
d. MAAG recommended that the present unnecessary duplication of the high level personnel in Corps and Military Region Headquarters be eliminated or corrected.

"... As explained previously, this concept envisions the organization and detailing of specialized ARVN units as 'anti-guerrilla guerrillas' employing improved guerrilla tactics against the VC guerrilla. They could well dress in guerrilla type clothing and would take the field in their assigned areas within the divisional zones for a period of one to six months, operating in the swamps, mountains and jungles as does their quarry - the guerrilla. These hunter-killer teams must be strongly disciplined, well indoctrinated, highly motivated, and imbued with the spirit of the offensive - and they must be offensively trained and led. They must have the will and determination to close with and destroy the VC.

"Our objective must be to find, fix, fight and finish the enemy! No half measures will do. Time is our most precious commodity and the urgency of the situation requires that we use every second gainfully. This leaves no place for complacency on your part - or a business-as-usual attitude. MAAG cannot afford the luxury of an eight hour day or a five day week - neither can RVNAF. History will not wait."

General McGarr's impress was on the Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP), which reached Washington in January 1961, just before John F. Kennedy took office.

b. Content of the CIP

The CIP consisted of a basic directive and three annexes dealing with RVNAF force increases, concept of operations, and logistics, respectively. It incorporated one major point of difference between Ambassador Durbrow and General McGarr -- the RVNAF force increases (Despatch 276):

Ambassador Durbrow:

I maintain reservations concerning the proposal to increase the force level up to 20,000 additional RVNAF troops, purely to meet the threat in Viet-Nam and still believe more calculated risks should be taken by using more of the forces in being to meet the immediate and serious guerrilla terrorist threat. I recognize, however, that additional well-trained forces in being in this area are probably now justified from purely U.S. interest point of view in order to meet growing bloc threat SEA represented by Soviet airlift in Laos.
MAAG Comments:

The military requirement for this force increase to accomplish the current mission had been demonstrated in MAAG considered opinion as early as August 1960. This force increase was badly needed before the beginning of the Soviet airlift in Laos. The recent Viet Minh overt aggression against Laos merely reinforces this requirement.

The four divisions in the North in I and II Corps Areas are committed in anti-guerrilla and static guard duty to the extent which not only cuts down on their ability to resist overt attack, and thus magnifies the risk to a militarily unacceptable degree, but also prohibits required training to adequately counter either external or internal aggression.

But otherwise, the CID represented agreement on what the problem was in Vietnam, and what steps were necessary to solve it:

"I. SITUATION . . .

Developments in South Viet-Nam over the past year indicate a trend that is adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem's government. Beginning in December 1959 and continuing to the present, there has been a mounting increase throughout South Vietnam of Viet Cong terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. . . .

Politically, discontent with the Diem Government has been prevalent for some time among intellectuals and elite circles and has been rising among the peasantry and, to some extent, labor and urban business groups. Criticism of these elements focuses on Ngo family rule, especially the roles of the President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and Madame Nhu and the influence of the clandestine Can Lao political apparatus of the regime. An even more important element in the political situation is the criticism of the President's leadership within government circles, including the official bureaucracy and the military. In the past, such discontent and criticism had been centered on Diem's brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, as directors of the allegedly corrupt Can Lao Party.

Further aggravating many of the government's problems is the active and partly successful campaign of the Viet Cong to discredit President Diem and weaken the government's authority through political subversion, as well as through military action. Among other factors making this possible is
the void between the GVN and its people which stems from the failure of the GVN to communicate understandably with the population and, in reverse, the lack of an effective mechanism whereby the people can in their terms communicate with the GVN. Taking advantage of this lack of effective communication and the GVN's inability to protect the people the Viet Cong has had considerable success in sowing disaffection and disrupting effective administration of the government among the population. This is especially true in the Capital, 1st and 5th Military Regions. Viet Cong successes in these regions are due to the large number among the population who, whether out of terror or sympathy, give support to the Viet Cong. Aided by this situation, the Viet Cong is striving to establish a political apparatus parallel to the GVN. Below province level in the 5th Military Region, no effective GVN control exists in many areas. The Viet Cong are increasing the void by taxation, terrorist acts, attacks on Self Defense posts, assassination of village and provincial officials, and simultaneously a systematic development of the Viet Cong political apparatus to fill the void. In view of the above conditions the principal task facing the GVN is restoration of individual security.

Military force, in the form of increased communist insurgency, is clearly the major immediate threat to the stability of Viet-Nam today. South Viet-Nam is unique in that it is the only country in the world which is forced to defend itself against a communist internal subversion action, while at the same time being subject to the militarily supportable threat of a conventional external attack from communist North Viet-Nam. The RVNAF force basis is inadequate to meet both these threats.

"The problem is twofold, although at present the counter-insurgency phase is the more dangerous and immediate. In this counterinsurgency fight RVNAF is on the defensive. Approximately 75% of ARVN is committed to pacification missions, about half of these being committed to static guard and security roles. The military chain of command has usually been violated at the expense of unity of effort and command. No adequate operations control or overall planning system presently exists, although significant progress has been made in the development of military plans. The President has exercised arbitrary control of operations, by-passing command channels of the JGS and often Corps and Division staff. Resources have been fragmented to provincial control. The above practices appear to have been designed to divide responsibility in order to guard against the possibility of a military coup through placing too much power in the hands of a single subordinate. The guerrilla
problem has become much more serious than the Civil Guard can manage, thereby requiring a disproportionately large RVNAF commitment, which has further resulted in a serious weakening of the RVNAF capability for defense against internal/external or overt attack in force. Rotation within RVNAF and Civil Guard cannot be accomplished regularly. Many units have been on operations for a year or more without relief, because RVNAF strength is insufficient to permit an adequate rotation policy and to conduct adequate border and coastal surveillance. Many troops are battle weary, in a state of low morale, and in need of recuperation and training. Notwithstanding the above deficiencies, GVN plans have recently been developed for the RVNAF Command Control and Logistic structure which upon implementation, possibly in the near future, should correct major deficiencies if adequate military strength is provided.

"The complete divorce of command control from logistics support in the field has resulted in a lethargic and cumbersome requisitioning and supply system. . . .

"The current military intelligence capability of the RVNAF is inadequate to support the critical intelligence requirements of all echelons of the armed forces. . . .

The economic health of the country, though not robust, has been improving rapidly. In the future, if current economic trends continue and the economy is not further disrupted by adverse security developments, the economy will be able, insofar as physical wealth is concerned, to provide for the consumption needs of a growing population and at the same time to finance a steadily increasing proportion of local military costs and could under favorable conditions meet essentially all these costs. . . .

Assumptions:

(1) That the greatest immediate threat to the continued existence of the Republic of Viet-Nam is posed by the steady expansion of guerrilla warfare by the Vietnamese Communists, with the Mekong Delta as a political and military base.

(2) That North Viet-Nam has the capability of supporting guerrilla operations in SVN by infiltrating regular forces and cadres to strengthen locally recruited elements. (Guerrilla forces have increased from 3,500 to an ARVN estimate of 9,800 during 1960.)

(3) That at the present time the Diem Government offers the best hope for defeating the Viet Cong threat.
TOP SECRET - Sensitive

(4) That the Government of Viet-Nam has the basic potential to cope with the Viet Cong guerrilla threat if necessary corrective measures are taken and adequate forces are provided.

(5) That the gravity of this threat will continue until a maximum offensive and coordinated retaliatory effort is made by civil and military authorities.

(6) That the most vital consideration of US policy in Viet-Nam is to create governmental stability by the eradication of insurgency in the Republic of Viet-Nam and to that end the activities of all US agencies will be coordinated.

(7) That the Viet Cong, in coordination with the communist parties of Laos and Cambodia, will continue to build up a maximum effort against the Republic of Viet-Nam. The April '61 elections constitute particularly critical period.

(8) That the DRV has a current continuing military capability for external aggression against SVN.

"2. MISSION: Defeat Communist insurgency efforts in SVN.

"3. EXECUTION:

a. Objectives:

(1) GVN must take immediate and extraordinary action to:

(a) Suppress and defeat disruptive Communist activities in South Viet-Nam and concurrently maintain a capability to meet overt aggression.

(b) Establish and maintain political and economic control and stability.

(c) Interdict aid flowing to insurgents across Vietnamese borders, to include both police and military action in coordination with the adjacent nations of Laos and Cambodia.

(2) Country Team:

(a) Induce the GVN to adopt and vigorously prosecute Country Team Plans designed to defeat Communist insurgency.
TOP SECRET - Sensitive

b. Tasks:

(1) Political:

(a) [Ambassador's reports cited above] ... In addition to tasks relating to the GVN administration itself, further steps are required in the field of development of independent and quasi-independent political institutions and organizations, such as labor unions, youth movements and political parties. Possible steps in this field are under study by the Country Team.

(2) Security:

(a) Establish an Emergency Operations Control System to include:


2. A director of operations (Permanent secretary for National Defense so designated 7 October 1960) with responsive regional, provincial, district, and village internal security councils.

(b) Implement fully planning aspects of the national planning, programming, and budgeting system.

(c) Develop and employ to optimum RVNAF capabilities to support emergency and related internal security operations on a fully coordinated schedule.

(d) Take extraordinary action starting at highest levels of government and extending to the lowest political subdivision (the village) to establish and maintain internal security.

(e) Assign high priority to the development of intelligence/counterintelligence staff and operational procedure to provide not only timely and accurate knowledge of Viet Cong activities and organization within Viet-Nam, but also provide information to enable the GVN to correct sociological and economic problems which the communists are exploiting.

(f) Develop an adequate border/coastal patrol system.

(g) Develop an adequate communication capability within GVN agencies to support emergency and related internal security operations.
(h) Employ full use of psychological and civil affairs programs in support of internal security actions.

(i) Establish concurrently means for assuring continued security.

(j) Retain the Civil Guard under the temporary control of the Department of Defense for the duration of the emergency.

(k) To develop the force basis for the RVNAF to cope with the insurgency now threatening the GVN and to build capacity for resistance to external aggression.

(3) Economic: to be forwarded in supplemental submission to this basic plan.

(4) Psychological:

(a) Improve communications between the Government of Viet-Nam and its people.

(b) Attract the loyalty of the population to the GVN and to the Diem regime.

(c) Acquaint the people with the aims and actions of the GVN, and persuade them that the GVN is acting in their interests.

(d) Counteract among the people and in the military sense within the RVNAF VC propaganda denigrating the Diem regime and painting it as opposed to the reunification of North and South Viet-Nam.

(e) Foster a spirit of national unity and purpose among all elements of the Vietnamese society.

(f) Strengthen the people's confidence in and respect for the RVNAF as a security force vis-a-vis the VC.

(g) Raise South Viet-Nam's prestige among the peoples of other countries especially in Asia and Africa as a means of enhancing the GVN's national security and stability.

c. Concept of Operations:

(1) General:

(a) Political Operations. Refer to Embassy communications listed in political section under "Tasks" above.
(b) Politico/Military Operations. In order to provide protection which the people require, it is necessary to exercise more than an ordinary degree of control over the population. Among the more important operations required are those for exercising control in such manner as to isolate insurgents and sympathizers from the support of the populace. Such techniques as registration and identification, food control and control of movement will be implemented as appropriate.

(c) Military Operations:

1. There are immediate actions, civil and military, which the GVN can and must take to halt or slow down the current and extremely serious adverse security trend until such time as the necessary increased offensive capability can be brought to bear. These actions include, of course, extraordinary action by the GVN to:

   a. Further develop a national emergency operations control system.

   b. Implement the National Planning System.

   c. Implement the plan for a national intelligence organization and system with particular emphasis on obtaining information at the village level, and integrating effort at the national level.

   d. Fully employ military capabilities to include strengthening and reorganizing military command and control channels.

   e. Establish a border/coastal surveillance system.

   f. Improve the civil and military communications system.

   g. Reduce attrition rate of armed forces and utilize the trained manpower pool."

In the field of political tasks to achieve its stated objectives, the CIP cited the Embassy and other Department reports relating to the demarche by Durbrow and the later discussions in December. A covering cable presented a discussion by Ambassador Durbrow of the Country Team proposals, presenting these in three categories:
(1) Measures that Diem had, in fact, requested, and that required U.S. action, principally the proposed 20,000-man increase in ARVN.

(2) Measures which the GVN currently had "under study" or which would shortly be presented to the GVN, but on which foot-dragging and some resistance could be expected; such as implementation of a firm military chain of command (in particular, willingness by Diem to cease by-passing his military staff and commanders in dealing with province chiefs and subordinate commanders); establishment of a military operational command for counterinsurgency operations; and development of a national plan for counterinsurgency.

(3) Recommendations "considered by the Country Team to be indispensable and in the GVN's own best interests," but which would "probably not be particularly palatable to the GVN"; this situation pertained particularly to certain political actions and concepts of the military-civilian relationship. (For example, strengthening the role of the National Assembly, and including respected oppositionists in the Cabinet.)

The disagreement between the Ambassador and Chief, MAAG, evident in the CIP, reflected the divergences that were to persist among U.S. decision-makers through 1961. Durrow's position, reflected in later, similar dispatches to the State Department, and to the President himself, was that the unpalatable political measures aimed at "liberalizing" the regime were essential to the achievement of U.S. (and GVN) goals in Vietnam. Therefore, in the face of resistance to such measures by Diem it was necessary to assert some leverage to win his acceptance; and the most expedient means of leverage would be to postpone or threaten withholding of those measures of support that Diem actually wanted, until Diem should have complied with our aims in the political area. In the case of the program represented by the CIP, this could only mean withholding of part or all of the funding for the 20,000 man force level increase that Diem (backed by MAAG) had requested. Earlier, Durrow may have turned to this tactic because of a suspicion that the 20,000-man increase was not really essential. By January 1961, he was evidently prepared to agree on the need for additional troops (referring to the increasing threat posed by the Soviet airlift in Laos), but he still pointed to the tactical requirement that somehow Diem had to be induced to take unpalatable political actions. "These questions are an integral part of the overall plan and are essential to its successful accomplishment. Consideration should, therefore, be given to what actions we are prepared to take to encourage or, if necessary to force, acceptance of all essential elements of the plan."
A considerable part of the rationale within the CIP -- including one long annex -- was devoted to justifying the enlarged force level for RVNAF, emphasizing that action must be taken to implement the increase as quickly as possible, since from one to two years would be required to fill the new units. It could be foreseen that those who saw the Viet Cong threat as most important (which was the basic tone of the CIP, and subsequently of the DOD), and who regarded military measures against this threat as most urgent, including measures that would require increased acceptance and cooperation by Diem, would be impatient with "pressure tactics" when they involved delays on "vital" military matters in the hope of winning concessions from Diem in political areas that seemed peripheral or trivial in the context of the communist insurgency.

A factor tipping the scales toward what might be called the Diem/MAAG/DOD priorities in each instance was the coincident, and increasing, need to "reassure" Diem of U.S. support for Vietnam and for him personally, in the light of events that had shaken that assurance (and hence, Diem's willingness to cooperate on less controversial measures) such as, in Diem's eyes, U.S. involvement in the abortive November 1960 coup, U.S. pressures via Durbrow for political reforms, and, above all, U.S. policy with respect to Laos. This need to reassure Diem was at cross purposes with the use of pressure tactics to influence him and, in part, conflicted with the U.S. desire to have Diem adopt moves (such as delegating authority to a single military commander, or include oppositionists in his cabinet) that he regarded as directly threatening continuation of his rule.

c. Presidential Action on the CIP

Ten days after President Kennedy's inauguration, on 30 January 1961, a memo from the President to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense noted that as a result of a meeting on 28 January he had authorized:

"... an increase of expenditure of $28.4 million to expand the Viet-Nam force level by 20,000; and an increase in expenditure of $12.7 million for a program to improve the quality of the Viet-Nam civil guard." *

These figures represented the dollar costs of the increases recommended in the CIP. In passing on this authorization from the President in a Joint State-Defense-ICA message, the Department pointed out:

* The author, Benjamin Bock, of the State Department Study: Recent American Policy and Diplomacy Concerning Vietnam, 1960-1963, Research Project #630, January 1963, notes that Chalmers V. Wood, the Vietnamese desk officer in the 1961 period, had told him in June 1963 that President Kennedy had personally approved the Counterinsurgency Plan.
"... U.S. would as Plan provides expect GVN absorb local currency costs these increases and does not contemplate further US-dollar grants to generate additional local currency for this purpose." (Joint State-Defense-ICA Message, Deptel 1054 to Saigon, 3 February 1961, p. 1)

The Department suggested that the Ambassador and the Chief, MAAG, prepare an abridged version of the plan to present to Diem and emphasized:

"... Immediate purpose Plan is to enable GVN defeat insurgency, but Plan also envisages that GVN must move on political front towards liberalization to retain necessary popular cooperation; that various economic steps be taken; and that there be adequate cooperation with RKG on frontier control. It considered US view that success requires implementation entire plan."

"... Future funding will require Congressional approval. Views Congress likely be influenced by developments in political as well as security situation. FY 61 component represents large increase in US support Viet-Nam. If GVN willing to accept the obligations involved in its implementation, the US is ready give full and immediate support in carrying it out."

(Ibid., pp. 1-2)

In a passage suggesting some naivete on the part of the Department as to actual working procedures and the rhythm of negotiations in Saigon, the Department suggested:

"... proposing to Diem that members US Missions ready confer with GVN opposite numbers work out agreed version Plan within, say two week time limit ... " (Ibid., p. 2)

The guidance concluded:

"If Ambassador considers GVN does not provide necessary cooperation, he should inform Washington with recommendations which may include suspension US contribution." (Ibid., p. 3)

On 2 February 1961, Walt W. Rostow showed the new President the memorandum on Vietnam written by General Lansdale (reproduced above). The President read it in Rostow's presence, and said, "This is the worst yet ... You know Ike never briefed me about Vietnam ... " It has been reported that shortly thereafter Lansdale was summoned unexpectedly to the White House, and was ushered into a meeting of principle Cabinet and National Security Council.
members. At this meeting, the President discussed Lansdale's report, and apparently indicated that Lansdale would be sent to Vietnam in "a high capacity." If the appointment of Lansdale to replace Durbow was under active consideration, there is no record so indicating. In March, Frederick E. Nolting was appointed to replace Ambassador Durbow. (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op. cit., 320; Shaplen, "The Lost Revolution," op. cit. 148-149)

d. Implementing the CIP

In the meantime, the Ambassador and the Chief, MAAG, carried out their instructions from Washington, obtaining an interview with Diem and Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency, on February 13, 1961. Both Diem and Thuan expressed concern as to how they could finance the local currency costs for the additional 20,000 men. The Ambassador expressed his firm conviction that by taking "extraordinary measures" the Vietnamese government could raise sufficient piasters. When Thuan asked what the U.S. position would be if the Vietnamese could not see their way to finance the plan as a whole, the Ambassador replied that the plan was a "comprehensive document" and therefore all facets should "basically be carried out." The Ambassador reported that he was "not very sanguine" that an agreed plan could be worked out by the end of February. (From Saigon Deptel 1367, 13 February 1961, summarized in State Department Research Project No. 630, op. cit., p. 15)

A month later, Ambassador Durbow discussed the status of GVN acceptance of the CIP with Thuan. On the political measures:

"... He repeated question of bringing opposition members into cabinet would depend on whether such persons would agree with government policy. I replied I felt certain GVN would find loyal oppositionists who would be in basic agreement with policy and therefore urged this step be taken. Thuan expressed skepticism. He repeated legislative investigation of executive only practiced in US; therefore GVN would not accept this suggestion..." (Saigon 1454 to SecState, 11 March 1961, p. 1)

On March 16, Durbow raised the subject of the CIP with Diem; by this time it was clear that agreement was being reached on the main military CIP suggestions to a degree "which MAAG considers it can live with provided GVN follows through with proper implementation," but the GVN position on other "fundamental" (in Durbow's eyes) CIP suggestions -- i.e., in the political sphere -- was not yet clear. (Saigon Deptel 1466, to SecState, 16 March 1961) Durbow enumerated these remaining questions:
"(1) We believe it important to attain further national unity that Diem make reasonable offer take one or two non-commie oppositionists into cabinet.

"(2) I stated we still receiving allegations and rumors about Can Lao Party secret activities which, whether true or not, are harmful to GVN. I again urged that party come out in open or dissolve itself and suggested might be worthwhile pass law or issue decree stating against law have any secret parties Viet-Nam, pointing out this would help give legal basis act against various secret parties even covert communist-front organizations.

"Diem interrupted me at this point to describe what he called favorable evolution among non-communist oppositionists which now taking place. He stated many of those who took part in coup see errors their ways and now realize if they had won they would have only assisted communist take-over. According Diem most oppositionists, whether those arrested because of coup or others, now in process changing their attitude and realize it in national interests they try to work more closely with GVN. For this reason too soon to make offer cabinet posts to oppositionists but, without making firm promise, he stated that if some non-commies could agree basic policy GVN he might take them into government after election.

"He did not directly reply to my Can Lao suggestion but stated that more and more oppositionists and public in general coming to realize allegations and rumors re party are not true. I interjected these developments all more reason why Can Lao Party should come into open or dissolve and why he should seriously make reasonable offers non-communists enter govt. Diem made no promises." (Saigon Deptel 1466 to SecState, 16 March 1961, Section 1 of 2, p. 2)

In connection with the proposed Central Intelligence organization, Diem stated he had finally chosen an officer to run this; on the issue of better relations with the Cambodian Government, to the end of working out border control arrangements, Diem was, as always, very negative on the possibilities. Raising once more the issue of dealings with the peasants in connection with agrovilles:

"I again urged he make modest payments to peasants called upon furnish labor, particularly those for instance who work on agrovilles but would not live there and would thus get no benefit from their labor. Diem replied peasants everywhere except those in Cochin-China area gladly contributed to
community development. He added if he tried to tax them it would cause more disgruntlement. He argued even those who did not get into agrovilles received considerable benefits from establishment nearby markets, schools, hospitals and maternity wards. I stated that while this undoubtedly true, corvee labor was one of principal things used by communists to cause disgruntlement Delta." (Ibid., Section 2 of 2, pp. 2-3)

The Ambassador concluded with the following:

"Comments: Diem was most affable, exuded confidence and for first time expressed some gratitude our CIP efforts which he promised implement as best he could. Again before giving full green light believe we should await outcome detail discussion by GVN-US officials. In meantime MAAG quietly ordering some equipment for 20,000 increase (Embtel 1444)." (Ibid., Section 2 of 2, p. 4)

With the approval of the Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam and with the appointment of Ambassador Rohting, the Kennedy Administration launched its efforts to stem the Viet Cong tide in South Vietnam.